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Introduction
This volume presents essays delivered by most of the guest speakers in a
seminar on Bengal convened in the spring of 1972 at the University of
Hawaii. The seminar was organized by several South Asianists at the
University of Hawaii out of their concern for the independence struggle in
Bangladesh and for United States foreign policy toward the emerging
nation and its friends. It was their view that the events leading up to and
culminating in the war for independence could not be adequately under-
stood unless a knowledge of social and political development over a period
of several centuries in Bengal provided a basis for judgment. Their in-
tention in the seminar was twofold: to provide students with a rigorous
interdisciplinary study of Bengal that would result in new insights into its
contemporary problems, and to provide a group of Bengal specialists with
an opportunity to address themselves to certain aspects of history and
society that they understand to be influential on current developments in
Bengal.
The essays in this volume deal with three time units in the history of
Bengal-the middle period, the nineteenth century, and the twentieth
century.
The first essay, by Edward C. Dimock, Jr., describes his efforts to find
sources of contemporary Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the medieval
literature. Changes in family structure and social and world views in the
late middle and early modern periods are the subject of Tapan Raychau-
dhuri's study. These two essays take a brief look at an earlier period in
Bengali history and society.
The following four essays deal primarily with the nineteenth century,
although Blair B. Kling's study covers the transitional period from the
middle to the modern history of Bengal, as well. While Kling's contri-
bution deals with practical and material aspects of upper-class Bengali
life, the next three essays are concerned with intellectual debate and de-
veloping ideas in the scintillating decades of the Bengal renaissance. John
N. Gray, a graduate student in the seminar, offers a critique of David
Kopf's and my essays and goes on to develop a theory which would extend
our work a step further. Readers will notice that these studies deal almost
exclusively with the Hindu community in the nineteenth century, an im-
balance which may seem to reflect lack of deep involvement on the part of
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the Muslim community in the social and intellectual ferment of the cen-
tury. This dearth of Western scholarship concerned with the Bengali
Muslims is a subject to which I shall return.
J. H. Broomfield and John R. McLane both concern themselves with
aspects of the independence movement in the twentieth century and the
phenomenon of communal politics. Nicolaas Luykx traces the evolve-
ment of public policy on rural development in East Bengal, including the
role played by American agencies in development projects.
The bibliographic essay by David Kopf is devoted entirely to publi-
cations by Bengal specialists in American universities. Sufficient time was
not available to cover the vast literature on Bengal produced by scholars
of many countries. In addition it seemed appropriate to this volume to
discuss the work of American specialists, most of whom had been trained
on United States government grants intended to provide the nation with
resources of specialized knowledge of the various areas of the world,
including Bengal.
Bringing together the work of nine authors in a single volume results in
a certain amount of variety, most obviouslY.,in style. Scarcely less obvious
in this volume are differences of spelling and use of diacritics in foreign
words and names. Several years ago the Bengal Studies Group made a
serious effort to standardize a system of transliteration for Bengali words;
nevertheless, wide variations still exist in the methods of Bengal specialists.
The problem with proper names is even greater. Some writers use a trans-
literation of the name as spelled in Bengali; others use anglicized spellings,
many of which were used by the owners of the names themselves when
writing in English. Given the extent of variation in these essays, it seemed
best to let each author keep his own system rather than inflict the radical
changes that would be necessary in some essays in order to employ a
uniform method throughout the volume. The result of this decision is that
a single name may appear in several versions if it appears in more than one
contribution.
Finally, these essays, while dealing exclusively with Bengal,undoubtedly
contain much that is of interest to other South Asianists and quite possibly
will furnish materials for area specialists of other regions who are inter-
ested in comparative studies. Still it must be pointed out that a collection
of essays is often less than what its planners would have hoped to present.
Although this volume was never intended to be an introductory or compre-
hensive work on Bengal, it was expected to be more representative of the
studies done in the various periods of Bengal's history. Unfortunately,
three excellent essays, on society in ancient India, anthropology, and art
history, were not submitted for publication. Larger problems have also
provided obstacles to the fulfillment of our objectives. The singular lack of
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substantial material on the Bengali Muslim community in this volume
reflects the limited amount of research done on that group by Bengal
specialists in American universities. A few younger scholars have now
begun to work in that area, thus undertaking to correct a major neglect of
many years. Other areas of study similarly have not been approached by
American scholars, or, in fact, by anyone else. The present work simply
offers the views of a number of scholars on elements from their own areas
of research influential on the contemporary history of Bengal. If, as a
secondary result, research is stimulated in areas about which this publi-
cation is silent, it will have made our effort doubly worthwhile.
There is particular pleasure in writing this final paragraph of these
introductory remarks, the paragraph traditionally reserved for acknowl-
edgment of help received in the preparation of the volume. This work,
like most others, could not have come into existence without a great deal
of help from people whose names are not listed in the table of contents. Of
fundamental help in both the planning and the execution of the seminar
were Professors Harry Friedman and Burton Stein. Without the practical
and intellectual contributions of these two colleagues at Hawaii, neither
the seminar nor the volume would have been possible. The University of
Hawaii and its Asian Studies Program joined together in providing all the
funding for both the seminar and the publication, a noteworthy under-
taking in this time of academic poverty. The support and recommen-
dations of the Asian Studies Publications Committee, and the excellent
clerical assistance of Machiko Tsuruya, have been directly responsible for
placing this volume in your hands.
RACHEL VAN M. BAUMER
Honolulu
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/Hinduism and Islam in Medieval Bengal
EDWARD C. DIMOCK, JR.
University of Chicago
The Hindu-Muslim riots in January 1964-those which, some may re-
member, were touched off by the theft of the Prophet's hair-are the only
ones I have ever seen but they made an indelible impression. The scenario
of the riots in Calcutta, if described, should sound familiar, for it would
be reminiscent of more recent scenes in Bangladesh.
After the Gurkhas had quieted the city, I went to Dacca. On a panel in
Washington not long ago, I heard the remark that communal riots have
been frequent in India, but rare in East Bengal and nonexistent in West
Pakistan. I do not know about West Pakistan, but Dacca in 1964 s~ggests
that such remarks stem from a common type of selective vision. The
government ofIndia in 1964 sent a judicial commission to interview Hindu
refugees and find out what had happened. Here are two completely
random and typical excerpts from the report of that commission;
On the night of January 3, 1964, a large mob attacked and set fire to Hindu
houses in the village. People started running and they were chased. Quite a
lot of persons got killed, others burnt to death. The mob was shouting
with glee and also shouting the slogan "Jehad." Many women were
abducted, ravished, and killed. [Case K 746, p. 61]
During the looting many Hindus took refuge in the bazaar, which was
attacked by a large gang of Muslims who started killing people including
women and children indiscriminately. They snatched away suckling chil-
dren from the arms of their mothers, killed them in one stroke as one breaks
an egg, and threw them into the river.They also threw the dead and muti-
lated bodies of older persons into the river. The water of the river turned
red, the surface strewn with innumerable bodies. [Case DN 117, p. 141]1
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The report is a long one, and these interviews are in every way typical.
In many cases the Muslims specified as committing the atrocities were
Biharis (a general term for non-Bengalis); but this is not always specified.
And if the stories from Bangladesh are true-that the murders of the day
before Dacca fell, the killing of people from the university and elsewhere,
were committed by right-wing Bengali Muslim extremists from the Al-
Badr and AI-Shams groups-one is forced to wonder.
Political history was not my concern before 1964, nor has it been since.
But the violence was of such a degree that it seemed to me that it could
only have stemmed from hatred of many centuries duration. Yet in my
reading of texts from the so-called medieval period (fifteenth to eighteenth
centuries) I had found little indication of such deep-rooted antagonism.
The sixteenth-century Kavikankan Candi, of the keen-eyed and witty
Mukundaram, accepts the fact of Hindus living side by side with Muslims
with perfect equanimity. The writer seems to look upon the Muslims as
simply another caste, somewhat varied in occupation. His description of
the settlement of the new town of Gujarata runs in part, in Ron Inden's
translation, like this:
[He] brought subjects of many castes [jaIl] to the town.... Many Mus-
lims settled there, receiving the hero's pan. He gave them the western
quarter.... They rise at dawn, spread out their red-colored mats, and
prostrate themselves five times. With Cholemani garlands, they mutter
prayers to the Pir Pegambar and light evening lamps in the pir's hall.
Kinsmen, sitting in groups of ten to twenty, constantly deliberate on the
Quran.... They do not abandon their ways; they wear tightly tied
pajama and on their heads ten-striped caps. . . . Some marry according to
Hindu usage.... Hindus who have become Muslims are called GarsaI.
Those who become blind only at night, beg during the night.2
The last two lines are particularly interesting, as is the tone of respect
that runs throughout. The last line is funny; the next to last means that
Hindu converts are looked down upon, garsiil being a term of disrespect.
This despite the fact that conversion is traditionally in Islam quite a
legitimate way of gaining adherents to the faith. Recently, in a paper given
at Chicago, T. N. Madan of Delhi University told the story of how, in
Kashmir, that other "seam" of two cultures, he knew a Brahman who
had converted to Islam out of loneliness and a desire to marry. Not only
would no Muslim girl marry him, but he was ostracized by both cultures.
To the meaning of life and accommodation in such cultural seams I shall
return.
Nor was I able to find much evidence of a consistent religious antagon-
ism between Hindus and Muslims in the great body of medieval Bengali
literature, that of the Vai~l)avas. In these texts is found suggestion of an
HINDUISM AND ISLAM 3
occasional campaign designed to destroy Hindu temples; Sanatana Gos-
vamin, who had been a high minister in the court of Husain Shah (1494-
1525), left the service of the king because the king was about to embark
upon a campaign in Orissa, in which temples would be destroyed. There
are stories of how (though this takes place in northern India) an image of
Kr~l)a had to be moved from place to place for fear that the Muslims
would capture and defile it. There are stories of how Muslims would come
to the houses of recalcitrant Hindu officials and sacrifice cattle in the
Cal)<;H-mal)<japa, thereby defiling it and its owner. And there are oc-
casional qiizi who treat individual Vai~l)avas harshly: one such has the
great disciple Haridasa brutally whipped through twenty-two market-
places because, although born in a Muslim family, Haridasa refused to
recite the Koran and iterate his faith in Islam. Here, though, it seems to be
Haridasa's apostacy rather than his Vai~l)avism that brought about this
cruel treatment. There are other qiizi who speak the name of Kr~l)a and
are thus saved; for, says Haridasa, even if a Muslim uses the term hariim
("defiled, unclean"), he is saved, that word having the name of Rama
embedded in it. And still other qiizi allow, extraordinarily, the nagara-
kIrtan, the Vai~l)ava street procession; this, from the attention given it in
the texts, was an unusual concession. Cases of oppression and even
antagonism seem to be random, and for every instance of hostility there is
one in the other direction. Husain Shah may have destroyed temples in
Orissa; but the Caitanya-Caritiimrta text (II :25: 184ff.) has this to say
about his personal relations with Hindus:
Subuddhi Raya had been a ruler in Gaura, formerly, and Husain Shah
Sayed was his servant. He gave him a commission, to excavate a tank; he
made a mistake, and Raya hit him with a whip. Afterwards, when Husain
Shah himselfhad become king of Gaura, he paid much respect to Subuddhi
Raya. His wife, seeing the marks of the whipping on his body, told the king
to whip Subuddhi Raya. But the king said: Raya was my protector and was
like a father. It is not proper that I should strike him. And his wife said:
If you will not take his life, take his caste. And the king replied: If I take
his caste, he will not live.3
There may have been cruel qiizi; but there were others in this high ad-
ministrative post who respected their very real social ties with Hindus,
based on village relationships. Caitanya-Caritiimrta I: 17:140ff. tells us
that one qiizi, speaking to Caitanya, said:
You have come in anger; I remained hidden to pacify you. Now you have
been pacified, and I have come to meet you. It is my good fortune that I
have received such a guest as you. By village relationship Cakravarti [i.e.,
Caitanya's maternal grandfather] is my father's brother; village relation-
ship is stronger than blood-ties. Nilambara Cakravarti is your mother's
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father, and so you are my nephew. A maternal uncle always endures the
anger of his nephew, and a nephew does not take offense at his maternal
uncle.
Even further, as I have tried to suggest elsewhere,4 there were Muslim
poets who wrote on Hindu themes: the beauty of the Ganges (Daraf
Kahn, in Sanskrit) or the love between Radhii and KnI)a. The following
poem, though not the best that could be found, is not atypical:
You do not know how to play the flute.
You play it at the wrong times. You care nothing for me.
When I am sitting with my elders,
you call me with your flute. I could die of shame.
You play it on the farther bank. I hear it here.
I am an unlucky girl; I do not know how to swim.
If you find the bamboo clump from' which this flute was made,
tear it up by the roots and throw it in the river!
Cand Qazi says: I hear the flute, my life ebbs from me-
I shall not live, unless I see my Hari.
Except for the signature line, it is a Vai~I)ava song. Whether the poet
was a Vai~I)ava or whether he was simply substituting the names of Radhii
and Kr~I)a for the Sufi concepts of the soul and God is not known. Which-
ever the case, it is clear that there was no scorn, on the part of the Muslims
who wrote these songs, at least, of the Vai~I)ava form of Hinduism.
Nor is there scorn of Islam on the part of the Vai~I)avas.When, in the
biographies, Caitanya is arguing with one Muslim or another, he treats his
antagonist just as he treats the Vedantins and other Hindus: he does not
tell them that they are wrong, merely that they have misread and misinter-
preted their own scriptures. In the Caitanya-Caritiimrta, Caitanya argues
in the following way (illustrating, perhaps less than in some other places,
its author Kr~I)adasa's interesting ideas of the Koran and Islamic the-
ology).
Caitanya with four companions is on his way home from a pilgrimage to
Vrndavana; they are in a forest, and he has fallen unconscious in a fit.
The party is approached by some Muslim soldiers, Pathans, who accuse
Caitanya's four companions of having poisoned him to rob him. Two of
Caitanya's companions are from western India, and two are from Bengal.
Indicative of the attitude of the Pathans toward Bengalis is the Muslim
leader's remark: "You two are from the west and are good men; but these
two Gauriyas [i.e., Bengalis] are rogues; and so they tremble" (II: 18 :162).
II :18:177-188 reads:
And among those mlecchas [i.e., Muslims] there was a most brave man; he
wore black cloth, and people called him "pir." His heart softened when he
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saw Prabhu [i.e., Caitanya]. "Our own sastras [i.e., the Koran] establish
the qualityless Brahma and preach nondualism." Prabhu refuted his
arguments using those very sastras.... Prabhu said: "In your sastras the
qualityless [God] is established; in your sastras it says at the end that isvara
[God] is one, that his body is dark in color, and that he is full of all divine
qualities. . . . From him are creation, establishment, and destruction, the
equal refuge for worlds both gross and subtle; he is the best of all things,
to be worshipped by all, and is the cause of causes.... Except for service
of him, the worldly pain of the living creature does not pass away; love at
his feet is the essence of the meaning of mankind.... None of your
pandits understand your sastras, and that among injunctions what is earlier
and what is later, that which is later is stronger. Examine your own sastras,
and ascertain what has been written there at the end.
5
But as Joseph O'Connell points out in his doctoral dissertation "Social
Implications of the Gaudiya Vaisnava Movement"5-and it should be
noted that much of this essay owes a debt to that excellent study-by and
large the Vai~l).avas do not seem to single out the Muslims by religion.
They treat them, as we have seen Mukundaram do, as a caste among many
other castes, having odd customs of dress, but having a place, just as do
Brahmans and Kayasthas, in a complex society. The terms Muslim or
Mussulman are not used by Vai~l).avas to single out this beard-bearing,
cap-wearing group until texts of the late eighteenth and even nineteenth
centuries (Prema-vilasa and Bhakta-mala).6 Before these relatively late
dates the terms used were secular: Muslims were called mleccha, which
was not originally very complimentary, meaning something like "bar-
barian," and yavana, which is simply "foreigner" and is applied to Greeks
as well as to Muslims. From the other point of view, the term lfindu is
used sometimes by Muslims, and sometimes also by Hindus, but only
when they are addressing Muslims. It must be remembered, however, that
in the middle period it is quite possible that the term was not used to
designate a religious community, as it is today, but a people inhabiting a
geographically definable piece of territory. The term comes from the name
of the Indus River and was used by the Greeks and later by other invaders
from the west to designate the people of a strange new land. So it is far
from certain that Muslims were using this term in a religious sense; the
usage possibly denotes no more about religion than the terms Bengali or
Maharashtrian: geography, language, and culture of which religion is but
a part.
Hindus, when they are talking among themselves, speak of Vai~l).avas
and Saktas, Brahmans and purohit. When they use the term Hindu, it is to
reply to Muslims in categories the Muslims themselves use. The Caitanya-
Caritamrta, interestingly, uses the term Hindu-dharma, which would sug-
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gest that Muslims saw a specifically Hindu way of looking at things, on a
couple of occasions. In the passage where Caitanya is confronting the
qiizi who has tried to stop the nagara-kirtan, he says:
You are the qazi, and have power over hindu-dharma; but you do not use
it. I do not understand this respect. [1:17:174]
In the city the hindu-dharma grows greatly; nothing is heard except for
the sound of the name of Hari. [I: 17:193]
As O'Connell points out, in the first of these statements there is recog-
nition of the potential power of repression that lies in the hands of the
Muslims. But there is also recognition of the fact that it is not being used.
To the Vai~l)avas, not only were the Muslims acceptable as one religious
and social group among many, but their political dominance was also ac-
cepted, if with some trepidation. Vrndavana-dasa in his Caitanya-bhiiga-
vata uses the term kiilii-yavana ("the yavana as death") and mahiitzbra-
yavana ("most cruel yavana").7 But so long as this potential was not
realized, the Vai~l)avas were content. Their real enemies were the Hindu
pasalJdi, Brahmans antagonistic to Vai~l)avismwho tried to bring about
persecution by informing Husain Shah of the prophecy, Christian-like,
that a revolt in Navadvip, Caitanya's city, would rid the land of yavana
rule. The Vai~l)avas did not go so far as the Sunya-puriina, a text of the
cult of the god Dharma which rejoices in the Muslim conquest, seeing it as
chastisement of proud Brahmans;8 but neither, so long as there was no
systematic persecution, did they attempt anything except coexistence.
If such mutual understanding and even sympathy were present in the
seventeenth century, the contrast is at least impressive, with pictures of
burning bustees and people being shot from rooftops as they fled the
flames seemingly typical of the twentieth. O'Connell (p. 63) paraphrases
Muin ud din Ahmad Khan's History of the Fara'idi Movement in Bengal,
1818-1906 as follows:
Even though the total Muslim population of Bengal probably was larger
than elsewhere the population became polarized into antagonistic compet-
ing Hindu and Muslim communities only in the 20th century and then only
after intensive efforts to pry Bengali Muslims loose from their Bengali cul-
tural moorings.
If this is true, it will take a historian of British India to explain why. And
if it is true, it will suggest further that Bengal in this as in other respects
cannot be fully included in the generalizations made about India. Bernard
Cohn, in conversation, tells of genuine Hindu-Muslim riots in Benares as
early as 1809, with all the trappings thereof: temples desecrated by the
slaughter of cattle, destruction of temples to build mosques, and so forth.
And in the middle of the nineteenth century in Kerala there were riots, at
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first for economic reasons but later polarized along communal lines, the
reports of which sound much like those taken in Calcutta in 1964. At this
point it might be helpful to go back to the beginning.
Every region of the Indian subcontinent differs from every other region
in a variety of ways, and each region varies in different ways from the two
main classical traditions that otherwise unite them-the Sanskritic tra-
dition and the Perso-Arabic tradition of Islam. It can be argued that
Bengal differs more than most. In the first place, long before the coming of
Islam, Bengal was recognized as far from the heartland of the Indo-Aryan
people, in the upper Gangetic plain. Bengal was quite literally beyond the
pale, and in early Sanskrit texts references to the place are invariably full
of scorn. A Jaina text points out that Bengal is a perilous place in which to
travel, being filled with barbarians who think nothing of murdering even
monks. 9 Other texts say that Bengal is so impure that those who are ill-
advised enough to go there must submit to ritual purification upon their
return to God's country.lO And there is the legend of the king Adisura,
who wanted to perform an elaborate Vedic sacrifice but could not find any
priests in Bengal with enough knowledge to do it; so he sent to the west
for these priests, and they came and performed the sacrifice and were re-
warded with lands on which they established hierarchical societies with
themselves at the top.l1 And in Mogul times, generals were sent to Bengal
as punishment,12 for the place, as one of them succinctly put it, was a
malarial swamp. Besides, the Bengalis were always revolting about one
thing or another, and more often than not succeeding, because they knew
the watery terrain and how to use it.
If the British had had any control over history, it is certain that they
would not have established their capital at Calcutta. But history, with her
incomparable sense of humor, had seen fit to have Job Charnock establish
his trading post in those three little villages on the Hugli. The British did
not much like Bengal, or the Bengalis either. If one scans the texts written
by servants of the Company, or even Kipling, one cannot but be struck by
phrases like "toadying, sly and deceitful, cowardly, pompous, slight of
build and dark of skin" applied to the Bengalis. By contrast, the people of
northwestern India were "tall, strong, and brave, eaters of beef, direct and
truthful, courageous enemies and staunch friends." And so the native re-
giments of the British armies were made up of these people-Panjabis,
Pathans, Baluchis, warlike peoples with qualities much like those the
British considered their own. In Black Watch (1929), brave Muslim troops
from the northwest frontier, fighting side by side with their red-coated
comrades, save India for England during World War I, taking their place
in the British military Hall of Fame beside the Fuzzy Wuzzy, as those
first-class fightin' men hurl themselves forever against the British square.
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Some have characterized the Bengalis as paranoid. But it is not paranoia
if somebody really is after you. So many factors have had their effect: the
geographical location of Bengal on the far eastern end of Indo-Aryan ex-
pansion so far as Hindus are concerned, cut off from the birthplace of
Islam (and geography is significant in Islam, as the fact of the hajj attests)
to the Muslims; the contempt of the British for lacking warlike qualities
and of the Brahmans from other parts of India for eating fish and mis-
pronouncing Sanskrit. These factors alone, contrasting with and stimulat-
ing a pride in intellect, in language and literature, have understandably
made Bengalis feel apart. And, too, there is the Bengali pride in the
motherland, shared by Hindus and Muslims alike. It is not insignificant
that the anthem of Bangladesh, written by the non-Muslim Tagore, Amar
sonar bangia, explicitly speaks of Bengal as mother. Nor is the poem
written by the Muslim Nazrul Islam insignificant:
We are two flowers on one stem [or, in a Bengali pun, at one nipple]l3-
Hindu and Muslim-
the Muslim the jewel of the eye, the Hindu the breath-
that sky is one, where moon and sun swing, in the lap of the mother,
one blood in the deeps of the heart, one the puIl of that pounding pulse.14
Full-fledged Muslim invasions of Bengal began in the thirteenth century.
There had been a trickle of Sufis, some gentle and some warlike, at earlier
times; and the Muslims ruled the place, either from local courts in Bengal
or from imperial courts in Delhi, until the defeat of Siraj-ud-ullah by the
British at Plassey in 1757. When Islam came to India in the tenth century,
it arrived with a religious book, a complete set of interpretations of that
book, a set of laws, and a social structure relatively fixed. Because of this
cultural cohesion, Peter Hardy argues, Islam was able to retain a kind of
"cultural apartheid" vis-a.-vis the Hindus. It is true, he admits, that the
Muslim rulers of Delhi and elsewhere used Hindus in the administration
of their vast empires and that Hindus sometimes reached positions of
great power in these administrative networks. It is also true that Akbar was
a student of Hindu among other scriptures, that Dara Shikoh, eldest son
of Shah lahan, was a profound and serious student of Hindu philosophy,
and that syncretistic cults such as that of Kabir sought to blend the relig-
ious systems by seeking the best in both of them. But, Hardy would say,
Akbar, Dara Shikoh, Abul Fazl, and the rest were exceptions, and Kabir
came from, and spoke to, the lower cultural orders.15
In regard to Bengal, his argument would be harder to make. It is true
that one stratum of Bengali Muslim society is the ashraf-Muslims of the
aristocracy who seek to preserve the cultural apartheid, looking to the
west for their heritage and claiming descent from the lineally pure invaders,
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who in their turn were descended from those close to the Prophet. Some
question the historicity of this claim; in an excellent thesis for the Austral-
ian National University, Ashim Roy characterizes the ashriif as follows:
"The upper strata of the Muslim society in Bengal had thus been organized
into a distinct social entity on the basis of an amalgam of history and fic-
tion welded onto the body of material power."16
Such people are more tied to their western lineage and to Islam than to
the Bengali motherland. But there are other strata of Bengali Muslim
society. There are village people who, together with their Hindu neighbors,
visit, or used to visit, the same shrines, tombs of saints; there are cults
shared by Hindu and Muslim, that called Satya-pir by Muslims and Satya-
narayaI)a by Hindus, for example; there are Hindu festivals celebrated by
Muslims, and vice versa; we shall see an example in a moment. And there
is the stratum which is Bengali by birth and heritage, and proud of the
fact, and which, unlike the village people, see distinctions between Hindu-
ism and Islam and are Islamic in all their habits and beliefs. There may be
. some among these who, like the ashriif, have contempt for those who make
no distinctions and contempt for Hindus. But there are others who see
Hindus as fellow Bengalis and fellow human beings, with a right to their
own beliefs. They are like the Kashmiri Muslim merchant whose advertis-
ing calendar shows the gods of the Hindu pantheon.
The second and third of these three strata have another thing in com-
mon-the Bengali language-and it is here that the cultural apartheid
between the ashriifand other Muslims in Bengal is most obvious. Let me
quote Ashim Roy again:
Thus in their thought, ideas, and even their language the ashraf remained,
or at least posed to remain, alien to their coreligionists in Bengal, and
looked down upon the Muslim masses because they thought themselves
nearer to Islam, as they were closer to the Arabic and Persian languages,
literature, and culture, which according to them were permeated with
Islamic values, while the Bengali language and literature, subjected to the
influence of the Hindus, was steeped in idolatry.l7
Roy quotes Yaqinuddin Ahmad, writing in the Moslem Chronicle in 1896:
"The Muhammadans of Bengal had leaders who tried their utmost to
belong to the northwest. They talked Hindustani, imitated Delhi or Luck-
now manners, but in spite of that they were Bengalis."ls And Ni'am ud
din, in Zudbat ul masa'il in 1873: "The accomplished men of [Bengal] do
not take themselves to Bengali books for the poor quality of the language,
not worth listening to.... They do not like their children to read them;
rather, it is forbidden by many."19 One cannot take pride in one's language
and literature, if one is a Bengali, and be a Muslim. An instructive letter
appeared anonymously in the Moslem Chronicle in 1895:
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Several heathen customs have crept into the society and [innovations in
Islamic custom] and [belief in local deities] are practiced with impunity
every day by thousands of so-called Mussulmans in their feasts and festi-
vals. There are places where widow-marriage is looked upon with hatred.
. . . In every district of Bengal there are benighted places where people
profess a corrupt form of Islam ... they even openly worship Hindu
gods and goddesses. Nearly all of the people of [Nadiya district] have
Hindu names; their manners and customs are those of Hindus; they cele-
brate the pujas; they have caste distinctions too. We are choked with in-
ward shame and mortification by witnessing a scene, which we did the
other day in Taltola. . . . It was the day of Sripancami puja when we saw
troops of Muhammadan lads, children of lower-class people and reading
in Hindu patsalas, carrying small flags and chanting heathen ditties in
praise of Ma Sarasvati.2o
If the Bengali ashrttffelt this way, how much more so Muslims from the
untainted West? For the attitude is that no matter how pure their personal
Islamic beliefs and practices, all Bengalis, excepting perhaps the ashriif,
have been stained by Hinduism. To become contemporary for a moment,
it was reported in the New York Times for 13 May 1971 that a Pakistani
army major, asked about the army's attack on Dacca University, replied:
"We have to consider that an entire generation of students has been lost,
because of the laxity and permissiveness of parents. You hear of alcohol
drinking and raping going on at the university-things unheard of in a
Muslim society." The mention of rape is particularly ironic: but then
Bengali Muslim girls are not Muslims.
There are millions of Bengalis, however, who call themselves Muslim;
where did they all come from? They are not all ashriif, nor do they all
claim to be. O'Connell calculates on the basis of some figures in Abdul
Karim's Social History of the Muslims in Bengal that in 1650 there were in
Bengal 8.6 million Hindus and 4.1 million Muslims. At that time, the
Muslims had been in Bengal over three hundred years. Although I have
not stopped to calculate it, the original invaders, who probably did not
number over a few tens of thousands, would have had to multiply at a
prodigious rate. The obvious theory is that most Bengali Muslims became
Muslims through large-scale conversions. The question of course is this:
If conversions there were, how did they come about and who was con-
verted?
There may have been large-scale forcible conversions. And there are
examples of how Hindus lost caste-Subuddhi Raya, who did finally lose
his caste at the insistence of Husain Shah's wife, is an example-by being
forced to eat, perhaps, forbidden food and, no longer accepted by the
Hindu community, became Muslims. But the case of Subuddhi Raya is
HINDUISM AND ISLAM 11
....
instructive, though no one knows how typical: while some Brahmans told
him that he might as well kill himself, others prescribed the simplest pos-
sible prayascitta (ritual purification): the taking of the name of God. And
Mirza Nathan in his history tells of a severe reprimand given a Muslim
official for forcibly converting a Hindu. There were such conversions,
then, but seemingly not on a vast enough scale to answer the question.
Another argument is that lower-caste Hindus and noncaste people, and
Buddhists who, everybody seems to feel, were running about the place in
numbers, found social and religious satisfaction in Islam, which did not
discriminate so rigidly. These, the argument goes, converted voluntarily.
All these arguments have some merit; as is often pointed out, not only is
it difficult to tell by physical features most Bengali Muslims from most
Bengali Hindus, but many Muslims perform the same services as their
Hindu neighbors: both are fishermen, both are weavers, both are culti-
vators, and the like. There were probably high-caste converts too, attracted
especially by the warmth of Sufi Islam; Sanatana Gosvamin, minister to
Husain Shah and later a favorite of Caitanya, seems to have been of a
Brahman family, but became a diirveS, a Sufi.
It is perhaps unfair to conclude with a series of questions I cannot an-
swer. As to what it all means to Bangladesh: rivers of communal blood
have flowed in Bengal and may yet flow. And in Bangladesh the term
communal takes on a new dimension: there are Hindus who are Hindu and
Bengali, Muslims who are Muslim and Bengali, and Muslims who are
Muslim but not, psychologically at least, Bengali. The last have hunted
the first two, and may be hunted in their turn. Hindus have been hunted by
some of the second and most of the third, and may be again. But history
has shown too that Bengalis of all communities have lived together; if not
always in tranquillity, drawn together, as Nazrul would have it, by the
common blood of their common mother. That common blood has soaked
the soil of the new nation. One keeps one's fingers crossed and hopes that,
as Abul Fazl, minister to the Great Mogul, said, "the thorn of strife and
hatred be caused to bloom into a garden of peace."
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Norms of Family Life and Personal Morality
among the Bengali Hindu Elite, 1600-1850
TAPAN RAYCHAUDHURI
Oxford University
Until at least the latter half of the eighteenth century, our chief sources of
information for Bengali social values are the literary and religious texts
besides a meager amount of biographical data contained in these very
texts. The caste histories and the chronologically uncertain traditions
preserved in the district histories written in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries marginally supplement this information. Most of these works
are written by the members of the upper castes with traditions of literary
education and reflect their values. Even when they write of other orders of
society, they present an outsider's image of a different social group and
unconsciously interpolate their own values; often the incongruities are
obvious; more often the authenticity of the portrait cannot be checked.
In the nineteenth century, especially the latter part, descriptions of social
groups without any literary traditions become more abundant, but the
paucity of evidence for the earlier period precludes any comparison with
former conditions or the discussion of any trends over time. A study of
social norms in Bengal for the period under discussion has hence to be
concerned with the "upper stratum"-"upper" in terms of social status
more than anything else-who have been described somewhat loosely
as the "elite" for the purposes of this study. This stratum, of course, was
not homogeneous, but the sources do indicate a basic uniformity of norms
and a limited range of diversities. The differences between the Hindu
and the Muslim elites-determined by differences in social organization
and religious ideology-were more basic. Such a comparison has not
been attempted here, partly to keep the essay within reasonable limits.
Finally, the time period covered here is really less awe-inspiring than it
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seems. The continuity of relevant values is considerable, and even if the
starting point of this study were pushed back by two more centuries it
would not have made a great difference. The time limits refer simply to
the broad chronology of the sources used. The significant changes are
concentrated in the last half century and, to some extent, in the last one
hundred years of the period.
A striking fact about Bengal's social life before the mid-eighteenth
century is the relative absence of the joint family. Although our infor-
mation on this point is by no means exhaustive, it is too extensive to be
explained away as mere coincidence. Several writers of panchali in the
seventeenth century-Mukundaram, Ruparam, Kshemananda-have
left behind some autobiographical data. The life stories of the Vaishnava
hagiographers are known, and we have a number of biographies of
Chaitanya and his followers. The typical family in nearly all these cases
is nuclear and rather small. The heroes and heroines of the medieval
ballads are also portrayed as belonging to small nuclear families. The
one major exception is to be found in the legend of the merchant Chand,
who had seven grown-up sons living with him.
The norms associated with the nuclear family were necessarily different
from those of a joint family. Negatively, there was a lack of concern with
duties to a wide range of uncles, grand-uncles, cousins, and the like,
and family obligations referred typically to one's immediate blood re-
lations. The reverence due to the jiititi or the kinship group-especially
the latter's right to sit in judgment on one's conduct-was recognized.!
But the total involvement with the larger kinship group-in terms of
one's associations, affections, and family duties-appears to be a later
development.
There is only one feature of the joint family one can trace back to the
seventeenth-century literature. The aged parents apparently continued to
live with the grown-up and married son unless they preferred to live in
retirement after a while in the holy city of Benares. In such cases, how-
ever, the father became an honored guest rather than the head of the
family, although in the domestic setup the daughter-in-law was expected
to submit respectfully to the mother-in-Iaw's instructions.2 The principle
that the aged parents were not to interfere with the decisions of their
grown-up sons in such households was recognized even in the late eight-
eenth century, though it was deemphasized if not consciously abandoned
later on. The household of Umapati Tarkasiddhanta, great-grandfather
of Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, as described by the latter, is an instance
in point: "Tarkashiddhanta was very old by now; hence, the affairs
of the family were under the control of his son, Ramsundar Vidyabhu-
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shan. Therefore, the latter was the real master and his wife the real
mistress. According to the custom of the land, Tarkasiddhanta and his
wife were mere figureheads; their writ did not run in any sphere."3 This
withdrawal of the older generation from positions of real authority
in the family probably stemmed from the basically nuclear character of
the family, though the custom persisted even after the joint family had
become a marked feature of social life.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century, the joint family was very
much an established fact of upper-caste Bengali society. The family annals
contained in the district histories and the biographies of the nineteenth-
century literary lions compiled by B. N. Banerji confirm this fact. If the
seventeenth-century poets were scions of nuclear families, their most
famous eighteenth-century counterpart, Bharatchandra, broke away
from a family dominated by unfriendly brothers. 4 Vidyasagar's great-
grandfathers-both on his mother's and on his father's side-were the
heads of large joint families. 5
Vidyasagar thus described an ideal joint family in the latter years of
the eighteenth century, spelling out the contemporary norms:
On Vidyavagish's death, his eldest son Radhamohan Vidyabhushan be-
came the head of the family, the second, Ramdhan Nyayrathna, began to
teach in his father's college [Chatushpathi], the third Guruprasad and the
fourth Bisweswar Mukherji began to earn their livings in Calcutta. The
four brothers lived together in ajoint family ["shared a common kitchen]"
all their lives; everyone handed over his earnings to the eldest. The eldest
was just and equitable in his conduct, as far as was humanly possible. His
care and affection for his brothers' families exceeded, if anything, those for
his own family. In fine, under his authority nobody had any reason· for
anger or displeasure.... All the four [brothers] were equally worthy and
full of goodwill; hence, no one ever found them in mutual dispute or
misunderstanding. Leave aside their own families, they never treated dif-
ferentlyeven their sisters, sisters' daughters and sisters' grandchildren.6
The preeminent claims of one's extended family on one's affections
were taken for granted by the upper-caste Bengali in the early decades of
the nineteenth century. One of the first autobiographies written in Bengali
-that of Kartikeyachandra Ray, dewan of the Nadia Raj-repeatedly
expresses such sentiments. The author thus described the happy life of
lris early youth: "All the twelve months in the year I spent at home; I
could [thus} see my elders, I was surrounded by my relations, the most
desired objects of life." His ancestors who worked for the Nadia Raj had
two houses, one near the palace where they lived with their relations "in
pleasures and entertainments" and another in a neighboring village for
their immediate families. "Therefore, either in their family affairs or
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psychologically, they experienced no inconvenience or unhappiness."
He further explains that formerly aristocratic families preferred to live
where their relations could live with them when necessary. The attach-
ment to one's extended family was reinforced by regular instruction in
one's genealogy in all its aspects. The earlier generations knew the genea-
logy of one's neighbors belonging to other castes as well. A deficiency in
such knowledge was considered a matter for shame. These good practices,
the dewan writing in the latter half of the nineteenth century regretted,
had fallen into disuse. The poignancy of the loss is thus expressed:
If I do not know the name of my great-grandfather and my kin also does
not know the name of his great-grandfather, then how should one know
that they are the same person? Consider, through our ignorance, nothing
could be known about our close relationship and the joy that could have
been derived [from the knowledge] or the mutual services we could have
rendered would not materialize.7
In the same vein, while he accepts as entirely natural the friendship of
his cousin (his father's sister's son), he humbly wonders how people
unrelated to him became his close friends.
The tensions within the joint families reflected a conflict of values
traceable largely to the changing economic milieu. An early instance of
an individual opting out of a joint family is that of the eighteenth-century
poet Bharatchandra. Son of an improverished zamindar, Bharat wanted
to follow scholarly pursuits and learned Sanskrit, much to the chagrin of
his elder brothers who saw no possibility of restoring the family fortunes
through such useless knowledge. Bharat left home to make his career.
After some wanderings he eventually became the court poet of Raja
Krishnachandra and set up his separate establishment, refusing to return
to his family.8 The economic opportunity which the poet found and the
circumstances of the ruin of his ancestral fortune-an armed attack on
their property by the Burdwan maharani-were not atypical of the earlier
centuries. The atypical fact of a zamindar's son trying to make a career
of service and learning Persian for that purpose is, however, not unrelated
with the opportunities in commerce and services, which undoubtedly
increased in the eighteenth century. Significantly enough, Bharat's patron
was the dewan to the French government at Chandernagore and his host
was the dewan to the Dutch at Chinsura. It was only the insight of his
patron which prevented Bharat from following in his footsteps. So long
as the traditional means of livelihood provided a family income to be
shared by all concerned, the only threat to the norms and continuity of
the joint family could arise from a clash of personalities, which tend to be
muted in nonindividualistic societies. The new economic opportunities
-------------
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created an accent on individual aspirations and, eventually, an inequality
of income which undermined the norms of fraternal harmony. This
process, witnessed by Kartikeyachandra Ray and Vidyasagar9 among
many others early in the nineteenth century, has slowly worked toward
the dissolution of the system.
It would, however, be incorrect to suggest that there was a total revolu-
tion in values affecting family life in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century. The old norms showed in fact a remarkable capacity for survival.
The ritual purity of the extended family, as the prime determinant of the
family's status, had long been a major preoccupation of the upper-caste
Bengali Hindu.l° When kuhn polygamy turned ritual purity of one's kula
into a lucrative source of income in the course of the eighteenth century,
its maintenance and projection were naturally even more emphasized
than before. Besides, the reformist assault on orthodox prejudices led to
a reinforcement rather than a weakening of older values so far as a large
section of the Bengali caste Hindus were concerned. Even individuals
influenced by Brahmoism and critical of the kulzn preoccupation with
ritual purity to the exclusion of all else saw some justification in the
orthodox practice of inquiring into the prospective bride's family back-
ground as far back as four generations on the ground of the heritability of
negative traits.ll That the inquiry was concerned mainly with ritual purity,
especially from the point of view of the matrimonial alliances contracted
by the girl's forebears, was apparently overlooked in this argument.
In any society, marriage is one of the major institutions around which
the norms of interpersonal relationship tend to crystallize. The peculiar
ambivalence of Bengali society with regard to the question of polygamy
reveals a conflict of values-between a preference for ritual excellence
and a desire for psychological security and domestic peace. Polygamy
appears in medieval Bengali literature as an accepted, but exceptional,
fact of life. Few medieval Bengali personalities of whose lives we have
any knowledge were either polygamous themselves or came from polyga-
mous homes. The same pattern is reflected in the lives of the fictional
characters. Marriage to polygamous husbands was considered a great
calamity by the bride as well as by her mother.l2 Polygamous homes were
described as the abode of continuous quarrels, enough to drive away
benign deities.l3 But all such humane considerations were counterbalanced.
by the status dividends of giving one's daughter in marriage to a ritually
pure kulln and, presumably, the expectation of benefits in the hereafter
from such an act of religious merit. For reasons not quite clear, kulln
polygamy increased enormously during the eighteenth century; yet even
during this period and later the majority of kuhn must have remained
monogamous. The family histories of well-known kuhn personalities
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contain few instances of polygamy. Besides, demographic factors surely
acted as a check on this aberration: if some kulm rejoiced in hundreds of
wives, most of their fellows would have to be satisfied with one each, the
supply of high-caste women being subject to some natural limits. The
pathetic fate of kuhn women, doomed either to dishonorable spinster-
hood in their brothers' households or to a nominal marriage which per-
mitted them to meet their husbands only once a year, was described in
Bengali literature from the first novel in the language14 down to the days
of Saratchandra.l5 Yet the inhuman system persisted well into the twen-
tieth century. Even kindhearted and sensitive men, fully aware of the
misery it implied, gave their daughters in marriage to polygamous kulm
husbands.l6 In the first half of the nineteenth century, among the caste
Hindus the only social group that broke away from this practice com-
pletely-under the influence of humanistic and puritanical social ideologies
of the West-was the Brahmos.l 7
Another institution which persisted from medieval times well into the
twentieth century was that of child marriage. Toward the closing years
of the sixteenth century, Mukundaram wrote:
Blessed is the girl given in marriage at the age of seven. . . . If at the age
of nine a daughter is given according to proper rites to a bridegroom, the
water offered by her son ensures a place in heaven [for the grandfather].
. . . At the age of twelve, a girl attains puberty and is no longer afraid of
men.... If on seeing a handsome man, the [unmarried] daughter feels
the stirrings of desire, the father will suffer in hell. IS
Both before Mukundaram and after, the image of the child bride appears
repeatedly in medieval Bengali literature. In fact, the "English-educated"
youth of the early nineteenth century sought to discover a romantic di-
mension in this institution. Kartikeyachandra Ray, married at the age of
fifteen, later observed:
No doubt, the system of child marriage has many faults; but it offers a
happiness which courtship [Western style] cannot.... For, at the time of
courtship, even if the lover and the beloved may be deeply enamoured,
sometimes through accidents their engagements break up. Hence the
happiness of courtship is not comparable to that of the first phase in our
marriage. 19
Even among the Brahmos, the age of marriage was pushed up by only a
few years; for girls, it hardly ever exceeded fourteen.
As I have discussed elsewhere,2o the institution of child marriage was
linked to the normative requirements of absolute chastity and devotion
to one's husband expected of all married women. The literary conventions
of the period repeatedly emphasize the good wife's unqualified devotion
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to her husband-the Radha-Krishna legend and the opposite convention
of wives lamenting their fate on seeing a handsome hero notwithstanding.
That the wife's love for her husband was necessarily more intense than
the husband's attachment to her was a generally accepted image of marital
relations. To quote Bharatchandra: "Can the husband's feelings for his
wife compare with a woman's desire for her husband? A woman longs
for her husband's body, as is evident from her burning herself to death
with her dead husband. Consider, when the wife dies, a man forgets her
and takes another wife."21 The belief that a husband's love is the panacea
for all ills to a woman is continually emphasized in the literary and bio-
graphical works of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well.
Within the limits of such innocent faith, the norms permitted a frankly
voluptuous attitude to marriage-a frankness which got shrouded in the
sentimental verbiage of Indian "Victoriana" by the middle years of the
nineteenth century. Mukundaram writing in the late sixteenth century
thus describes his enamored hero: "Having heard from people of Khul-
lana, the merchant's heart was afflicted by the darts of desire ["lust"]. He
discussed [the matter] with Jamai Pandit and told him, 'Save me by ar-
ranging the marriage.'22 Thus Bharatchandra even more explicitly: "A
woman's life is in love-making. Who can survive without it? Fie on the life
of she who lives without this essence of life."23 And thus a nineteenth-
century worthy reminiscing on his married bliss: "To our wives, we were
their sole treasure. . . . Whatever their unhappiness at home . . . they
forgot it all when they saw their husbands. . . . If saddened by any family
circumstances, they lost their sorrow on seeing their husbands, just as
darkness is dispelled when the sun rises, and like mariners of old they
had their eyes fixed on their [only true] star, the husband."24
Kulln polygamy pushed into the background certain older norms of
marital relationship. The literary conventions down to the days of Bharat-
chandra emphasize the feminine expectation that the husband should be a
good provider. 25 A married woman living with her parents or a man
dependent on his in-laws was the object of contempt and pity.26 The kulln
polygamist, however, made a profession of marriage, and no social stigma
attached to his living entirely off his year-round visits to in-laws' houses
where his numerous wives lived permanently. Even the kulln not given to
such excesses grew up in the expectation of being provided for by their in-
laws and often had no other means of livelihood.27 By virtue of the ritual
purity of their genealogy alone, such pedigreed stud bulls were much
sought after.
The nineteenth-century Bengali reformers' preoccupation with the
condition of women-the debates and agitations over widow burning,
widow marriage, women's education, and the age of marriage-probably
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makes sense in the context of a degradation in the position of women.
Widow burning, for instance, definitely increased in the nineteenth cen-
tury.28 Nowhere in the literature before the mid-eighteenth century are
women represented as objects of contempt or pity. A bigamous husband
is shown as extremely anxious to soothe the elder wife's feelings not only
in Mukundaram but even in Bharatchandra.29 The fate of the kulzn grass
widow portrayed in AlMer gharer dultil30 has no parallel in earlier litera-
ture. That this degradation had become part of the accepted norm is clear
from the well-known conservative resistance to all attempts at reform,
often blatant, at times sheltering behind shamefaced sophistry. Western
education, and especially education of women, brought about a slow
change in attitude.31 Yet in the first half of the nineteenth century such
change was confined to a small segment of caste Hindu society-mainly
the Brahmos and the "reformed" Hindus.32
An important outcome of the change in values was an increased freedom
of social contact between men and women. Outside the circles of reform,
men's contact with women unrelated to them long consisted only in visits
to prostitutes or brief encounters with the young women of the neighbor-
hood who came to visit the new bridegroom. Women could enjoy the
pleasures of conversing only with the new bridegroom either in their own
family or in the family of relatives in the neighborhood. Even such contact
was unlikely except with one's own husband or one's husband's sister's
husband. "Their joy knew no bounds when they met a good-natured,
simple-hearted and sweet-spoken bridegroom. . . . Whatever accomplish-
ments they had, they sought to display before him. In all this," we are
assured, "neither the girls nor the young women ever had any impure
feelings in their hearts. Later, writes Ray, "when several of us, friends,
began to meet one another's wives, we and our wives were deeply grati-
fied. "33
The shift in attitudes toward women had its counterpart in the growing
discrimination between male and female children on the part of the
parents. The literary record before the rise of kulzn polygamy shows that
the birth of a daughter was less welcome than that of a son but was by no
means considered a calamity.34 As kulzn polygamy turned the daughter's
marriage into a serious financial liability, there was a corresponding
decline in the value of daughters in parental eyes. Kartikeyachandra Ray
records a pathetic incident in which kulzn parents virtually allowed their
little daughter to die while fussing over their not-so-sick son.35 The married
or widowed kulzn girls lived in their brother's or father's house almost as
menials, though there were occasional exceptions to this pattern.36
A different type of change in parental attitude toward sons was deter-
mined by new economic opportunities. In the traditional Bengali society
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a son was expected to inherit his father's estate or follow his father's
profession without any special effort to achieve excellence. The scholar or
poet seeking fame was perhaps an exception to this pattern, and an
ambitious scholar might even want his son to achieve great academic
distinction. The notion that a man might aspire after such wealth and
status beyond his birth appears to have been rare. The education given
to a child conformed to this status-oriented pattern of expectation. A
Brahmin scholar's son acquired knowledge of Sanskrit; others learned
Bengali and Persian, which would be useful in securing clerical jobs. The
experience of the companies' compradors, however, set in motion a new
pattern of expectation. Education, especially knowledge of English, came
to be regarded as a passport to wealth through jobs with the various
agencies of government or at least in the city of Calcutta. Someone like
Vidyasagar's father might still desire a Sanskritic education for his son in
tune with the scholarly tradition of his family, but in general the emphasis
had definitely shifted to job-oriented education likely to lead to wealth
and a new status. The quaint custom of subjecting the prospective bride-
groom to a written test of his knowledge of the useful languages was
evidence of this new concern.37 As a determinant of status, wealth had
gained an altogether new importance and made possible a divergence in
the values of family life as between the rich and the poor. Seeking mar-
riage alliance with rich families never appears to have been by itself an
object of ambition with the genteel Bengali Hindu until the latter half of
the eighteenth century.38 The spoiled son of the rich family repeatedly
parodied in the nineteenth-century novels was a newcomer in Bengali
literature, a product of the new cult of money.
The traditional morality of the Bengali upper castes had two distinct
but interrelated dimensions. The dharma of one's jiiti had a hard core of
ritualism and, beyond a point, personal ethics was not distinguishable
from ritual correctness. But even the caste duties were particular applica-
tions of some generally accepted ethical norms-notions of universal
morality summed up in the expression $[1 (right conduct). For the upper
castes, Brahmins in particular, hi consisted in righteousness, humility,
generosity, self-restraint, love of scholarship, knowledge of the scriptures,
and devotion to the gods, Brahmins, and the gurU.39 A nineteenth-century
writer describes the virtues of earlier generations in similar terms: "Devo-
tion to gods and one's parents, affection for brothers and sisters, filial
attachment, love for one's neighbors, hospitality, charity, forgiveness-
to such great virtues they were deeply attached." Elsewhere the same
writer eulogizes a relation who lived by the traditional norms as a person
who never turned away a suitor for charity, never desired any woman but
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his wife, was kind to people who had harmed him, totally honest, always
in control of his temper, and stoically unmoved by suffering.4o Vidya-
sagar's grandfather, another embodiment of traditional virtues, is des-
cribed by the savant as a man of independent spirit who never hesitated to
speak out his mind and scorned to speak to ill-behaved men, even though
they were scholarly, rich, and powerful. His anger had no out~ard ex-
pression. He preferred not to depend on anybody. "He took only one
meal a day, was a vegetarian, clean in his conduct and careful in the per-
formance of his daily duties. Hence everyone pointed him out as a living
saint."41
The nineteenth-century Bengali humanists were acutely aware of the
blind spots in the traditional norms. Lying, bribery, and sensual indul-
gence were apparently considered only minor vices by the older genera-
tions around the turn of the century.42 It seems likely, however, that there
was some ambivalence in these respects and also some fluctuation over
time. The distinction between bribes and perquisites was rather blurred to
the medieval mind in India as elsewhere, and there was nothing special
about Bengali upper-caste attitudes in this regard. Nepotism was con-
sidered a blameless and natural behavior, if not actually a virtue, even by
the nineteenth-century humanists in Bengal.43 In the traditional system of
values, the notions of public morality were indeed dim. Administrative
oppression was calmly accepted as a divine visitation in retribution for
people's sins.44 But at least some literary references of the eighteenth
century imply disapproval of oppressive officials.45 And, again, one pas-
sage in Bharatchandra has a curiously nineteenth-century flavor in its
scorn for masculine self-indulgence: "Even if a woman suffers the pangs
of desire for 12 years, she should not cohabit with a lecherous man. What
sort of a woman is she who kisses a man that has kissed another woman?
Even one who touches a person who has a stomach for the leftovers from
other people's plates is herself defiled."46 This is not the conventional
idiom of the khaIJcJita nayika, the heroine crossed in love of Vaishnava
poetry.
However, to the rising generation of the 1820s a certain laxity of sexual
morals, some proneness to lying, and a weakness for easy money were
vices commonly associated with the older generation. The ethical message
they derived from their Western education implied a rejection of these
vices and a desire to imitate "English ways."47
The results were not always fortunate. Drinking, formerly associated
with religious rituals and practiced generally in moderation and quietly
at night, became respectable as a part of "English ways." Ifthe wild youth
of commercial Calcutta rejoiced in smoking opium, the sophisticated
Hindu College students took to drinking in earnest. Rajnarayan Basu
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recalls in his memoirs his honest but unsuccessful attempts to follow his
father's advice-to drink only in moderation. The excesses of Young
Bengal which went much further were a deliberate rejection of all tradi-
tional norms.48
Although the oldest profession in the world was surely not brought to
Bengal by the British rulers, the economic and administrative changes of
the late eighteenth century provided it with a market probably unpre-
cedented in its scale. The growth of the new administrative centers fostered
colonies of clerks, lawyers, and the like-grass widowers all, who left their
families back in their village homes according to the custom of the times.
Many of them found solace in the company of concubines recruited from
r. the fast expanding red light districts. Even the more inhibited regularly
visited the "huts," which became centers for social gathering. "Especially
on the festive days, there was hardly space enough for people there. Just
as on the Puja nights people go around to look at the images [of the
deity], so on the night of Bijaya men went around to have a look at the
prostitutes."49
The puritanical creed of Brahmoism sternly rejected such laxities and
put forward a new ideal of personal morality. Barada Babu, a character in
the first Bengali novel, is one of the best-known embodiments of the new
puritan ethic. Barada Babu "was continually engaged in discourses about
God from his boyhood days. Hence his sufferings did not worry him."
A poor man, he spent his youth in study and meditation. He had none of
the false pride of the English-educated. He was gentle and polite, dutiful
to his family and relations, charitable to the poor, performed good deeds
in secret, and "would never take to unrighteousness even if it cost him his
life." He performed only such acts as were dear to God and avoided all
that was not dear to Him. Discipline, meditation, analysis of self, and
continuous study of the works of worthy men enabled him to find out
what the Lord desired. He did not spend his time in frivolity. His devotion
was evident from the tears that flowed every morning when he prayed.
"Through such practices has his soul become pure and calm."5o
Besides the morality of the Brahmo patriarch a new humane sensibility
gradually emerged, giving a fresh dimension to personal ethics. Karti-
keyachandra Ray, who lived a blameless life despite many temptations,
recalls in his old age the love a fallen woman had offered him and he could
not accept:
I used to think this singer's body is impure, her heart is impure, but her
love is not impure. If a flower grows in some foul spot, does the flower
become foul as well? If one enjoys the love of a dog, why should one not
be happy when a human being loves you? I felt both happy and sad about
her love.... How tragic is the fate of women. We despise the man guilty
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of adultery, but do not feel defiled if we sit or converse with him. But when
a woman is adulterous, we feel defiled even if we look at her.51
A passionate skepticism and a melancholy awareness of the human condi-
tion eventually provided the basis for a very different personal morality in
Bengali elite culture. The sentimental reminiscences of a suburban babu
quoted above anticipated the tortured individualistic groping of a later
age toward norms which required no external sanction.
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Economic Foundations of the
Bengal Renaissance
BLAIR B. KLING
University of Illinois
Most historians of the Italian Renaissance have assumed the existence of a
high correlation between commercial vitality and cultural renaissance.
Robert S. Lopez, however, has warned against accepting any simplistic
cause-and-effect relationship between economics and art, and he observes
that "intellectual development must be traced primarily to intellectual
roots."l On the other hand, he writes, the content, themes, and fashions of
art are a function of the morale of the creative artist and cannot help
being affected by his total environment, including the economic condition
of his society.2 In the Bengal renaissance there was a perceptible change in
literary themes between the early and latter nineteenth century, and with-
out going any further than the unobjectionable generalization offered by
Lopez, one may be able to associate these changes with changing economic
conditions in Bengal.
The dominant literary theme of the first half of the nineteenth century,
expressed by such diverse writers as Rammohun Roy, Bhabanicharan
Bannerji,3 and the radical students of Young Bengal, was Indo-British
collaboration. They wrote in a period of economic cooperation between
the races, a time of embryonic industrialization in Lower Bengal when
the area was technologically advanced and when the mercantile com-
munity, composed of both races, was attempting to establish independent
economic institutions.
After mid-century, Bengali attitudes changed. David Kopf has referred
to the growing xenophobia and cultural nationalism of the latter nine-
teenth century, and Warren Gunderson has noted that "by the 1870s ...
new cultural patterns were emerging which were more assertive and more
26
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aggressively national. . . . In the new age new men appeared on the stage
who were much more skeptical about the value of cooperation with the
British."4 The period of nationalism and xenophobia in literature cor-
responded with a period in which Calcutta had become an economic
dependency of Great Britain and locked into the imperial economic sys-
tem. Furthermore, the Bengali merchant was no longer a partner in the
modern sector of the Calcutta business world but subordinate to both
British and western-Indian merchant communities.
One result of Calcutta's economic backwardness was a shortage of
employment opportunities for the growing number of Western-educated
Bengalis. But this problem was not manifest until the 1880s, and the
earliest expressions of economic nationalism in Bengal antedate by at
least a decade economic stress among the bhadra/ok.5 In 1869 Chandranath
Bose, and in 1873 Bholanath Chandra, called for protective tariffs to
encourage the development of indigenous factory industries. Bholanath,
in particular, urged the Indians to establish their own banks, corporations,
mills, and factories, and he denounced those of his countrymen who
preferred foreign goods to indigenous manufactures.6 These early ex-
pressions of nationalist economic doctrines were inspired not by personal
economic hardship but by the poverty of the masses and disappointment
with the government for its failure to encourage economic development.
The decade of the 1850s was a transitional period that marked both the
beginning of purposeful economic imperialism and the end of over 150
years of Bengali-British business collaboration.
The modern Bengali business class, in fact, owes its origin to British
commercial activity. When Europeans began trading in Bengal in the
sixteenth century, the traditional Bengali merchant castes had been dis-
placed by traders from north India who had captured the lucrative foreign
trade in Bengali silk and cotton textiles. It was from these outsiders-
Marwaris, Pathans, Kashmiris, and others-and not from Bengalis that
the British seized the trade of Bengal in the eighteenth century. Greater
resources and the use of the dastak enabled the British to outbid the
merchants of north India for the products of Bengal. In addition, wherever
possible the British bypassed the middlemen and gathered handloom
weavers and silk winders into compounds under their own control. They
also diverted the extensive coastal trade between Bengal and Gujarat
from the boats of independent Indian merchants to their own ships and
changed the direction of the flourishing trade between these provinces to a
separate trade of each with the Far East. 7
As they drove the north Indian traders from Bengal, the British develop-
ed in Calcutta a new Bengali merchant class. In the late seventeenth cen-
tury, when they first came to the site of Calcutta, the British found a few
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villages of Setts and Basaks, lower-caste Bengali weavers who had learned
while dealing with the Portuguese in the previous century to combine
trade with weaving. Under British rule many Setts and Basaks amassed
fortunes as brokers and dadni merchants. 8 Other Bengali communities
quickly became aware of commercial opportunities under British auspices
and migrated to Calcutta. By 1763, along with those of Setts and Basaks,
the names of Kayasthas and Baniks appear on lists of investment agents
of the East India Company, and after Plassey, Brahmin names were
added. 9
By the end of the eighteenth century Calcutta had moved far ahead of
the older trading and administrative cities of Bengal in population and in
wealth. Among its citizenry was a new Indian elite composed of banians,
dewans, and pundits associated with the British in trade, government,
and educational institutions. They were drawn from a variety of Bengali
Hindu castes. What they had in common were ambitious ancestors who
had come to the city in search of wealth. The new elite invested their
money in both modern and traditional activities. To establish status in
Bengali society, they built temples and ghats, supported Brahmin priests,
threw great feasts, and performed expensive shraddha. But they also built
new mansions and furnished them with Western imports. In their produc-
tive investments they joined with Europeans in commerce, shipping, and
land development. On their own they purchased zamindaris and urban
real estate.
In addition to Bengalis Calcutta attracted a large cosmopolitanpopu-
lation from all parts of India and Asia. A new wave of north Indian busi-
ness communities, primarily Marwaris, settled in Calcutta to work as
shroffs (moneychangers) and kothiwal (merchant bankers) in the Burrah
bazaar. During the nineteenth century they complemented the interna-
tional commercial system by advancing money to agency houses that
imported British textiles and acted as middlemen for the distribution of
British imports to northwestern India. Until the Opium War they also
speculated heavily in opium.I° But unlike the Bengalis they usually re-
mained outside British commercial institutions and maintained their
traditional upcountry networks along with their traditional "bania" way
of life.
The British carried on their international trade through a group of
firms known as agency houses. Formed in the late eighteenth century by
enterprising men who left the Company service to try their hand in private
trade, these houses represented the sector of the economy oriented toward
international markets. They used the money of their constituents, civil
and military servants of the Company, to finance the import-export trade,
especially the country trade, and to produce indigo and other agricultural
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 29
---
products for export. By the 1820s competition had forced them to expand
their activities. They built and operated ships, served as bill brokers,
formed banks and insurance companies, and lent their support to ventures
in mining, manufacturing, and plantation industries. l1 The number of
agency houses steadily increased over the years. In 1790 there were fifteen;
in 1828, twenty-seven; in 1835, sixty-one; and by 1846, ninety-three.l 2 Of
these only half a dozen at anyone time were great houses; the majority
were limited in their activities and operated with small sums of capital.
Bengali capitalists known as banians were directly associated with the
Calcutta agency houses and provided money for the international export
trade. In the eighteenth century the banian was valued for his knowledge
of internal markets and sources of supply. As the British learned more
about India, his value declined; but after the free-trade charter of 1813
and the influx of a new set of adventurers from Britain who came with
little capital of their own, the banian again became important, now as a
source of finance. His importance continued to grow after the crash of
1830-1833, which frightened off the capital that had been provided by the
British nonmercantile community. By the I 840s Europeans were employed
"as agents of native capital,"13 and one writer complained that the new
banians had "assumed airs which their more wealthy predecessors had
never taken on themselves; they treated their European connections not
only with contemptuous disregard, but often with much insolence. The
Hindoo star was in the ascendant, and these men made the most of it."14
In the mid-1850s capital from Britain began to move increasingly into
India and the banian, who now lost much of his financial power, was
demoted or discarded altogether.
In their heyday the banians also joined in the development of Calcutta's
commercial infrastructure, including insurance companies, a docking
company, banking, warehousing, a chamber ofcommerce, and commercial
newspapers. After 1834, British and Indian merchants invested together in
a number of joint-stock companies engaged in steam tugging, coal mining,
indigo manufacturing, tea planting, river steamboat services, and railroad
building. In these enterprises Indians held, on the average, one-fourth to
one-third of the shares.l5
Finally, Indians also joined in the development of modern power-
operated residentiary industries that competed for capital with export
industries and counterbalanced the colonial export economy. For the
time, it appeared that Calcutta was on the threshold of a small-scale in-
dustrial revolution. In 1844 J. H. Stocqueler, a Calcutta journalist, noted
that "on approaching Calcutta, the smoking chimneys of steam engines
are now seen in every direction, on either side of the river, presenting the
gratifying appearance of a seat of numerous extensive manufactories,
30 KLING
vying with many British cities. "16 In the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the application of steam power was the measure of a nation's
industrial standing, India led all other colonies and dependencies of Great
Britain in the use of steam power,17 Bengal saw its first steam engine in
1818, and by 1845 there were 150 engines generating six thousand horse-
power in use in the Presidency. A few of these had been locally ptoduced
by British engineer-technicians, but almost all the rest were imported
from Britain. Half the engines were used in sugar refineries, docks, col-
lieries, flour and rice mills, and paper factories; the remainder saw service
in sea and river steamers, tugs, and pleasure boats.l8
In the Calcutta area the largest single industrial complex was located at
Fort Gloster, fifteen miles south of Calcutta. The complex included a
factory for making cotton twist, a rum distillery, an iron foundry, an oil-
seed mill, and a paper mill, all worked by five steam engines.l 9 The cotton
mill, set up in 1817, was the oldest in India.20 In 1833 the mill, worked by
two engines of fifty horsepower each, produced a large quantity of cotton
twist which, according to a contemporary report, "was daily rising in the
estimation of the natives and . . . the labour of men initiated in the art of
weaving is now almost double of what was performed at the commence-
ment of the undertaking."21 After Fergusson and Company, its owner,
went bankrupt in 1833, the Fort Gloster complex was purchased by ajoint-
stock company most of whose shareholders were old India hands resident
in England. But at least one Bengali, Dwarkanath Tagore, and possibly
others, were major shareholders. By 1840 the mill was producing 700,000
pounds of yarn annually, the lower numbers of which sold in Calcutta
better than imported yarn and the larger numbers on a par with imports.
The labor force, with the exception of the European superintendent, was
recruited from Orissa and Bengal, paid by the task, and worked eleven
hours a day.22
Before the middle of the nineteenth century manufacturing activity
had spread northward along the right bank of the Hughli River into the
suburbs of Hughli, Howrah, Sibpur, and Sulkea, called by one writer "the
Southwark of Calcutta."23 Included were sugar factories, rum distilleries,
cotton screws, a biscuit factory, flour mills, a mustard oil mill, and a paper
factory. In and near Calcutta itself were a number of steam-operated iron
foundries; Jessop and Company, established in the eighteenth century,
repaired steamboats, manufactured tools and simple machinery, and in
1825 offered to build a railway from Calcutta to Diamond Harbor. 24 The
government itself operated the most extensive foundry. From a modern
plant opened in 1834 at Cossipore, four miles north of Calcutta, the
foundry supplied brass ordnance to the whole of India. The court of
directors had sent out twelve boring and turning lathes, some lighter
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lathes, and two small steam engines to power the works. Adjacent to the
foundry was a casting and smelting house with cupola blast furnaces for
smelting iron and large reverberatory furnaces for smelting gun meta1. 25
A large, docile, and talented labor force was available to operate the
factories and mills. The leading employer was the Government Steam
Department, which hired Indian and Eurasian labor as mechanics, ship-
wrights, millwrights, plumbers, and boilermakers. Elsewhere in the city
skilled workmen, recruited from Hindu artisan castes and from the Chi-
nese community, worked as carpenters, painters, blacksmiths, locksmiths,
and jewelers, some under European master craftsmen. Workmen were
hired in gangs under contract with a chief mistry, an Indian master crafts-
man who received the wages from the entire gang and distributed them as
p.e wished. 26 Although there were mixed reports on the quality of Indian
labor, those employed in the mint were said to handle the machinery, in-
cluding the steam engine, with facility.27 Similarly, the workmen at the
Fort Gloster cotton mill were considered experts in their machinery du-
ties. 28
In terms of the total production of Bengal this industrial activity was
probably not of great significance. Its importance, instead, must have been
in its effect on the intellectual and moral climate of the city, in awakening
a pride of citizenship. Calcutta appeared to be moving inexorably toward
industrialization, and a sense of progress pervaded the city. Indian partici-
pation in the modern sector of the economy was on an upward trend, and
the Bengali elite must have participated in the prevailing pride of citizen-
ship and sense of progress.
An important factor was the encouragement given by the government.
Before the mid-nineteenth century the government of India supported
economic development, including industrialization, even when it conflicted
with home interests. The governors general-Bentinck, Auckland, EI-
lenborough, and Hardinge-were expected to balance the budget and
remit the home charges in the face of rising expenses and the prevailing
poverty of the peasantry. The obvious answer was to find new sources of
revenue. Lord Bentinck's minute favoring European colonization aroused
opposition from the manufacturing interests of Britain, who "saw in colo-
nization the spectre of a second Lancashire on the bank of the Ganges,
which could beat the original with cheap Indian labour and raw mater-
ial."29 But evidently Bentinck anticipated no conflict between British and
Indian economic interests. After leaving office he testified that he had sup-
ported steam communication with India on grounds that it would facili-
tate the education of Indian students in England, from which they would
return with technological knowledge, the key to progress in India. It would
also facilitate the influx of British businessmen, who had done much for
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Indian economic development. And along with plantation industries he
unabashedly cited with approval the Gloster mills, the iron foundries, and
the coal mines, all of which competed with British products.3o
Lord Auckland (1836-1842) was even stronger in his conviction that
India must industrialize. He favored both the revival of Heath's modern
steel mill in Madras and cast-iron manufacturing among the primitive hill
tribes of Assam. Auckland directed the Cossipore foundry to supply the
government's needs for suspension bridges and iron boats and instructed
the Coal Committee to expand its activities to locating the best ores and
fluxes available in India as the foundation for a local steel industry. He
promoted experiments for the improvement of cotton, the processing of
hemp, the manufacture of pottery and porcelain, and the growing of nut-
meg, pepper plants, and cochineal insects. Moreover he looked forward to
the development of Assam, "a country of vast promise," by the applica-
tion of both European and Indian capital.31
His successors, EIIenborough (1842-1844) and Hardinge (1844-1848),
were too involved in military affairs to devote time to internal develop-
ment, but their sentiments were not essentially different from those of
Bentinck and Auckland. In 1828, as president of the Board of Control,
EIIenborough had encouraged, in the face of strong opposition from the
private trade interests in the Court of Directors, a policy of import substi-
tution to save the Indian government money.32 As governor general he
strove to develop public works and establish experimental cotton farms
but was thwarted because of a shortage of funds. 33 Hardinge encouraged
the early planning of railway building. "Our rule," he wrote Hobhouse on
the subject of railways, "has been distinguished by building large Prisons;
and the contrast with the Mogul Emperors, in the respect of public works,
is not to our advantage."34 At a ceremony awarding prizes to colIege stu-
dents in Calcutta for their recitation of Shakespeare, he concluded his
address "by giving his hearers a practical account of the magic powers of
steam and electricity."35
Among the British publicists of the period, some were willing to admit
that India possessed an industrial potential and others were not. George
W. Johnson, an attorney who spent three years in Calcutta in the early
1840s, minced no words on the subject:
Doubtless, it is of high importance for the increase of India's wealth to
improve her cotton growth, and to establish extensively on her soil the
cultivation of the tea-plant, but these are only some of the first steps to-
wards the desired object. . . . It is now shown that the mineral wealth of
India fits her for a higher destiny; and that she, like America, may be at
first agricultural, but gradually may become, also, a manufacturing coun-
try.36
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A Madras civil servant named Everett, after a visit to Fort Gloster,
predicted that abundant raw cotton and cheap labor would enable the
local textile mill to supply "a great part, if not the whole, of the Eastern
world, to the exclusion of the European manufacture." He deplored Brit-
ish opposition to the export of cotton mill machinery and asked whether
"the manufactures of Bengal have not as good a claim to the protection of
the sovereign as those of Lancashire. . . . But India," he concluded, "has
never yet been regarded as part of the empire. It goes by the unhappy
name of colony, a place ... made expressly to be plundered by the
Mother-country."37
On the other hand, far more influential publicists such as Robert M.
Martin and John Crawfurd, who were trying to promote British invest-
ment in India, stressed the enormous potential of India as an importer of
British capital. To allay the fears of British industrialists and exporters,
they emphasized the potential of India as a producer of raw cotton and
plantation products. Crawfurd considered that any "attempt to introduce
the complex manufactures of Europe into India [would be] a signal com-
mercial blunder. "38 In the same vein R. M. Martin wrote of the ideal
relationship of mother country and colony: "the one [Britain] teeming
with a hardy, industrious and ingenious population, two-thirds of whom
are engaged in manipulating and vending the produce of more genial
climes . . . the other [India] rich to overflowing with bounty with which
nature has enriched the earth, and peculiarly so in those agricultural pro-
ducts necessary to the manufactures, comforts and luxuries of the more
civilized nation."39 His racial arrogance turned to doubt by 1860, when he
became aware of the industrial potential of the Indian textile industry that
had developed in Bombay. "Even the present generation," he warned,
"may witness the Lancashire manufacturer beaten by his Hindu compet-
itor."40
Indians, noting the effects of both machine-made imports and Fort
Gloster yarn on the rural weavers and spinners, were at first less certain of
the efficacy of industrialization.41 A Hindu traveler who visited Fort
Gloster mill in 1830 reported that the local people considered industriali-
zation a mixed blessing. As consumers they benefited from cheaper cloth;
but some, who had learned from English friends about the results of the
industrial revolution in cities like Glasgow and Manchester, were fearful
of the long-term effects of industrialization on human life.42 Other western-
ized intelligentsia lumped commerce and industry together and called on
the youth of the country to turn from the study of English literature t9
such practical subjects as science and commerce.43 Gradually, however,
Indian writers recognized the importance of industrial development. An
editorial written in 1847, probably by Iswar Chundra Gupta, lamented the
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closing down of the Calcutta Mechanics Institute because of a lack of
public interest and noted that industry and technical skills were essential
for a nation's progress.44
The issue may never have occurred to the leading entrepreneur of the
day, Dwarkanath Tagore. He saw immediate profit in the production of
staples and plantation products, and though he may have believed that
India would eventually produce its own steam engines and iron and steel,
he was content for the time to import superior British engines at reasonable
prices. Dwarkanath cast his lot with the free traders and joined in their
attack upon the restrictive policies of the East India Company. He believed
the end of the Company's business operations would stimulate the import
of British capital and skill, hasten the economic development of India, and
lead to the rise of a strong, independent, and reform-minded Indian mid-
dle class. It was natural for an enlightened and politically astute Indian
like Tagore to associate himself with the party of progress in Britain. But
he closed his eyes to the full implications of a movement grounded in the
concept of an industrialized England supported by agricultural colonies.
It was, in fact, free-trade imperialism that would frustrate the industrial
development that he and his British partners were to promote with such
vigor in the l830s and 1840s.45
Indian attitudes carried over from business into politics, and by the
fourth decade of the nineteenth century the Indian elite of Calcutta con-
sidered themselves potential partners with the British not only in com-
merce and industry but also in citizenship. Rammohun and Dwarkanath
traveled to England to visit the capital city of an empire they considered
their own,46 and one reason they wanted the end of Company rule was
that they preferred to be subjects of the crown rather than of a mere
trading company. Admittedly, British rule in India was looked upon as
far from perfect, and the intelligentsia were outspoken in their criticism.
But they felt that improvement would come in time, and they could point
to many signs of progress achieved thus far under British rule-battles
won for a free press and jury trial, colleges founded, law and order
established, economic opportunities opened. Most important, the British
were the bearers of a new culture of science and technology in which alone
lay any hope for transforming India.47
While Indians were developing a loyalty to the empire, among the
Calcutta British a group was emerging that could be called an "Indian
interest." It was composed of the partners of the major agency houses
with heavy investments in mofussil industries such as indigo. One of the
first expressions of a "Calcutta" as opposed to a "metropolitan" interest
was the attempt of the Calcutta community to promote steam communi-
cation with Britain. The struggle lasted from 1823 to 1840 and was finally
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lost when the British-based Peninsular and Oriental Line obtained a
government charter.48 The Calcuttans also opposed any competition from
British-domiciled banking with their own Union Bank and succeeded
until 1853 in keeping an imperial bank out of India.48 Again, the Calcutta
board of directors of the Assam Tea Company battled against the London
board for control over local operations, though the latter represented
over ninety percent of the capital. Eventually they too lost to London.5o
Finally, the local interest groups united in 1846 in a life and death struggle
against Manchester-supported houses to prevent the abolition of the
"hypothecation system." Under this system, which existed until 1850,
the government of India advanced money to Calcutta export houses
hypothecated to the shipment of indigo and other staples, advances made
by the government in order to remit funds to England to pay its home
charges.51
Thus, until the mid-nineteenth century the leading indigenous mer-
chants were gaining in strength and anticipating a larger share in the
operation of the economy if not the administration itself. At the same time
a sector of the Calcutta British mercantile community was increasingly
identifying its interests with India and holding the line against metro-
politan control over the economy of the country. Together they were
building a local, independent economic structure that formed the basis
for a vigorous interracial social and cultural life.
But their promising achievements were destined to fail. Even in the
heyday oflocal enterprise powerful currents were undermining the founda-
tions of Calcutta's economy. One basic problem was the huge remittance
pressures that distorted the foreign trade of Bengal. From 1817 to 1840
the annual volume of Calcutta's commodity exports averaged twice its
imports-rupees 2t crores of imports against rupees 5 crores of ex-
ports. In the 1840s both imports and exports increased to almost double
their previous value. Calcutta's large merchandise export surplus formed
part of a total export of capital from India that exceeded imports by
£5 to £6 million annually. Of this amount, £3.5 million was remitted on
behalf of the East India Company, primarily to meet its home charges,
and the balance represented remittances by private British subjects. The
unilateral transfer of funds had severe repercussions on the economy of
Bengal. When commodity exports failed to meet remittance demands,
bullion was exported and, in the absence of a paper currency, this resulted
in a contraction of the money supply and lower prices. Because the land
revenue demand was constant, many zamindars could not meet their
taxes. The most acute instance of this problem occurred during the com-
mercial crisis of 1830-1833 when landed estates, sold in default of taxes,
glutted the market. Another effect of the transfer problem was to encour-
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age the diversion of capital from other sectors of the economy into ex-
port industries; this situation resulted in an imbalanced economic struc-
ture.52
In Bengal the export industry that received the bulk of investment was
indigo. Demand for the blue dye was rising in Britain, and Bengal had
the natural endowments to produce the finest indigo in the world. In the
1820s, to pay for the increasing importation of British yarn and textiles,
indigo production expanded greatly. From Dacca to Delhi over one
million acres were put under indigo, producing annually a crop valued
at £2 to £3 million. But indigo production and export created more prob-
lems for the houses than it solved. The market for indigo fluctuated with
European trade cycles and the supply varied with the Indian monsoon.
Indigo production rose not in response to any real demand in Britain but
in response to the need for an item for remittance. Even if the trade had
been "spontaneous" rather than "induced," indigo would have presented
problems. Seed had to be distributed and advances given to cultivators
two years before the indigo was to be marketed in Britain. Its suitability
for remittance purposes forced up its price in Calcutta independently of
its price in London, resulting in overproduction and a glut on the Lon-
don market. As often as not indigo planters, capitalized by the agency
houses of Calcutta, went bankrupt. In these cases the entire investment
was lost because the fields in which indigo was cultivated belonged to
Indian zamindars while the expensive processing equipment was useless
unless worked.53
By the mid-1820s, with so much of their capital tied up in indigo pro-
duction, the agency houses began to experience a number of difficulties.
In 1825 a commercial slump in England depressed the demand for indigo;
to compensate for lower prices, still more indigo was produced and ex-
ported, leading to a further glut on the market. A number of agency
house partners sold off their enormous Indian assets and retired home.
Between 1830 and 1833 the entire edifice crumbled and the old houses,
some of which had been in existence from the beginning of the century,
failed. 54
In 1834 a new commercial structure replaced the old. It lasted until
the commercial crisis of 1847. One group of the new houses, which can be
called "export houses," specialized in indigo production; a second group,
which can be called "import houses," specialized in importing cotton
textiles on consignment from British manufacturers.55 Many of the import
houses formed by British manufacturers specifically to serve as agents
for the sale and distribution of yarn and textiles, had no independent
resources. They remitted their funds to their British suppliers by advancing
money on or purchasing indigo, further encouraging speculation in that
overburdened commodity.56
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This situation left the export houses to provide the bulk of local in-
vestment capital. Some of them invested not only in indigo, silk, and
sugar production but also in mines, steamboats, and other local industries.
Partners of export houses were heavily represented on the boards of direc-
tors of the Union Bank and of the joint-stock companies; they belonged
to the group of British and Indians concerned with preserving local control;
they tried to raise capital for these undertakings locally and were the
entrepreneurs among the merchants of Calcutta. In their statements and
activities can be glimpsed the first dim urges toward economic self-deter-
mination in India.57
Each set of houses developed its own sources of supply and its own
marketing system. Import houses developed internal markets; but, be-
cause of their dependence on their British correspondents, they were not
in a position to invest in local manufactures to supply these markets.
Export houses invested their capital in the production of goods for
markets abroad, and the economic structure of Bengal was bifurcated into
two separate channels.
Conversely, in Bombay the same house was likely to combine an im-
port with an export trade. Typical of Bombay merchants was the Parsi
Cowasji Davar, the father of Bombay's modern textile industry. He was
"involved in the export and financing of raw cotton and the import of
cotton textiles. . . . It was inevitable that the notion of importing ma-
chinery and starting a textile mill would strike Davar or one of his con-
temporaries."58
Because of an international commercial crisis in 1847 the entire group
of export houses and the Union Bank which they controlled crashed.
The crisis had been touched off in Britain by the railroad mania 'and a
precipitous fall in the price of rail stocks. It disrupted the commercial
life of Britain and led to the bankruptcy of houses shipping colonial pro-
ducts from all parts of the world. In Calcutta the houses that had tried
to build an independent capital position on the quicksand of indigo were
hurt the most. The Union Bank had behaved as if indigo factories were
sound capital assets that could be redeemed if loans against them were
defaulted. Its directors closed their eyes to the truth that the expensive
indigo establishments were worthless unless the price of indigo on the
European market held the line.59
The crash of 1847 led to a readjustment in business thinking to cor-
respond with the reality of Calcutta's economic situation. The business-
men of Calcutta could not build an independent economy on the basis of
a colonial product that was inelastic both in its production and in its
demand. In the absence of a manufacturing industry catering at least in
part to an indigenous market, Bengal was doomed to a dependent colonial
position. After the crash the merchants accepted their fate and Calcutta
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become a typical parasitic city in a colonial setting, a nerve center for
colonial exploitation rather than a generator of economic growth.60
Until the end of the nineteenth century its only important new industry
was jute processing, an enclave industry with almost no internal market
or backward linkages that would have stimulated the developmettt of
ancillary industries in Bengal.61
Until the middle of the nineteenth century Calcutta had been a center
of industrial progress and advanced technology. This milieu, however
small a part of the total economy, contributed to the exhilaration of social
and cultural life in the city. But it was Bengal's unhappy fate to be the
major provider of export staples, the strong demand for which was arti-
ficially stipmlated by the remittance needs of the government and the
British business community. Those of the business elite who identified
themselves with local interests tried valiantly to overcome this skewed
development, but the demand factors were too strong and their own
capital resources too weak. Their attempt ended in the crash of 1847 and
they succumbed to the subjugation of their economy of imperial re-
quirements.
Once interrupted the momentum of industrial development in Bengal
was not resumed until the twentieth century. Government policy after
mid-century contributed to the decline in the rate of development of new
industries. The government was obligated to develop India into a producer
of raw materials and semifinished products that would feed into British
industry. It facilitated this policy through fiscal means, particularly by
refusing to establish protective tariffs. In addition, as the largest single
consumer of manufactured goods, the government discriminated against
indigenous manufacturers in its stores-purchasing policy.62
Related to the decline in the rate of technological progress was a deterio-
ration in the position of the Bengali businessman in the advanced sector
of the economy. Underlying this was an increased racial bias and social
discrimination against Bengalis by both private and official Britishers.63
Technological advance and industrialization leveled off until the end of
the nineteenth century, and the inferior status of Calcutta's economy
influenced the cultural and social life in the latter nineteenth century. In
1839 the Bombay Gazette had noted with envy:
We are one good century behind Calcutta in matters of improvement,
speculation, and so forth. We have here no public scheming and projecting,
no active open system of public spiritedness, no companies forming, no
societies emerging. All with us is as yet unwelded and unamalgamated.
We hold counsel in a system ofwrapt up secrecy and shrewdness in all our
dealings with one another. Our monied people have a taste for solitude
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and abstraction, and can seldom be made to meet, or subscribe, except on
the departure of some Governor.... In Calcutta we observe a totally
different spirit. There we do recognize something like community of feeling
and a combined idiosyncrasy; societies, meetings, projections follow in
quick succession, and a current of healthy sympathy and sentiment seems
to pervade the monied mass. Instead of maintaining the lonely icicled state
of magnificence in which we exist, the thaw of social harmony has pro-
duced a permeative process of coalescence, which is spreading in every
direction, and resolving into one community both Europeans and Na-
tives. 64
39
In the next half century the positions of the two cities were reversed
and, as the races drifted apart, the "renaissance" was infected with the
virus of cultural chauvinism.
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The Universal Man and the Yellow Dog:
The Orientalist Legacy and the Problem of
Brahmo Identity in the Bengal Renaissance
DAVID KOPF
University of Minnesota
The most important fact of the present age is that all the different races
of the world have come close together. And again we are confronted
with two alternatives. The problem is whether the different groups of
peoples shall go on fighting with one another or find out some true
basis of reconciliation and mutual help; whether it will be interminable
competition or cooperation.
Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism
When God finished making the world
He had a few stinking scraps of mud left over
and used it to make a yellow dog
(And when they hate any race or nation they
name that race or nation in place
of the yellow dog).
Carl Sandburg, The People Yes
1. THE ORIENTALIST CONTRIBUTION TO THE BENGAL RENAISSANCE
This essay is in part an interpretation of the Bengal renaissance and in
part an analysis of cultural identity among Bengali intellectuals struggling
to maintain their outgoing universalism against the rising tide of militant
and aggressive nationalism. The outgoing universalism of Rabindranath
Tagore, which is relatively well known among Western scholars, was
perhaps the single most significant idea to emerge from the Bengal renais-
sance. This renaissance-of which Tagore is often held to be both the finest
and the final expression-occurred largely in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and was characterized by a remarkable creative
outburst of literary, artistic, and ideological achievements.
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Universalism, so characteristic of the renaissance spirit and thought,
was an intellectual outgrowth of East-West contact in Calcutta. At that
time the city was a dynamic pivot for acculturating India's most progres-
sive intelligentsia to modernizing impulses from western Europe. The
Brahmo Samaj (Society for the Worship of the One True God) was per-
haps the most representative institutional expression of the Bengal
renaissance. This movement, made up for the most part of a Western-
educated professional elite dissatisfied with the shortcomings of their own
society and culture vis-a-vis the West, sought to modernize their religious
and social traditions.
The birth of a modernizing intelligentsia in Bengal is a subject I have
treated in British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance. From my point
of view, the renaissance was the child of eighteenth-century cosmopolitan-
ism and pragmatic British policy (derived from Warren Hastings)l built
around the need for an acculturated civil-service class of Englishmen
(trained at the College of Fort William from 1800).2 Calcutta, chosen as
capital of British India in 1772, provided the ideal environment. Spurred
on by a class of British officials known as Orientalists3 sympathetically
engaged in a scholarly reconstruction of the Hindu past, a newly formed
intelligentsia selectively reinterpreted their heritage and strove to reshape
their culture in the new image.4
Rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and dynamic classicism were the three
key intellectual values transmitted by British Orientalists to the Bengali
intelligentsia while functioning as windows to the West. These character-
istic components, derived from the Age of Enlightenment in Europe,
were universal rather than parochial in tenor. Rationalism pertained to
the search for "constant and universal principles" of human nature. 5 Cos-
mopolitanism was based on the ideal of tolerance and understanding
between all peoples and cultures.
Dynamic classicism is more subtle and requires some elaboration.
Classicism in general may be defined as looking back through history to
what one envisions as a classical age of one's culture, an age when one's
distant ancestors seemed to have the right answers to the eternal questions
of politics, society, and religion. This age was the real or imagined moment
of truth for that culture. The implication to Afro-Asian intellectuals under-
going the same experience is that between the golden age and their own
age lies a long, dark period of cultural stagnation. In the mind of such an
intellectual awakened to a sense of inferiority as a result of his defensive
encounter with the modern West, there arises the question invariably:
How does one end the dark age and give one's culture a new lease on
life?
The intelligentsia can solve this problem in a number of ways. They
can try to disavow their heritage and history completely and succumb to
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some Western style of life. This is not an easy solution unless one moves
physically from one's point of origin to a utopia across the seas. America
was founded this way. The opposite of westernization is "static classi-
cism," the attempt to make one's culture vital and strong again by reviving
the purely ancient ideals and traditions without interference from Western
influences. This is another impossible solution because the past is dead
and buried. There is no way of revitalizing a decadent culture except by
borrowing heavily from progressive cultures of the West. This is the root
cause of "ambivalent modernization," which is in its more negative
aspect a form of militant nationalism often bordering on fascism. Com-
munalism in India and Pakistan, as well as aspects of black nationalism
in the United States today, reflect both the dilemma and the dangerous
consequences of this position.
The dynamic classicist stands somewhere in the middle-between the
westernizer who renounces his culture in order to save it and the nativist
who romanticizes it for the same purpose. The dynamic classicist argues
that golden age models are to be used not to shape the present in the image
of the past but to rediscover guidelines in one's classical heritage appro-
priate to a society in transition. Unlike the static classicist he uses history
to justify accepting modern values from the West. But he makes a sharp
distinction between adopting modern values from the West and westerni-
zation.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MACAULAYISM AND THE ORIGINS OF
MODERN NATIONALISM IN BENGAL
In the 1830s the antithesis to Orientalist cultural policy appeared in Bengal
as Macaulayism, named after Thomas Babington Macaulay, author" of
the famous Education Minute of 1835.6 Macaulayism represented both an
alternative to Orientalism as a modernizing program for India and an
alternative to universalism as an ideology for modern man.
Hans Kohn, an authority on nationalism in the West, places the rise
of nationalism "as a general European movement in the nineteenth
century" and refers to Macaulay as a chief participant in the movement. 7
"Nationalism," Kohn writes, "made the divisions of mankind more
pronounced and spread the antagonistic aspirations to wider multitudes
. . . than ever before." It also produced a "cultural tension which
invested the national struggles with the halo of a semi-religious crusade."8
When Macaulay wrote that the English "have become the greatest and
most highly civilized people ever the world saw" 9 he was evidently expres-
sing a chauvinism (however seemingly true to Victorians) that was in sharp
contrast to what Kohn calls "the rationalism of the eighteenth century
with its emphasis on the common sense of civilization."lo
Rationalism-the belief in unity over diversity-now gave way to
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romanticism, the belief that each culture had a special genius which made
it intrinsically different from its neighbor. Cosmopolitanism-the belief
in humanity over nation-succumbed to nationalism, the contrary belief
in the supremacy of national character and sovereignty. Dynamic clas-
sicism-the reinterpretation of tradition in the light of contemporary
values from the West-now surrendered to dynamic futurism, the fepudia-
tion of all history and tradition. As Macaulay himself aptly put it, "Words,
and more words, and nothing but words had been all the fruit of all the
most renowned sages of sixty generations."ll
Macaulay was, like his counterparts in continental Europe-including
Hegel-a well-intentioned liberal optimist of the early nineteenth century,
and it is historically unfair to accuse him of deliberately unleasing the
yellow dog of national and racial hatred. Nevertheless, in Bengal of the
1830s, Macaulayism did have the immediate psychological effect of doing
precisely that by polarizing the loyalties of the intelligentsia into two
opposite camps.l2 The Calcutta cultural mediator who for decades had
responded favorably to the culture of the British Orientalist (who was
himself favorably impressed with Indian culture) now faced a different
view: that all patterns of reform were an integral part of Western civiliza-
tion and that all Asian civilizations were almost by definition static and
decadent. (Macaulay had seriously advised Asians to dress like English-
men, eat like Englishmen, speak like Englishmen, and act like English-
men, as their only valid passport to modernity.)l3
The intelligentsia in Calcutta therefore confronted a crisis in identity.
The westernizers, called Young Bengal, followed Macaulayism and tem-
porarily set themselves adrift in a cultural limbo between their own
heritage, which they naturally rejected, and that of England, the utopia
across the seas, which they understood only imperfectly and to which
they could never really belong.l4 The older men, those who had worked
with British Orientalists and were dynamic classicists for most of their
adult lives,I5 turned defensive and nativist in their sudden zealous ap-
preciation of Hinduism.I6 They formed an organization called the Dharma
Sabha (Society in Defense of the Hindu Socio-Ethical Religious Order),
which historically has the importance of being India's first modern
nationalist movement.l 7 Macaulayism, unwittingly perhaps, had unleash-
ed the yellow dog of militant Hindu nationalism in Bengal.
III. TRINITARIAN ETHNOCENTRISM AND UNITARIAN UNIVERSALISM
IN THE BENGALI SETTING: THE CASE OF RAMMOHUN Roy
The renaissance which owed its genesis to outgoing universalism seemed
to be facing its first real crisis as a generation of intellectuals defected
from modernism and turned to ingrown nationalism and xenophobia.
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Looking back, however, the Dharma Sabha movement was never more
than a yellow puppy of hatred for the English rather than a large ferocious
dog for the simple reason that the government never implemented Ma-
caulay's radical program of secular westernization. As it turned out, not
secular Macaulayism but the religious variety proved far more formidable
a threat to the universalist spirit of the renaissance. Represented by mis-
sionaries like the Presbyterian Alexander Duff and converts like Krishna
Mohun Bannerji, the gospel of religious Macaulayism denied the validity
of all things Indian and based its program on the ethnocentric proposition
that Christianity was an integral part of European civilization.l 8
It was at this point that the Brahmo Samaj began to play its crucial
role in the history of the Bengal renaissance. Under the patronage of the
powerful Tagore family of Jorosanko, and under Debendranath Tagore's
leadership in the 1840s, the Brahmo Samaj with its subsidiary Tattvabo-
dhini Sabha became the most popular organization for the increasing num-
ber of Western-educated intelligentsia.l 9 Within a single decade after
1843, Debendranath had endowed the movement with a structure (the
Brahmo mandir or church), had evolved an ideology (the Brahmo Dhar-
ma), and had provided an identity (the Brahmo covenant).20
The Protestant missionaries, far more interested than the government
in reshaping men's minds, began a campaign in competition with Brahmos
to win over the Western-educated whose training, mentality, and new style
of life had alienated them intellectually and psychologically from their
countrymen. Whereas the government only anglicized Bengalis sufficiently
to make subordinate officials and clerks out of them, the missionaries
were anxious to transform total personalities to save souls for Christ.
Moreover, since missionaries in those days were ethnocentric and elitist
in sympathy, they worked mostly in cities and mostly with the Western-
educated through the medium of English.
The missionaries did begin to make inroads with the intelligentsia,
converting members of some of the best families. 21 The Brahmo Samaj
met the challenge and provided what they hoped would prove an indigen-
ous alternative to Europeanized Christianity. They offered the Western-
educated a reformed Indian religion-Vedantism-which they argued was
free of superstition and priestly tyranny. At the same time, Brahmos
claimed to offer an ethical system based on Hindu scriptures but reflecting
the identical sentiments of the Sermon on the Mount. Finally, Brahmos
suggested a way of life within the framework of a classical Hindu social
order which they said was as accommodating to this-worldly asceticism
as was Protestantism.
The origins of Brahmo reformation ideology, upon which Deben-
dranath and his associates constructed a system, date back to the do-
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mestication of modern Unitarianism in Bengal by a remarkable intellect
named Rammohun Roy (1772-1833). The Bengali version of Unitarianism
was from its infancy a far more complex phenomenon than the Western
variety in that the problems faced by a Rammohun were always magnified
by the perspective of cross-cultural contact. Unlike William Channing in
America or Lant Carpenter in England, who sought simply to convince
their own countrymen to liberalize their religion and care for the. under-
privileged among them, Rammohun was continually challenged by the
questions Europeans invariably raised: Do you improve the lot of Hindus
from within the system or must you undermine it by assimilating to a
foreign system? As for the specific content of religious Unitarianism,
Rammohun was confronted by such central questions as whether India
should follow Christ (however denuded of later excrescences) or whether
India should follow some Christlike figure in her own tradition who
seemingly represented the same principles.
Rammohun's sympathies, as those of a leading pioneer of the reforma-
tion, are quite apparent in the way he adapted Christian Unitarianism to
Indian circumstances. To be sure, Rammohun's Precepts of Jesus, which
constituted his side of a theological debate with a Baptist missionary
named Joshua Marshman, was so thoroughly Unitarian in a European
sense and so sophisticated in theological erudition and subtlety that one
could easily be misled about the author's identity.22 Indeed, one has only
to compare the Precepts by Rammohun (1820) with a tract by Lant Car-
penter (also 1820) entitled An Examination of the Charges Made against
Unitarians and Unitarianism to understand the remarkable ideological
kinship between the Bengali intellectual and Western Unitarians. 23
One could certainly hypothesize that the Precepts was largely an ex-
tension of the debate in the West between Unitarianism and orthodox
Christianity. Rammohun's primary concern was to maintain the unity of
God against all the false ideas and techniques devised by man to adulterate
the purity of monotheistic faith. Thus he repudiated all myths, mysteries,
miracles, and images which made a mockery of the unity of the God-
head.24 Rammohun here resembles the familiar liberal and rationalist
Unitarian upholding the historic ethical Christ and rejecting vicarious
atonement, the Trinity, and other "fabricated fables."25 Rammohun's
view that justice and mercy were more acceptable to God than sacrifice
was equally Unitarian in spirit, as was his scriptural reliance on the
"Synoptic Gospels with the emphasis on Jesus's teachings rather than the
Gospel of St. John with its meditation of Jesus."26
Shortly after the debate, Rammohun and a former Baptist named
William Adam formed the Calcutta Unitarian Committee.27 By 1823,
Adam, Rammohun and Dwarkanath Tagore (father of Debendranath)
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seem also to have established a Unitarian Press in north Calcutta.28 In
that same year, Rammohun under the pseudonym of Ram Doss found
himself in another debate, this time with an orthodox Christian named
Tytler, conducted for the most part in the local press. Remarks by Tytler
make it evident that Rammohun was considered by Europeans to have
been a Unitarian-a term of disrepute to the orthodox. But the debate
was mere theological conflict as in the case of Marshman. Faced with
narrow, bigoted attacks on Hinduism in particular and Asians in general
by a member of the ruling foreign elite, Rammohun was forced into a
defensively nationalist position. But because Rammohun was a modern-
izer and not a revivalist, he faced his opponent as an Orientalist would a
westernizer.
This stance is elucidated well in Rammohun's "Reply to Certain
Queries Directed against the Vedanta," printed in the Brahmmunical
Magazine on 15 November 1823. Tytler had accused Rammohun of read-
ing into the Vedanta the sublime message of Christ.29 Since only the
Christian Scriptures were revealed, he claimed, Rammohun's interpreta-
tion was a fraud. In reply, Rammohun with his customary analytical
approach proceeded to prove that the message of the Vedanta not only
contained the unity of God but did so in a way superior to the Judeo-
Christian Bible. Unlike the Bible, the Vedanta did not attempt to cate-
gorize the attributes of the Almighty-a gesture which Rammohun found
both anthropomorphic and futile. 3o That Rammohun was now using
Unitarianism in an Indian way was evidenced by his attack on the Trinity.
He argued that whereas Christianity required a blood sacrifice to expiate
the sins of man, the Vedanta taught that the "only means of attaining
victory over sin is sincere repentance and solemn meditation."31 In the
following quotation it appears as if the Bengali reformer had made a kind
of cultural transference from the synoptic Gospels to Sankaracharya:
"The sin which mankind contracts against God by the practice of wicked-
ness is believed by us to be expiated by these penances, and not as supposed
by the Querist, by the blood of a son of man or son of God, who never
participated in our transgressions."32
Equally interesting was Rammohun's use of the comparative religious
approach, which constituted another marked difference between himself
and his Western Unitarian counterparts. Whereas a Channing or a
Tuckerman maneuvered primarily in one religious tradition and aimed to
reform it, Rammohun was challenged by the need to reconcile at least
two major faiths. In the process he was compelled to think comparatively;
and as a result his vision sharpened, leaving a narrow sectarian view of the
universe behind. He could, for example, in the same reply to Tytler, rebuff
his opponent for attacking popular Hinduism by pointing to comparable
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malpractices in popular Christianity: "A Hindoo would also be justified
in taking as a standard of Christianity the system of religion which almost
universally prevailed in Europe previous to the 15th century . . . and
which is still followed by the majority of Christians with all its idols,
crucifixes, saints, miracles, pecuniary absolutions from sin, trinity, tran-
substantiation, relics, holy water, and other idolatrous machinery."33
Rammohun could argue that in the same way the authentic Christian
tradition was submerged and corrupted, so the authentic Hindu tradition
was likewise submerged and corrupted. He willingly admitted that "our
holy Vedanta and our ancient religion [have] been disregarded by the
generality of moderns."34 This comparativist approach, coupled with a
modernist outlook, placed the Hindu reformation movement on an Ori-
entalist foundation from which indigenous traditions could be defended
at the same time they were modified according to progressive values in
contemporary Western societies. Though the foundation was a precarious
one it saved the Hindu reformation repeatedly from the snare of militant
nationalism.
IV. RELIGIOUS MACAULYISM AND BRAHMO RESPONSE: RAJNARIAN
BASU AS GRANDFATHER OF INDIAN NATIONALISM
In the 1840s these writings by Rammohun were collected and reprinted as
ammunition in the ideological struggle for the minds of Calcutta's West-
ern-educated. Several of the missionary adversaries-men like Duff,
Dyson, and Long-were keen intellects who were familiar with Rammo-
hun's position and were inventive enough to find ways of countering it.
In two areas particularly were the missionaries able to hit the Brahmos
where they were weakest: on their historical presentation based on a
virtually nonexistent historiographic tradition among the Hindus ;35 and
on the lack of a systematic Brahmo theology.36 On the other hand, follow-
ing the lead of Rammohun, Brahmo intellectuals such as Rajnarian Basu
and Akshoy Kumar Dutt were equally gifted and could turn every mission-
ary argument into a boomerang aimed at similar inconsistencies and ir-
rationalities-plus the presence of historically unverifiable events within
Christianity.3? These debates, because they were carried on at the highest
level and because there was a good deal of soul-searching involved, are
valuable today as a pioneering attempt at comparative religion.
One argument raised frequently by missionaries like Duff and by con-
verts like K. M. Bannerji was that in the whole of the so-called Vedic
tradition there was no notion of a personal god analogous to Jehovah.38
Missionaries contended that even in the Upanishads the concept of God
was so abstract as to be without analogy.39 This was the monotheistic-
monistic issue in the debate. Duff's concept of the ancient god of the Hin-
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dus was of a being who, "unencumbered by the cares of empire or the
functions of a superintending providence, effectuates no good, inflicts no
evil, suffers no pain, experiences no emotion; his beatitude is represented
as consisting in a languid, monotonous and uninterrupted sleep-a sleep
so very deep as never to be disturbed by the visitation of a dream."4o
The Brahmo reply in Vedantic Doctrines Vindicated suggests the fiery
and skilled debater Rajnarian Basu (1826-1899), who had acquired the
skill at Hare's School, developed it in subsequent encounters with Chris-
tians, and brought it to perfection as a nationalist critic of Keshub Sen's
universalism. In this tract of 1845, which was his first recorded encounter
with the missionaries, he took a phrase like "cares of empire" and asked
Duff whether God was a king or an emperor.41 Rajnarian made capital of
this iII-chosen expression, charging that the Christian god was more an
oriental despot than a merciful Father.
Rajnarian's second point was directed at Duff's depiction of the Upan-
ishadic Brahma as a god who "effectuates no good and inflicts no eviI."42
What kind of God is this, he replied, "who is author of evil?" How can we
possibly ascribe "the indiscriminate murder of millions" through "reli-
gious fanaticism or political hostility" to "our immaculate Creator?"43
The third point seems reminiscent of Rammohun Roy's debate with
TytIer in I 823-which was reprinted in 1845, the same year that Rajnarian
published his tract. Rajnarian took Duff to task for characterizing God as
a being which "suffers pain and experiences emotion." He accused Duff of
"rushing headlong into the hideous errors of a reckless anthropomor-
phism."44 "Can there be a worse doctrine than that which denudes and
degrades God by bringing the Almighty Creator to the level of a man ?"45
The Brahmos' ideological defense of Vedantism was certainly an im-
portant factor in stopping the advance of Christianity among the intel-
ligentsia but, remarkably, such was accomplished without resorting to
yellow-dog fanaticism. Besides ideology, the Brahmos, if they were
convincing enough, held a certain advantage among their fellow alienated
intellectuals: their reinterpretation of Hinduism, if accepted ultimately in
place of popular Hinduism, would bridge the gap between themselves and
the mass of their countrymen. The Macaulay-like missionaries, on the
other hand, rigidly persisted in Europeanizing their converts with the
inevitable result that each and every Indian Christian underwent excom-
munication and denationalization.
More significant stilI, perhaps, is the fact that the Brahmos retained,
with modifications, the outgoing universalism of their founder Rammohun
Roy and therefore saved the Bengal renaissance.46 Throughout long years
of ideological struggle with the missionaries they retained a firm distinc-
tion between orthodox Christian Trinitarians, who were their adversaries,
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and liberal Christian Unitarians, who were among their closest friends.
Instead of hating Westerners indiscriminately (the yellow dog attitude),
they maintained a steady intellectual and personal contact-through
exchange of books and correspondence-with American and British
Unitarians.47 Emerson, Channing, Theodore Parker, Martineau, and
others were as well known among Bengali Brahmos as they were among
their own Unitarian followers. 48 The universalist doctrine of Unitarianism
was itself a strong link in the chain which kept the yellow dog in check.
But it was very difficult, if not impossible, to retain the unqualified
cosmopolitanism of Rammohun Roy while at the same time battling
foreign missionaries who ridiculed and repudiated the foundation of
Hindu tradition. To continually remind one that he was a descendant of
an inferior heritage without any relevance in the contemporary world was
tantamount to waving a red flag before the bull. Tormented minds, or
mercenary ones, willingly submitted; but Brahmos of the mid-century with
greater idealism and integrity resisted, challenged, and refuted the foreign
missionaries. Thus despite their universalism the Brahmos were also
nationalist by virtue of their defense of Hinduism.
But there was already present an even stronger, almost defiant national-
ism in Rajnarian's Vedantic Doctrines Vindicated. It lies in the point-by-
point defense of a Hindu tradition against the pretensions of religious
revelation and superiority by an alien faith. If in Rammohun's writings
cultural nationalism never went beyond the point of proving that Hindu-
ism was equal to Christianity, in Rajnarian's earliest polemical tracts there
is already the germ of a more aggressive attitude: that Hinduism is superior
to Christianity. Of course, by Hinduism Rajnarian the Brahmo did not
mean the accepted popular form but the reformed Hindu variety based on
the classical Vedantic tradition:
The Vedanta, while it utterly rejects and condemns such degrading notions
of the deity, conveys to our minds a far loftier, a more adequate, consistent,
and ennobling idea of His attributes, by prescribing His worship as the
Supreme Regulator of this boundless universe and as the glorious and
beneficent originator of all earthly good.49
If, however, in this kind of religious encounter, superiority depended on
the validity of one's defense of Vedanta or Bible as being a revealed source,
then Brahmo nationalism of this early period was never dogmatic but
tempered by a cosmopolitan outlook. After years of soul-searching on the
part of Debendranath Tagore and other Brahmos, the issue was dropped
and in 1850 a momentous decision was reached: revelation for any
scriptural source, Hindu or otherwise, was denied. 50 Rajnarian, who in the
meantime was sharpening his wit in defense of classical Hindu superiority,
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accepted this decision against the Vedanta as the word of God with great
reluctance.
V. ANTINATIONALIST REACTION: THE BRAHMO UNIVERSALISM OF
KESHUB CHANDRA SEN
The positive side of this combination of outgoing universalism and de-
fense of culture was, as implied, that it kept the mind free of yellow dog
hatred. This was precisely what distinguished the Brahmo freedom fighter
from his militant Hindu counterpart in the twentieth century. Termed
"creative nationalism" by one such Brahmo, the attitude was simply one of
trying to keep the freedom struggle separate from a hatred of Englishmen
or a hatred of Europeans generally.51 But on the negative side, the intro-
duction of nationalism per se, creative or not, seemed to have a divisive
effect on the Brahmo intellectuals. In the first place, many Brahmos,
imbued with the Rammohun legacy of the universal man and universal
religion, saw nationalism as a dangerous departure from true Brahmo
doctrine. For them, Brahmoism was neither Hindu nor Christian but the
quest to end sectarianism by establishing a true universal church and
religion. In the second place, nationalism, so Brahmo intellectuals argued,
had the tendency of glorifying a culture and thus concealing its defects and
weaknesses. The result, they warned, would be to dampen the enthusiasm
of Brahmos for social reform and cripple the Samaj as a modernizing
movement.
In the 1860s it was becoming obvious that nationalism had cracked
Brahmo unity. The Brahmos under Debendranath suddenly found them-
selves an old guard defending the charge of social inaction which the
younger people associated with the movement's gradual drift back into the
Hindu fold. Like an old guard, Debendranath's group rested on their
laurels. Had they not arrested Christianity? Had they not refined Brahmo
ideology? Had they not carried rationalism in religion to its ultimate in
1850 when they rejected all scripture as revealed and left each individual
free to interpret truth according to the light of reason and intuition ?52
By 1865, the issue of social reform had reached crisis proportion within
Brahmo ranks. The younger generation under the leadership of Keshub
Chandra Sen (I 838-1884) insisted that the ministry be open to qualified
members of all castes; that Brahmos who were Brahmans by caste
renounce their sacred thread (symbol of caste inequality); that all the
Brahmos openly and unequivocally declare themselves against the caste
system; and that the Samaj publicly launch a vigorous campaign against
kuhn polygamy and child marriage while promoting widow remarriage,
intercaste marriage, and female improvement through education.53 The
underlying issue was national identity. Debendranath argued that such
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radical proposals at this time would alienate Hindus and tear down all the
progress Brahmos had made in convincing Hindus to accept Brahmoism
as reformed Hinduism.54 This was the natural position of a man who had
for twenty years defended the Hindu traditions against missionaries.
On 5 May 1866 Keshub Sen gave what was probably his most impor-
tant, most popular, and most misquoted lecture, at Medical College Hall,
Calcutta. This controversial talk greatly perturbed Debendranath and his
friends because they believed Keshub had sold out to the missionaries and
had publicly adopted the alien faith. Even the title created misunderstand-
ing between older and younger Brahmos: "Jesus Christ: Europe and
Asia."55 On the surface, as many missionaries and Debendranath himself
interpreted it, the lecture constituted a defense of Christ's teachings and
early Christian dogma. Ignored for the most part was Keshub's careful
distinction between "Christ's message of universal harmony"56 and the
institutional Christianity of the nineteenth century with its Europeanized,
sectarian, and "muscular" view of Christ.57 Also missed was his sophisti-
cated challenge to British cultural imperialism not as a militant but as a
creative nationalist who attacked foreign imposition without hating all
persons and things foreign. The lecture was also an essay on comparative
religion which, when saturated with Keshub's own spirit of universal
Unitarianism, expressed an objective and scientific attitude remarkable
for the times he lived in.
Keshub's Jesus, whom P. C. Mazumdar later popularized as the "Ori-
ental Christ," was inspired by God to offer to "humanity, groaning under
a deadly malady and on the verge of death, a remedy to save it."58 Christ's
remedy, a gift from the East to the West, was ethical and spiritual as
characteristic of Asian religions.59 The passage which shocked Deben-
dranath as much as it pleased the missionaries was Keshub's apparent
acceptance of the crucifixion. What Keshub accepted, as should be clear
from the following quotation, was the ethical value of the symbol:
He laid down his life that God might be glorified. I have always regarded
the cross as a beautiful emblem of self-sacrifice into the glory of God . . .
on which is calculated to quicken the hither feelings and aspirations of
the heart, and to purify the soul . . . and I believe there is not a heart,
how callous and hard, soever it may be, that can look with cool indifference
at that grand and significant symbol. 60
Most effective was Keshub's contrast between the noble self-sacrificing
Christ of the Orient and the missionaries of Christ sent out from churches
in the West to India. It is curious that such anti-imperialistic passages
completely escaped the notice of Adi Brahmos and others who were quick
to point to Keshub's surrender to westernized Christianity. After re-
porting that since the early part of the century only 154,000 converts had
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been won over to Christ in South Asia, and that 519 missionaries repre-
senting 32 societies with an annual combined budget of £250,000 were
combing the subcontinent for potential candidates to the new faith,
Keshub asked why they had accomplished so little. The reason, he be-
lieved, was that many of the missionaries not only "hate the natives with
their whole heart but seem to take pleasure in doing so." Said Keshub:
They regard the natives as one of the vilest nations on earth hopelessly im-
mersed in all the vices which can degrade humanity.... They think it
mean to associate with native ideas and tastes, native customs and man-
ners, which seem to them odious and contemptible; while native character
is considered to represent the lowest type of lying and wickedness. 61
But Keshub's response was not that of the militant Hindu nationalist in
a blind defense of his own heritage. Like Akshoy Kumar Dutt, Keshub
Chandra Sen placed universalism above national character. It is again
curious how the following passage, so clear and unmistakable, has been
ignored by those who have presented the reformer as an unqualified
Christian apologist. Said Keshub:
The fact is, human nature is the same everywhere-in all latitudes and
climes, but circumstances modify it, and religion and usages mould it in
different forms. Educate the native mind, and you will find it susceptible of
as much improvement and elevation as that of the European.62
Indeed Keshub was one of the first Bengalis to refer to cultural stereo-
types, which he termed "caricatures."63 It was not "national character"
which kept the Indian nation in darkness but circumstances. The trouble
is, he said, "that we are a subject race and have been for centuries."64 In
such passionate terms we find the same indignant mood against imperial-
ism in Vivekananda later on. But in contrast to Vivekananda, Keshub in
1866 attacked the excesses of imperialism in the name of the exalted image
of the true Christ:
Christ . . . do Europeans follow him? I regard Europeans in India as
missionaries of Christ and I have a right to demand they should always
remember and act up to his high responsibilities.... But I find pseudo
Christians with reckless conduct. . . . Yea their muscular Christianity has
led many a native to identify the religion of Jesus with the power and
privilege of inflicting blows and kicks with impunity. Had it not been for
them, the name of Jesus ... would have been ten times more glorified.65
It may be difficult to see how a detached comparative religious attitude
could possibly emerge from Keshub's angry mood, but it did. His under-
lying belief in unity over diversity made the comparative approach possi-
ble. In fact, though a theist and not a deist, Keshub in 1866 reminds one of
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Akshoy Kumar Dutt in the way he was groping for the universal prin-
ciples of religion. Even Keshub's identification with Christ may be mis-
leading. There are a few revealing passages in the talk which suggest that
it was not Christ as such that was crucial but what he represented univer-
sally in history: "It is my firm conviction that his teachings find a response
in the universal consciousness of humanity, and are no more European
than Asiatic, and that in his ethics there is neither Greek nor Jew, cir-
cumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bound or free. "66
VI. KESHUB'S SCHISM OF 1866 AND Am SAMAJ REACTION: THE NA-
TIONALIST IDEOLOGY OF DWIJENDRANATH TAGORE AND THE HINDU
MELA
At a general meeting of Brahmos on 15 November 1866 the formal break
between generations finally occurred. The birth of the Brahmo Samaj of
India at that meeting was anticlimactic, but the resolutions passed by the
Keshubites and subsequent debates sharply define the increasingly vital
issue of nationalism and universalism between the two camps. One re-
solution should be singled out in this regard-the one proposed by the
Vaishnava Brahmo, Bijoy Krishna Goswami, on behalf of the Keshubites.
It read: "Men and women of every nation and caste who believe in the
fundamental doctrines of Brahmo Dharma shall be eligible as members
of the Brahmo Samaj of India."67
Actually, Bijoy Krishna was not referring to Debendranath's book
Brahmo Dharma, which had served as a bible for the Adi Samaj and
which had neatly developed Brahmoism as the reformed Hinduism.
Quite the contrary, Bijoy Krishna promptly called for a new "compilation
of theistic texts to be taken from all the Scriptures of the world."68 It was
in reply to Bijoy Krishna that Nabagopal Mitra, personal friend of the
Tagores and ardent Adi Brahmo nationalist, raised his voice. This was the
same Nabagopal Mitra whose many subsequent activities of a patriotic
nature would earn him the title "National Mitra." He argued at the
meeting that "if there was truth sufficient near home, why should we go
abroad? There was all the truth which we require in the Hindu scriptures
and we need not therefore borrow anything from other scriptures."69
This mild statement hardly represented either Nabagopal Mitra's style
of belittling universalists or the harsh Adi Brahmo treatment inflicted
upon Keshub Chandra after the schism. The rupture had caused a second
major crisis of the Bengal renaissance. The impact on the older generation
of Brahmos was disastrous; Keshub became an object of hostility reminis-
cent of Macaulay's image in an earlier generation. The Adi Samaj turned
into a snarling yellow dog of nationalist arrogance. Rajnarian Basu was
perhaps earliest in his response with Prospectus to Start a Society for the
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Promotion of National Feeling Among the Educated Natives of Bengal in
April 1866. 70
Though the association was soon replaced by the more ambitious
Tagore-supported Hindu Mela, the prospectus was a powerfully worded
document in defiance of Keshub's universalism. Rajnarian was unim-
pressed by Keshub's desire to look abroad for inspiration. More impor-
tant to Basu was the realization of Bengal's degradation. How shameful,
for example, that "Hindu youth" had not only "severed themselves from
Hindu society but had renounced even the Hindu name." 71 A program of
regenerating Hindu youth was therefore necessary, one which included
physical training to "restore the manliness of Bengali youth" and their
long-lost "military prowess"; the establishment of a school in Hindu
music with the "composition of songs for moral, patriotic and martial
enthusiasm"; the founding of a school for Hindu medicine to revive "our
own medical sciences"; and the encouragement of "Indian antiquities" to
illuminate the "glory of ancient India."72
Along with the program of general Sanskritic revival, Rajnarian
offered proposals for building up contemporary Bengal as a society and
culture. He was most adamant about cultivating the Bengali language.
"We must learn to communicate in our language," he wrote. Do the
English communicate with one another in French or German? He recom-
mended that Bengali boys learn Bengali before English in school. He
urged giving up English food, dress, and even dramatic entertainment for
the Bengali variety. 73
The National Paper, which Debendranath commissioned Nabagopal
Mitra to edit in 1865, proved from 1867 onward to be the most elfective
means of propagating Hindu Brahmo nationalism against Keshubite
universalism among the Western-educated in Bengal. The articles which
graced the newspaper during its first years of existence, mostly written by
Dwijendranath Tagore, were brilliant expositions in defense of both the
Adi Samaj and the national culture. Dwijendranath, who was among the
most defiant of all Indian patriots from the Bengali middle class, couched
his nationalism in the Orientalist ideological heritage. Thus he accepted
modernization but argued that the true modernizer had first to identify
with his culture and then work within to revitalize it.
As a philosopher by inclination rather than by profession, Dwijen-
dranath was one of Keshub Chandra's most formidable intellectual op-
ponents. In contrast to his younger brother Rabindranath, who under-
went prolonged identity crises and continually shifted between univer-
salism and nationalism, Dwijendranath remained steadfastly nationalist-
even much later in life when he debated his brother in support of Gandhi's
noncooperation movement. As early as 1867, Dwijendranath was con-
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Akshoy Kumar Dutt in the way he was groping for the universal prin-
ciples of religion. Even Keshub's identification with Christ may be mis-
leading. There are a few revealing passages in the talk which suggest that
it was not Christ as such that was crucial but what he represented univer-
sally in history: "It is my firm conviction that his teachings find a response
in the universal consciousness of humanity, and are no more European
than Asiatic, and that in his ethics there is neither Greek nor Jew, cir-
cumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bound or free."66
VI. KESHUB'S SCHISM OF 1866 AND Am SAMAJ REACTION: THE NA-
TIONALIST IDEOLOGY OF DWIJENDRANATH TAGORE AND THE HINDU
MELA
At a general meeting of Brahmos on 15 November 1866 the formal break
between generations finally occurred. The birth of the Brahmo Samaj of
India at that meeting was anticlimactic, but the resolutions passed by the
Keshubites and subsequent debates sharply define the increasingly vital
issue of nationalism and universalism between the two camps. One re-
solution should be singled out in this regard-the one proposed by the
Vaishnava Brahmo, Bijoy Krishna Goswami, on behalf of the Keshubites.
It read: "Men and women of every nation and caste who believe in the
fundamental doctrines of Brahmo Dharma shall be eligible as members
of the Brahmo Samaj of India."67
Actually, Bijoy Krishna was not referring to Debendranath's book
Brahmo Dharma, which had served as a bible for the Adi Samaj and
which had neatly developed Brahmoism as the reformed Hinduism.
Quite the contrary, Bijoy Krishna promptly called for a new "compilation
of theistic texts to be taken from all the Scriptures of the world."68 It was
in reply to Bijoy Krishna that Nabagopal Mitra, personal friend of the
Tagores and ardent Adi Brahmo nationalist, raised his voice. This was the
same Nabagopal Mitra whose many subsequent activities of a patriotic
nature would earn him the title "National Mitra." He argued at the
meeting that "if there was truth sufficient near home, why should we go
abroad? There was all the truth which we require in the Hindu scriptures
and we need not therefore borrow anything from other scriptures."69
This mild statement hardly represented either Nabagopal Mitra's style
of belittling universalists or the harsh Adi Brahmo treatment inflicted
upon Keshub Chandra after the schism. The rupture had caused a second
major crisis of the Bengal renaissance. The impact on the older generation
of Brahmos was disastrous; Keshub became an object of hostility reminis-
cent of Macaulay's image in an earlier generation. The Adi Samaj turned
into a snarling yellow dog of nationalist arrogance. Rajnarian Basu was
perhaps earliest in his response with Prospectus to Start a Society for the
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own medical sciences"; and the encouragement of "Indian antiquities" to
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most defiant of all Indian patriots from the Bengali middle class, couched
his nationalism in the Orientalist ideological heritage. Thus he accepted
modernization but argued that the true modernizer had first to identify
with his culture and then work within to revitalize it.
As a philosopher by inclination rather than by profession, Dwijen-
dranath was one of Keshub Chandra's most formidable intellectual op-
ponents. In contrast to his younger brother Rabindranath, who under-
went prolonged identity crises and continually shifted between univer-
salism and nationalism, Dwijendranath remained steadfastly nationalist-
even much later in life when he debated his brother in support of Gandhi's
noncooperation movement. As early as 1867, Dwijendranath was con-
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vinced that the only way the Adi Samaj could survive Keshub's schism
was to identify itself closer than ever with the Hindu Samaj. If Keshub
could command the loyalty of the progressive theistic youth on the
grounds of universalism, the Adi Brahmos could command the support of
the theists in the much greater Hindu society-to which at long last they
would emerge as leaders.
The assumption behind Dwijendranath's nationalist ideology was the
familiar notion that the westernizing model was a dead end to nation-
building and modernism in India. In an article of 25 September 1867
caIIed "European Model" he blasted those misguided progressives who
"have mistaken views of progressive civilization."74 These people have
sold themselves to "an exotic civilization" as if "there were only one
civilization in the world, viz. English civilization."75 The more sensible
alternative would be to work within that which was "genuine and national
in the manners, customs, and habits of this country."76 Certainly, he
argued, "English civilization deserves our esteem" but only because it is
the natural offshoot of the energies of the English nation and of no other
people. Thus argued Dwijendranath:
Each nation holds a distinct nationality and for so holding it is the more
entitled to the appellation of a civilized nation.... But our countrymen
rush madly to their own degradation by acting under the supposition
that to imitate English civilization ... is synonymous with making pro-
gress . . . and instead of making national institutions the bases of all
progress, import a foreign air in all actions and reform.77
Dwijendranath continued his exploration of the problem and later
added that a weII-intentioned foreign import could, under certain circum-
stances, "destroy the inner vitality and integrity of our native character." 78
In an earlier article on "Hinduism is not Hostile to Brahmoism" he sought
to define progress in terms of national identity. He discovered it to mean
"what is harmonious in the fusion of past and present standards of a
culture."79 Progress was assuredly not the substitution of something
foreign for something national but the "consolidation of institutions de-
funct as weII as those fast growing up" for the benefit of a given culture. 80
It was in the very depths of the psychology of cultural encounter under
colonialism that Dwijendranath waxed most eloquent in his defense of
nationalism. An article on "Nationality and Universality" was aimed
specificaIIy at Keshub. "That the Hindoos and the Europeans should have
everything in common is no doubt a desirable end," he began, but before
that, "we must have a footing of equality with the Europeans."81 "Under
present circumstance," he warned, "an adoption of European habits
would be like wearing a badge of slavery." 82 In a later article on much the
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same subject, Dwijendranath made a striking comparison between angli-
cized Bengalis and American Negroes:
With all our present inferiority and infirmities we are little better respected
by the world than the Christian negro of North America who speaks Eng-
lish, dresses himself with the jacket and pantaloon, and whose habits of life
in fact are mostly borrowed from the European settlers there. And why so?
Simply because his civilization is nothing more than an image of European
manners and habits, and he is no more like the true European than the
monkey in the red-coat riding on the she-goat is like a human being. By
means of mere imitation we can be just so much like the Europeans as
slaves are like their masters.83
As evidenced in Keshub's own paper the Indian Mirror, which he had
managed to acquire after his break with Debendranath, these attacks did
not go unnoticed. But far more significant than the exchange of ideas in
debate were Keshub's innovations as charismatic hero of the younger
generation of theistic progressives.
In the early years Keshub championed reformism and universalism
without much apparent inconsistency. Bijoy Krishna's proposal in the
meeting of 15 November 1866 for a compilation of scriptures from all the
religious sources led to the publication of the Sloka Sangraho, first used in
Brahmo services, and then borrowed and adapted by Unitarians for their
own services abroad. S4 The opening of the Keshubite mandir on 22 August
1869 boldly proclaimed the universalism and reformist intent of the newly
formed Brahmo Samaj of India. Keshub's declaration of principles was
obviously derived from Rammohun Roy's tenets in the trust deed to the
first Brahmo church, established in 1829. "This building," Keshub de-
clared, "is established with the object of paying reverence to all truths that
exist in the world . . . that all quarrel, all misunderstanding, all pride of
caste may be destroyed, and all brotherly feeling may be perpetuated."s5
No idols were to be worshipped and no scripture was to be considered
infallible. Furthermore:
No sect shall be vilified, ridiculed, or hated. No prayer, hymn, sermon, or
discourse to be delivered or used here shall countenance or encourage any
manner of idolatry, sectarianism or sin. Divine service shall be conducted
here in such a spirit and manner as may enable men and women, irrespec-
tive of distinctions of caste, color, and condition, to unite in one family,
eschew all manner of error and sin, and advance in wisdom, faith and
righteousness.86
Even the architecture of the mandir reflected Keshub's universalism.
It was a blend ofa Hindu temple, Christian church, and Muslim mosque.S 7
In 1870, when an expanded edition of the Sloka Sangraho was published
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for the congregation, the motto beautifully inscribed on the title page was
"The Wide Universe was the Temple of God."88
The Tagore family responded to Keshub's universalism by beautifying
and popularizing their yearly national festival which came later to be
known as the Hindu Mela. Started in April 1867 by the combined efforts
of Rajnarian Basu, Dwijendranath Tagore, and Nabagopal Mitra, it
aimed at carrying out the principles articulated in Rajnarian's prospectus.
Actually, by supporting local industry, it went even farther than Rajnarian
had anticipated and may in this sense be looked upon as the precursor of
the Swadeshi movement of the early 1900s. 89 Fervent nationalist poems
and songs were composed for the occasion, and wrestling matches were
arranged between Bengali and Punjabi students with the hope that the
former would defeat the latter-if and when they did, as in 1868, the fact
was well publicized. There were also exhibitions of every sort testifying
to the abilities of Hindus in general but Bengali Hindus in particular.
In 1869, the year of Keshub's new mandir, the Tagores invested more
money and talent in the festival, enlarging the program and drawing more
people. The management was pleased to report that seven thousand
people had attended the Hindu Mela that year. 90 Three themes were pro-
moted in songs, poems, and speeches: "progress, unity, and self-re-
liance."91 Progress to the Adi Brahmo backers of the Hindu Mela meant
progress of Hindus, whereas unity meant burying regional and caste
differences for the sake of Hindu unity and self-reliance meant the promo-
tion of entrepreneurship among Bengali Hindu youths principally.
The Hindu Mela, although it did help the Adi Samaj stay alive by giv-
ing it a share in the leadership of Calcutta Hindu society, did not affect
Keshub or his career. On the contrary, in the early 1870s the silver-
tongued reformer was riding the crest of his popularity and success. His
universalism seemed to endear him to all. An American Unitarian mis-
sionary named Charles Dall was made a member of the Keshubite com-
munity by signing the Brahmo covenant and was given every opportunity
to spread Unitarian literature and ideas among Brahmos in Bengal and
elsewhere in South Asia. 92 Dall predicted that Keshub's brand of Brahmo-
ism would ultimately triumph in India as an indigenous form of Christian
Unitarianism. 93 In 1866 Lant Carpenter's daughter Mary had come to
India to promote social work, and while in Bengal it was to the younger
Brahmos that she appealed directly for assistance. Her close friend was
Monomohun Ghose, an active member of the Keshubite organization
whom she called the "Bengali Unitarian." Her first visitor upon arriving
in Calcutta was Keshub Chandra, whom she viewed at the time as the
truest follower of her father's friend, Rammohun Roy. 94
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VII. IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND THE BRAHMO MARRIAGE ACT OF
1872
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The problem of national identity was no mere ideological issue between
Adi Brahmos and Keshubites but had serious practical implications as
well. The difficulty may be traced back to the 1850s when Debendranath
stated that "we Brahmos are situated amidst a community which views us
with no friendly feelings" since we ourselves attack "their Puranic and
tantric systems."95 He went on to point out that Brahmos have little in
common with anglicized "secularists" and with other "denationalized"
sorts such as members of the Christian community. He characterized the
Brahmo attitude to these persons as one of "practical hostility." Thus he
concluded that the Brahmo community was in a delicate position between
apologists of the Hindu status quo and apologists of a Western way of life.
And he predicted that Brahmos would continue to have a hard time of it
"so long as our numbers are so small, our resources so limited, and our
enemies so powerful as they now are." 96
When the new mandir opened, Keshub initiated twenty-one young men
into what he tried to make them believe was not simply a religion or
ideology or a social gospel but a full-fledged community. Three things
were painfully obvious to Keshub at the time. First, that most of the young
converts were excommunicated from their caste and ostracized from their
families. Second, the reason why they had been cut off from Hindu society
was that they were anusthanic Brahmos-Brahmos who practiced what
they preached. These two factors together added up to the third realiza-
tion: that his Brahmo community was already de facto separated from the
Hindu samaj but lacked de jure recognition of their existence. Even the
Christian families were protected legally as to inheritance and the validity
of their marriages.
In fact a year before the Keshubite mandir was completed and the new
community came into being officially, the advocate general of India ruled
that Brahmo marriages which conformed neither to Muslim nor to Hindu
rites "were invalid and the offspring of them were to be considered il-
legitimate."97 Since their marriages departed so little from Hindu rites,
Adi Brahmos had no problem. But the Keshubites found themselves in
the lamentable position of being penalized by a Western government for
adopting Western-inspired reform measures. Keshub had no recourse but
to pressure the government to give legal recognition to the Brahmo mar-
riage and family-a formidable task when it is considered how tiny a
minority the new Brahmo community constituted as against any organized
opposition by the vast majority of Hindus.
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Between 1869 and 1872 the controversy over the proposed Brahmo
Marriage Act was so violently abusive and so interlaced with other issues
that it led to a final and irrevocable split between the Adi Brahmos and
the Keshubites. Before then there was a kind of verbal truce between
Keshub and Debendranath,98 but after 1870 Debendranath withdrew
from Brahmo affairs to Santineketan, leaving the presidency of the or-
ganization in the hands of his more militant successor, Rajnarian Basu.
Rajnarian, Dwijendranath, and Jyotirindranath (another elder brother of
Rabindranath Tagore) lashed out against the Marriage Act proposals
from the pulpit of the church, from editorials in the National Paper and
Tattvabodhini Patrika, and from the podium at public meetings. They
hoped to stir up fear of the act's consequences among the Hindu samaj.
What appears to have disturbed the Adi Brahmos most of all was the
familiar nationalist concern about estrangement from Hindu society.
Most of their articles, speeches, and editorials led to the conclusion-by
no means an unfounded one-that it would arrest the course of "healthy
and spontaneous reformation" by legally defining the "Brahmos as a
body distinct from the general body of Hindus." Said Rajnarian in an
official memorial against the Marriage Act proposal on 12 April 1871:
"The Brahmos now in fact form an integral part of Hindu Society.
The law will dissociate the former from the latter-a contingency to be
highly dreaded as it will injure the course of religious reformation in
India."99
In the quest for identity, the Keshubites were now increasingly com-
pelled to admit that Rajnarian was right in his conclusion but wrong in
his gloomy prediction of the law's consequences. During the latter stage
of the controversy P. C. Mazumdar, on behalf of Keshub, wrote a reveal-
ing article on the problem of identity in an effort to arrive at a new per-
spective. The question he posed was this: Who in fact were the Brahmos?
Were they Christians as the Adi Samaj suggested? "How can we be
Christians?" he asked. Said Mazumdar, "We do not believe in the divinity
of Christ nor in the infallibility of the Bible, nor in miracles, nor in pro-
phecies, nor in sacraments." Nor are Brahmos Muslims. Are Brahmos
Hindus? Mazumdar's answer; "Yes, nationally and socially we are.
The Brahmos take pride in calling themselves Hindus so far as the name
of their country goes, so far as their ancestry and the society of their
countrymen among them whom they love are concerned."lOO
But then Mazumdar went on to declare that in ideology, ethics, and
social practice "we Brahmos are not Hindus."lol Brahmos do not accept
the Vedas and Puranas as infallible nor do they believe in "the sacred
wisdom of the Rishis," nor do they accept the "incarnations of Vishnu."
To round off his argument, Mazumdar said that "if again by Hinduism is
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meant idolatry, caste . . . incantations and all the false superstitions,
then we are certainly not Hindus."102
The intensity of expression surrounding the controversy only magnified
the seemingly insoluble problem of Brahmo identity. Keshub's own rea-
soning throughout was based on the proposition that so long as Brahmos
practiced their tenets no wrongs would result. There was nothing in Brah-
moism which would produce denationalizing tendencies. The Marriage
Act would have the effect of enabling Brahmos to practice what they
preached. Moreover it was the Adi Brahmo Samaj that was treading a
dangerous path because it was sacrificing the Brahmo program for the sake
of national identity. More and more, however, Keshub found himself
arguing the universalist position that Brahmos were neither Hindu nor
Christian but the pioneer community for a syncretic religion which re-
presented the best features of the existing universal faiths.l°3
No theory could erase the fact that on 19 March 1872, when the Brahmo
Marriage Act was enacted by the government, those Brahmos who ad-
hered to it discovered themselves legally divorced from Hindu society.
The fact was momentarily overshadowed by jubilant progressives all over
India who hailed Keshub as a miracle worker. They pointed not to the pro-
vision on Brahmo identity but to the provisions allowing for such reforms
as intercaste and widow marriage or prohibiting such social evils as child
marriage and polygamy. Keshub had struggled and won against enormous
odds. By means of memorials, letters, visits to bureaucrats in Simla,
and by publicized consultations with doctors as to the proper marital
age for young adults, Keshub had convinced Lord Lawrence to sign into
law an act of social reform.
The only difficulty was in the wording of Sir Henry Maine, who wrote
the act. The reforms applied to "those marrying parties who declared that
they did not profess the Hindu, Mohammedan, Christian, Parsee, Bud-
dhist, Sikh, or Jainna religion. "104 Thus at the stroke of a pen, in the eyes
of the government, Brahmoism was no longer reformed Hinduism but a
distinct religious community with a distinct legal identity.
VIII. BRAHMO UNIVERSALISM BETWEEN CULTURAL IMPERIALISM AND
MILITANT NATIONALISM: THE FAILURE OF KESHUB SEN'S NEW
DISPENSATION
Thus Keshub was certainly not the Christ-lover or simplistic anglophile
his critics have made him out to be. These same critics, rather inconsis-
tently, also accuse him of Vaishnava emotionalism which prompted him
to introduce the kirtan and processions as a regular Brahmo practice.l°5
Keshub was an ardent universalist or cosmopolitan who in the 1870s
drove his immediate disciples into an intensive study of all major religions
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from primary sources in their originallanguages.106 Not only Christianity
was studied as an alien religion but Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism,
and Islam as well. The first Bengali translation of the Koran was a product
of this research. I07 Then Keshub held seminars on comparative religion;
from available accounts no single religion was held as revealed or superior
to the others.l08 The purpose of all this: to ascertain the underlying unity
of all religions.
So long as Keshub combined universalism with social activism as a
modernizer, he maintained the loyalty of the progressive wing of the intel-
ligentsia. This he managed to do until the middle of the decade. In 1878
he lost the progressives and younger people with the formation of the
Sadharan Brahmo Samaj just as Debendranath had done twelve years
earlier. In part, Keshub was victim of historical circumstances which
dashed his program to pieces; and in part, he was victim of his uncontrol-
lable obsession with the development of a true universal religion.109
The alarming increase of British yellow dog racism and cultural im-
perialism ultimately made a mockery of Brahmo universalism.110 In the
first place, there was a sharp rise of the educated unemployed who could
not find suitable jobs.l11 The British were rightly blamed for their mis-
fortune. Secondly, gifted Bengalis were discriminated against openly by
Britishers who resented "niggers" in high positions.112 Thirdly, the
nonofficial British community blocked every effort to give Indian magis-
trates the power to judge cases involving whites as well as nonwhites. In
short, the historical atmosphere suddenly made Keshub's universalism
ludicrously inappropriate if not downright unpatriotic.
At a time when Indian cultural nationalism was rapidly becoming
politicized, Keshub publicized his continuing loyalty to Queen Victoria, a
gesture which must have seemed offensive to the younger radicals.l I3
In this regard, it should be pointed out that the leaders of the Sadharan
Brahmos who broke with Keshub in 1878 were the very same people who
led the Indian Association, precursor of the Indian National Congress,114
Ananda Mohun Bose in particular-who was among the twenty-one
young men to proclaim publicly his adherence to anusthanic Brahmoism
under Keshub's leadership at the mandir in 1869, and who rebelled against
Keshub to found the Sadharan Samaj less than ten years later-proved
to be the prime mover, organizer, and financier of the Indian Associa-
tion.lI5 Indeed it was Bose who employed Surendranath Bannerji after the
latter's dismissal from the civil service and Bose who provided the inspira-
tion and support for Bannerji's rise as early nationalist critic of the excesses
of British imperialism,116 Behind Bose and Bannerji were such articulate
politicized Brahmos as Bipin Chandra Pal, Sivanath Sastri, Krishna Ka-
mul Mitra, and Dwarkanath Ganguli.
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Keshub was also victim of his preoccupation with the composition of a
universal religion which demanded more and more of his time and energy.
His American Unitarian friend, Reverend Dall, warned him repeatedly
against deserting social reform for the task of constructing a highly intel-
lectualized, highly abstract religious system,11 7 But Keshub persisted in
his dream of a New Dispensation which would integrate the best elements
of all religions.l18 Intellectually, without doubt, the New Dispensation
represents one of the major achievements of the Bengal renaissance.
The rites, myths, and symbols of all the major faiths underwent a subtle
and ingenious transformation to become parts of a new system that it was
hoped would replace the limited sectarian system,119 It was, unfortunately
for Keshub, a futile gesture. Many thinking people the world over had by
1884 (the year of Keshub's death) rejected the validity of religious solu-
tions to social problems. Moreover, in the so-called progressive West,
virtually every country was becoming an armed yellow dog as Europe
before 1914 increasingly resembled a community of hounds on the eve of a
fox hunt.
IX. THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE TRIUMPH OF
UNIVERSALISM AS A CULTURAL IDEAL: THE BRAHMO
HERITAGE AND RABINDRANATH TAGORE
To complete this study of the Orientalist legacy and the problem of Brah-
mo identity in the Bengal renaissance, one must look carefully at Rabin-
dranath Tagore's reinterpretation of the Adi Brahmo idea of Hindu
modernism, which may well constitute his most important ideological
contribution to Bengal and to India. Though it is enormously difficult to
follow Tagore's intellectual meanderings-indicating a certain cultural
rootlessness-I would recommend that we pay heed to the relationship
between Hindu modernism and his self-acknowledged adherence to a
Hindu Brahmo identity.
Hindu Brahmoism, which I have traced back to 1866 as one consequence
of Keshub Sen's schism from the Adi Samaj, was born out of an encounter
of modernizing alternatives framed in the context of nationalism and
universalism. It was surely no accident that the earliest use of the term
Hindu Brahmo was in reference to Adi Samajists such as Rajnarian Basu,
Debendranath Tagore, and Dwijendranath Tagore. To my knowledge
the term was first applied to a Sadharan Samajist in 1890, when Ramanan-
da Chatterji cast off his sacred thread and declared himself a Hindu
Brahmo because "Brahmoism was the truest exposition of Hinduism."12o
With the escalation of British imperialism and the consequent rise of
militant nationalism, the problem of modernity became even more acute.
Here is the setting for Rabindranath's role and contribution as a key
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member of the Bengali intelligentsia within the Brahmo context.
Though the basic biographical data of Rabindranath's life are well
known to the general reader of Indian history, the Brahmo side of his life
is relatively unknown in print. Stephen Hay, in a recent monograph on an
aspect of Tagore's ideology, claims that the earliest formative influence on
Rabindranath was Keshub Chandra Sen.121 The fact that Rabindranath
was born in 1861, during the honeymoon period of relationship between
Keshub and Debendranath, is significant to Hay. The fact that Rabindra-
nath was born at the very time Keshub fled his house to live in the Tagore
bari is also highly significant. Indeed as Rabindranath himself later wrote:
"I was fortunate enough to receive his [Keshub's] affectionate caresses
at the moment when he was cherishing his dream of a great future spiritual
illumination."122
No doubt Rabindranath was influenced by Keshub-especially in his
ideological development in mature life-since few Brahmos from Deben-
dranath's time onward were not at first favorably attracted to the reformer.
But we should also keep in mind that Rabindranath was five years old
when the bitter schism radically transformed the affections of the Tagore
family and made them deadly foes of Keshub. For all practical purposes,
Satyendranath passed out of the Calcutta scene in 1862 when he went to
England and upon his return became a covenanted civil servant in west
India. The family leadership passed into the hands of Dwijendranath and
Jyotirindranath, two of Keshub's deadliest enemies both ideologically and
personally.
Indeed, it is Jyotirindranath who became Rabindranath's favorite broth-
er in the years that followed.l 23 If Rabindranath experienced anything
during the years of Nabagopal Mitra's nationalist enterprises, the National
Paper with the inflammatory articles by Dwijendranath, the Tagore-
supported Hindu Mela, and Rajnarian's presidency of the Adi Samaj, it
was assuredly a strong family commitment to Hindu Brahmoism and
cultural nationalism. As viewed by Keshub and his followers, the Tagores
were drifting back into the Hindu fold. If in his youthful years Rabindra-
nath was still attracted to Keshub's universalism (which is likely, but
difficult to prove one way or the other), then we may have isolated the
origins of that "traditionalist-westernizer" split in Tagore's personal and
ideological makeup which S. C. Sarkar, in an illuminating essay on Tagore
and the renaissance, has interpreted as the two most significant currents
of thought in the poet's lifetime.l24
Although Sarkar is in my opinion as close as anyone in identifying
this crucial "dialectic" in Tagore's intellectual development, he has
unnecessarily imposed his own value judgment on both extreme positions.
In terms of the identity problem faced by Brahmos throughout the Bengal
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renaissance, Sarkar's analysis is from my point of view partial and in-
adequate. Sarkar evidently approaches Tagore with the idea of the slavo-
phile-westernizer split among the Russian intelligentsia in mind.l25 In the
context of the identity problem vis-a-vis the West, this is certainly a valid
approach. He splits the sentiments of Bengali intellectuals like Tagore into
an Orientalist or traditionalist camp and a westernizer or modernist
camp.l26 The difficulty emerges when Sarkar reduces traditionalism to
"worship of past glories," "a consciousness of Hindu superiority," and a
"tendency to spiritual mysticism and emotionalism."127 On the other hand
westernism equals rationalism and liberalism.l28
Considering some of the salient aspects of Adi Brahmo Samaj history
reviewed in this essay, where in fact does such a definition lead us? Does a
defense of one's own tradition always mean traditionalism in the reac-
tionary antimodern connotation employed by Sarkar? The Adi Brahmos
in the Tagore family camp were not advocating a defense of status quo
traditionalism but were instead aiming to modernize the Hindu tradition
through Brahmoism. Nor were any of the Adi Brahmos given to spiritual
emotionaIism.l29 On the contrary, we find such religious excesses, if you
will, among the Keshubites, who were in fact more liberal reformers than
the Adi Samajists.l30 The Sadharan Samajists, admittedly the most pro-
gressive group of the lot, were no less dominated by religious enthu-
siasts.l31 Often, those most westernized were also the most passionate
theists, whereas Sanskrit College-trained pundits like the famous Vidya-
sagar-thoroughly exposed to the spirit of the classical tradition-were
indifferent to religion. Moreover, belief in the superiority of Hinduism,
which was a natural component in the rise of nationalism in India, does not
necessarily exclude a belief in constructive change and modernism..
Actually, in terms of cultural identity, nationalism would probably
describe the Adi Samaj attitude more accurately than traditionalism.
The challenge by the Keshubites, who were professed universalists, only
reinforced Adi Samaj loyalty to their own cultural tradition or national
heritage. Thus when Sarkar quite rightly points out that between 1882 and
1885 Rabindranath was under Rajnarian Basu's influence,132 this does not
imply that the poet was at the time antimodernist so much as it implies that
he identified strongly with Hindu India against the West. Take, for exam-
ple, the Tagore preoccupation with nationalist projects such as the Hindu
Mela or with the national secret society organized in Jorosanko in 1874.133
Rabindranath, then thirteen years old, was invited to the meetings by
Jyotirindranath.l34 Two other conspicuous members were Dwijendranath
and Rajnarian. To be sure, the secret society identified itself in no uncer-
tain terms with the Hindu tradition. But in the order of the Swadeshi-like
program of the Hindu MeIa, the organization promoted, among other
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things, the industrial development of India, starting with textiles and
jute.l35 Was this support of industrialism, in Sarkar's terms, "traditional,"
"Orientalist," and "reactionary"?
Also, in 1884 when Rabindranath was supposedly in one of his dark and
reactionary periods as a prisoner of "Orientalism," he became secretary of
the Adi Brahmo Samaj. According to Ramananda Chatterji, who first met
Tagore at this time, Tagore was shocked at Bankim Chandra Chatterji's
"defense of Hinduism" in the issues of Prachar Nabajuban.l 36 Ramananda
was much taken with Tagore's attitudes at the time. When one considers
that Ramananda was in his radical student phase in Calcutta it is difficult
to believe that he and his peers would have been attracted by the lectures
of a traditionalist reactionary.137
In fact, sociologically speaking, the young Rabindranath in the early
1880s was hardly the persevering puritanical type of Brahmo applying
himself diligently for some professional career. In comparison with the
trio of Satyendranath, Dwijendranath, and Jyotirindranath, Rabindranath
was the least educated formally and, in retrospection, the least likely to
succeed-judged from the high standards of Brahmo society. Satyendra-
nath was preparing himself for the covenanted service, Dwijendranath
was a self-trained technical philosopher, Jyotirindranath was an accom-
plished musician and erudite musicologist.l38 But as Stephen Hay relates,
"Rabindranath in 1882 at 21 years of age had no worldly responsibilities
to concern him" as he "lived off income from tenants of the family's large
estates."139 Moreover, having stopped school at thirteen, his education
was most irregular.
The 1880s were unsettling years for Rabindranath. He evidently suffered
a great loss when his sister-in-law, Kadambani Debi, Jyotirindranath's
wife, committed suicide.l40 Five months before that his father had married
Rabindranath off to an eleven-year-old girl with little education, the
daughter of an employee in the zemindari,141 This was the period when he
moved about in a coarse sheet as a garment and rarely wore shoes.142
Hay puts great stress on Rabindranath's feeling the rootless outsider
during this decade. Then in 1890 he went off to England with his brother
Satyendranath for a holiday.
From Sarkar's point of view, Rabindranath was in a pro-Western
phase in the period 1886-1898. Using numerous examples from the poet's
writings, Sarkar has made a convincing case for Rabindranath's antipathy
to Hindu revivalism. This was the era of the newspaper Bangabasi under
violently anti-Brahmo and generally antiprogressive Jogendra C. Basu.143
In this period the Hari Sabha branches began to proliferate.144 This was
the age of vicious satires against Brahmos in novels and plays by sharp-
witted defenders of the status quo such as Indranath Bannerji,145 This was
THE ORIENTALIST LEGACY 69
the time when Puranic Hinduism and the whole medieval tradition was
being defended by such notorious antiwesternizers as S. T. Chadamani and
K. P. Sen.146 The ethos of the era was well captured in 1889 when a Sadha-
ran Brahmo missionary named Bipin Chandra Pal lashed out at what he
called "the present social reaction":
When education, instead of enlarging our minds and making us ready to
welcome and fitted to receive the light of other ages and the truth of other
countries, simply helps to envelop us in a mist of narrow and selfish pa-
triotism that refuses to acknowledge the existence of any virtue beyond the
limits of the narrow hold which we call our country, we may shudder to
realize how strong this reaction has already become. In fact, the whole
atmosphere seems to be literally surcharged with this virulent poison,147
Rabindranath also spoke out against the virulent poison of traditional-
ism which was mechanical and deadening, but not quite in the westernizing
manner suggested by Sarkar. Tagore was, after all, the son of Deben-
dranath and there is no evidence I have seen that indicates a reaction
against the Hindu Brahmo style of the Adi Samaj. Most assuredly,
Rabindranath was against revivalism, nativism, and xenophobic national-
ism. On the one hand, he attacked Bankim Chandra and Nobin Chandra
Sen for the dangerous way they wedded some of the worst features of
traditionalism with an aggressive nationalism. And he repudiated a static
view of the Hindu heritage in the following way:
A lifeless people, stagnant and immobile
Its course obstructed by the morass of tradition
A nation that does not move for its feet are tied
By scriptural commands and endless incantations,148
But on the other hand, Rabindranath seemed to stay clear of that alli-
ance between a westernized Brahmoism and political constitutionalism.
His attitude to the Indian Association and the National Congress of
Ananda Mohun Bose and Surendra Nath Bannerji is illustrated in an
anecdote by Rabindranath's son Ratindranath. One night the poet was
invited to a dinner by "anglicized" congressites for the purpose ofenlisting
his support in the movement. "Father came dressed in a dhoti and chan-
dur in the midst of the anglicized diners," wrote Ratindranath,149 He then
went on to say that "my father had little faith in their politics" because he
"realized the futility of holding meetings and passing pious resolutions."150
The fact is the Rabindranath between 1890 and 1900 spent much of his
time in rural East Bengal supervising the zemindari.l51 In sharp contrast
to the Brahmo professional intelligentsia of Calcutta, who were deeply
and directly involved in such issues as modernism, revivalism, and nation-
alism, Rabindranath was the privileged and poetically gifted son of a
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prominent Brahmo zemindar who could drift along the rivers of up-
country Bengal in a houseboat cursing "the organized selfishness of
Calcutta city life."152 Perhaps no other Bengali poet so captured the
natural beauty and simplicity of East Bengal as did Rabindranath.
Between 1898 and 1906, Sarkar has placed Tagore in another extreme
antiwesternizer phase. There was deep unrest in the poet, while his work
reflected the "shadows of an anguished mind."153 This was the brief
period of Rabindranath's politicized behavior on behalf of the Swadeshi
movement. In 1904, at his father's birthday celebration, Rabindranath
proudly recalled the Adi Samaj contribution to Indian nationalism. He
is quoted as having said that the greatness of his father lay in refusing
"to dilute our supreme national religion into a vague universalism."154
This was also the period in Rabindranath's life when in defiance of Brahmo
social reformism he married off his daughters aged eleven and fourteen
in the traditional Hindu manner.155
One should view this phase of Rabindranath's antiuniversalism against
the backdrop of Brahmo defections and the rise of militant nationalism
in Bengal. It was probably a kinship of nationalist feelings that prompted
Rabindranath to invite Brahmobandhab Upadhyay to be headmaster of
the new school at Santineketan in 1901. Rabindranath's own recorded
sentiments during these years resemble those of Brahmobandhab.156
Even Rabindranath's notion that "Brahminism and not kingship was our
country's wealth" in ancient times, uttered in 1904, closely followed
Brahmobandhab's own interpretation.157 Burning with indignation a-
gainst the excesses of European imperialism, which he expressed in poems
on British intervention in the Boer War or in suppressing the Boxer
Rebellion in China, Tagore underwent a Brahmobandhab period, ag-
gressively defying Western racism, militarism, and economic exploita-
tion.158 .
The question may then be asked whether Rabindranath at this point
defected from Brahmoism. Certainly as a militant nationalist, Tagore
was never so suspicious of modernist impulses from the West as during
this period of his life. From a Keshubite or Sadharan perspective, Ra-
bindranath's extreme nationalism would make him appear a defector.
But in the Adi Brahmo tradition, nationalism was more characteristic
than universalism. The question poses a serious dilemma which Tagore
himself quite possibly sought to resolve in his most powerful novel, Gora,
first serialized in Ramananda Chatterji's Probabasi in 1907.159 In 1907
the poet was clearly beginning to retreat from nationalism back to uni-
versalism.
His Gora, the massively built, fair complexioned, and strong-faced hero
who is chairman of the Hindu Patriot's Society160 and detests anglicized
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Brahmos, is according to one contemporary source a caricature of Brah-
mobandhab Upadhyay. Just as likely is the possibility that Gora was
Tagore himself during his Brahmobandhab period between 1898 and
1906. Written at the end of this period, the novel can hardly be interpreted
as a propaganda piece on behalf of Hindu nationalism against Brahmo
universalism. Instead, it may be seen as a brilliant soul-searching ex-
ploration of the dilemma of Hindu modern identity caught between the
polarity of nation and world.
On the surface the story is about romantic and other entanglements
between Gora's Hindu family and a prominent Brahmo family. On
another level it is both a defense and repudiation of Hindu nationalism
and a defense and repudiation of sectarian Brahmoism. Only an Adi
Brahmo like Tagore, through the character of Gora, could defend Hindu
nationalism with such fervor as essential for identity. Take, for example,
Gora's reply to the charge of Hindu social abuses and cultural decadence:
"It matters not whether we are good or bad, civilized or barbarous, so
long as we are but ourselves."161 Then there is the dialogue between Gora
and his closest friend Binoy in which Gora is forced into the position of
defending caste, declaring that "since lowe allegiance to society, I must
respect caste also."162 "Are we then bound to obey society in all matters?"
Binoy asks. Gora replies that "not to obey society is to destroy it." "What
if it is destroyed?" Binoy retorts. Gora's reply : "You might as well ask
what harm there is in cutting off the branch in which one is seated."163
This same theme is pursued later on in the book when Binoy is sitting
with a Brahmo girl discussing "the defects of our society and the abuses of
our caste system."164 He explains to her that Gora feels otherwise because
he refuses "to regard the broken branches and withered leaves as· the
ultimate nature of a tree."165 Gora regards well-intentioned Brahmo
reform as being too often "simply the result of intellectual impatience."
Gora maintains that he is not a reactionary because "he does not ask for
any praise of the decaying boughs, but asks us to look at the whole tree
and then try to understand its purpose."166
The alert Brahmo young lady replies that, withered boughs aside, it is
the fruits of caste which should be considered and "what kind of fruits
has caste produced in our country."167 Binoy, still representing Gora by
proxy, gives a significant answer which again accentuates the need to
place the nationalist values of cultural loyalty and self-respect above the
Brahmo propensity to expose Hindu social defects:
What you call the fruit of caste is not merely that, but the result of the
totality of conditions of our country. If you try to bite with a loose tooth
you suffer pain-for that you don't blame the tooth, but only the looseness
of that particular tooth. Because owing to various causes, disease and
72 KOPF
weakness have attacked us, we have only been able to distort the idea which
India stands for, and not lead it to success. That is why Gora continually
exhorts us to become healthy, become strong.168
But if Rabindranath sympathetically defended the basic tenets of mili-
tant nationalist ideology, he was equally sympathetic to Brahmo modern-
ism and universalism. The book is as much a repudiation of the Brah-
mobandhab thesis that modernism had to be sacrificed for nationalist
goals as it is a defense of the proposition that universalism is not incom-
patible with the quest for a cultural identity in the modern world. When
Gora out of compassion for the poor travels throughout rural India to
arouse the masses to their own enormous potential for change, he is
greatly disillusioned with his experience:
This was the first time Gora had seen what the condition of his country was
like, outside the well-to-do and cultured society of Calcutta. How divided,
how narrow, how weak was the vast expanse of rural India-how su-
premely unconscious as to its own welfare.... What a host of self-im-
posed imaginary obstacles prevented them from taking their place in the
grand commerce of the world.... Without such an opportunity to see it
for himself, Gora would never have been able to observe how inert were
their minds, how petty their lives, how feeble their efforts.169
That Rabindranath remained faithful to the Adi Brahmo doctrine of
modernism proceeding along national lines is quite obvious even when
articulated through the defiant nationalist posture of Gora. In one passage
after Binoy challenges Gora on the vitality of Brahmo persistence to re-
form society, the reply is the familiar argument Adi Samajists had been
using since the Keshub Sen schism of 1866. Gora says that he too is for
change but that "it won't do for those changes to be absolutely crazy
ones."170 In a manner reminiscent of Dwijendranath Tagore, Gora
declares that:
A child gradually grows up to be a man but man does not suddenly become
a cat or dog. I want the changes in India to be along the path of India's
development for if you suddenly begin to follow the path of England's
history-then everything from first to last will be a useless failure. I am
sacrificing my life to show you that the power and greatness of our country
have been preserved in our country itself.l71
The crushing blow to Gora in the very end of the novel is Rabindra-
nath's vindication of Brahmo universalism against this extremely narrow
nation-centered view of change. Throughout the book Brahmos contin-
ually argue with Gora that effective change in India is impossible if her cul-
tural frontiers remain shut to the progressive forces in the West. I72 The
persuasiveness of the position gradually wins over Gora's friend Binoy,
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who becomes a Brahmo sympathizer. Then in the final pages Gora, after
burying himself deeper and deeper in the pit of his Hindu militancy, learns
from the man he viewed as his father that he is not a Hindu after all but
the son of an Irishman killed in the Indian Mutiny.! 73 Both of Gora's
parents had been white Europeans. "In a single moment Gora's whole
life seemed to him like some extraordinary dream," writes Tagore. In the
following narration, Tagore explodes the myth of a narrow, confining
national loyalty and places Gora in the limbo ofan uncertain identity:
The foundations upon which, from childhood, all his life had been raised
had suddenly crumbled into dust, and he was unable to understand who
he was and where he stood. . . . He felt as though he were like the dew
drop on the lotus leaf which comes into existence for a moment only. He
had no mother, no father, no country, no nationality, no lineage, no God
even. Only one thing was left to him and that was a vast negation.174
But the book ends on a triumphant note when Gora begins to accept the
wider identity of universal humanism-which Tagore himself was ac-
quiring at this time. Symbolically, it is to Paresh Babu, the most sympa-
thetic to Brahmo in the book, that Gora discloses: "Today I am free ...
today I am really an Indian. In me there is not longer any opposition
between Hindu, Muslim, and Christian. Today every caste in India is my
caste, the food of all is my food."175
Evidently Tagore, after years of brooding despair among the ranks of
the nationalists, now returned to the larger tradition of Brahmo uni-
versalism. And Gora may well have represented his last major reconcilia-
tion of opposites leading to a higher synthesis of the nobler features of
the Brahmo heritage with the exigencies of contemporary life in Bengal.
It is unlikely that he ever deviated much from the vision achieved through
the writing of Gora but only enriched it with new challenges and experi-
ences moderated by the infirmities of old age.
By 1921, in his beloved ashram at Santineketan, the ever youthful
Rabindranath Tagore was busy launching the most ambitious institutional
project of his career. Three years earlier, on 22 December 1918, he had
assembled the students and faculty of his vidyalaya to explain that a new
educational experiment known as Visva-Bharati would take place at
Santineketan.176 His expressed purpose was clearly in the tradition of
earlier attempts to implement the ideal of Brahmo universalism, such as
Keshub Sen's efforts through disciples to study major religions by means
of primary sources in the original languages. Keshub's home at Lilly
Cottage became in fact a virtual meeting place of the cultures of the world.
In 1921 it was Tagore's desire to create an "institution which would be a
true center for all the existing cultures of the world . . . and where the
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wealth of past learning which still remained unlost might be brought into
living contact with modern influences."l77 The motto, taken from a
Vedic text, was "where the whole world forms its one single nest."l7B
In December of that year a meeting was held to announce the formation
of Visva-Bharati University. Rabindranath's own dedication speech
neatly summarized his last fourteen years of wrestling with the problems
of unity and diversity, universalism and nationalism. Why this university?
Tagore answered: because "mankind must realize unity."l79 He went on
to explain that:
The first step towards that realization is revealing the different peoples to
one another.... We must find some meeting ground where there can be
no question of conflicting interest. . . . One such place is the university
where we can work together in a common pursuit of truth, share together
our common heritage, and realize that artists in all parts of the world have
created forms of beauty, scientists have discovered secrets of the universe,
philosophers the problems of existence, saints made the truth of the spiri-
tual organic in their own lives, not merely for some particular race to
which they belonged but for all mankind. ISO
Thus, through the intense problem of finding and maintaining a cultural.
identity in the modern world, we can establish a causal link between
Keshub Sen's New Dispensation Church of the nineteenth century and
Rabindranath Tagore's Santineketan experiments of the twentieth. In
this sense, the New Dispensation should not be viewed so much as a
failure as the first serious attempt within the Brahmo Samaj to make
concrete the renaissance ideal of universalism. Bijoy Krishna Goswami,
a former Brahmo missionary under Keshub, sought to infuse this spirit
into an updated and revitalized form of Vishnavism.lBl Vivekananda,
another former Brahmo under Keshub and founder of the Ramakrishna
Mission, offered the world neo-Vedantism as the basis for religious and
cultural unity. Brahmobandhab Upadhyay, another Keshub disciple,
carried the messages of Brahmo universalism into a de-Europeanized form
of Roman Catholicism before his final identity crisis and withdrawal
into yellow dog national fanaticism.l B2 Sasipada Bannerji, one of the
most activist of Sadharan Brahmo reformers, started the Debalaya, which
aimed to bring representatives of all castes, religions, and creeds together
in order to find ways and means of ending hatred and strife. lB3
These experiments, including Tagore's Visva-Bharati, were utopian
schemes to be sure, especially in light of the more extreme forms ofIndian
nationalism that followed in the wake of European militarism and im-
perialism. But so long as these utopian institutions remained true to the
original intent of their founders, and to the Orientalist legacy, the Bengal
renaissance did not die.
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The Reinterpretation of Dharma in Nineteenth-
Century Bengal: Righteous Conduct for
Man in the Modern World
RACHEL VAN M. BAUMER
University of Hawaii
This essay, in slightly modified form, was originally written for and read to the
symposium on Aspects of Religion in South Asia, conducted in the spring of
1971 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
It will also appear in a forthcoming publication of the symposium papers
and is included here by permission of the editor of that volume. Inclusion of
the essay in this volume, however, seems particularly appropriate for two
reasons. It explores the nature of synthesis in nineteenth-century Bengali
thought by examining in detail the change in one fundamental idea brought
about by intellectual arguments of that period. Perhaps even more important-
ly, it examines the philosophical and psychological mechanism which laid the
basis for acceptance in the Hindu community of ideas of patriotism, inde-
pendence, the nation, and democracy. Seen in this light, the reinterpretation
of dharma is an intellectual development having basic usefulness and impor-
tance to the Indian nationalist movement.
There are several important motifs in Hindu thought, the history of which
may be traced in continuity from very ancient times. Among these, the
concept of dharma! has exerted a dominant influence on both the society
and the individual. Conversely, in its treatment by scholars and sages from
age to age, it has reflected the modifications of the social order and
attendant changes in social usages with the flow of history. Examination
of the various views of dharma in chronological sequence would provide
a fascinating study of the expansion of social, religious, and political ideas
by Hindu scholars. It is my purpose, however, to confine this study to the
last major reinterpretation of dharma, which evolved in Bengal during the
nineteenth century. As the quality and style of life changed under the
impact of historical events, Hindu society everywhere in South Asia was
compelled to reexamine its understanding of the order of things, but
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nowhere were the motivation and response stronger than in Bengal, the
center of British and Indian interaction. In the vigorous intellectual
ferment of that remarkable century, the ancient concept of dharma was
not discarded but, rather, accommodated to changing society. The manner
and extent of its accommodation can be more thoroughly appreciated by
reviewing a few simple, yet basic, aspects of the development of ideas of
dharma prior to the modern period.
The ideas of dharma and its close associate, karma, are manifestations
of a primary concern in Hindu thought from ancient times for mainten-
ance of order. The emphasis in the Vedic period was placed upon up-
holding the cosmic order. Priests viewed the sacrifice as the vehicle by
which this goal could be reached. In their zeal to sustain the cosmic bal-
ance, they developed an exceedingly elaborate ritual of sacrifice and gave
primary significance to exact performance of the ritual. In an extension of
this elementary idea,2 the conduct of human life was seen as contributing
to preservation of the all-important order and, in fact, many relationships
and interactions in human life were believed to be parallels to divine
relationships and behavior. Just as complex rules developed around the
ritual of the sacrifice in an early period, a detailed set of rules regulating
human life was gradually formulated. This development was accompanied
by a subtle shift of emphasis from exclusive concern with cosmic order.
Order in human society itself became a valuable objective.
The code of ethical behavior which was the outgrowth of this process
was given systematic treatment by a number of early scholars, most
prominent among them the legendary sage Manu. His work, believed to
have been composed early in the Christian era,3 classified the various
dharmas into two main categories under which were listed an inventory of
duties obligatory in each. The one category, varIJiisramadharma, conce'rn-
ed duties imposed upon an individual by the circumstances of his birth,
i.e., caste, and by his stage in life, i.e., iisrama. A parallel can be seen
between the earlier idea of sustaining the cosmic order by the proper
performance of all the acts which supported it and the later system of
varIJiisramadharma in which the world order, that is, the social order, was
to be maintained through proper actions of the individuals who made up
its component parts. Concern for social order had gained strength through
the belief that the individual benefits directly from a society in which all
services and actions are functioning in harmony. Thus, if the individual
faithfully performed the duties obligatory upon him through his caste
affiliation, he provided a necessary service to the society from which he
benefited. If he carefully fulfilled the duties attached to his particular
iisrama, he contributed to the moral and spiritual well-being both of
society and of himself. Manu's second category, siidhiiraIJadharma, con-
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sisted of duties imposed on every individual as a human being regardless
of his position in society or his stage of progress in life. These duties were
steadfastness, forgiveness, application, nonappropriation, cleanliness,
repression of the sensibilities and sensuous appetites, wisdom, learning
veracity, and restraint from anger.4 The righteous man was the individual
who, with no thought of self, made rigorous efforts to perform all his
duties in accordance with the sacred law.
The individual's chief concern, nevertheless, was with himself, for he was
responsible for his action alone and not that of any other. His motivation
did not lie in a sense of public responsibility but rather in an understanding
of the importance of keeping the sacred law for the purpose of his own
welfare. In one respect, as noted above, the proper performance of one's
dharma secured the welfare of the social order and hence his own derived
welfare. In the other respect, the strict performance of one's dharma
secured his own spiritual well-being in the future experience of release
from rebirth, mok~a. In whatever way it is viewed, the individual's concern
was self-directed, though in no sense was it permitted to be selfish. "Hindu
morality primarily aimed at the autonomy of the individual, i.e., at
making him self-sufficient and self-dependent and free from all external
bonds, physical and social."5
This notion of dharma, allied as it was with the doctrine of karma,
maintained an important place in subsequent Hindu speculative and reli-
gious thought. Moreover, its effect on the history of the Hindu people,
while difficult to measure, cannot be cast aside. Ideas of dharma sub-
merged individual personality in a fixed role on the one hand and, on the
other, strengthened individualism along the lines of individual responsi-
bility, individual action and, in a particular sense, detachment. Further-
more, they implied a worldview and historical perspective in which group
roles were fixed and the interaction among them was a reflection of divine
action. On this point Bankimcandra was to write in modern times deplor-
ing the view of ancient Hindus who saw human history as the history of the
gods.6
These primary characteristics and effects of the concept of dharma
remained essentially unchanged during the course of the medieval cen-
turies. Even reinterpretations which seemed to set forth sharply contrasting
views revealed upon examination the same core of understanding.
Whether in speculative thought such as the teaching of viSi~{iidvaita,or
in religious movements, as, for example, the cult of the god Dharma,7 or
in purely social reaction such as that of Hindu society under Muslim rule,
the concept of dharma remained little altered in scope at the end of the
medieval period in comparison to that of the code of Manu. Dharma
remained an intensely personal code of conduct, limiting the individual's
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perspective to his immediate relationships and to his own progress in life.
Obligations to society were those due family, caste, and immediate
community. Political ideas consisted chiefly of the duties and obligations
of the individual to the king (or, in the case of the king, his duties and
obligations to his subjects). Spiritual fulfillment was pursued on the
basis of one's own style of life based on the classical four asrama. Further-
more, the entire code was constructed on a principle of relativity. What
signified obligation for one man did not necessarily constitute another
man's duty.
The devoutly religious man of late-eighteenth-century Bengal was
surrounded by an unsurmountable barrier of duties, obligations, practices,
and taboos which effectively cut him off from deep involvement in his
fellow man. His entire way of life was directed inward as he strove to
maintain his dharma. Nevertheless, not all men of late-eighteenth-century
Bengal were devoutly religious. A substantial number of high-caste,
educated, and influential Bengalis of that period had developed a worldly-
mindedness which gave little place to concentration on observing rigid
rules of righteous conduct. While having a certain emotional attachment to
the traditional teachings of the fathers, many prominent Brahman families
of Bengal had adopted a secular style of life molded by the necessities of
position and survival under the Muslim power. At the time of assumption
of authority by the British, there existed an elite society in Bengal whose
tastes and manners were cosmopolitan, who were often more learned in .
Persian than in Sanskrit, and who were caught up in administrative and
commercial affairs. Members of this group were quick to reach out for a
place in the new system, not only in the areas of administration and
commerce but in the spheres of culture and social exchange as well.
The elite Hindu society clearly perceived the urgency of accommoda-
tion and synthesis in the various arenas oflife. They could look for success
under the new authority only by becoming familiar with the methods and
manners of the new rulers. Despite British efforts to bring a certain
continuity to administrative organization and to suppress disruptive
influences on the Hindu way of life, a sense of drastic change must have
been apparent to those Hindu elite who were in direct contact with the
British. The lifestyle of the British stood in direct contrast to Hindu
culture. Perceiving the motivating influences of action-psychological,
philosophical, moral-would have been formidable. In addition to
meeting the practical demands of establishing a modus operandi, Hindu
society had to meet the challenge of superior British technology. Although
it took several decades for the significance of that challenge to penetrate
Bengali intellectual circles, a superficial appreciation of the British tech-
nological superiority was evident from the beginning. The first ventures of
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British missionaries into the field of education at the end of the eighteenth
century added to the impetus toward learning, understanding and, where
possible, making accommodation to British culture, worldview, and
philosophy. It became an important means for disseminating British
procedures in practical affairs. Thus the pressures to investigate and to
assimilate the ideas of the new rulers were many.
The obstacles to smooth accommodation were many, also. The psycho-
logical crises brought about by a relationship of superiority versus in-
feriority were continuous throughout the history of British rule in India.
In Bengal they covered a wide range of reactions from anglophilia to anti-
British terrorism. The emotional problem was inherent in the situation
and could never quite be overcome. A further obstacle to the synthetic
process was intellectual: widely disparate points of worldview and atti-
tudes toward life were held by the two cultures. Western views and
Western thinkers were often misinterpreted because Hindu understanding
and perception rested on Hindu assumptions and conditioning. In yet
another area, the challenge to religious belief thrown out to Hindus at an
early period by the Christian missionaries evoked from the beginning the
strongest response from Hindu society. The resulting schism between
orthodox and universalist groups was in one sense an obstacle to the
process of synthesis, yet in other ways it was extremely helpful in that it
provided the forum in which philosophical views argued out. It is, in fact,
this aspect of nineteenth-century development that I would call one of the
most influential factors in helping Bengalis to define their social and
political views, the results of which have shaped the course of their recent
history.
Several aspects of Hinduism in Bengal at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century should be noted here. There was, of course, that character-
istic of Hinduism evident in many ages, a basic flexibility, a tendency to
absorb new religious practices and symbols. Furthermore, Bengal had had
a long history of religious heterodoxy. Several major reform movements in
eastern India had threatened orthodox Brahmanism in centuries past.
There was, on the other hand, an increasing lack of interest in piety on the
part of certain privileged groups in Bengal. Their wealth and influence
made it possible for them to exert considerable pressure for relief from the
more irksome rules of dharma and to urge a liberal reformation of reli-
gious belief. Among the notable examples of their public efforts are the
petitions of several rajas to Brahman courts for permission to arrange the
marriages of widowed daughters. A final and particularly important
condition of the period was the fact that a small number of Brahman
families had become thoroughly secularized, thus making available
respected channels for penetrating reinterpretations of basic Hindu
REINTERPRETATION OF DHARMA 87
beliefs. From just such a family came Rammohan Ray, first of the great
Bengali intellectual leaders of the nineteenth century.
In the year 1800, Rammohan, then twenty-six years of age, was oc-
cupied in looking after property belonging both to himself and to his
father, a well-to-do Brahman landlord.s His father was a Vaisnava and
his mother Sakta, but the Rays seem to have been much like other high-
caste families who had been engaged for several generations in serving the
Muslim administration. 9 Their tastes and lifestyle were entirely secular,
and their chief interest lay in the pursuit of business affairs. It was Ram-
mohan's early venture as a moneylender that brought him into close
contact with members of the British community. For ten years he was
associated with two of them, both civilians, either in an official capacity or
by private arrangement. Early in this period, he wrote his first tract,
Tuhfat-ul-Muwahiddin, in which he expounded his belief in monotheism.
The tract suggests a fair knowledge of Muslim theology on Rammohan's
part and testifies to his knowledge of Persian and Arabic before he learned
Sanskrit. He studied the latter language, along with the Hindu sastra,
during his stay in Rangpur from 1809 to 1814. There is some evidence
that the pandit with whom he studied, and who was a lifelong friend,
initiated Rammohan into Tantrism. It was after he moved to Calcutta in
1815 that Rammohan had closer contact with Christian doctrine through
his associations with Christian clergymen both in Calcutta and in Seram-
pore. Writing of Rammohan's life in Calcutta, De comments that he
entertained friends and distinguished visitors in his two Calcutta houses,
a practice which brought him "in closer contact with a larger world, in
which prevailed in those days three divergent types of culture, Hindu,
Muslim and Christian."lo
Rammohan's interest in religious inquiry was thoroughly stimulated
through these contacts, although he maintained his former business and
social interests too. From his investigation of the three religions emerged
a strong universalist conviction which manifested itself mainly in his
writings on the nature of God. His religious tracts, really begun in a major
way at the age of forty, were devoted primarily to advocating worship of a
Supreme Being without form or symbolic representation. While Ram-
mohan is remembered chiefly for his preaching of the worship of one God
and for his attacks on idolatry, his writings in that connection also
contained the first significant change in the understanding of righteous
conduct to be voiced in the nineteenth-century Hindu community.
In a strong statement in his Second Defense ofthe Monotheistical System
of the Veds, Rammohan denounced the traditional Hindu doctrine of
karma, pointing out the distinction between the Sanskrit term and the
English word works. Yet at the same time he cited, in support of his
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position, the great Hindu authorities Manu and Sankaracarya, who
placed the highest value on knowledge of God through contemplation
and worship:
To English readers, however, it may be proper to remark, that the Sunskrit
word which signifies works, is not to be understood in the same sense as
that which it implies in Christian theology, when works are opposed to
faith. Christians understand by works, actions of moral merit, whereas
Hindoos use the term in their theology only to denote religious rites and
ceremonies prescribed by Hindoo lawgivers, which are often irreconciliable
with the commonly received maxims of moral duty: as, for instance, the
crime of suicide prescribed to widows by Ungeera, and to pilgrims at holy
places by the Nursingh and Koorma Poorans. I do not, therefore, admit
that works, taken in the latter sense (that is, the different religious acts
prescribed by the Sastra to the different classes of Hindoos respectively)
are necessary to attain divine faith, or that they are indispensable accom-
paniments of holy knowledge; for the Vedant in chapter 3rd, section 4th,
text 37th, positively declares that the true knowledge of God may be ac-
quired without observing the rules and rites prescribed by Sastra to each
class of Hindoos; and also, examples are frequently found in the Ved, of
persons, who, though they neglected the performance of religious rites and
ceremonies attained divine knowledge and absorption by control over their
passions and senses, and by contemplation of the Ruler of the universe,
Munoo, the first and chief of all Hindoo lawgivers, confirms the same
doctrines in describing the duties of laymen, . . . the illustrious San-
karacarya declared the attainment of faith in God, and the adoration of
the Supreme Being, to be entirely independent of Brahmanical ceremon-
• 11les....
The pursuit of the knowledge of God, through proper worship12 and
exercise of self-restraint,13 was in Rammohan's view the highest aim of
the righteous man. Closely associated with this aim was the manifestation
of righteous conduct in relation to one's fellow man. This was not the
older notion of occupational duties to be carried out conscientiously for
the efficient working of society. Rather, Rammohan's concept of service
to one's fellow man was associated with moral ideas of consideration,
compassion, and the Golden Rule.l4 One aspect of his views on worship
formed a parallel in principle to the old idea of obligation to exact per-
formance of caste duties, or even exact performance of the sacrifice, to
maintain order and balance of the whole. Rammohan taught that each
believer was responsible for performing his act of worship completely and
with care. If he did not do so, the worship of none of the group could be
complete.15
In explaining the distinction between the popular understanding of
karma and the Western notion of merit, Rammohan led to an important
REINTERPRETATION OF DHARMA 89
distinction to be made within the context of Hinduism-the distinction
between customs and fashions (traditions and usages) and scriptural
authority. It was a distinction that was to be widely used throughout
the century by men of various persuasions,16 and it was related both in
origin and usage to another crucial principle of Rammohan's, namely,
the necessity of rational approach to textual criticism in the interpretation
of the Scriptures. In his introduction to the Kena Upanishad, he wrote of
his work:
It will also, I hope, tend to discriminate those parts of the Veds which are
to be interpreted in an allegorical sense, and consequently to correct those
exceptional practices, which not only deprive Hindoos in general of the
common comforts of society, but also lead them frequently to self destruc-
tion, or to the sacrifice of the lives of their friends and relations. I?
The principles of criticism which Rammohan employed seem to have
been based on rudimentary perceptions of rational judgment, lacking the
scholarly refinements of a later day; but his courage in leading the way
to a critical interpretation of the most sacred of Hindu texts was remark-
able and its results far-reaching. Contrary to the practice of some later
Bengali intellectuals, he made the sacred texts the sole authority for his
arguments, but his method of interpretation made it possible for him to
prove his point of view.
The teachings of Rammohan's literature led away from a notion of
righteousness based on performance of karma. Righteousness consisted
in cultivating knowledge of the Supreme Being through adoration and
contemplation. Along with this righteousness was a sense of moral social
behavior which directed the individual's thoughts and attitudes outward
to an awareness and consideration of other men's feelings and conditions.
These ideasreveal a dramatic change ofinterpretation of righteous conduct.
While individual responsibility remained strong and personal, the indivi-
dual's freedom of action and sense of social involvement were quite dif-
ferent. Men were obligated to act toward other men in a way they them-
selves wished to be treated. They were to respond to other men's needs
with compassion and sympathy. Dharma placed few other demands or
restraints upon them than these attitudes toward others and the perform-
ance of the true worship of God. Although Rammohan's message of
moral conduct was liberal and opposed to the sanction of tradition, he
was still careful, despite both his luxurious style of life and his writings on
religious doctrine, to keep intact his caste standing, a consideration of
greatest importance in his day,18
Rammohan's ideas on worship were put into practice in the meetings of
the Brahmo Sabha, which he founded, and later in those of its successor,
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the small but highly influential Brahmo Samaj. The main lines of emphasis
put forward by the Brahmo Samajists during subsequent decades were
essentially those of Rammohan, but they were much more fully developed
and, in some instances, considerably changed. The pursuit of the knowl-
edge of the Supreme Being through worship and contemplation retained
primary emphasis. In this connection, a great deal was said also about the
cultivation of all the human faculties as part of the discipline of true
worship. The attainment of the full potential of humanity was the result of
a fruitful search for the knowledge of God. The man who had this quality
of complete humanity had developed all the human faculties to their full
potential, and he had complete control over them.
Involvement in the well-being of others was an equally strong principle
of the Brahmo Samaj, and the ideal was transformed into practice through
a variety of social services. The Brahmos were extremely active in the field
of social reform, particularly as it related to the status and treatment of
women, education, and medical service. The motivation, in part, was
similar to Rammohan's ethical ideal of the Golden Rule, but it had curious
overtones of the older notion of a properly functioning society. In the
first edition of Tattvavodhini Patrika, the official organ of the Brahmo
Samaj, an editorial signed by "A" (undoubtedly Aksay Kumar Datta)
pointed out the dependence of human beings on each other for survival,
as compared to other animals. He argued that God had given man this
nature, and the person who ignored that fact did so at his own peril. The
essay challenged traditional views and customs on several levels. It com-
pletely rejected the traditional practice of asceticism implied in the third
and fourth stages of asramadharma and equally endorsed the first and
second stages. Man, it said, belonged in human society in an active way,
not only because men depend on each other's help in the material and
temporal affairs of life but also because men depend on each other for the
transmission of knowledge and wisdom. This particular line of argument
operates somewhat on the "vested interest" aspects of varlJadharma, that
is the proper performance of man's duty to uphold a society which, in
return, offers him the necessities for maintaining his own life.
The Brahmo Samaj generally took a rather sympathetic view of the
division of society into castes.l 9 But the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, a
splinter group from the Brahmo Samaj, took a strong position against
caste, advocating and performing intercaste marriages.
While the Brahmo Samaj carried forward ideas of Rammohan's with
regard to righteous conduct, it also revived aspects of older concepts
which played a much more minor role in Rammohan's writings. The idea
of maintaining order and balance of the whole by the proper performance
of worship, the idea of interdependence of human beings as an underlying
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motive for service, and the emphasis put upon discipline of the human
faculties and control of the passions-all were in parmony with age-old
Hindu beliefs.
There were several other streams of religious and social thought in
Bengal contemporaneous with the Brahmo Samaj movement. In the first
half of the century, the most radical group was Young Bengal, a faction of
young men who formed themselves into the Society for the Acquisition
of General Knowledge. Their early activities created a furore in Calcutta's
upper-class Hindu society, the effects of which reverberated through the
controversies of the remainder of the century. They held nothing of the old
customs and taboos sacred. Their whole effort was directed toward deny-
ing completely their Hindu heritage. Although a few members of the
faction converted to Christianity, most of them came to maturity with a
satisfying, if somewhat curious, blend of a restored general belief in
Hinduism with European rationalism. It was their youthful fascination
with the latter that had resulted in their rebellious pranks against Hindu
customs and institutions. Fondness for the philosophies of the West was
to remain constant with others as well, who, coming after them, were also
recipients of Western education.
The intellectual and social reforms of the Brahmo Samaj and the radical
actions of Young Bengal were not without counterreaction in conservative
circles. The preaching of Rammohan Ray had aroused several prominent
defenders of traditional Hinduism to response. In the days of the Society
for the Acquisition of General Knowledge, the name of the poet and
editor, Isvarcandra Gupta, became closely associated with the cause of
the traditionalists who argued mainly in defense of the use of images and
symbols in worship and social regulations in common usage, deriving
from the doctrines of varlJiisramadharma and siidhiiralJadharma. They
represented both the Sakta and Vaisnava sects of traditional Bengali
Hinduism.2o
In the latter part of the century, Vaisnavism itself was reinterpreted21
by a number of Bengali intellectuals, foremost of whom had been, in his
youth, a protege of Isvarcandra Gupta. The label of conservatism in-
herited from Isvarcandra has attached itself to the name of Bankimcandra
Chatterji to this day. Yet a careful reading of his literature reveals an
astonishing mixture of Saktism and Vaisnavism, traditional and Brahmo
Samaj doctrines, Sankhya philosophy and European positivism. From a
point early in his career,22 his literature was devoted increasingly to the
theme of Hindu nationalism, a theme which was supported by a defense of
Hindu institutions. During the l870s and 1880s, Bankimcandra was,
perhaps, the most influential novelist and journalist of Bengal. When,
finally, his religious monographs appeared, it is doubtful whether they
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created the same sensation aroused by his earlier literature; yet they were
to exert a strong influence on the development of twentieth-century
thought through such channels as Aurobindo.
It was particularly Bankimcandra's monograph, Dharmmatattva, which
provided the doctrine of nationalism used so widely in twentieth-century
Bengal. But this monograph is also among the most significant of the
nineteenth-century statements of dharma. Bankim's reinterpretation of
the ancient concept brought together the various strands of nineteenth-
century thought into a whole that reflected the synthesis of ideas which
had been achieved by the last quarter of the century. Bankimcandra cannot
be credited with great originality of thought. Most of his ideas can be
traced to other sources. But he was able to write down those ideas with
greater power and appeal, and in a somewhat more systematic fashion,
than any of his Bengali contemporaries. Furthermore, his formulation of a
systematic theology and moral code was more extensive than most works
written in that century with the possible exception of the Rammohan Ray
literature.
Bankimcandra's religious background was Vaisnava. In his mono-
graphs,23 the sole basis in Hinduism for his arguments was Vaisnava
faith and doctrine. He supported that branch of Vaisnavism which views
the world as primary reality and the relationship between the soul and the
Supreme Being as dualistic. Without a fundamental perception of this
kind, there would have been a certain difficulty in developing his doctrinal
statement in Dharmmatattva. His delineation of the character of Krishna
provided him with an example of his meaning in the definition of dharma,
a method similar to some aspects of Christian teaching concerning
Christ. On the theological level, Bankim's position was quite different
from Rammohan's. It opposed the idea of a quality-less God and sup-
ported belief in an avatar, namely Krishna. It was founded upon the Gita
and related texts, but owed little, or nothing, to the Vedanta.
To the interpretation of the ancient Vaisnava texts, however, Bankim-
candra brought the same principle of textual criticism which had guided
Rammohan's interpretation of the Scriptures. Bankimcandra had received
a more extensive training than Rammohan in Western philosophical
thought through the medium of Western education, and he borrowed
widely, not only from its method but from its content as well. In this
respect, he differed from Rammohan in that he took materials for de-
veloping his doctrine from a broad variety of sources. Quite contrary to
Rammohan and the Brahmo Samajists, he was prepared to argue the
value of certain traditional social views on the basis of custom and
usage. 24 But even though he generally supported caste as an efficient
means of organizing society and the traditional role of women in society,
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he was completely intolerant, as were these others, of the endless ritual
demands and taboos established through the centuries by priestly Brah-
mans25 in the name of dharma.
Dharma, in Bankimcandra's definition, was a matter of the heart.
Oppressive social rules and taboos, he wrote, were a devilish invention,
but "devotion to God, love for mankind, and quietness of heart, this,
indeed, is dharma."26 True dharma, he taught, was founded on purity of
heart (cittasuddhi). This was the foundation of the Hindu religion, and
whoever had this purity of heart needed no other religion. 27 The mani-
festation of cittasuddhi, in Bankim's view, was control of the senses,
the sensual appetities. The theme of self-discipline, or firm control over
the physical being, is very old in Indian thought. Like the idea of dharma
itself, the ideal of self-control appears over and over in various guises in
the many religious and philosophical systems indigenous to South Asia.
In the nineteenth century, it was advocated by Rammohan, the Brahmo
Samaj, traditional Hinduism, and ultimately by later religious thinkers
such as Bankimcandra, Ramakrishna Paramhansa, and Vivekananda. In
this connection, Bankimcandra taught the necessity of cultivating all the
human faculties, mental as well as physical, to attain manu~yatva,28 one
of the primary goals of dharma. On this point, he not only gleaned
inspiration from the teachings of the Brahmo Samaj, but also anticipated
the philosophical basis of Rabindranath's Manu~erDharma. 29
From these general views of dharma, as well as from his investigation of
the philosophies of Spencer, Comte, and MiII,3o Bankimcandra, in the
later years of his life, formulated a doctrinal view of dharma which was
set forth mainly in his monograph Dharmmatattva and, in part, in the
monograph KNlJacaritra. His teachings incorporated long-standing yiews
of Hindu tradition and new ideas introduced from Western thought. In
this synthesis, dharma was still, in fact, the principle by which the fully
developed man conducted his life in the modern world:
The expression and maturing, the consistency and fulfillment, of all our
physical and mental faculties in every part is dharma. This dharma is
dependent on cultivation, and cultivation is dependent on actions [karma].
Therefore karma is the chief means to dharma. This dharma may be called
duty31 [svadharmmapalan].32
Dharma was not to be understood as having two categories, each with
its separate code of obligatory duties. Although Bankimcandra supported
the organization of society into castes, he did not endorse the distinction
between varlJadharma (one's duties to others) and asramadharma (one's
duty to oneself). Rather, Bankim he believed that man, in the cultivation
of all his mental and physical faculties, having achieved completeness,
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satisfied the demands of dharma in all its aspects and in one operation.33
In effect, he denied special rules of conduct applying to certain men ac-
cording to the circumstances of their birth and taught a code of conduct
to be followed by all men in all conditions, a code analogous to sad-
haralJadharma. The great example of the complete man was Krishna, who
satisfied all the ideals of manhood-physical, mental, intellectual, and
ethical. Following his example, modern man could attain these high
ideals by keeping righteousness itself as his primary motivation:
The cultivation and fulfillment of all the faculties, indeed, is dharma. That
you wiII do neither for yourself nor for others. You will do it because it is
dharma.34 Those faculties are related to oneself and to others; in their cul-
tivation, one's own welfare and the welfare of others [are] accomplished
together. Consequently, if you understand dharma in this way, removing
the distinction between one's own welfare and another's welfare is an ob-
jective of the theory of culture.35
Although one should perform the actions of dharma not with regard to
self or to others but because they were dharma, he believed in a motivating
agent which led the righteous man to maintain his high standard of
conduct and self-development. That motivating agent he called prUi, love
which is completely selfless and all-transcending. He identified this love
with bhakti, which he defined as that state of mind existing when one has
become a follower of God, having cultivated all the human faculties. The
manifestation of prUi and bhakti in respect to man's outward conduct
corresponds to an ethical principle Bankim claimed to derive from two
sources: the words of the ancient Hindu sastra, "atmavat sarvvabhflte~u
yab pasyati sa paIJ4itab"; and the words of Christ, "Therefore all things
whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."36
The objects ofprUi were ranked by Bankim in their order of importance,
and the actions associated with each level were commented upon. In each
case the primary concern of action was for saving the particular object of
prUi. He defined the four great stages of love, at once similar to Darwin's
theory of evolution, Herbert Spencer's three stages of social development,
and the Hindu four asrama of life. The development of prUi began with
love for oneself. The remaining stages were love of family, love of country
and, last and highest of all, love of God. Although love of God was the
highest stage of prUi, the highest level of its manifestation in earthly
relationships was love of country, a theme based largely on Herbert
Spencer's view of the importance of the life of the social organism over the
life of its units.37 The presentation of his message, however, bore a great
likeness to Vaisnava doctrine.
The result of this bhakti is love for the world because God is in every being.
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There is no contradiction between love for the world and love for one-
self, love for one's own people, love for one's own country. To begin with,
whatever conflict we feel arises because we do not exercise care to develop
all of these faculties with lack of desire. That means that there is a lack of
proper cultivation. Moreover, I have understood that saving one's own
people is a much greater duty than saving oneself, and saving one's own
country is much greater than saving one's own people. When bhakti toward
God and love for all people are the same thing, it can be said that, apart
from bhakti toward God, love of country is the greatest duty of all. 38
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In Bankim's definition, one's duty in the matter of saving his country
included giving his life for it when called upon to do so.
Bankimcandra's nineteenth-century doctrine of dharma rested upon
the ancient notion of a code of righteous duty for which each individual
was completely responsible. Moreover, it restated the importance of the
idea of karma, although the term was given a quite different meaning. It
seems significant to later use of Bankim's doctrine that, in writing of
karma, he reemphasized a philosophical view which Hindus understood
well and which had been denied by such nineteenth-century religious
thinkers as Rammohan and leaders of the Brahmo Samaj. The definition
and description of righteous duty were changed considerably, making all
of man's obligations acts of love toward God, expressed in acts of love
toward his fellow men and country.
In his doctrine, however, was woven the Brahmo Samaj idea of culti-
vation of all the faculties. Rammohan's concept of achieving one's full
potential of righteousness through adoration (that is, worship) of God,
though Vedantist, was not very different in principle from Bankim's
Vaisnava view of bhakti as the essential element in the operation of
dharma. These two systems of thought, moreover, emphasized a new
aspect of righteous conduct. While still directed inward in the sense of
teaching strong personal responsibility and negation of desire, they put a
sharply different emphasis on human relationships. Actions and attitudes
toward others were based on an ethical principle which included empathy,
the feeling of care toward others that one experiences for oneself. This
new dimension laid the foundation for the great social service programs
conducted by a number of Hindu groups, chief among them the Brahmo
Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission.
The new concept of relationships moved the circle of concern and
responsibility beyond one's own people, that is, family or community, to a
much larger unit. The maximum unit indicated by Bankimcandra was the
whole world. But in practical application, one could not save the whole
world. One was responsible for saving the largest unit to which he be-
longed on the basis of cultural affinity. Thus emerged the concept of the
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nation. The object of political action was defined, and, indeed, the
completely foreign concept of political action was brought within the fold
of traditional Hindu dogma. At a later period, Aurobindo was to write
in emotional terms of Bankimcandra's having given the mantra and con-
verting a whole nation in a day; but the fact cannot be denied that with
Bankim's doctrine of dharma, an acceptable philosophical, religious, and
psychological basis had been laid for the twentieth-century nationalist
movement.39
Not the least important ofthese aspects was the influence exerted by the
nineteenth-century religious writers in asserting that textual criticism on a
rational basis was the only acceptable procedure for the intelligent man in
approaching the interpretation of the scriptures. This principle was
founded upon and, in turn, supported the idea of individual judgment.
The growth of that idea among the educated people of India could only
serve to strengthen not merely the emergence of views of self-determina-
tion but also the very acceptance of democracy as a form of government.
At the close of the nineteenth century, the synthesis was complete.
Dharma remained intact, but redefined. With it was associated still the
concept of karma, though drastically reinterpreted. Primary concern was
still directed inward in the sense of responsibility for one's actions and
morality in an attitude of selflessness. But dharma was no longer com-
partmental. It was a moral principle which operated in all aspects of a
man's life, directing the whole and integrating all the noble faculties of
humanity. It was motivated by love of God, a love manifested in one's
view of all other men in whom God resided. It demanded that one give
himself completely to the service of all men who held the truth as he did
and were bound together by this view of life. The preservation of that
society held first priority over all other demands of life. In its breadth of
scope, it could give place to Rabindranath's concept of Universal Man or
it could also support Hindu nationalism, depending on where the empha-
sis was placed. The events of history proved to be decisive. The emergence
of the state fulfilled the greatest dharma of all apart from love of God-
saving one's own country.
NOTES
1. The word dharma was used by various religious and philosophical systems of
ancient India to denote a number of concepts and ideas having considerable
difference of meaning. The word dharma is used in this essay to denote a code
of ethics, social law, customs, duty-those principles, having divine origin
and divine imperative, which were intended to guide each individual on his
journey from birth to death.
2. The idea of emphasis on social order being an extension of the emphasis on
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order in the sacrifice is, admittedly, just one of many views on the subject.
3. A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (New York: Grove Press, Inc.,
1959), p. 80.
4. S. K. Maitra, The Ethics ofthe Hindus (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta,
1925), pp. 7, 8.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
6. Bankimcandra Chatterji, "Biingiiliir Itihiis," Bankim Racaniibali, vol. II
(Calcutta: Sahitya Samsad, 1959), p. 330. This volume is referred to hereafter
asBR.
7. For a description of this cult, see Shashibhusan Dasgupta's Obscure Religious
Cults (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1946), pp. 297-396.
8. Sushi! Kumar De, Bengali Literature in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed.
(Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), p. 503. Facts of Rammohan's
life and career contained in this essay are taken mainly from De's work.
9. Ibid., p. 503: "His ancestors, in the latter half of the 18th century, served the
Muhammedan rulers of Murshidabad and acquired property in some capacity
or other."
10. Ibid., pp. 514, 515.
11. Rammohan Ray, "A Second Defence of the Monotheistical System of the
Veds," English Works of Raja Rammohun Roy, vol. I (Calcutta: Brahmo
Samaj Century Committee, 1928), p. 117. (This volume is referred to here-
after as BSCC.) The tract was published originally in Calcutta in 1817.
12. To be understood as prayer and contemplation of the Supreme Being.
13. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Ibid., pp. 48, 79.
15. Rammohan Ray, "viijasaneyasamhitopanifader bhiifii bibarQlJer bhiimikiir cur-
lJak," Tattvabodhini Patrikii. "sakaler ucit ye iipan iipan anuflhiin yatna piirb-
bak karen. sampiirlJa anuflhiin nii karile upiisanii yadi siddha nii hay, tabe kiihiiro
upiisanii siddha haite pare na."
16. Among the more prominent of this number were Isvarcandra Vidyasagar
and Bankimcandra Chatterji.
17. BSCC, p. 35.
18. S. K. De, op. cit., p. 528. Another ofRammohan's contemporaries, Ram Ram
Basu, expressed his inability to convert to Christianity in spite of his attraction
to its teaching because of the importance to him of maintaining his caste
standing. His Raja Pratapadityacaritra gives further evidence of the great
importance he placed on caste affiliation.
19. For example, see Sridhar Nyayaratna's sermon to the Brahmo Samaj printed
in Tattvabodhint Patrikli. vol. 1, no. 8, p. 61.
20. These two sects are not mutually exclusive.
21. The reinterpretations of Vaisnavism in Bengal over the past five centuries are
manifold.
22. His second novel, KaplilkulJ4alii. published in 1866, gave the first real hint of
the emerging theme.
23. One intriguing aspect of Bankimcandra's literature is the Vaisnava doctrine
of his monographs and the Sakta appeal of his novels. While the latter have
certain Vaisnava elements, the overwhelming religious and emotional appeal
is made through the devt.
24. His position on Hindu widow remarriage was based on this argument.
25. Bankimcandra, like Rammohan, was a Brahman.
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26. B. C. Chatterji, "dharma ebam siihitya," BR, vol. II, p. 258. See also "samya,"
BR, vol. II, pp. 838, 384.
27. B. c., Chatterji, "cittasuddhi, " BR. vol. II, p. 259.
28. The completely developed state of all the qualities of humanity.
29. Rabindranath, a Brahmo, undoubtedly was influenced to some extent by
Bankim's writings.
30. These were foremost among the many Western philosophers he quoted.
31. Duty is Bankim's word. He wrote the English word in parentheses after the
Bengali word svadharmmapiilan.
32. B. C. Chatterji, "krflJacaritra." BR, vol. II, p. 433.
33. B. C. Chatterji, "klim," BR, vol. II, p. 271.
34. The italicizing of the word is translates the Bengali emphatic particle.
35. B. C. Chatterji, "samya," BR, vol. II, p. 384.
36. Ibid.
37. For another discussion of this aspect of Bankim's literature, see T. W. Clark's
"The Role of Bankimcandra in the Development of Nationalism," in His-
torians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. C. E. Phillips (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), pp. 432-435.
38. B. C. Chatterji, "dharmmatattva," BR. vol. II, p. 661.
39. An interesting analogy suggests itself between Bankim's doctrine of national-
ism based on dharma and the relationship of dharma and mokfa in ancient
Hindu thought. The role of dharma in providing a basis for the idea of mokfa
(Le., as defined in the Upanishadic context, freedom) is, in part at least, that
of demonstrating the necessity of freedom by creating awareness of being in
bondage. National freedom could, in part, be seen as necessary on the basis
of public and private bondage; but this perception could be greatly streng-
thened by the view of dharma as a binding obligation toward one's country
from which he would gain release only as the country achieved freedom.
Bengal and Britain: Culture Contact and
the Reinterpretation of Hinduism
in the Nineteenth Century
JOHNN. GRAY
University of Hawaii
I
During the nineteenth century, two cultures, each with a long history
and rich traditions, intensely interacted in Bengal. The arena for this
interaction was the city of Calcutta. The participants in the interaction
were the colonial officers, professionals (educators, scholars, doctors, and
lawyers), businessmen, and missionaries from England and the urban,
Western-educated, Hindu upper-caste Bengali elite. These Bengalis were
not a homogeneous group; rather they may be seen to be divided into two
groups based upon their attitudes toward Hinduism and social reform.
The orthodox Bengali elite supported Puranic and Tantric Hinduism with
its emphasis on Siva and Sakta and opposed British social reforms such
as the abolition of sati. The more progressive segment of the Bengali elite
felt that Puranic/Tantric Hinduism was one cause of Indian backwardness
and that Vedic Hinduism was more compatible with a modern society.
They advocated social reform and government intervention in effecting
these reforms. Both groups within the Bengali elite were composed of
Brahmans, Kayasthas, and Baidyas who had received a Western education
and who secured professional, commercial, and government employment
in Calcutta. As a result of their interaction with the British, both groups
of the Bengali elite, by the end of the nineteenth century, felt they were
ready to approach the problems of modernization and eventual inde-
pendence.
It is possible to classify the interaction between the British and the
Bengali elite with other culture-contact situations on three counts: first,
as is common to the colonial situation, the representatives of British
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society were clearly dominant in the interaction; second, as the sub-
ordinate partner in the interaction, the Bengali elite assimilated British
ideas and values into their culture; and third, the Bengali elite maintained
an identity with and a continuity with their own culture.
These three attributes are commonly used in historical descriptions of
nineteenth-century Bengal. Rachel Van M. Baumer, for example, portrays
the Bengali elite as a group which "perceived the urgency of accommoda-
tion and synthesis in various arenas of life."l She suggests that the motiva-
tion for the Bengali elite to effect a synthesis of British and Bengali cul-
tures was the practical need of the Bengalis to learn the ways of the
British and to develop a modus operandi in their interactions with them.2
On the other hand, Baumer indicates that the superior-inferior relation-
ship between the British and the Bengali elite and the Bengali's wide varia-
tion in attitudes toward British culture were two of the obstacles that pre-
vented a synthesis of British and Bengali cultures.3 By delving into the
motivations for and against a synthesis of British and Bengali culture,
Baumer identifies an important area of investigation. These motivational
forces, however, have a more complex relation with the synthesis effected
by the Bengali elite. If we analyze the motivations, attitudes, and inter-
actions of the Bengali elite as a process that results in a synthesis, then we
find that these factors are not simply positive or negative forces. De-
pending on additional circumstances, namely the British attitude toward
Bengalis and the shifting economic and political conditions, the superior-
inferior relationship between the British and the Bengali elite may be seen
as a deterrent to synthesis at one time and a stimulus to synthesis at ano-
ther; and practicality as a motivation for adopting British customs and
values may vary in its importance in stimulating a synthesis.
David Kopf's analysis of the British Orientalists of the early decades
of the nineteenth century pursues similar themes: an encounter with a
dominant culture and an identity quest on the part of the Bengalis who
had assimilated attitudes and values of the British culture.4 His analysis
demonstrates the importance of the status differential between the British
and the Bengali elite, the British attitude toward the Bengali culture, and
the stress felt by the Bengali elite who assimilated British customs and
values.5
It is the literary creativity of Bengalis in the nineteenth century that is
often used to demonstrate the synthesis of British and Bengali cultures.
Baumer, Kopf, and other Bengal specialists have explained the synthesis in
the following motivational framework: first, the superior-inferior rela-
tionship between the British and the Bengali elite; second, the attitudes
of the British toward the Bengalis and vice versa; third, the alienation
experienced by the Bengalis who imitated the British; fourth, the main-
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tenance of a "Bengaliness" even though much British culture was as-
similated; fifth, the practicality of adopting aspects of the British lifestyle;
and sixth, the economic and political policies of the British colonial ad-
ministration. An important factor that seems to be missing from these
analyses is the Bengali elite's perceptionof the interaction. Some significant
questions arise as a result of considering their perception of the situation.
Even though historians claim that the British were clearly dominant in the
interaction, how did the Bengali elite view their own status? If they, too,
considered themselves in a subordinate position, how did they react to it?
How is their perception of subordination related to the synthesis they
effected? Similar questions can be asked concerning their perceptions of
the British attitude toward Bengali culture and the economic and political
conditions during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, we need to delin-
eate the changing relationship between the motivations as their strengths
vary and as other social conditions vary during the evolving process of
synthesis. We also need to explain the specific relationship between the
motivations and the synthesis. For example, why did the superior-inferior
relation move the Bengali elite to incorporate British ideas and values into
their culture?
It is my aim to answer these questions while expanding previous ex-
planations of nineteenth-century Bengal by employing a combination of
two orientations: a consideration of the Bengali elite's perception of their
own culture and of British attitudes; and an analysis of the continually
evolving synthesis to show the shifting relationships between the significant
motivating factors for and against the synthesis. As a chronological frame-
work for the analysis, I divide the nineteenth century into three periods-
1800-1830, 1830-1870, 1870-1905-based on the shifting British attitudes
toward Bengali culture and the Bengali elite's perception of these shifts
and their perceptions of themselves. As the discussion proceeds, the basis
for choosing these criteria will become evident.
Before moving into the analysis of the events of nineteenth-century
Bengal, I should make some comments about the object of study-the
Bengali elite. I have chosen to focus on this group for two reasons. First,
historical studies of nineteenth-century Bengal concentrate almost exclu-
sively on the Bengali elite in Calcutta. This emphasis indicates the group's
historical importance. Second, it is they who did most of the writing which
is the basic source of data for my analysis. To generalize beyond this group
of Bengalis, who as a result of the interaction with the British became less
and less like other segments of Bengali society, would not be warranted.
Yet at various times during the century and for various reasons, the Ben-
gali elite sought to influence these other segments ofBengali society.
Martin Orans has observed a similar synthesizing process among a
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variety of groups. After studying the Santal tribe of India,6 the Jatars of
Agra city, the Burakamin of Japan, and the American Negroes,7 he de-
veloped the theory of the rank concession syndrome (RCS) to explain the
synthesis effected by these groups. His theory is relevant to the Bengali
elite of the nineteenth century because, like the groups he studied, they
were in a subordinate position and accommodated ideas and values
from the dominant culture.
The RCS theory describes the processes that result when a subordinate
society concedes rank to a dominant society.8 As a result of conceding
rank a society will emulate rank attributes of the dominant society in an
attempt to raise its status. Associated with rank concession is power con-
cession, which indicates that the subordinate society also concedes that
the dominant society is technologically more powerful. A society will
borrow technology from the dominant society not because of inferiority
feelings but to attain some practical goal (crops, health, victory in war).
Although a society concedes power when it concedes rank, power can
be conceded independently of rank.
There is a motivation which is in opposition to the motivation to borrow
that results from rank and power concessions. This opposing motivation is
what Durkheim terms solidarity.9 Solidarity refers to those shared cul-
tural characteristics that bind a society together. These characteristics
also serve as a boundary between two societies and inhibit the mutual
assimilation of traits. The binding effect of the shared cultural characteris-
tics is termed internal solidarity; their boundary effect is termed external
solidarity.l° According to Durkheim, individuals of a society want to be
like other individuals in that society and will be motivated to preserve the
society's solidarity. Thus emulation is in conflict with solidarity, given that
a society concedes rank. Orans calls this an emulation-solidarity conflict.
Emulation is not distributed evenly among the individuals within a
rank-conceding society. Those with greater economic and political power
are more apt to emulate because of their more frequent interactions with
members of the dominant society. Such "differential emulation"ll is
destructive of internal solidarity. Nevertheless, an individual cannot be
successful in raising his status without economic and political power.
Therefore, an emulation-solidarity conflict occurs among those who have
the economic and political resources to pursue higher status by borrowing
and being accorded higher rank by members of the dominant society.
Hence there is a relation between the strength of the emulation-solidar-
ity conflict and the economic and political conditions under which mobility
attempts are made. If individuals pursue an "economic rank path,"12
there is less conflict because the solidarity requirements of this path are less
important than in a political rank path. Solidarity is less emphasized
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in the economic rank path because, in a market economy, economic
success requires individual initiative. Ties with the family or other groups
can hamper the economic success of an individual because he may be
socially required to distribute his wealth. A political rank path supports
the solidarity of a society because, in democratic governments, political
success requires the backing of a majority of a society's members. Thus
in the political rank path, while emulation and the motivation to borrow
remain, solidarity requirements are stronger and this produces a more
severe emulation-solidarity conflict than does an economic rank path.
Orans identifies five means of synthesis by which individuals may
attempt to resolve their emulation-solidarity conflict:
I. Indigenous claims-through the history-mythology of the culture,
individuals demonstrate that what is borrowed is really a forgotten in-
digenous custom.
2. Syncretism-"naturalizing" borrowed customs by combining them
with indigenous customs.
3. Innovative combination-a fusion of indigenous and borrowed
customs that results in a change in both.
4. Pattern emulation and trait maintenance-incorporating the deep
values of the dominant culture while vigorously emphasizing distinctive
indigenous traits.
5. Redefinition of relevant group identification-escaping the conflict
by establishing an identity with a group outside the boundaries of the
subordinate culture (for example, the proletariat, a different religion).
The most severe emulation-solidarity conflict develops when individuals,
after pursuing rank economically, switch to a political rank path. Mobil-
ity attempts via the economic rank path emphasize borrowing, and suc-
cessful individuals will have internalized many of the borrowed customs
and values. When they shift to a political rank path, where solidarity is
paramount, they find they are alienated from their own society and may
have difficulty reacquiring indigenous customs. Under these conditions
a "cultural movement"13 results. Cultural movements are evidenced by a
proliferation of literary creativity. The motivation underlying this crea-
tivity is the severe emulation-solidarity conflict. The literature produced
is directed at resolving the conflict by employing some, if not all, of the
techniques noted above.
Of the many anthropological theories of social changes, Orans' RCS
theory seems to be the most powerful. By using it we are able to describe
the complexity of the varying relations among the motivations for a syn-
thesis and the process whereby the Bengali elite in dealing with these moti-
vations developed a synthesis.
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The city ofCalcutta was founded by Job Charnock in 1690 as a commercial
settlement. Thus even in 1800 Calcutta was a relatively new city. It had
no traditional inhabitants whose behavior might serve as a standard for the
Bengalis migrating to the city for economic reasons. Yet Calcutta was the
major arena for interaction between the Bengalis and the British. For
both, Calcutta was a new environment in which they could work out their
modes of interaction without any of the influences that would have been
present had Calcutta been a city with a longer history. Both groups had
the opportunity to adapt or ignore their own traditional customs if they
proved to be detrimental to their commercial interests. It seems to me that
such an environment was conducive to the Bengali elite's adoption of
British customs and values because of the geographical, if not social,
distance from the inhibiting influences of traditional customs and attitudes.
Thus, at the behavioral level of analysis, I infer an urban/rural dichotomy
with reference to Calcutta and the rest of Bengal. Whether or not this
dichotomy exists at the level of values and abstract social rules is a ques-
tion beyond the scope of this essay,14
1800-1830
After the British established their control over Bengal in 1757, many
Hindu upper-caste Bengalis (Brahmans, Kayasthas, and Baidyas) entered
into relations with British commercial, financial, and administrative or-
ganizations in Calcutta, from which they realized great economic bene-
fitS. I5 Thus began a long period of economic interaction between the Bri-
tish and the Bengali elite which continued well into the nineteenth cen-
tury.I6 It is difficult to sort out from the available data how much the
Bengalis borrowed from the British culture and what motivation lay
behind such borrowing. We may be able to get some indications of the
Bengali elite's attitude toward British culture and the kind of borrowing
that took place during this period by looking at the family backgrounds
of several influential personages of the Bengali elite in the latter half of
the nineteenth century.
The earliest of this group, Devendranath Tagore, who led the most
westernized reform group in the 1840s and 1850s, was brought up in a
family which had amassed wealth in commercial relations with the British
in Calcutta,17 His father, Dwarkanath, had started an agency house in
Calcutta and also managed industrial concerns.IS Ananda Mohan Bose,
a prominent figure in the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, was born to a Kayas-
tha family in 1847. His grandfather had become wealthy through a salt
business, and his father had been a government officer. Ananda Mohan
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received an English education.19 The family of Sasipad Benerje, who was
born in 1840, was in government service in a suburb of Calcutta.2o He,
too, was given an English education. Bipin Chandra Pal's father was also
in government service. Giving up his government post, his father moved
the family to Sylhet, where Bipin Chandra could receive an English edu-
cation.21 Sivanath Sastri (born 1840) at the age of nine went to Calcutta
to live with his uncle, who edited a Bengali journal. He was educated at
Sanskrit College but chose the English medium course.22 Bankim Chandra
Chatterjee, whose literature flourished in the late nineteenth century,
was born in 1838. His father was in the civil service. Bankim attended an
English medium school and Presidency College. Vivekananda was born to
a Kayastha family in Calcutta. His great-grandfather had become wealthy
as the managing clerk and associate of an English attorney. His descend-
ants retained that wealth and position by going into the professions.23
In fact, most members of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj (which is con-
sidered by many historians to be the most westernized reform group in
the latter part of the nineteenth century) came from families associated
with the British, either in the professions, commerce, or civil service.24
Almost all these Brahmos had an English education, many with college
degrees. 25
What I have been trying to demonstrate with this summary is that many
fathers and grandfathers of the Bengali elite had successfully interacted
with the British during the early decades of the nineteenth century. With
respect to the RCS theory, the family histories suggest that these Bengalis
borrowed British behavior patterns because successful economic interac-
tion demanded it. Because the British dominated the government, commer-
cial, and professional life of Calcutta, the Bengalis had to conform to the
British lifestyle if they wished to establish lucrative relations with them.
The least I can say about the motivation of these Bengalis is that they
borrowed British customs for their economic interactions because it was
beneficial to their success. If this was the case, then we may hypothesize
that the members of the Bengali elite who were involved with the British
borrowed customs because they had conceded power. Whether or not
these same Bengalis had conceded rank is difficult to establish with the
data available to me.
We may get further indications of at least power-incorporative borrow-
ing on the part of the Calcutta Bengali elite by looking at the rise of
Western education in the early nineteenth century. The reason for the
establishment of Hindu College in 1817 exemplifies the attitudes of many
of the Bengali elite toward Western education. According to Kopf, "such
families as the Mullicks, Debs, Tagores, and Ghoshals owed much of their
recently acquired wealth to European relationships. They valued highly
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competence in the English language and training in European fields of
study."26 Further, HindN College was the Calcutta elite's expression "of
a practical need to provide the sons of that group with an advantageous
European education."27 If Kopf's conclusions are correct, one may infer
that the elite, who themselves had been quite successful in their interac-
tions with the British, felt that Western education was an important pre-
requisite for further successful relations. It is significant that they chose
Western education and not the traditional one because this choice indi-
cates a concession that English education would give their sons a practical
advantage.
It is also significant, as Kopf points out, that the Bengali elite did not
feel their culture threatened by Western education:
It was the Orientalist understanding and respect for Hindu civilization that
probably impelled the founders to favor the idea of a Hindu College in the
first place. The Orientalist belief that western education should serve not
as an end in itself but as the stimulus for changing the indigenous culture
from within explains why Bengalis accepted the experiment without a re-
corded murmur of dissent. It was therefore not really secular knowledge in
western dress that was to be imparted at Hindu College, but useful know-
ledge from the West transmitted without ethnocentric bias.28
If Kopf's analysis is valid, then it appears that the elite did not feel Bengali
solidarity was being disrupted by the formation of Hindu College. Thus,
in terms of the RCS theory, power concession and power-incorporative
borrowing are not perceived to conflict with a society's solidarity main-
tenance. If this is the case, then concession of inferiority, not mere borrow-
ing, is the crucial factor in the process of effecting a synthesis.
Another point should be made concerning the formation of Hindu
College: there was some resistance from the orthodox Hindus. David
Hare and Rammohun Roy appear to have been the originators of the idea
to open a school like Hindu College. After approaching Sir Edward Hyde
East, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who agreed with the idea,
they received approval from other members of the Bengali elite.29 How-
ever, the orthodox Hindus of Calcutta "refused to have any connection
with the school if Rammohun was included in the College Committee."3o
They presumably felt this way because they viewed Rammohun's seem-
ingly westernized theology and his appeals for social reforms (such as
the abolition of sati) as a threat to their culture. They did not want their
sons to incorporate these ideas while obtaining an education, though it
appears that they did want their sons to have a Western education. This
episode may indicate the beginnings of a conflict between a desire for
Western education and a desire to maintain Hindu solidarity on the part
of the orthodox Hindus. However, the motivation behind the elite's sup-
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port of Western education is stilI unclear. With the evidence of the re-
sistance to Rammohun's involvement with Hindu College we open the pos-
sibility of rank concession along with power concession on the part of the
orthodox elite in Calcutta. In any event the wide support for Western
education instead of traditional education suggests that the elite felt that
Western education was superior for at least practical purposes (power con-
cession).
Although there seems to be no concrete evidence for rank concession
with respect to the Bengali attitude toward Western education, there are
some indications of feelings of inferiority among the progressive Bengali
elite, as exemplified by Rammohun Roy. Rammohun's early education
consisted in learning Persian under a Maulavi and Arabic in Patna.31
His later education included a study of Sanskrit language and literature in
Benaras.32 He acquired knowledge of English and Western culture while
working as a civil servant under John Digby.33 By 1815 Rammohun had
been exposed to the culture and religion of India, the Muslims, and the
West. His theology was an attempt to synthesize all these traditions into a
universal monotheism which closely resembled the Unitarianism of the
West.
That Rammohun conceded rank to the West, especially Christianity, is
evidenced in a letter he wrote to Digby in 1817: "I have found the doctrine
of Christ more conducive to moral principles, and better adapted for the
use of rational beings, than any other which [has] come to my know-
ledge."34 Further, Rammohun states: "Genuine Christianity is more
conducive to the moral, social and political progress of a people than any
otherknowncreed."35 Ingeneral,Rammohun'stheology and social reforms
were a response to the morally degraded condition into which he felt
Hinduism had fallen. He believed that women suffered from moral degra-
dation and inhuman social customs and therefore championed the aboli-
tion of sati and the general emancipation of women.36 Realizing the "de-
graded" state of Hindu society and blaming the Puranas and the later
Sastras, Rammohun seems to concede that Christian principles provided
a means of morally regenerating Hinduism. Rammohun experienced an
emulation-solidarity conflict in that he always considered himself a Hindu
and tried to incorporate-by means of indigenous claims, syncretism, and
innovative combination-Western social reforms and Christian Unitarian
principles into Upanishadic philosophy and theology. The founding of
the Brahmo Sabha in 1828 can be seen as the expression of the emulation-
solidarity conflict felt by Rammohun because he attempted to demon-
strate with Brahmo religion that Western ideas, values, and behavior
patterns were indigenous to Hindu tradition.
Rammohun's attitude toward Western education was mentioned in
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connection with the formation of Hindu College. It appears. that Ram-
mohun felt Western education was an important ingredient in India's
progress toward moral regeneration, social reform, and modernization.
He opposed the formation of Sanskrit College, an institution proposed by
H. H. Wilson which would stress "the traditional Sanskritic studies of
rhetoric, sacred literature, law, and grammar"37 along with Western
subjects. in 1823, when the government decided to organize Sanskrit
College, Rammohun wrote a letter of protest to Lord Amherst:
If it had been intended to keep the British nation in ignorance of real
knowledge, the Baconian Philosophy would not have been allowed to dis-
place the system of Schoolmen, which was the best calculated to perpetuate
ignorance. In the same manner the Sanskrit system of education would
be best calculated to keep this country in darkness, if such had been the
policy of the British legislature. But as the improvement of the native
population is the object of the government, it will consequently promote a
more liberal and enlightened system of instruction embracing Mathe-
matics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Anatomy, with other useful
sciences, which may be accomplished with the sums proposed by employ-
ing a few gentlemen of talents and learning, educated in Europe.ss
Relying solely on these remarks, we have difficulty deciding whether Ram-
mohun conceded rank and power or just conceded power with regard to
Western education. Clearly, he though that Western education was better
suited to India's progress. But did he also think that Western society in
general was better than Hindu society? He probably felt that Western
society was better than contemporary Hindu society. Assessing his atti-
tudes toward Christianity and Western education, I feel that he did con-
cede rank to Western culture and that he also experienced an emulation-
solidarity conflict, the expression of which was his attempts at synthesizing
Western moral principles and social reforms into the Upanishads, the for-
mation of the Brahmo Sabha, and the sharp criticisms his view received
from the orthodox Hindu community.
According to Kopf, 1800-1830 was the age of the Orientalist.39 In order
to train British civil servants for the posts in India, the British Orientalist
scholars had to systematize Indian language and translate Hindu texts
into English. As a result of their work, the Orientalists and the Bengali
pundits who worked with them found that India had a long history and
"discovered" the Indian golden age in Vedic times. The Bengali pundits
became conscious of their ancient civilization and developed a pride in it.
The concept of an Indaan golden age of Vedic times subscribed to by
the British Orientalist scholars and their pundits suggests that both these
groups thought that contemporary Hindu society was in a degraded state.
In addition, this same concept indicated to the Orientalists and the Bengali
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pundits that India possessed an indigenous model for revitalizing its
culture without the wholesale adoption of Western culture. The Orien-
talists also introduced the idea of renaissance to the Hindus which, com-
bined with the idea of an Indian golden age, could have encouraged the
intelligentsia to seek cultural revitalization through the renaissance of
their golden age.40
When viewed in terms of the RCS theory, the Orientalists and the
Bengali pundits of the College of Fort William present a perplexing
picture. There does not seem to be any evidence indicating that the
Bengali intelligentsia of the college felt that their culture was inferior,
except perhaps for contemporary Hinduism.41 Equipped with historical
consciousness and a pride in their golden age, it appears that these Bengal-
is felt their culture needed a regeneration from its present state and that
their civilization contained the ingredients of the progress they envisioned.
Modernization could take place but it could be consistent with Indian
tradition. The major legacy of the Orientalists was a sympathetic attitude
toward Indian culture and a historical consciousness of a golden age to
which Bengalis of the latter nineteenth century turned in their attempts
to reduce the emulation-solidarity conflict.
In sum, the 1800-1830 period of Bengali history displayed no clear-cut
evidence for rank concession, though I suspect it was present in Rammo-
hun Roy's theology and social reforms. However, I think there is con-:
crete evidence for power concession and borrowing in the elite support of
education and the success in their economic interactions with the British,
although it is hard to tell whether their power-incorporative borrowing
was associated with rank concession and emulation. I suspect that much
of the difficulty in distinguishing between "pure" power-incorporative
borrowing and rank-concession borrowing with the associated power-
incorporative borrowing is due to Orans' insufficient explication of these
concepts. His only statement on this problem is that "emulation and
power-incorporative borrowing are often intermingled in particular
acts."42 However, I hope to show that these phenomena crystallized
during the next period (1830-1870) as a result of the defense of Hinduism
against attacks by such Englishmen as Macaulay and Duff.
1830-1870
When Bentinck became governor general in 1828, the growing tide of
anti-Hindu criticism that had been expressed by some Englishmen for
more than a decade attained the status of official policy. This change in
British attitude-from the Orientalists' respect for Hindu Vedic civili-
zation to the vehement anti-Hinduism of the anglicists and evangelists-
produced a defensive response by the Bengali elite which crystallized the
110 GRAY
Ii
II
I!
II
II
II
II
incipient emulation-solidarity conflict of the previous decades. Since the
latter years of the eighteenth century, many Englishmen had held a rather
low opinion of Indians and their Hinduism and had felt that Christianity
and Western education were needed to civilize the subcontinent. How-
ever, the Orientalist position was well entrenched in the administrative
structure because of the efforts of men like Wellesley, Wilson, Colebrook,
and other scholars connected with the College of Fort William. One
might assume that the anti-Hindu opinions of the early nineteenth century
did not have a great impact on the Calcutta Bengali elite because such
opinions were tempered by the Orientalists and because missionary activity
was held to minimum until 1813.
Exemplifying this anti-Hindu criticism of the early nineteenth century
were the attitudes of Charles Grant. Upon his return from India in 1794,
Grant started advocating missionary activity in India "to transform and
deliver a whole people from superstition to light through the educational
process."43 For Grant, "Indian civilization was barbaric because its
religion was degrading. It was both dangerous and a violation of the
Christian spirit even to tolerate such a culture."44 The continuing con-
troversy about allowing missionary activity in India brought to light
further indications of anti-Hindu feelings in England. Lord Teignmouth,
in supporting the evangelical position in 1813, maintained that "only
the strong ethical content of Christianity could eradicate the deeply
rooted deceit, obscenity, and tendency toward corruption" that he found
so common in Hindus.45 Both Grant and Wilberforce in their strong sup-
port for missionaries in India "portrayed Hinduism as rotten to the core
and incapable of any sort of restoration, reform, or renaissance."46 And
Wilberforce argued before Parliament that "the Hindu divinities were
absolute monsters of lust, injustice, wickedness, and cruelty. In short,
their religious system is one grand abomination."47 Against this criticism,
the Orientalists could not prevent Britain from allowing the establish-
ment of Christian missions in India.
James Mill's History ofBritish India was another source of anti-Hindu
criticism. The following passage demonstrates the attitude of at least one
British scholar toward India:
Even in manners, and in the leading parts of the moral character, the lines
of resemblance [between Indians and Chinese] are strong. Both nations are
to nearly an equal degree tainted with the vices of insincerity; dissembling,
treacherous, mendacious, to an excess which surpasses even the unusual
measure of uncultivated society. Both are disposed to excessive exaggera-
tion with regard to everything related to themselves. Both are cowardly
and unfeeling. Both are to the highest degree conceited of themselves, and
full ofaffected contempt for others. Both are in a physical sense disgusting-
ly unclean in their persons and houses.48
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Such opinions of Indians and Hinduism forcefully and officially con-
fronted the Bengali elite in Calcutta under the administration of Bentinck
and in the statements and actions of Macaulay, Duff, and the Young
Bengal group. Bentinck dismantled the College of Fort William, nearly
drove to extinction the Calcutta Madrassa and Sanskrit College, rendered
impotent the Calcutta School and School Book Societies, forced the
anglicization of the curriculum of Serampore College and strongly sup-
ported Western education for Indians.49
The Bengali elite of Calcutta also encountered the derogatory state-
ment of Macaulay and Duff. In the Minute of 1835 Macaulay wrote:
It is I believe no exaggeration to say that all the historical information
which has been collected to form all the books written in the Sanskrit lan-
guage is less valuable than that what may be found@in the most paltry
abridgements used at preparatory schools in England. In every branch of
physical or social philosophy, the relative position of the nations is the
same.50
Macaulay felt that contemporary English culture and knowledge were
the zenith of civilization and that westernization was the only true form of
modernization.51 That Macaulay sought modernization through Western
secular education is clear when he said, "We must do our best to form a
class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we
govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and color, but English in tastes,
in opinion, in morals, and in intellect."52
Alexander Duff, a Scottish missionary who arrived in India in 1831,
was the religious counterpart of Macaulay's secular westernization. Duff
also believed that Western education was an important ingredient of
modernization for India, so long as it was "in close and inseparable
alliance with the illuminating, quickening, beautifying influence of the
Christian Faith."53 The need for the combination of Western education
and Christianity in modernizing India was predicated on Duff's harsh
opinion of Hinduism. In India and Indian Missions, Duff wrote:
Ofall the systems of false religion ever fabricated by the perverse ingenuity
of fallen man, Hinduism is certainly the most stupendous-whether we
consider the boundless extent of its range, or the boundless multiplicity of
its component parts. Of all the systems of false religion it is that which
seems to embody the largest amount and variety of semblances and
counterfeits of divinely revealed facts and doctrines.54
The impact of these British opinions was multiplied when Bengalis
themselves leveled similar criticisms at Hinduism. The appointment of
Henry Louis Vivian Derozio to the faculty of Hindu College in 1828
signaled the beginning of a wave of loud and vehement Bengali criticism
of Hindu religion and civilization. The students of Derozio at Hindu
112 GRAY
College, who came to be known as Young Bengal, felt that revitalization
of India was not to be found in her past but in opening "Indians' minds
to the cultural offerings of the west so that India might once more share
the benefits of human progress."55 That Young Bengal had a low opinion
of Hinduism is clear from Madhab Chandra Mallek's statement in the
college magazine: "If there is anything that we hate from the bottom of
our heart, it is Hinduism."56 The debates held by the students of Hindu
College generally revolved around the so-called vileness, corruptness,
and unworthiness of Hindu religion and its unfitness for rational beings.57
Along with their denunciation of Hindu religion, Young Bengal ad-
vocated westernization as a better way to modernize India. Derozio had
instilled in his students a spirit of free thought and revolt against Hindu
society and customs. These students were inspired by the writings of
Voltaire, Locke, Hume, and Paine and by European history. Krishna
Mohan Bannerjee, a Christian convert, in the first address given before
the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge echoed the feelings
of Young Bengal:
If the study of history be of such immense consequence to mankind in
general, it is by far more so to persons of our present situation. We are by
no means satisfied with the state of things around us. We wish we were not
surrounded with such wretched and degraded fellow-men. . . . Dissatis-
fied with our present intellectual an d moral condition and desiring to
improve ourselves and countrymen, we have come to the determination
of organizing this very society.... There are nations that at one time
groaned under the wretched degradation but who stand conspicuous now
for everything that is good and great. ... Can we observe with attention
the rise of European Communities from the lowest depths of barbarism
without getting some insight into the secret of human emancipation from
corruption and misery?58
In 1833 Young Bengal started a journal, Bijnan Sar Sangraha, the purpose
of which was "to communicate, chiefly among the natives of Bengal, such
selections from works of European literature and science as may tend to
enlarge the sphere of their moral sentiments and infuse a spirit of activity
and enterprise in all those pursuits which conduce to the happiness or
glory of man."59 Young Bengal felt that Hinduism was the cause of the
so-called social and moral corruption and backwardness of Hindu society
and that by imitating Western culture and with Western science and
philosophy India could be a great country.
Young Bengal's imitation of the West went beyond education. De-
scriptions of their lifestyle provide further evidence of their attitudes
toward Hinduism and Western culture. Bose reports that these radical
students shouted at orthodox Hindus that they ate beef, and that they
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greeted the image of Kali with "Good morning, madam."6o Benoy Ghosh
reports that the main characteristics of members of Young Bengal were
"their love of the West and intoxication with the English."61 Heimsath
quotes K. A. N. Sastri's description of these students: they "adopted an
agressive attitude to everything Hindu and openly defied the canons of
their inherited religion, while some of them offended public opinion by
their youthful exuberance such as drinking to excess, flinging beef bones
into houses of the orthodox, and parading the streets shouting 'we have
eaten Mussulman bread.' "62 S. Mukerjee states that "there was a rush
for everything English, and English ideals dominated our lives and
thoughts."63 In a Calcutta periodical in 1851 the students of Hindu College
were described as having a "smattering of English," dressing fashionably,
carrying around Shakespeare and Milton, eating beef, and drinking wine.64
With reference to the RCS theory, the members of Young Bengal had
conceded rank to English culture in the early 1830s. However, as the de-
cade progressed a large portion of the Bengali orthodox community
harshly criticized their ideas and behavior. The orthodox elite's attempts
to check the westernization of the members of Young Bengal revealed
their growing concern with the solidarity of Bengali society. The Dharma
Sabha, formed in 1831, protested against the radical trends of Young
Bengal. Parents withdrew their sons from Hindu College and forced the
firing of Derozio. The Young Bengal members were threatened with ex-
communication from Hindu society. The orthodox community forced the
suspension of the progressive periodical Parthenon, published by the
students of Derozio, after its first issue in 1830.65 The attacks by the or-
thodox elite became more vehement after the Christian conversion of
about fifty of the students, among them Mahesh Chandra Ghosh and
Krishna Mohan Bannerjee.66
Two points must be made about the reaction of the orthodox elite to
Young Bengal. First, the feelings of alienation feIt by Young Bengal
were the result of these attacks. In terms of the RCS theory, the alienation
of these students was an important factor in the emulation-solidarity
conflict they experienced toward the end of the 1830s. Most members of
Young Bengal joined Devendranath Tagore in revitalizing the Brahmo
Samaj in 1842. The Brahmo Samaj of 1842 was an extension of the ideas of
Rammohun Roy which, as demonstrated above, were attempts to solve
the emulation-solidarity conflict. In other words, most members of Young
Bengal returned to the position of espousing social reform and moderni-
zation while attempting to maintain their Hindu solidarity by using the
techniques of synthesis and indigenous claims of Brahmoism. I will have
more to say about the Brahmo Samaj shortly.
Second, the reaction to Young Bengal of the members of the Dharma
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Sabha demonstrated an emulation-solidarity conflict on the part of even
the most orthodox Hindus of the Calcutta Bengali elite. According to
Kopf, the members of the Dharma Sabha were not against modernization
but against the total westernization of India.67 That the members of the
Bengali orthodox community were in favor of Western education eventual-
ly is demonstrated in their support of Hindu College. The organization
of the Dharma Sabha followed Western lines with a president, board of
directors, secretary, and treasurer. They conducted their meetings ac-
cording to the strict rules of parliamentary procedure.68 They tended to
agree with the British criticism of Hinduism-that the customs and
practices of eighteenth-century Hinduism were inferior and that reform
was needed. Their ideas for social reform, such as their plan for aiding
the rural poor and their proposal for aiding Calcutta's poor by building
a charitable institution and hospital, were derived from their contact
with and emulation of Western society.69 Yet they resented the forceful
intrusion of Western culture and the harsh criticisms of the British. As a
result, they sought to maintain their solidarity by defending the Hinduism
reconstructed by the Orientalists. 70
The Brahmo Samaj of Devendranath Tagore presents the clearest
example of the emulation-solidarity conflict felt by the more progressive
Bengali elite between 1830 and 1870. In general, they agreed with the
derogatory opinions of Puranic Hinduism held by the British. The mem-
bers of the Brahmo Samaj believed there was much that was better in
Western culture. However, they were also defensive of Hinduism as
reinterpreted by Rammohun Roy. Therefore they attempted to maintain
their Hindu solidarity through the Brahmo religion.
When Devendranath Tagore assumed the leadership of the Brahmo
Samaj in 1843, that organization had passed through a period of stagna-
tion since the death of Rammohun in 1833. It is probable that Devendran-
ath had conceded rank to British culture. Because his father, Dwarkanath,
had been successful in his business relations with the British in the 1800-
1830 period, it is assumed that he internalized many English customs that
his family had adopted because of presumed power-incorporative bor-
rowing of his father. Devendranath attended Hindu College in 1831 and
continued his studies there for four years. Although I lack evidence, it
seems probable that he held attitudes similar to those of the Young Bengal
students of the college. We get indirect evidence of his sympathy with the
ideas of Young Bengal and his rank concession to Western culture by the
fact that he joined the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge
in 1838. We also get indirect evidence of his emulation-solidarity conflict,
for in that same year he was converted to the Brahmo faith. In his auto-
biography, Devendranath mentions a spiritual loneliness which was
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lessened when, after coming across a part of the Upanishads dealing with
monotheism, he took up the Brahmo faith. 71
The formation of the Brahmo Sabha by Rammohun Roy in 1828 was an
expression of his emulation-solidarity conflict. There seems little reason
not to accept that when Devendranath assumed the leadership of the
organization in 1843 it was still an expression of the members' emulation-
solidarity conflict. Most members of the Brahmo Samaj were Western-
educated Bengali elite who had conceded rank in the sense that they ad-
mitted that the Puranic/Tantric Hinduism, which the British criticized, was
inferior. But the blind imitation of Western culture by Young Bengal was
viewed as a threat to Hindu solidarity.
In an attempt to stem the tide of westernization and to provide a means
of identifying with Hindu civilization while incorporating many of the
social reforms and institutions of the West, Devendranath formed the
Tattvabodhini Sabha in 1839, which became a subsidiary of the Brahmo
Samaj when he joined it. The journal of the Brahmo Samaj, Tattvabodhini
Patrika, emphasized Bengali solidarity symbols by stating the need for
developing the Bengali language, studing science and theology, and
battling against the superstition and idolatry of medieval Hinduism if
moral and material uplift were to be realized. 72 They confronted the
criticism of the missionaries by publishing rejoinders in defense of Vedic
Hinduism: "We will not deny that we consider the Vedas and the Vedas
alone as the authorized rule of Hindu theology. They are the sole founda-
tion of all our beliefs and the truths of all other Shastras will be judged of
according to their agreement with them."73 It seems that the members of
the Brahmo Samaj indirectly admitted the inferiority of medieval Hindu-
ism by using Vedic Hinduism as their foundation of Brahmo religion..
Brahmoism provided an alternative to westernization and Christianity.
"They offered the Western-educated a reformed Indian religion-Vedant-
ism-which they argued was free of superstition and priestly tyranny.
At the same time, Brahmos claimed to offer an ethical system based on
Hindu scriptures but reflecting the identical sentiments of the Sermon on
the Mount."74 If Kopf is right, the Brahmos were clearly attempting to
deal with an emulation-solidarity conflict.
The Brahmoism of Devendranath was not wholly successful in resolving
the emulation-solidarity conflict. The Brahmo Samaj did manage to
check missionary proselytizing and put an end to the wholesale imitation
of the West by providing the Bengali elite of Calcutta with a form of
Hinduism that denied the so-called superstition, idolatry, and moral and
social corruption of medieval Hinduism. 75 However, the same religion,
Brahmoism, which synthesized the Western-inspired reform of the position
of women, education, and sati with the Hinduism of the Vedas and Up-
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anishads also alienated the Brahmos from the orthodox Bengali elite. In
the 1850s Devendranath stated that "we Brahmos are situated amidst a
community which views us with no friendly feelings" because we attack
"their Puranic and Tantric systems."76 Another factor which added to
their alienation from the more orthodox segment of the Bengali elite was
their continued sympathy toward American and British Unitarianism. 77
The orthodox Bengali elite probably believed that this sympathy was a
further Western influence that would destroy traditional Hindu religion.
Raj Narain Bose, in a reaction to this alienation, attempted to demon-
strate the superiority of Hinduism over Christianity. The Hinduism he
chose to support was that of classical Vedanta while attacking that of the
Puranas and Tantras. 78 These efforts failed the convince the orthodox
community of the Brahmos' Hindu identity because the Brahmos attacked
the very religion in which they believed. Thus the Brahmos in the 1850s
were still experiencing an emulation-solidarity conflict.
When Keshab Chandra Sen joined the Brahmo Samaj in 1858, the
organization switched from an emphasis on religious reinterpretation of
Hinduism and incorporation of Western ideas to an emphasis on social
reform. 79 Keshab quickly became the leader of many younger Brahmos
by advocating campaigns against kulm polygamy, child marriage, and caste
while promoting widow-remarriage, intercaste marriage, and women's
emancipation through education.8o These reforms were too radical for
Devendranath because he felt they would alienate the Brahmo even fur-
ther from Hindu society. With more data I might have been able to de-
monstrate that Devendranath agreed with many of the reforms proposed
by Keshab Chandra and that because of the emulation-solidarity conflict
he chose to identify more closely with Hinduism than did Keshab Chandra.
In any event, Keshab Chandra's speech "Jesus Christ: Europe and
Asia," delivered in 1866, was interpreted by Devendranath and his faction
as an apologia for Christianity and led to a split in the Brahmo Samaj in
that same year. Keshab's group formed the Brahmo Samaj of India;
Devendranath and his followers formed the Adi Brahmo Samaj.
Devendranath attacked the Brahmo Samaj of India and started pro-
grams aimed at the modernization of India. At this point the solidarity
focus of the emulation-solidarity conflict was extended by the Adi Brahmo
Samaj. They realized that their Brahmoism must be spread among a wider
segment of Hindu society so that a majority of Bengalis could have pride
in their culture. Thus the Hindu Mela was started by Dwijendranath
Tagore. The program included a display of Hindu industrial goods,
physical training to restore the manliness of Bengali youth, the establish-
ment of a school of Hindu music, the founding of a school of Hindu med-
icine, and the encouragement of Indian antiquities. These programs were a
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response to the "degradation" of Bengali society.81 Dwijendranath,
recognizing the danger of westernization but also recognizing the "in-
feriority" of Bengali society, attacked the Brahmo Samaj of India in 1869:
With all our present inferiority and infirmities we are little better respected
by the world than the Christian negro of North America who speaks Eng-
lish, dresses himself with the jacket and pantaloon, and whose habits of
life in fact are mostly borrowed from the European settlers there. And why
so? Simply because his civilization is nothing more than an image of
European manners and habits, and he is no more like the true European
than the monkey in the red-coat riding on the she-goat is like a human
being. By means of mere imitation we can be just so much like the Euro-
peans as slaves are like their masters.82
While the Tagores and the Adi Brahmo Samaj were dealing with their
emulation-solidarity conflict by creating the Hindu Mela to increase the
internal solidarity of Hinduism and uplift the masses and instill pride in
Hindu civilization, the Brahmo Samaj of India was becoming more and
more westernized and more and more alienated from Hindu society. The
Brahmo Samaj of India under Keshab continued to push for social re-
forms as a response to their agreement with the criticisms of the West.
Their alienation attained a de jure status with the Marriage Act of 1872.
This act stated that intercaste marriages would be legally recognized if the
partners declared that they were neither Hindu, Christian, Muhammadan;
Parsi, Buddhist, Sikh, nor Jain. 83
Why the Adi Brahmo Samaj experienced a more severe emulation-
solidarity conflict and started programs aimed at fostering the internal
solidarity of Hindu society and massing support for their program of
nationalism and why the Brahmo Samaj of India did not seem to experi-
ence the same degree of conflict may be explained by reference to rank
path. The Adi Brahmo Samaj chose a political rank path as evidenced by
the nationalistic tenor of their programs. According to the RCS theory,
the choice of a political rank path results in an increased emulation-
solidarity conflict which can be resolved by syncretizing indigenous and
emulated customs and by emphasizing the indigenous customs in order
to gain the support of the masses. The Hindu Mela was just such a pro-
gram with the added ingredient of instilling pride in Hindu culture.
Because Keshab's program was universalist in tone, he spoke of solidarity
with mankind more than solidarity with Hindus. Thus there was not the
severe emulation-solidarity conflict and less motivation to emphasize in-
digenous customs and symbols in their program and philosophy. Kes-
hab's group did experience an emulation-solidarity conflict as evidenced
by their derogatory opinion of Hinduism. However, in speaking of a
solidarity with all mankind they relieved the self-hatred that accompanies
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rank concession without "the exigencies of social unity aimed at improving
status."84 In sum, the difference between the Adi Brahmo Samaj and the
Brahmo Samaj of India was the choice of rank path and the focus of so-
lidarity. The former group by choosing the political rank path of national-
ism experienced an increase in the emulation-solidarity conflict. Con-
sequently they had to gain mass support through the Hindu M(lla. The
latter group, though experiencing an emulation-solidarity conflict, did
not switch to a political rank path but rather attempted to resolve their
conflict by speaking of a solidarity with all mankind. Such rhetoric may
decrease overt solidarity attempts, and thus they were free to pursue their
Western reforms without the inhibiting influences of a nationalistic so-
lidarity with their own society.
1870-1905
The organizations, theology, and events of the 1830-1870 period were a
reaction by the Bengali elite to the change in attitude of the British. In-
stead of the Orientalist sympathy for Hindu Vedic religion and civili-
zation, the anglicist scorn for all that was Indian prevailed. The British
attitude indicated to the Bengalis that the only way India could purge
herself of the so-called backwardness, corruption, and idolatry of medi-
eval Hindu civilization was the wholesale adoption of British culture.
Although the Bengali elite seemed to agree that Puranic/Tantric Hinduism
was inferior, they reacted in defense of Vedic Hinduism through such
organizations as the Brahmo Samaj and Dharma Sabha. Brahmoism
incorporated Western-inspired social and religious reforms into Vedic and
Upanishadic Hinduism as a defense against British criticism of the entire
civilization and history. By doing so, the Brahmos indicated that they
were experiencing an emulation-solidarity conflict. At the beginning of
the 1870-1905 period, there was another shift in British attitude and
policy toward Bengalis. According to Kopf, this shift was shown in three
ways:
In the first place, there was a sharp rise of the educated unemployed who
could not find suitable jobs. Secondly, gifted Bengalis were discriminated
against openly by Britishers who resented "niggers" in high positions.
Thirdly, the nonofficial British community blocked every effort to give
Indian magistrates the power to judge cases involving whites as well as
nonwhites.85
In other words, now that many Bengalis had emulated and borrowed
British customs-a course which had been advocated by the British in
the 1830s-the British reversed their position and displayed hostility
toward the kind of westernized Bengali they had sought to produce.
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The changing economic conditions of the nineteenth century were an
important factor in the Bengalis' view of British attitudes. Between 1800
and 1850 the Bengali upper castes in Calcutta were highly successful in
their commercial dealings with the British. 86 Around 1850, Bengalis were
withdrawing from commercial affairs because of a series of commercial
crises and increased British exclusiveness. 87 At the time the commercial
ventures were failing, there were increasing opportunities of white-collar
employment for the Bengalis who had an English education. 88 These
employment opportunities, together with the opening of government
appointments for Bengalis, increased the stimuli for Bengalis to acquire an
English education. The members of the Bengali elite were successful in
obtaining most of the white-collar positions as well as the government
appointments. 89 After 1870, the Bengali elite were almost entirely left
out of commercial development. In addition, because of rising population,
land fragmentation, and lack of agricultural improvements, their revenue
from landholdings was decreasing. 90 This loss of agricultural revenue in
the l870s forced more of the Bengali elite to seek public service and pro-
fessional employment.
Since English education was necessary for professional and public ser-
vice employment, there was a sharp increase in school and college enroll-
ment in the l870s. The increasing numbers of English-educated Bengali
elite meant stiffer competition for civil service and government jobS. 91
However, the number of job opportunities did not keep pace with the
number of qualified Bengalis. 92 Thus many educated Bengalis found
themselves unemployed in the latter part of the nineteenth century and
they blamed the British for their situation. In 1876 the British govern-
ment sought to lower the maximum age limit from twenty-one to nineteen
for the open competitive examination for civil service posts. 93 This action
was a prime example of what the Bengalis viewed as British attempts to
keep Indians out of government service.
Those Bengalis who did secure employment in the professions or in
civil service found themselves discriminated against by the British in
attaining higher positions. For example, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee
"felt that there was little chance of his extra labors receiving recognition
since he wa's not an Englishman." 94 It appears that Bengalis did not receive
the promotions that less-qualified Englishmen received because the
British believed that the educated Bengalis were cunning, deceitful, and
lacked manly courage. A handbook for British administrators in India
stated that: "The physical organization of the Bengali is feeble even
to effeminacy.... His mind bears a singular analogy to his body. It is
weak even to helplessness for purposes of manly resistance but its sup-
pleness and tact move children of sterner climates to admiration not
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unmingled with contempt."95 Furthermore, educated Bengalis who did
find employment were subject to demands of servility from their British
superiors. In addition, as John R. McLane points out elsewhere in this
volume, Bengali professionals, particularly lawyers, had a difficult time
"gaining access to the highest position in the bar" because of the poor
training they received and the belief on the part of many Indians that an
Indian lawyer was less likely to be successful in winning court cases. 96
Another expression of the shift in British attitude was the failure of the
Ilbert Bill to become law. Since the "Black Acts" of 1849, Indians had
been trying to bring "British-born subjects under the jurisdiction of the
local courts, thus abolishing the existing privilege of trial by the Calcutta
supreme court alone." 97 The Ilbert Bill of 1882 sought to legalize the rare
practice of trying Englishmen by Indian magistrates. But the European
community, organized by Branson, successfully killed the bill by pressur-
ing Lord Ripon.
The unemployment of the educated Bengalis, together with economic
and legal discrimination, clearly displayed the British attitudes toward
Bengalis in the 1870s. The change in attitude forced the Bengalis to re-
consider the rank path they had chosen to raise their status. Until the
1870s, the Bengalis had been pursuing higher status via their economic
interactions with the British and religious reform. As mentioned, the
economic rank path produces a less severe emulation-solidarity conflict
because it is a more individual avenue of mobility. The fact that the
Bengali elite was pursuing an economic rank path may explain the greater
emphasis on emulation of Western culture in previous periods. This is
not to say that the elite was not concerned with solidarity; rather that, in
relation to the period with which we are now dealing, they seemed to be
emphasizing the borrowing of Western customs more than attempting to
affirm their likeness with their own culture. Dwijendranath's comments
about the Brahmo alienation from the rest of Bengali society were a re-
cognition of the fact that both the orthodox community and the Brahmos
were concerned with Bengali solidarity.
The situation we encounter in the 1870s is different from those that
Orans considers. 98 The increased emulation-solidarity conflict for the
Santal, Jatars, Burakamin, and Negroes resulted from the opening of the
political rank path. In the Bengali case of the nineteenth century, we see
the closure of the economic rank path. The result is that the Bengali elite
was forced to pursue a political defense of the position they had gained
through the economic rank path. In other words, the closure of the econo-
mic path, together with British discrimination against the Bengali elite,
forced the Bengalis to attempt to organize politically to maintain, if not
improve, their positions and numbers in the professions and in civil
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service jobs. Thus there was a shift from an economic to a political rank
path not because of new political opportunities but because of diminishing
economic ones.
The switch from the economic to the political rank path brought about
more severe emulation-solidarity conflict. In fact, it might be hypothesized
that the Bengal elite did not experience a severe emulation-solidarity
conflict until the l870s, when they were forced to pursue rank politically
and thus wider their base of support. The Adi Brahmo Samaj was ex-
ceptional because it expanded the focus of its solidarity attempts in
1866 as a reaction to the alienation they experienced and the programs
advocated by Keshab Chandra. The Hindu Mela was an expression of
their expanded focus.
If the Bengali elite did shift from an economic to a political rank path
with the resultant increased emulation-solidarity conflict, then we should
expect a "cultural movement" in which the elite attempts to increase
their solidarity with Hindu civilization in order to gain wider support
for their programs of modernization. Further we should expect literary
creativity to proliferate, practicing the techniques of syncretism, inno-
vative combination, and indigenous claims in order to naturalize the
borrowed ideas and values from the West and to increase Bengali
solidarity. The neo-Vaisnava and neo-Vedanta movements of the last
quarter of the nineteenth century were stimulated by the increased emu-
lation-solidarity conflict resulting from the shift to the political rank
path.
To exemplify the cultural movement of the last quarter of the nin~teenth
century, I turn now to the literary works of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee
with respect to the increased emulation-solidarity conflict of this per:iod.
Bankim Chandra was boni in 1838 of a kulm Brahman family. He prob-
ably had close contact with Western culture because his father had been
in the civil service and because he had an English education. His upbring-
ing therefore included many English values which became internalized
during his youth.
Bankim Chandra experienced an emulation-solidarity conflict. That he
felt Bengali society was inferior is evident: "Moreover, the people of our
country, particularly the humble people, are exceedingly lazy."99 Accord-
ing to Bankim, Hindu society was backward because of the mastery of
the Brahmans and the lack of moral strength to resist on the part of the
common people: "At first the mastery of the Brahmans increased through
the passiveness of the other castes. Because of the loss of intellectual
strength on the part of the other castes, their minds became especially
susceptible to superstition. Superstition is produced by fear."lOO And
Bankim showed equal disdain for the westernized Bengali babu:
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Whose words are one in his mind, ten in speech, a hundred in writing,
and a thousand in a quarrel, he is a babu. Whose strength is one thing in
his hand, ten times greater in his mouth, a hundred times greater on the
written page, and out of sight at the time for work, he is a babu. Whose
intelligence in his childhood is in books, in youth in a bottle, in adulthood
in his wife's ancal, he is a babu. Whose god of good fortune is the British,
whose guru is the teacher of the Brahmo religion, whose Veda is the native
newspaper, and whose place of pilgrimage is the National Theatre, he is a
babu. Who is a Christian to the missionaries, a Brahmo to Kesabcandra,
a Hindu to his father, and an atheist to Brahman beggars, he is a babu.
Who takes water at home, liquor in his friend's house, a tongue lashing in
the prostitute's quarters, and a collaring at his Master Sahib's house, he
is a babu. Who despises the use of oil at bath time, his own finger at meal
time, and his mother tongue at conversation time, he is a babu. Whose
concern is only with clothing, whose diligence is pursuing a good job,
whose only respect is for his wife or mistress, and whose anger is only for
good books, without doubt, he is a babu.101
Not only did Bankim view Hindus as inferior but he also conceded that
the British were superior: "That the English are generally superior to
the people of this country, no one will deny except the man blinded by
conceit. The English are superior to us in strength, culture, knowledge,
and glory."102 Bankim admired the bravery and dedication to duty of the
British; and he felt that Indian backwardness was due to the lack of self-
confidence and moral strength of his generation,lo3
Although Bankim conceded rank to British culture and especially
admired the strength and courage of Englishmen, he did not feel that
westernization should be the form of modernization for India, as evidenced
in his description of the babu. Further, he did not advocate the program
of social reform as did the Brahmos; rather he felt that a moral regenera-
tion and a nationalistic spirit were the answer to the problem of Indian
backwardness. "He believed that social and political reform would follow
naturally upon religious regeneration."104 His reinterpretation of Vais-
navism was an attempt to naturalize those values of the West which he
admired by demonstrating that the values were actually part of Vaisnava
tradition. As such, his neo-Vaisnavism, together with Vivekananda's
neo-Vedanta, was part of the "cultural movement" stimulated by the
increased emulation-solidarity conflict resulting from the switch to a
political rank path.
Because Bankim Chandra regarded religion as the basis of moral re-
generation, he viewed it as a system of ethics, not merely a belief in gods:
I am not one of those who think that a belief in God, or in a number of
gods, or in a future existence, or anything else which does not admit of
proof, constitutes religion. But when such belief, or any belief whatever,
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furnishes a basis for conduct of the individual towards himself as well as
towards others . . . it is religion. . . . Religion viewed thus is in theory a
philosophy of life; in practice it is a rule of life.105
In order for India to solve the problems of her backwardness, Bankim
Chandra advocated a two-pronged program: the creation of a righteous
kingdom with moral and ethical regeneration, and the fostering of a
national spirit by developing self-confidence and strength. Since religion
was the key to both these programs, he reinterpreted Vaisnavism in order
to naturalize the ethics and national feeling necessary for creating his
righteous kingdom. Bankim Chandra demonstrated that there did exist
a righteous kingdom in Hindu tradition. He portrayed the Aryan culture
of Vedic times as one of enlightenment and morality. Yet this righteous
kingdom had degenerated because the masses of Hindus were too lazy
to resist the corruption introduced by the Brahmans through fear and
superstition.
The proper ethics of moral regeneration were to be found in the Krisna
portrayed in the Mahabharata. Krisna displayed the social and ethical
activism, the devotion to humanity, and the moral strength to resist evil.
In Krsnacharitra ("Biography of Krisna") Bankim presented the goal of
moral regeneration as the kingdom of righteousness and claimed that it
would be attained if Hindus upheld their dharma. Dharma, however, was
not the multiplicity of particularist ethics of Puranic Hinduism but a
universalist ethic of devotion exemplified by Krisna in the Mahabharata.
All Hindus should emulate Krisna's code of ethic-karmayoga, the path
of works as service to man rather than the performance of rituals.I 06
Bankim portrayed Krisna in Krsnacharitra and in Anandamath as the ideal
man. Together with his ascetics, Krisna devoted himself to the creation
of a nation in which "the truth of the eternal religion will triumph. Ban-
kim Chandra pictured the creation of the Indian nation as a triumph of
religious truth."107 Thus the moral regeneration of Indians would foster
a national feeling among Hindus because of their pride in their kingdom
of righteousness.
Bankim also portrayed Krisna as powerful warrior, a good tactician
and administrator, just, good, forgiving, brave.I°8 In order to carry out
his dharma of creating a righteous kingdom and working for the good of
humanity, Bankim believed that a man should cultivate all his faculties.
He was against the ascetics' physical withdrawal from the world and their
consequent physical degeneration. Physical and mental strength were
necessary for spiritual regeneration.109 For Bankim a major message of
the M ahabharata was that a man should be physically and mentally pre-
pared to resist evil with violence, if necessary, in order to creat the king-
dom of righteousness.ll° As mentioned, Bankim felt that India had
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degenerated because the people were too lazy to resist the corruption of
the Brahmans. Thus he advocated physical training along with spiritual
uplift as the way to prepare Hindus for their dharma of creating a righ-
teous kingdom.
Another important factor in Bankim Chandra's reinterpretation of
Vaisnavism using Krisna was asceticism. In the novel Anandamath, he
portrayed a band of sannyasin who fought "to create a golden age of ma-
terial and moral progress when the eternal religion would flourish. "111
As mentioned above, Bankim was against a sannyasa's withdrawal from
the world. Instead he advocated a this-wordly asceticism by which man
would attempt to perfect not only himself but also his society. In Krsna-
charitra, "Krisna is ideal because he worked for the good of his people
and for the creation of the good society."112 Bankim believed that a
sannyasa should sever his family ties so that he could be wholly dedicated
to his dharma of working for the good of his motherland. In sum, Bankim
advocated a this-worldly asceticism in which man should become a
sannyasa by severing his family ties, by developing his physical, mental,
and spiritual strength and courage, by devoting himself to work in this
world for the good of his fellow man, by spreading the eternal religion,
by resisting evil with force if necessary in the pursuit of righteousness,
and by building the confidence and national feeling of the people of India.
In both Krsnacharitra and Anandamath, Krisna and his sannyasin were
portrayed as possessing all these virtues, and they sought the moral
regeneration of their people in creating a kingdom of righteousness.
Bankim Chandra did not exclusively use Vaisnava symbolism in his
reinterpretation of Hinduism. In fact, the major symbol for his nation
when the eternal religion reigned was Sakta. The goddess Kali was used
as the symbol of the Hindu nation. Kali represented both the degradation
of Hindu society and the source of strength and power to whom sannyasin
should dedicate their works.113 For Bankim, Kali was the symbol of the
nation which would stimulate a national feeling among Hindus. She would
stimulate the moral and physical courage to resist evil; she would stim-
ulate an active dedication to the creation of a righteous nation.l14 The
new nation, symbolized by Durga, would be based on the ethic of love of
humanity. Bankim believed that the moral regeneration ofIndia depended
on love of others. Love of God was the highest stage of human love, but
because civilization was imperfect, love for one's countrymen would
suffice until a higher ethical stage was reached by man. The three stages
leading to the development of love of God were love of self, love of
family, and love of nation.115 Bankim translated these stages oflove into
an ethic of works:
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Saving one's own people [family] is a much greater duty than saving
oneself, and saving one's own country is much greater than saving one's
own people. When bhakti toward God and love for all people are the same
thing, it can be said that, apart from bhakti towards God, love of country
is the greatest duty of all.116
Thus Bankim Chandra used the symbol of Kali and an ethic of love to
stimulate a national feeling among the Hindus.
In his reinterpretation of Vaisnavism and Sakta symbolism, Bankim
Chandra naturalized, through indigenous claims, several of the Western
values he admired. Two of these values were bravery and dedication to
duty, and it is clear that he emphasized these in his interpretation of the
dharma of Krisna and the sannyasin. Choudhury's description of the
Western ideas which influenced Bankim's reinterpretation of Vaisnavism
indicates the extent of his borrowing from the West:
Like the Sadharan Brahmos, Bankim Chandra had also been greatly in-
fluenced by his readings in western philosophy. He was a great admirer of
Auguste Comte and his concept of a religion of humanity. Bankim's em-
phasis on humanitarianism and his doctrine of cultivation of all human
faculties seem to have reflected the influence of John Stuart Mill. But Ban-
kim Chandra insisted that these basic ideas and ideals existed in Hindu
thought in a better form. The Comtean religion of humanity is imperfect
because it did not include a belief in God. In the life of Krisna Bankim
Chandra found a similar religion of culture which included belief in God
and was based on the incarnation of God. He also found in the life of
Krisna the principle that the criterion of true religion is what is good for
humanity, which he says is similar to the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham
and Mill. According to Bankim Chandra the spiritual principles necessary
for a moral regeneration can be found in Hinduism and did not need to
be imported from outside. The true principles of Hinduism must be re-
discovered and reapplied for religious reformation and regeneration.
Bankim Chandra stated that religious reform must evolve from within
Hindu religious tradition. Western religious and philosophical thought
could only act as a stimulus to reexamination of the real meaning of the
Hindu tradition.H7
A further indication of Bankim's borrowing and incorporation is evident
when he said:
Religion in its fullness cannot be found in the qualityless god of the Ve-
danta, because he who is without qualities cannot be an example to us....
The basis of religion is a god with qualities such as is mentioned in our
Puranas and in the Christian Bible, because He and only He can be our
model. The worship of an impersonal God is sterile; only the worship of
a personal God has meaning to man. lIS
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Bankim Chandra Chatterjee was part of the cultural movement of the
last quarter of the nineteenth century-a movement that was stimulated
by the increasing emulation-solidarity conflict resulting from the switch
from an economic to a political rank path. Through his literary creativity
he sought to resolve his own emulation-solidarity conflict by advocating
the solidarity of his people. His literary creativity is demonstrative of
Orans' RCS theory in that he attempted to naturalize British ideas and
values into Hindu tradition, principally through the technique of indi-
genous claims. Furthermore, he chose the god of the Puranas as the god
of his new Hinduism. This is significant in that the Puranas were singled
out for criticism by the British missionaries earlier in the century and
therefore carried low status value. Emphasizing low status attributes is,
according to Orans, ideally suited to stimulating external solidarity be-
cause these attributes are the most distinctive,l19
Space does not permit a similar analysis of the neo-Vedanta of Vive-
kananda. But if my understanding of his theology is correct, he too natur-
alized several ideas and values from the West. The disciples of Bijoy
Krisna Goswami, many of whom converted from Brahmoism, also dis-
played the emulation-solidarity conflict in their attempts at synthesizing
Western values and indigenous tradition. The fact that several of his
disciples converted from Brahmoism is significant in that, as the nineteenth
century drew to a close, the members of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj
found themselves more and more alienated from the rest of the Calcutta
Bengali elite. Although these Brahmos advocated social reforms similar
to those of the neo-Vaisnavas, neo-Vedantists, and the Adi Brahmo Samaj,
they did not attempt to naturalize the programs as thoroughly as did the
other groups. It appears that the Sadharan Brahmos were not so concerned
about solidarity because they felt that their group was the core of Bengalis
who would interact with the British for the betterment of Hindu society.
I think that they underestimated the solidarity requirements of a political
rank path. It was not until the partition of Bengal in 1905 that the Brahmos
saw the futility of agitating a small group to gain British concessions in
political, economic, and social matters. Their activity failed because they
were alienated from the rest of the elite and therefore lacked the wide
support necessary in the political rank path. They did not try to counter
their alienation by thorough attempts at naturalizing the Western ideals
and values they emulated The post-1905 political activity was based upon
the more indigenous reinterpretations of Hinduism of Bankim Chandra
and Vivekananda. For it was these philosophies which combined the social
activism, universalist ethics, free thinking, and social reform ideas bor-
rowed from the West with the solidarity attributes of Hinduism.
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By considering the entire nineteenth century, this analysis of the Bengal
elite in Calcutta has been more suggestive than comprehensive. In terms
of Orans' RCS theory, the behavior and attitudes of the Calcutta Bengali
elite can be seen as a long process of conflicting motivations and ideas
culminating in the sweeping reinterpretations of Hinduism which synthe-
sized the cultures of Britain and India in the last quarter of that century.
It was these neo-Hindu theologies which were philosophical foundations
of the more radical, and sometimes violent, political events of the first
quarter of the twentieth ceptury.
The phenomenon of the Bengali elite borrowing ideas, values, and
customs from the British while continuing to proclaim themselves Hindus
was more than a need for synthesizing two cultural traditions. It was also
a result of two conflicting motivations: first, the motivation to imitate
the British after having conceded rank to them; and second, the motiva-
tion to maintain group solidarity in the face of the increasing alienation,
due to borrowing, of the rich and powerful Bengali elite of Calcutta. These
motivations and the behavioral consequences were closely related to
changing British attitudes and colonial policies in India. Decreasing
economic opportunities after 1850 forced the elite to seek political means
of maintaining their position in British economic and political institutions
and of securing a significant voice in the modernization of their region and
country. The switch to a political rank path increased the severity of the
emulation-solidarity conflict, motivating a cultural movement in which
Bengalis sought to demonstrate that the values they borrowed from the
West were actually indigenous to Hindu civilization.
The process of synthesis that evolved in Calcutta during the nineteenth
century had a unique character due to the time, place, and participants.
On the other hand, this analysis has identified characteristics of the
synthesis which enable us to view it in the wider context of culture contact
where one society is dominant. In this the history of nineteenth-century
Bengal may tell us something about the colonial situation in general,
given that the subordinate society concedes rank. Such optimism is en-
hanced by the similarities of the process of synthesis between nineteenth-
century Bengal and the societies studied by Orans.
The case of the Bengali elite of Calcutta in the nineteenth century
suggests at least one new aspect of Oran's RCS theory. In the cases that
Orans considered, the switch from an economic to a political rank path
occurred when political democracy offered a significant alternative for
mobility. As we have seen, when the Bengali elite switched to the political
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rank path, it was not because political democracy had become a real
opportunity but because the economic path was closed off to them. Thus
the British compelled the Bengalis to use the political path before it was
viable.
To be sure, this analysis has not made nineteenth-century Bengal fully
comprehensible. However, by adopting the approach I have taken,
scholars may gain significant insights into culture change in general and
nineteenth-century Bengal in particular by analyzing the events, organi-
zations, and personages of shorter periods within that century.
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The Social and Institutional Bases of
Politics in Bengal, 1906-1947
J. H. BROOMFIELD
University of Michigan
The recent revolution in Bangladesh must have revealed to nonspecialists
what has always been evident to the specialist in Bengal studies: that our
knowledge of the twentieth-century political history of this major world
region is woefully inadequate. No detailed narrative of the Indian nation-
alist movement in the old undivided British province is available, and the
development of Muslim politics has been even more thoroughly neglected.
One turns hopefully from English to Bengali language sources, but there,
apart from some interesting memoirs and less reliable biographies, the
situation is no better.
It is this state of neglect which has encouraged me to consider the
following questions: What political institutions existed in undivided
Bengal? How did those institutions change through the forty years up to
independence? And what do the changes tell us about the shifting social
bases of politics?
One great merit of institutional analysis is that it permits us to say
something reasonably exact about the extent of political participation and
the nature of leadership. The analysis of membership and executive
committee lists, if combined with painstaking biographical compilations,
is certainly less slippery ground for generalization than the claims of poli-
ticians about their following and influence, all too frequently relied upon
by historians. Similarly, an examination of the stated purposes of institu-
tions and their practical achievements is a salutary test of political rhetoric.
CHRONOLOGY
To provide a chronological framework for the discussion, and also to
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provoke thought about the major political movements of the half century,
I shall first divide Bengali politics into chronological phases. I assume
there would be general agreement in reckoning 1971 and 1947 as mile-
stones in the region's history. Most historians would also add 1905
but, as the title of this essay indicates, I reject that date in favor of 1906.
Opposition to the partition of Bengal had begun as soon as the proposal
was announced in 1903, but the agitation followed the pattern of "polite"
protest characteristic of the late nineteenth-century Congress. It was 1906
that brought radical departures: the mobilization of the Congress volun-
teer brigades; a militant campaign of economic boycott and Swadeshi;
and the first spectacular strikes by the terrorist samiti. The year also saw
serious communal rioting and the formation of the All-India Muslim
League at Dacca. Here were many of the elements that characterize
twentieth-century Bengali politics.
I select 1918 as the begi.nning of the next period, again passing by (this
time with less assurance) a commonly accepted milestone-provincial
reunification in 1912. The moderates lost control of the Bengal Congress
in 1918, and with the rising star, C. R. Das, in the vanguard, the new
leadership began the construction of a genuine party machine to give
Congress the capability ofengaging in mass politics. This strategy involved
the extension of recruitment and organization to the district towns, in
itself a major reorientation. The revitalized party attracted even the
terrorists, and for a time there was a lull in revolutionary violence. Muslim
politicians also were rudely confronted with the problems of mass political
participation in 1918 when the frustrations of their coreligionists in
Calcutta resulted in fierce rioting. This outburst precipitated the forma-
tion of new communal organizations, most notably the Khilafat commit-
tees, and influenced their organizational efforts among industrial labor.
Eight years later Calcutta suffered even more serious communal rioting,
which marked another turning point in the province's political history.
Congress had splintered after Das' tragically early death in 1925, and the
Hindu-Muslim Pact which he had laboriously negotiated was repudiated
by his successors. The slide toward Hindu communalism, accompanied
by a reactivation of the terrorist samiti, was matched on the Muslim side
with an open advocacy of separatism. A vigorous attempt was made to
organize the Muslim voters behind communalist candidates in an effort to
gain control of all elective institutions. This effort was sustained into the
1930s, and was largely successful.
The appointment of A. K. Fazlul Huq, Krishak Praja party leader, as
chief minister of Bengal in 1937 opened the next phase. Four million ad-
ditional peasants had been enfranchised in 1935, and many and varied
were the politicians who stood forth claiming to speak in the name of the
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tenantry. Among them were the new converts to Marxism, recently gra-
duated from British prisons. Huq held the premiership for six years, and
his succession of ministries produced an impressive body ofrural economic
and social reform legislation.
Huq fell in 1943, M. A. Jinnah claiming that his defeat was a triumph
for the ideals of the Muslim League, by then committed to the achievement
of Pakistan. From 1943 to 1947, the final phase, the league held bffice in
Bengal, and the prospect of the incorporation of all or part of the province
within Pakistan was the overriding political issue.
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGACY
For each of these five periods, let us examine the institutional framework
of politics. In doing so we shall be well advised to place the broadest pos-
sible construction on the term political institution. Many institutions which
are nominally economic, social, or religious are used for political ends,
and we shall limit our understanding of the political process if we do not
take them into account. Here, however, I exclude the political role of
government administrative institutions and, at the opposite pole, the poli-
tical role of the family. Almost all that lies between may be termed volun-
tary association.
At the opening of the twentieth century Bengal already had an extensive
network of political institutions-to the annoyance of the British imperial
administrators who regarded this situation as an unhealthy characteristic
of the province. The British themselves had been responsible for introduc-
ing some of the institutions, but to their displeasure they had been pro-
gressively taken over by Bengalis to serve indigenous purposes. The Bengal
Legislative Council, almost forty years old by the turn of the century,
remained a small consultative body under tight British control. This was
less true of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the district and local
boards of the other municipalities. Election or appointment to these bodies
was prestigious, and they had sufficient local power to make membership
attractive to landholders and lawyers, the two occupational groups then
most active in Bengali politics.
For this reason, the landholders and bar associations to be found in
most district towns and in the capital had a lively political involvement.
Coordination of their activities, though only intermittently attempted,
was supplied from Calcutta in the former case by the aristocratic and
influential British Indian Association and in the latter by the High Court
Bar Library Club.
In Calcutta there were also chambers of commerce to represent the
interests of bankers and merchants, plantation, colliery, mill, and factory
owners. These chambers were organized on communal lines, with separate
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British, Marwari, Muslim, and Bengali Hindu organizations. In the mo-
fussil, however, almost all prominent bankers and merchants (Marwari,
Muslim, and Bengali Hindu) also held land; so we find the landholders
associations representing their interests locally.
Lawyers and landholders were prominent on the executive committees
of the district and people's associations, but here were also to be found
college professors, schoolteachers, journalists, and government officials.
A few of these organizations were active in the district headquarters towns,
but most were based in Calcutta, where the prominent professional and
commercial men had gone to further their careers and where the most
effective lobbying for district interests could be done. Functioning as their
central organization, in a manner parallel to that of the British Indian
Association and the Bar Library Club, was the Indian Association of Bow
Bazar.
What we do not find at the beginning of this century is a Congress
organization. Many members of the associations described called them-
selves congressmen; most members of the Indian Association were so
identified. But the institutional activities of Congress were limited to the
annual national convention and the annual provincial conference, or-
ganized jointly by the Indian Association executive and the district
association of the host district. The Bengal Provincial Congress Com-
mittee, though in existence on paper, was in effect a subcommittee of the
Indian Association.
One of the most prevalent distortions in historical writing on modern
India is the equation of nationalism with politics, and it bears repeating
that in the early twentieth century there was much politics to which na-
tionalism was irrelevant or only marginally important. One obvious area
of this kind in Bengal was educational politics. At every level, from the
senate of Calcutta University to the school boards of subdivisional towns,
the most prominent local men were engaged in voluntary educational
administration, which had assumed extraordinary importance for Bengalis
as one of the few avenues of constructive public endeavor open to them in
their circumscribed colonial society.
This was one field in which the Muslims were very active. Apart from the
affairs of their own madrassah and maktab, they were taking an increasing
interest by 1900 in general educational politics, with associations at the
provincial and national levels (the Central National Mahommedan
Association being the most renowned) lobbying for remedial help for the
community on the ground of educational backwardness. The District
Islamia Anjumans, parallel bodies to the Hindu-run district and people's
Associations, also gave educational affairs priority.
To complete this picture we should take note of the college students'
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associations, themselves arenas for lively political contests and a fertile
recruiting ground for nationalists. Less directly involved with politics,
but important as centers for educated gathering and discussion, were the
private libraries, reading rooms, and cultural societies (Sahitya Parishad,
Saraswat Sabha, and Sanskriti Samaj) found in many towns. As one may
guess from their Bengali titles, these were primarily Hindu societies,
concerned with the Hindu cultural heritage of particular localities. It is
indicative of how much less lively was the cultural life of Bengal's Muslims
that they had few such societies outside Calcutta, and many of those were
patronized by the Urdu, rather than the Bengali-speaking, community.
At this point a word of caution is necessary: institutional development
had not proceeded evenly throughout the province. Calcutta, of course,
was in a category by itself, but between the districts there was also a
marked variation in the level of institutionalization. In Midnapore and
Hooghly, for instance, we find greater activity than in neighboring Ban-
kura, Burdwan, and Birbhum. Dacca and Chittagong had many more
political institutions than did the districts which lay between. We can guess
at some of the reasons for these disparities, but the very fact that we are
still speculating about such fundamental features of Bengal's political
system is a mark of how limited is our knowledge.
PHASE ONE: 1906-1918
Lord Curzon's partition gave an extraordinary boost to politics in Bengal,
one indicator being an immediate jump in newspaper circulation. In the
latter half of the nineteenth century Calcutta had been justly famous for
its lively journalism, but we must be careful in retrospect not to exag-
gerate the size of the profession or its influence. It was only from 1906
onward that readership expanded sufficiently to support a sizeable number
of professional journalists, and the newspaper and periodical offices be-
came the focal points of important political groupings. Dacca, capital of
the short-lived Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, was now able to
sustain a daily paper; other mofussil towns intermittently produced
weeklies. These were most often a sideline of small commercial presses,
and their publishers could afford to dabble in nationalist politics only
when they had financial backing from local congressmen to compensate
for the inevitable loss of their staple government advertising. This was one
of the small, but effective, ways in which the British discriminated against
the Hindu nationalists. Expressions of support for Muslim political
positions did not bring similar punitive action.
The British had good reason to be disturbed by institutional develop-
ments in Bengal in 1906 and the years immediately following. Inspired
by Garibaldi's Red Shirts, the younger, militant congressmen organized
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volunteer brigades to lead the boycott of stores selling imported cloth
and to hawk Swadeshi goods produced by the experimental economic
self-help societies founded since the turn of the century. This ideal of econ-
omic self-reliance was paralleled by the ideal of national education, which
inspired the establishment of schools and colleges independent of the Brit-
ish-dominated Calcutta University and state systems. The curricula of the
new institutions combined an emphasis on the glorious cultural heritage
of Hindustan with a stress on technical and physical education. As in the
establishment of sports clubs and gymnasiums at this time, no great effort
was made to conceal the intended connection between physical training
and the preparation for a disciplined struggle against the imperialists.
More clandestine were the revolutionary samiti, which attracted re-
cruits from the college generation with a heady doctrine of political self-
sacrifice as service to Ma Kali, the avenger. Elaborate rites of initiation
bound the members with vows of loyalty, secrecy, and celibacy, and, for
the most trusted, there was training with revolvers and bombs in prepara-
tion for attacks upon British officials. Calcutta and the peri-urban areas
to the north along the Hooghly, Dacca and Barisal, were the initial centers
of organization. But as the British reinforced their Committee for Imperial
Defence and hit back with arbitrary arrest and deportation, the terrorists
were forced to scatter across the province, spreading the legend of revolu-
tionary violence which has become so important a part of Bengal's politi-
cal tradition.
Less spectacular but also working to establish the link between religious
tradition and nationalism were the jatra (folk theater) and loksangit (folk
song) parties, which now went out from the urban centers to spread the
message of resistance and national regeneration to a wider audience.
Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore supplied songs and dramas for their
repertoire.
The period also saw new religious institutions spreading into the
mofussil from Calcutta. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the
metropolis, and one or two of the larger towns, had witnessed a lively
conflict between reform groups like the Brahmo Samaj and their tradi-
,tionalist opponents, but in rural Bengal religious organization had re-
tained its traditional familial form. Vivekananda's Ramakrishna Mission,
whose math, ashrams, schools, hostels, libraries, and dispensaries were
soon to be found all over Bengal and beyond, supplied a new model-and,
incidentally, a new arena for politics.
The social service ideal which inspired the mission's work also inspired a
host of smaller societies, many of them secular. To meet the recurrent
disasters of famine, flood, cyclone, and epidemic to which Bengal is tra-
gically prone, these organizations raised funds, assembled relief supplies,
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and ministered to the needs of the suffering. Many a political reputation
was made through hard work and effective organization during emergency
relief operations.
The initiatives in nationalist politics produced a flurry of counteraction
among the Bengali Muslims, and this activity was sustained by the suc-
cession of crises which beset the community through the subsequent de-
cade. The foundation of the All-India and Bengal Presidency Muslim
Leagues following the December 1906 conference in Dacca was an event of
major importance, but surprisingly this was the only significant Muslim
institutional innovation in this period.
PHASE Two: 1918-1926
Engaged in the winter of 1917-1918 in a struggle to wrest control of the
Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC) from the Indian Associa-
tion, C. R. Das and his fellow extremists organized an All-Bengal Political
Conference in Calcutta to which they brought more than a hundred rural
delegates. Acting with their approval,they seized control of the BPCC and
immediately reconstituted it to provide direct representation for district
associations.
This was the beginning of the construction of a Congress machine
in Bengal, the organizational effort reaching its high point during the non-
cooperation movement in 1921. By that time the BPCC had its own office
in Calcutta, from which Das' staff of full-time workers directed the affairs
of the four divisions into which the metropolitan area had been divided
and kept in regular communication with the Congress committees now ac-
tive in each district. A Congress News Service dispensed party propaganda
and the Congress volunteers, more numerous and more formally organized
than in the partition period, were at work throughout the province col-
lecting for the Swaraj Fund, the party purse.
Women made their first appearance in any numbers in political agita-
tion, and the new mahila samiti began educational and social welfare work
in the towns. The national schools and colleges, most of which had ex-
pired in the years since the partition agitation, were revived to encourage
a boycott of government educational institutions, and in some places
Congress arbitration boards were offered to mediate disputes withdrawn
from the law courts. Although this effort at parallel government could not
be sustained for more than a few months, it did set a pattern which was
repeated with increasing success in each of the other civil disobedience
campaigns up to-and beyond-independence.
To carry Congress' influence outside the towns, the Gandhians built
up rural ashrams where the lessons of village reconstruction and cottage
industry were patiently taught through the example of personal labor. In
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all these activities Muslims as well as Hindus were involved, for this period
from 1918 to 1925 was the high point in Muslim involvement in Indian
nationalist politics in Bengal.
In addition the Muslim politicians had their Khilafat committees,
the product of the discontent-international and local-accompanying
the end of World War 1. These committees, with a central headquarters in
Calcutta and branches in every district town, paralleled the Congress
organization, with which they were encouraged (unsuccessfully) to merge.
The Khilafatists also showed vigor in taking over the District Islamia
Anjumans, and with the support of many mullahs they had a reliable com-
munications network among their coreligionists.
It was they who took the initiative, quickly followed by the Congress,
in trade union organization. Agitation among transport workers, miners,
mill laborers, and, later, tea garden coolies produced a rash of strikes in
the immediate postwar years, but the organization was weak, with scarcely
any strike funds available to it, and the workers involved suffered severely.
It took another twenty years of organization before the trade union move-
ment in Bengal became a powerful force.
These efforts were obviously directed toward agitational recruitment.
There were other organizational initiatives inspired by the enfranchisement
in 1921 of almost a million new voters among the urban lower middle class
and the prosperous cultivators. We find prominent and aspiring politicians
busy with the formation of associations of teachers, mukhtar, nongazet-
teered government officers, and joatdar. The electoral stakes were now
worth playing for. The provincial Legislative Council had been given
control over some government departments; power in the Calcutta Muni-
cipal Corporation was transferred by mid-decade from official nominees
to the elected members; and an expanded system of local boards was tak-
ing over functions of the district and subdivisional officers. Even at the
height of their success in 1921, the noncooperators were uncomfortably
aware of the risks involved in leaving these institutions to their opponents,
and in 1923 they returned to the hustings.
Another major institutional development of the years between 1915
and 1925 must be noted: the caste associations. Some caste sabha in Bengal
dated from much earlier, but it was in this period that many more of the
middle and lower castes were organizing. The new associations appear to
have had little connection with the traditional caste panchayet, a few of
which still survived in Bengal to settle marriage and other intracaste
disputes. The normal pattern of the new associations was for a handful of
educated and professionally employed members residing in a district town
or, more frequently, Calcutta to form a committee. Through printed
circulars and at meetings called in the district town most conveniently
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located for the majority of the caste members, they explained the objec-
tives of the proposed association.
Typically these aims included the improvement of the caste's ritual
practices to conform with the higher status (Kshatriya, Vaisya, or clean
Sudra, whichever it might be) to which the caste was "unquestionably"
entitled. Stress was laid upon ensuring that this "correct" status, and a
caste name appropriate to it, be recorded at the decennial census. In some
cases the abolition of endogamous subgroups within the caste was urged;
in others, particularly where there was marked occupational differentia-
tion between the divisions, a complete split was advocated. In view of the
new powers vested in local boards and the legislature, attention was drawn
to the opportunities open to the caste if its members gave solid support to
those of their fellows who were candidates for elective office. Caste mem-
bers were urged to subscribe to the association to support the educational
campaign needed to effect these reforms and to enable the association to
aid indigent caste members. When the appeals were successful, the asso-
ciations usually began the publication of caste journals, but few were
sustained for any length of time.
PHASE THREE: 1926-1937
Criticism of the privileges and power of high-caste men in the literature of
some of the caste associations was one of a number of disturbing develop-
ments which led to the formation of the Bengal Hindu Sabha in 1923.
The prime movers were Brahmins, and their stated purpose was to resist
the growing disunity among Hindus, which, they asserted, endangered
Hindu social order and political power. From 1926 onward the Bengal
Hindu Sabha had many battles to fight.
Congress' repudiation ofe. R. Das' Hindu-Muslim Pact, and the subse-
quent brutal communal rioting in mid-I926, convinced many Bengali
Muslims that they should follow those leaders who were urging an end to
all alliances with the Hindu nationalists. With the approval of the provin-
cial government, and with the assistance of British officials in some
districts, there was a successful consolidation of the local Muslim associa-
tions to ensure more efficient electoral management. This consolidation
resulted in the return of many separatist candidates to the Bengal Legisla-
tive Council in the December 1926 elections; it also created a large increase
in Muslim representation on the local boards when those elections were
held in the following year. In the early 1930s more and more seats were
captured, and inroads were made on the Hindu-controlled college and
school boards.
In rural areas there was now evidence of growing collaboration between
the Muslim and low-caste Hindu peasantry, to the detriment of the in-
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terests of the higher landed classes. The Krishak Samitis, which had
struggled ineffectually to organize the peasantry since their foundation
after World War I, now began to attract a much wider following as the
world depression throttled Bengal's economy. They were given central
leadership and spokesmen in the legislature when Fazlul Huq formed the
Krishak Praja party in July 1929. At the same time Depressed Classes
(Scheduled Caste, as they later came to be called) Associations were
formed to unite low-caste sabha in a lobby against the high-caste Hindus
in the constitutional debates which opened with the appointment of the
Simon Commission. Pursuing the same objective of political visibility,
the tribals-a large but generally disregarded minority in Bengal-were
also attempting to build intratriballinks between their traditional village
councils. They had only limited success, the Santals being perhaps the
most enterprising.
These were violent years, with extremist organizations of many kinds
active in Bengal. The fascist and communist parties of contemporary
Europe provided models for some of the younger Bengali agitators. The
home-grown terrorist samiti had extended their networks throughout
much of rural as well as urban Bengal, and their coercive tactics were now
used against their Muslim and Hindu political opponents as well as against
the British. During the civil disobedience campaigns between 1930 and
1934, they gained sufficient strength and weapons to engage the British
police and military in guerrilla warfare. In Midnapore district their re-
peated assassinations of British officials temporarily broke British control,
and the Congress was able to run a parallel government for a time.
Aggressive Muslim revivalist groups, like the Ahmadiyyas from north
India, did battle (and the word is not used metaphorically) with equl;llly
aggressive Hindu organizations like the Arya Samaj, also an import from
the Panjab. Societies to oppose cow slaughter and music before mosques
fervently sought evidence of offenses by their communal opponents.
To complete a dismal picture there were Calcutta's goonda dol, which
enterprising politicians of both religions (H. S. Suhrawardy and
Sarat Bose among them) found useful as hired auxiliaries in interparty
fighting.
The period also gave thousands of Bengali nationalists institutional
experience of another kind: incarceration in British jails or detention
camps. No humor is intended in describing these as political institutions.
By crowding together prisoners of widely differing ages, experience, ideo-
logical persuasion, and region of origin, the British inadvertently created
an environment in which parties, platforms, manifestos, and conspiracies
flourished. The nationalists emerged from these political "staff colleges"
with a great deal besides their accolade of Prison Graduate.
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PHASES FOUR AND FIVE: 1937-1947
The decade from 1937 to 1947 was so full of political excitement and
tragedy for Bengal that although it seems lame to describe its institutional
history as simply more of the same, such a characterization is not far wide
of the mark. There were some new developments. The cooperative
movement, which had limped along since early in the century, was given
new vigor in the late 1930s by the zeal of the Krishak Samitis and the
commitment of a provincial government armed with an electoral mandate
to reduce rural indebtedness and provide new sources of agricultural
credit. This was the first administration to take office under the 1935
Government of India Act, which established responsible government in
the provinces. Its legislative backing included the Krishak Praja and
Scheduled Caste parties, the latter an important new element in Bengali
politics.
Radical legislation could also count upon the support of the host of
Marxist cells, which had hatched in the peculiarly favorable conditions of
the British prison camps. Many of the younger terrorists had been con-
verted to communism during their internment, and their release in the late
1930s added to the complexity of Bengali politics. Muslim politics in
Bengal had always been notorious for its factionalism, and after Das'
death the provincial Congress had seemed determined to follow suit. With
the expulsion of the dominant Bose group at Gandhi's instigation in 1939,
and with the formation of the Forward Bloc, all chance of a unified na-
tionalist movement in Bengal was destroyed. Throughout the political
infrastructure-municipalities, student associations, trade unions, District
Congress Committees, Krishak Samitis-rival parties now struggled for
control. Adding to the clamor in Calcutta, and reflecting a growing mood
of regional exclusivism throughout India, were new representative as-
sociations formed by non-Bengalis. These groups had the dual function of
providing social welfare for their fellows and lobbying for the protection
of their corporate interests, particularly their employment.
In the last phase-the years immediately before independence-we see
some strikingly divergent developments. One was the neighborhood puja
committees, which progressively were transmuting the great Hindu festi-
vals, most notably Durga and Saraswati Puja, from family to community
functions. Given their detailed knowledge of their localities built up
through a number of years of fund raising, and the rivalries which were
generated with the sponsors of adjacent panda!, these committees became
useful adjuncts to the formal political parties.
Many of the Marxists, meanwhile, had set to work among Bengal's
proletariat-the industrial and plantation laborers, and the landless trib-
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als-and among the peasantry to foment social revolution, for they saw
the opportunities offered by the disruptions which would inevitably
accompany the departure of the British. In some places in support of their
campaign for agricultural rent and tax resistance, they revived the /ok-
sangit and jatra techniques employed many years before during the first
partition.
At the international level, Subhas Bose's daring escape and alliance
with the Axis powers to form the Indian National Army set the seal on the
romance of violence in Bengal. Less romantic and more immediately
violent were the vigilante groups and militia, organized by communal
extremists of both the major religions. These private armies skirmished
throughout the early I940s and finally closed in pitched battle in 1946. The
bloodshed ensured the partition of Bengal.
THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS
If our understanding of the institutional history of twentieth-century
Bengal is imperfect, how much worse is the state of our knowledge on the
social bases of politics. No more than a beginning has been made with the
detailed research necessary to trace the shifting regional, status, class, and
age composition of the political leadership or its following.
The institutional changes which have been sketched here provide clues
to those shifts, but they are no more than clues. Besides, we must be
cautious of reading too much into them. Observing the preeminence of the
landholder associations at the beginning of the century, and their precipi-
tate decline in importance from the mid-1920s, we may rightly conclude
that the old zamindari class was losing power. We shall be misled, how-
ever, if we also conclude from this example that all institutional decline
reveals a shift in power to a new social stratum. For instance, after 1918
the Indian Association sank into insignificance, but the leadership of the
Bengal Congress, which superseded it, came from the same bhadra/ok
status group that had dominated nationalist politics in Bengal since the
late nineteenth century.
Elsewhere I have described the bhadra/ok: "a socially privileged and
consciously superior group, economically dependent upon landed rents
and professional and clerical employment; keeping its distance from the
masses by its acceptance of high-caste proscriptions and its command of
education; sharing a pride in its language, its literate culture, and its
history; and maintaining its communal integration through a fairly com-
plex institutional structure that it had proved remarkably ready to adapt
and augment to extend its social power and political opportunities. "1
It has been a frequent cause for comment that the bhadra/ok have con-
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tinued to dominate political institutions, providing leadership even after
independence in West Bengal and even in parties as radical as the Com-
munist Party Marxist and the Naxalites. This appearance of continuity
is perhaps illusory. The bhadra/ok category is probably too inexact for
detailed analysis, concealing rather than revealing subtle changes in the
social bases of power over the half century.
It is of no help, for instance, in measuring the effects of the generational
conflicts which periodically beset Bengali nationalist politics-for example,
during the first partition agitation and again in the late 1920s when dis-
satisfaction with the infighting and ideological bankruptcy of the Congress
bosses led the younger intellectuals to form the Socialist party. Similarly,
we must not overlook class tensions within bhadra/ok society which appear
on some crucial occasions, for example during the noncooperation debate
of 1920, to have forced major changes in political tactics.
This institutional analysis has revealed a reorientation from 1918 of
nationalist organization toward the district towns, and we find a parallel
in the late 1920s in Muslim reorganization. What this reflects is the
growth of new wealth in the Bengal countryside. To explain this growth
we must look at Bengal's topography, which has always hindered easy
communication, and at its shifting river courses, treacherous climate, and
debilitating endemic diseases, which together have caused repeated
fluctuations in population density and agricultural productivity. These
fluctuations meant that even into the early years of the present century
there remained underused areas of Bengal and its hinterland-for example,
the Sunderbans, the char along the Brahmaputra, the Terrai, and the sal
jungles of the Chota Nagpur fringe-which were available for economic
enterprise as transportation, agricultural, and health technologies were
improved. There has as yet been no study of who profited from the opening
of these new lands, nor is there an accurate measure of the capital rein-
vested in agricultural land from East Bengal's jute trade, North Bengal's
tea industry, and West Bengal's mines. We do, however, observe the
emergence by 1920 of a parvenu class (Muslim as well as Hindu) residing
in the district towns and controlling sections of the surrounding country-
side through powerful patronage networks.
It was this class which was best situated to take advantage of the
devolution of power to the district and local boards, as also of the enlarge-
ment of the provincial legislature and the extension of the franchise. It
was they who most frequently gained the organizational backing of the
caste associations and the consolidated Islamia Anjumans. They were the
moving force in the joatdar associations, and their investments sustained,
among other ventures, the district cooperative banks.
The existence and activities of a parvenu class should alert us to the
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danger of assuming that once outside the cities and past the riijbiiri of the
great zamindars, all that was to be seen in Bengal was an undifferentiated
peasant mass. There were, of course, a number of "fat cats" among the
generally poor rural populace. The thinnest of all-the dispossessed
triba1s and other landless laborers-had no institutional representation
before independence. The nonoccupancy raiyat and the poorer share-
croppers appear to have had to wait until the 1940s for the Marxists to
give them a lead with the Tebhaga and similar movements. It was the oc-
cupancy raiyat who were the prime movers in the Krishak Samitis, and the
mainstay along with some of the higher tenure holders (joatdar, talukdar,
and patnidar) of the agricultural cooperatives. Thus what appear at first
sight to be institutions of the rural poor prove on closer inspection to be
new sources of strength for the moderately well-to-do.
The political mobilization of the industrial proletariat in Bengal, as we
might predict from the European experience, preceded that of rural
landless labor by three decades. The years immediately following World
War I were seminal. War demands had artificially stimulated industrial
and mining development in Bengal, but early in 1920 there was a severe
trade recession. To make matters worse a succession of natural disasters in
1918 and 1919, including the great influenza epidemic, had led to a sharp
rise in the price of foodstuffs and cotton goods. Wages did not respond to
the price inflation. The work conditions for industrial labor and the terms
of employment were generally deplorable.
We have already observed that the Khilafatists and congressmen saw
in this situation a fine opportunity for agitational recruitment, and their
initial successes added strength to the noncooperation movement. In the
long run, however, the politicians were faced with a thorny problem: they
were Bengalis while almost all the industrial laborers were from Bihar and
the United Provinces. The sustained disinclination of these men to ac-
cept Bengali leadership, as also their refusal to identify themselves with the
region in which they lived out their working lives, has been the source of
serious instability for twentieth-century Bengal, East and West. The
periodic resort to violence by the "Biharis" should serve as a reminder that
not all politics is institutionalized. Historically the mob has been a potent
political force.
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Bengal's Pre-1905 Congress Leadership
and Hindu Society
JOHN R. McLANE
Northwestern University
THE PROBLEM
In its first twenty-five years, the Indian National Congress failed to fulfill
two of its primary goals. First, the Congress did not succeed in persuading
most nationalists outside the English-speaking professions that it wel-
comed their participation or represented their vital concerns. Second, it
was unable to convince Muslim leaders that it was in their interest to join
the Congress. Not only did Muslim leaders generally remain aloof from
the Congress prior to founding the All-India Muslim League in 1906 in
opposition to the Congress; they also persuaded the small number of
Muslims who had attended the Congress sessions to withdraw. Only a
handful of Muslims were delegates to the 1907, 1908, and 1909 Cone
gresses.l The first elections under the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909
confirmed that the anti-Congress position of the Muslim League was
widely supported by Muslim voters. Members of the league won "all the
Muslim seats on the provincial Legislative Councils of Eastern Bengal
and Assam, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bombay, and Madras." They
also gained a number of general seats. 2
An examination of the organizational and programmatic goals of the
Congress does not yield an adequate explanation of the Congress' failure
to attract Muslim support. Congress leaders actively sought Muslim
participation in the early years. The avoidance of specifically Hindu
themes and symbolism and the reliance on the English language in the
early Congress meetings were intended to make Muslims feel welcome,
although the resulting cultural drabness and neutrality undoubtedly
diminished the Congress' appeal for many Hindus. A Muslim (Badruddin
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Tyabji) was offered the Congress presidency in 1886, 1887, and 1883,3
Muslim delegates were given free transportation and lodging at early
Congresses, and Muslims were promised that no new resolutions to which
Muslim delegates as a body objected would be passed. With the important
exceptions of Congress proposals for representative institutions and com-
petitive examinations for the civil services, the core of the Congress pro-
gram was generally not opposed by educated Muslims. Yet Muslims
generally avoided the Congress.
The key to understanding this abstention is to be found in Muslim
perceptions of what the Congress movement stood for. A number of
recent studies have attempted to define Muslim perceptions.4 However,
insufficient attention has been given to developments within Hindu society
which may have affected the ways Muslims viewed the Congress. Nor has
there been much study of the religious identity of Congress leaders or of
their efforts, or lack of efforts, to reassure Muslims of their security in the
new competitive society. It has not been explained, for example, why the
secular-minded Hindu Congress leaders relied upon the initiative of their
English colleagues in appealing for Muslim support. Why did A. O.
Hume in the earliest years of the Congress and William Wedderburn in
19105 assume responsibility for making overtures to Muslim leaders on
behalf of the Congress? How can the stated goal of communal coopera-
tion be reconciled with the failure of cosmopolitan Congress leaders to
react creatively to incipient Muslim separatism? How does one explain
the immobility, helplessness, and resignation of Congress leaders when
faced with communalization of politics after the 1905 partition of Bengal?
A partial answer to these questions may be found in a reconstruction of
the professional and private lives of leading Congress members. It will be
seen that their roles tended to be discrete, unrelated, and perhaps incom-
patible. As members of a nation-building movement, they were expected
to subordinate their individualistic ambitions, pride, and Hinduness to
the collective interest of a multicommunal organization. As members of
the legal, journalistic, and teaching professions, they were engaged in
highly competitive enterprises whose language and milieu were English
and whose personnel were rarely Muslim. As members of bhadra/ok
society (if such a varied, individualistic, and fractious category of human
beings maybe called a society), they were subjected to group pressure
and sometimes ridicule for their assimilation of English ways. Segments of
Hindu bhadra/ok society were insisting upon conformity to Hindu norms
of behavior and were asserting the primacy of Hindu values in Bengali life.
These pressures were, in effect, a form of Hindu populism, and they
seriously challenged the representativeness of Congress leadership and the
right ofcongressmen to speak for the larger society. When forcibly exerted,
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these pressures must not only have undermined the self-confidence of
Congress leaders; they must also have reduced their viable options in
dealing with Muslims or other Hindus.
This essay examines the professional and private lives of Congress
leaders in Bengal with the object of revealing the disintegrative effect of
the separate demands imposed upon them by their multiple roles. It
attempts to find out why and how they were experiencing and responding
to the pressures of their professions, their society, and the needs of the
Congress.
It is too easily assumed that the communalization of politics in Bengal
stems directly from Hindu-Muslim conflict. Whereas in other north In-
dian provinces Hindus and Muslims had clashed over language policy,
cow slaughter, and communal balance in government services, pre-1905
politics in the Bengali-speaking region was relatively free of these conflicts.
Those Muslims in Bengal who did complain publicly about disparities
in the economic and political opportunities available to Hindus and
Muslims were frequently non-Bengali Muslims of Calcutta, such as
Nawab Abdul Latif and Amir Ali, whose connections with Bengali
Muslims outside Calcutta seem to have been slight. Because few Bengali-
speaking Muslims raised their voices before 1905, it is difficult to gauge
Muslim opinion. For example, it is not certain that the views of Abdul
Latif and Amir Ali were more representative of Bengali Muslim concerns
before 1905 than were the views of influential Muslim Congress supporters
in the Bihari-speaking districts of Bengal. In the prepartition years, two
prominent lawyers and civic leaders with distinguished ancestry, Mazhar-
ul Haq of Chapra and Bankipur and Sayyid Ali Imam of Patna supported
the Congress without ceasing to work for Muslim interests. Mazhar-ul
Haq, in fact, worked actively for the Congress and the Muslim League in
Bihar after the latter was founded in 1906. That English officials preferred
to regard Abdul Latif and Amir Ali as authoritative spokesmen for
Muslim opinion is understandable but it is not evidence of their represen-
tativeness.
This essay's point of departure, then, is that politics in Bengal had not
polarized along communal lines before 1905 despite the failure of the
Congress to attract many Bengali Muslims. The 1905 partition crystal-
lized a Hindu-Muslim division which hitherto had been more potential
than articulated and organized. In stating this, there is apparent disagree-
ment with John Broomfield. Broomfield has implied that in pre-1905
Bengal the Madra/ok were worried about their relations with "the mass of
the [Bengali] community, Hindu and Muslim." He goes on to say that:
What we observe here is a point of critical significance: profound bhadralok
uncertainty on the crucial issue of whether their society should be open or
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closed. Ifwe look carefully at the subjects of social and political discussion
at the turn of the century we find that this was the fundamental issue
underlying bhadralok debates. Should Bengali society be dominated by
a caste elite, drawing its authority and its strength from the great tradition
and organic unity of Hinduism, or should free access to the elite be pro-
vided for able individuals of all classes through an expansion of the utili-
tarian institutions that had been developed in the nineteenth century in
contact with Europeans?6
Broomfield demonstrates convincingly that this became a fundamental
issue after the 1905 partition. Perhaps it was inevitable that it should be so.
But in suggesting that competition with Muslims and non-bhadra/ok
castes was central to bhadra/ok concerns before then, it seems that he has
telescoped separable developments. Prior to 1905, neither Muslims nor
castes such as the Namasudras had mounted a serious challenge to bhadra-
/ok dominance in education, the professions, or, in most areas, even in
the control of landed resources. Nor had efforts to help low-caste Hindus
by Sasipada Banerji, Sivanath Sastri, or the Indian Association been on a
scale large enough to arouse significant controversy. Insofar as the open-
ness of society or competition for the material goods of life was central to
internal bhadra/ok politics, resentment was expressed against the wealthy
lawyers, zamindars, and Brahmos. Usually this resentment took the form
of attacks upon the anglicization of educated Bengalis rather than direct
criticism of the acquisition or use of their wealth. Broomfield does discuss
the "considerable class feeling within bhadra/ok society."7 This comes
much closer to the central issue of pre-1905 Madra/ok politics. Hindu
populism was in part a leveling protest against the spectacular economic
successes of elite members of the English-language professions.
This essay discusses the interaction of congressmen and Bengali society.
It is an indirect approach to the question: Why was the Congress goal of
building a national movement into which both Muslims and the larger
Hindu society would be integrated pursued with so little vigor? The focus
is on the Congress leaders in Bengal because, as unrepresentative as they
were of many late nineteenth-century trends, they were a prime object of
Hindu populist pressures, they did articulate the goal of communal har-
mony and national integration more clearly than any other group, they
were the dominant Indians in the Legislative Council after 1892 and in the
Calcutta Municipal Corporation, and they and their supporters did control
most major Bengali newspapers. Although nineteen congressmen from
Bengal (Bengal proper, Bihar, and Orissa) will be identified for statistical
purposes, considerable illustrative information will be drawn from the
lives of other congressmen and from the development of the legal profes-
sion in other parts of India.
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WHO WERE THE LEADERS?
Who were the leaders of the Congress movement in Bengal? How does
one establish who is and who is not a leader in a movement as loosely
organized as the Congress was in its first twenty-five years? The Congress
met once a ye~ and did not have full-time workers between sessions. Only
a handful of men from each province attended the annual sessions on a
regular basis. To obtain a composite profile of the all-Indian Congress
leadership, I compiled a list of delegates who between 1885 and 1914
spoke five or more times or who were appointed to three or more special
Congress deputations and committees, such as those to visit England,
consider the Permanent Settlement, and draft a Congress constitution. 8
The list contains eighty-six names. Because of the autocratic way Con-
gress conducted its affairs, the list represents those individuals whom A. o.
Hume, Pherozeshah Mehta, Surendranath Banerjea, and other members
of the inner circle approved to speak and selected to perform important
Congress tasks. Several key figures were missing from the list, including
M. G. Ranade, Aurobindo Ghose, and Bipinchandra Pal. Despite these
omissions, I felt the list was useful for the purpose of drawing a composite
portrait of Congress leadership. Inclusion of the names of men whose
period of leadership was brief or whose leadership was exercised behind
the scenes would not have altered the portrait significantly.
The composite profile contained few surprises. Sixty of the eighty-six
were in the legal profession. Not only were the majority in law but a
sizeable proportion practiced in the High Courts, where incomes were
often substantial and where forensic skills and full familiarity w;th the
English language were needed. High achievement was not limited to the
lawyers. The list contained twenty-three journalists, ten businessmen and
bankers, and eleven educators, many of whom had attained distinction in
one or more professions. The esteem for these men outside the Congress
may be gauged by the fact that thirty-five of the eighty-six served in the
Legislative Councils, each of which prior to 1909 contained fewer than ten
elected members.
The provincial distribution was wide. Madras had twenty delegates,
Bengal had nineteen, Bombay had eighteen, and the United Provinces and
the Punjab had thirteen and seven, respectively. This distribution fails to
reflect the dominance of Bombay leaders (A. O. Hume, M. G. Ranade,
Pherozeshah Mehta, William Wedderburn, and Dadabhai Naoroji) in the
conduct of Congress affairs in its first twenty years, but it does indicate
the inner circle's desire for regional balance.
Brahmans outnumbered non-Brahman Hindus, thirty-eight to nineteen.
There were also six Muslims, five Parsis, and five Englishmen.
The figures for Bengal's delegates follow the all-Indian pattern. Thirteen
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of Bengal's nineteen delegates were lawyers. 9 Nine were Brahmans, one
was Muslim, one was Bihari. The Bengal delegates differed as a group
from others in that they owned zamindaris more often than did delegates
from other provinces. Eleven of the twenty-one zamindari-owners were
from Bengal. However, eight of the eleven were lawyers by profession and
none seems to have depended on land as his major source of income. The
Bengal list also lacked even a single prominent extremist, assuming that
Aswinikumar Dutt should be classified as a moderate. The all-India list,
on the other hand, contained B. G. Tilak, G. S. Khaparde, Lajpat Rai,
and G. Subramania Iyer. Finally, the Bengali delegates were more likely to
have been educated in England (six had been). This pattern was compati-
ble with prior impressions that, as a group, Bengal's leaders were more
anglicized in lifestyle than leaders from other provinces.
Study in England was in fact a key factor in determining leadership
within the Congress. The nucleus of Indian leadership was drawn from a
group of nine men from Bombay and Calcutta who had formed inter-
regional friendships in London. The future Congress leaders who were
together in London in the late l860s were Pherozeshah Mehta, Badruddin
Tyabji, W. C. Bonnerjee, and Manomohan Ghose.10 As those young
friends were finishing their studies, a second group who also became
Congress leaders began to arrive. W. C. Bonnerjee met Surendranath
Banerjea and Romeshchandra Dutt when they landed in 1868 to study for
the civil service. ll Before Banerjea and Dutt returned to Calcutta, they
were joined by Lalmohan Ghose12 and Anandamohan Bose.I3 All these
men seemed to have come under the influence of Dadabhai Naoroji and
his efforts to start an all-Indian political organization. Naoroji was an
older Parsi merchant who lived in London and acted as an informal
ambassador for the nationalist cause for half a century.
All these men except Dadabhai returned to successful careers in India.
Judging from their incomes, their London training was a major asset.
Mehta, Tyabji, Bonnerjee, and the Ghose brothers established exceedingly
prosperous law practices, earning as much as leading English barristers
and more than almost any other Indian lawyers. Anandamohan Bose
also practiced law with profit but gradually turned his attention to educa-
tion, founding City School (later City College), where Surendranath
Banerjea taught. Neither Surendranath nor Romeshchandra Dutt prac-
ticed law, although both had received legal training and both had large
incomes. Surendranath taught, ran a college, and edited the Bengalee
after his explusion from the Indian Civil Service (ICS). And Romesh-
chandra remained in the ICS until 1897, when he joined the Congress.
Although most Congress leaders in Bengal were lawyers, their fathers
had been in "service" under the British, a zamindar, or a native state
more often than in the law. In most cases it seems that the sons earned
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incomes which far exceeded those of their fathers. Illustrations of this
disparity were found outside Bengal. Ranade's father earned Rs. 250 per
month as private secretary to the Maharaja of Kolhapur while Ranade's
own salary as High Court Justice was in the neighborhood of Rs. 4000 per
month.I4 Gandhi's law income of over Rs. 6000 per month in South Africa
must have been many times the amount his father earned as a minister in a
small princely state.I5 Lala Lajpat Rai's father never earned more than
Rs. 35 per month as a Persian teacher in a government school whereas
Lajpat averaged more than Rs. 1000 per month as a vakil in Hissar be-
tween the ages of twenty-two and twenty-eight, before he joined the Chief
Court bar at Lahore.I6
Probably all the Congress leaders who had successful professional
careers received help from Englishmen at important stages in their acade-
mic and occupational training. It is evident from the biographies of
Indians born in the 1840s, as many early Congress leaders had been, that
the ratio of English teachers to students in the schools was high and that
teachers took a personal interest in the development of better students.
They awarded these students scholarships, entertained them in their
homes, advised them about their careers, and helped them go to England
or the local university for further study.
English kindnesses did not stop with college, although they seem to
have diminished considerably as Indians moved nearer to the point of
direct competition with Englishmen. Many nationalists who went to
London in the nineteenth century, before the number of Indians in Eng-
land was large and before English-speaking Indians ceased to be a novelty,
boarded with English families, continued to learn the ways of their rulers,
and returned with positive feelings about the English as individuals.
Romeshchandra Dutt, Surendranath Banerjea, Pherozeshah Mehta, and
Gandhi are examples.
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PROFESSIONS
Whether they completed their schooling in England or in India, Indians
graduating in the 1860s and 1870s were equipping themselves to move into
professions still manned by Europeans. And part of their success depended
upon having learned how to win the confidence, and how not to antago-
nize, European teachers, lawyers, and administrators. At least a minority
of Englishmen in the legal profession, as in the schools, were willing to
assist promising Indians. Possibly that assistance was often contingent on
how English a young man's bearing and accent were. This may have been
a factor in the decision of English lawyers to accept such men as W.e.
Bonnerjee,17 Bhupendranath Basu,18 and C. Sankaran Nair19 as appren-
tices.
Gaining access to the highest positions in the bar was a lonely and ardu-
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ous process for most men who made it, with or without English help.
Most Indians did not make it. The majority of those who enrolled in law
classes either dropped out or failed the examinations, and many others
who passed did not find employment in the major cities and had to look
for work in the mofussil (the districts outside the major metropolitan
areas). Legal education and apprenticeship suffered from lack of system.
Few English professors oflaw seem to have given the close attention to the
education of their students which teachers in the schools had. Law college
students found that their courses were only marginally related to their
examinations or future 'work. P. S. Sivaswami Iyer and V. Krishnaswami
Iyer, subsequently prominent Congress lawyers, used to sign the register
for their law class at Presidency College, Madras, and then spend their
class time at the beach.2o K. N. Katju confirmed that many students did
not attend classes or read the assigned texts. He wrote that while preparing
to take the High Court Pleader's Examination in 1906, "everyone used
cribs and aids to scramble through no matter how poor his grounding in
legal principles or how meagre his reading of those classics."21 Law classes
were crowded, teachers were poorly paid, sometimes young English law-
yers were appointed to teach until they could find a private practice, and
some law classes were operated chiefly for profit.22
After graduation, the more successful law students usually entered an
apprenticeship in the High Court which was likely to be unsupervised and
unstructured, regardless of whether they apprenticed with an English or an
Indian lawyer. Apprentices attended court and observed the performances
of the best known lawyers. Judging by the frequent references in memoirs
and biographies, the High Court lawyers had a keen appreciation of the
verbal aptitudes of their colleagues. This was reflected in speeches at the
annual Congress sessions, for which some men spent weeks preparing,
knowing that delegates valued highly an elaborately argued speech. Apart
from attending cases in court, apprentices tried to make themselves useful
by taking notes and preparing briefs for their lawyers. In general, though,
apprentices were ignored and their education was largely a matter of self-
help.23 It may be that the haphazard and unprofessional character of
nineteenth-century legal training in India contributed to the early failure
of Congress to develop businesslike procedures and a permanent organi-
zation.24
Indian efforts to break the English monopoly of the highest positions in
the bar took three forms. First, Indians qualified themselves as barristers
and tried to attract clients who usually took their cases to English bar-
risters. Pherozeshah Mehta made one of the earliest attempts in Bombay.
He soon discovered that in spite of his London education he was unable to
obtain many briefs:
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The entire practice was more or less concentrated in the hands of a few
eminent counsel, such as Anstey, ScobIe, Green, Latham, White, Mariott
and one or two others. It was a very difficult thing either to dislodge them
from their position, or even to carry away a few crumbs from their richly-
laden table.... The litigant public hung upon [those counsel], and took
no notice of the knot of hapless juniors hungrily looking for briefs. . . .
There were hardly any firms of Indian attorneys to give the young men
a lift in the profession. A deal of patronage rested in the hands of managing
clerks, whose smile was to be courted.25
Mehta complained publicly in 1873 that Indian barristers were not receiv-
ing a fair share of the legal business. The Bar Association of Bombay
responded by demanding an explanation from Pherozeshah for this
"breach of professional etiquette." Eventually he gave up hope of finding
sufficient work in the High Court and instead concentrated his practice in
the mofussil, where he prospered. Badruddin Tyabji, the third Congress
president, was more fortunate in finding work in the Bombay High Court
after he returned from England, largely because his brother had already
staked out a large practice as solicitor. Tyabji's cases came mostly from
Indians. He found that the English lawyers did not like having Indian
rivals and that English solicitors gave "all the work of the Government,
the Municipality, public works, railways, post offices, telegraphs and the
great mercantile firms" to English barristers.26 Even with friendly Indian
solicitors and vakils who were willing to send clients to Indian barristers,
it took years to overcome a widespread assumption among Indians that
even a London-trained Indian was less likely than an Englishmen to win
in the High Courts. 27 However, by the 1880s Indian barristers were mak-
ing deep inroads into the practice of Englishmen.
The second direction of Indian efforts was toward alteration of the "rules
restricting practice before the High Courts. High Court vakils fought for
the right to appear without a barrister on the Original Side. (The High
Court had an Original side and an Appellate Side. It was the more lucra-
tive practice on the Original Side which English barristers hoped to pre-
serve for themselves.) Victory came first in the 1870s in Madras, where
vakils formed their own association to press for changes in the rules. The
English barristers fought back and were supported by Judge Bittleson, a
former barrister, who said he could not support new regulations which
would "take the bread out of the mouth of a Christian and put it in the
mouth of a pagan." Eventually, the Vakils Association, applying pressure
with arguments and a vote not to act as junior counsel to any European
barrister, persuaded the High Court justices to equalize the vakils' status.28
The Calcutta High Court vakils, under the leadership of Rash Behari
Ghose, soon followed the example of the Madras Vakils Association and
won similar changes in the rules of the Calcutta High Court. 29
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The third issue which concerned Indian lawyers was the appointment of
Englishmen to government legal offices. Again, it was the Madras vakils
who led the way. They agitated not only to have Indians appointed to
government legal offices but also to have vakils considered along with
barristers for these offices. They won their campaign when V. Bhashyam
Aiyangar became the first vakil in India to be appointed an advocate
general.30 Up to that time, Europeans in Madras had held the offices of
advocate general, government pleader, government solicitor, crown prose-
cutor, and administrator general. 31 By 1900, a number of Indians in each
of the four High Courts had been appointed to government legal offices
and High Court judgeships.
Thus by the end of the century Indian lawyers in Bengal and elsewhere
had broken European monopolies. Institutional changes in court proce-
dures had been accomplished by acting in concert through Indian bar
institutions. Moreover, Indian lawyers had combined informally to re-
distribute legal business by channeling clients to fellow Indians. At times
this cooperation had been highly effective, as it was in the case of J. A. H.
Branson. Branson was the Calcutta barrister who made offensive remarks
about Indians during the Ilbert Bill controversy. The subsequent Indian
boycott was so effective that Branson was forced to return to England.32
On occasion, collective pressure was exerted on Indian lawyers as well. C.
Sankaran Nair, a beneficiary of several English friendships, was the only
member of the Madras Vakils Association to vote against the resolution
calling on Indians not to assist English barristers, and in consequence his
practice suffered for a while.33
Yet cooperation in the Indian bar was limited and fitful. In contrast to
the common partnerships found between English lawyers, Indian partner-
ships were said to be infrequent and unstable. The Indian bar did not
provide many of the corporate experiences of teamwork and specializa-
tion which ordinarily characterize modern professions and which might
have been utilized within the nationalist movement. One reason why the
legal profession was highly individualistic was the "chronic oversupply"
and the consequent competition which limited "solidarity and capacity
for corporate action."34 The great success of a small number of Indian
lawyers is perhaps the result of the individualistic aspect of the profession,
and the numbers of people who did not reach the top reveal its hazards.
Able men such as Gandhi35 and C. R. Das36 were total failures in their
first years of law practice in the 1890s. Muhammed Ali Jinnah spent three
years in Bombay, after his return from England, "without a single brief."37
These three men ultimately built up successful practices. But the wealthy
Indian lawyers represented only the peak of a broad-based pyramid.
The main concern of this discussion has been the High Court bar, to
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which many Congress leaders belonged. However, lawyers who were
unable to qualify for or find a practice in the High and Chief Courts in the
provincial capitals generally went to the mofussiI. P. S. Sivaswami Aiyar
estimated that only thirty-two out of the eighty students in his Presidency
College class in 1882-1883 passed the law examination; of these thirty-
two, only about one-fifth went to the Madras High Court as apprentices.38
Most of the others turned to mofussil practice. Mofussil practice could be
highly profitable for an able individual, such as Pherozeshah Mehta, with
the proper qualifications and contacts. The prospects in law were so at-
tractive, and the occupational alternatives so limited, that 2898 or over
eleven percent of Indian university students in 1906-1907 were studying
law.39
Little has been written about the mofussil bar. English officials believed
that the success of lawyers in being elected to the Provincial Legislative
Council even when most of the voters were landholders was due partly
to the network of contacts that lawyers established in the course of their
practice, which made canvassing easy. It is likely that the bar association
was the most visible and active voluntary association in many mofussil
towns and that it was the place where mofussil men were most likely to
exchange political ideas. Many mofussil pleaders occasionally attended
Congress sessions and, together with schoolteachers, represented the
Congress' chief link to the mofussiI.
SOCIAL ISOLATION AND A NEW STATUS HIERARCHY
The struggle to reach the top levels of the raj's occupational structure in
the mofussil and the larger cities had nationalist implications, especially
when it brought down racial barriers. But most of all, the new profession-
als were helping themselves. Few used either their money or their profes-
sional expertise in the service of their country before 1905. Once they had
reached the top, not surprisingly they made no attempt to dismantle or
level the structure. The structure recognized and rewarded ability and
diligence, and as the very success of the new professionals demonstrated,
it presented no insurmountable barrier to Indian talent. For those men
who wanted to join them, the new professionals recommended self-im-
provement: assiduous study, "never two words when one was enough,
clearness of thought and diction,"4o regular work habits, frequent exercise,
and so on. Few of them were levelers. Despite English efforts to portray
them as parvenus, most of them came from high-caste families. They had
not been trying to bring down or displace other Indian elites so much as to
open the modern professions to proven Indian talent. Most of them were
adding individual professional achievement and wealth to a previous, as-
criptively based, high social status.
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These men were part of a new status hierarchy composed for the most
part of families with more than one generation in English administrative
and professional occupations. The new hierarchy was parallel to the tradi-
tional social order, but many members near the top of the new hierarchy
occupied an indefinite place in traditional society because of their non-
traditional life styles and careers. It may have been the indefiniteness of
their position vis-ii-vis the old order which helps explain their preoccupa-
tion with making money. Perhaps many of them felt they had lost respect
in the eyes of traditional Hindus when they abandoned ancestral customs
in favor of English education and habits. Perhaps they were trying to com-
pensate for loss of status in the old order by achieving in the new.
In any case, the English-educated elite lived in a society in which some
form of social hierarchy was taken for granted. Neither Indian custom nor
Anglo-Indian social and official practices provided a serious challenge to
assumptions that people were ranked in order of lesser and higher beings.
Englishmen treated Indians as inferior and excluded them not only from
high office but also from their private clubs, barber shops, city parks, and
railroad cars. It was not uncommon for members of Indian elites to treat
their inferiors in similar fashion. Henry Nevinson, the Manchester Guard-
ian correspondent, wrote about the visit he made with Madhu Sudhan
Das, the Uriya leader, upon a Bengali deputy magistrate during a famine
in Orissa. The Bengali magistrate "had evidently determined not to fall
below the standard of European dignity. Consequently he received us with
his legs on the long arms of his deck-chair-an attitude which, I suppose,
he observed as customary among English officials when they receive 'na-;
tives.' " Madhu Sudhan Das tried in vain to persuade the magistrate to
listen to the widows outside the door who said their husbands had starved
to death. After failing to arouse a sympathetic response from the magis-
trate about the villagers' problems, Madhu Sudhan and Henry Nevinson
had no choice but to leave, "waving good-night to his boots" as they
went.41
Before 1905, the desire to display status and wealth was part of the effort
to become acceptable to English society and even to be superior to most
of that society. Renunciation of wealth was not yet a common way of
qualifying for political leadership. Vishnu Narayan Mandlik, a leading
Bombay lawyer and politician until his death in 1889, once hired a separate
train to get to a court case he was working on, and Pherozeshah Mehta
"engaged a special saloon for himself" on his way to the Calcutta Congress
of 1901.42 Only a handful of nationalists were wealthy enough to live as
lavishly as Mandlik and Mehta, but their lifestyle was shared to some
degree by W. C. Bonnerjee, Romeshchandra Dutt, and other Bengali
Congress leaders. It was common for Congress leaders to live in palatial
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houses, maintain many servants, use first-class travel accommodations,
and, in general, live on a scale which set them apart from most other
Indians. The luxurious lifestyle and the elitist attitudes it encouraged were
visible in the operations of the Congress itself. They inhibited efforts to
build a popular base and they became a source of dissatisfaction in and
around the Congress.
Younger nationalists were most outspoken about the elitism and angli-
cization of the Congress leaders. Aurobindo Ghose in 1893 wrote con-
temptuously of the "Indian Unnational Congress":
The Anglicized Babu sits in the high place and rules the earth for a season.
It is he who perorates on the Congress, who frolics in the abysmal fatuity
of interpellation on the Legislative Council, who mismanages civic affairs
in the smile of the City Corporation. He is the man of the present, but he
is not the man of the future.
The future rested with a new, rising generation who had not committed
cultural suicide by entering "the Services and the Law."43 Gandhi was
critical too, although he was much less sweeping. He had recently lived in
a "fine bungalow" outside Bombay and had "frequently felt a certain
pride in being the only first-class passenger in my compartment" on the
train.44 But he reacted to the behavior of Congress leaders at the 1901
Calcutta session. He remarked that J. Ghosal, a Bengali Brahman mer-
chant, zamindar, and member of the leadership's inner circle, had his
bearer button his shirt.45 Gandhi noticed that while some speakers were
permitted to exceed their time by half an hour or more, he was cut off by
the president's bell in less than five mintues.46 He also commented on
Gokhale's use of a horse carriage to travel about Calcutta and his frequent
trips to the India Club to play biIIiards.47 This sort of criticism was not
limited to men who had lived outside India. The Maharashtrian terrorist
Damodar Chapekar had only scorn for the behavior of another Congress
leader, Manomohan Ghose "or some such other name which I do not
remember. Though a Hindu by religion he dresses like a European from
top to toe and shaves his moustache like a eunuch. . . . He had a Euro-
pean to drive his carriage, and had to pay him a salary of Rs. 500 a
month. "48 Congress leaders' investment of energy and income in attempts
to live like sahibs or maharajas diverted their attention from the Congress
and led Lala Lajpat Rai to remark that only Naoroji and Gokhale per-
mitted the movement to interfere with their income and way of life.49
Although complaints similar to those of Aurobindo, Lajpat Rai,
Gandhi, and Chapekar increased, especially after the turn of the century,
many nationalists did not share these views. To earn as large an income as
a burra sahib, to speak English as well as an Englishman, to have as good
160 MCLANE
taste as the Victorians who shopped on Tottenham Court Road-this was
to demonstrate equality with Englishmen. This was important not only to
that handful of men who assimilated British values and habits but also to
a much larger number who could share these triumphs only vicariously.
Until a substantial number of Indians demonstrated to themselves and
their admirers individual achievements in law, government, education, and
business equal to those of Europeans, personal careers would continue to
absorb energies which otherwise might have been channeled into the
Congress. Preoccupation with personal achievement may have been a
necessary stage of nation-building because it contributed to Indian self-
esteem and helped overcome the negative feelings about fellow Indians
which English education and political subordination inculcated. Many
people took pride in the election of Dadabhai Naoroji and M. M. Bhown-
aggree to Parliament in 1892 and 1895, respectively, in Ranjit Sinhji's
exploits in English cricket matches, in the promotion of the first Indian,
Romeschandra Dutt, to the position of acting commissioner, and in the
elevation of Indian lawyers to the High Courts. Nevertheless, as success
in the ICS examinations, industry, and letters became common, a new
generation of nationalists began to question the value ofindividual achieve-
ments to the Congress cause. Aurobindo Ghose, Lajpat Rai, and other
younger men appealed for sacrifice and a selfless approach to politics.
However, these men had little impact on the Congress before 1905. The
older generation remained firmly in control of the Congress and continued
to enjoy large incomes.
The efforts of Congress leaders to adapt to British Indian professional
life did more than absorb their energies. It also led some to identify with
the institutions of the raj in a way that isolated them from the bulk of the
Indian population. Surendranath Banerjea was probably being sincere
when he told a group of English passengers on his ship en route to the 1894
Madras Congress that "we have everything to lose, nothing to gain by the
severance of our connection with England. We owe whatever position or
prestige we have acquired to our English education and culture. If you
were to leave the country, our English education and culture would be at
a discount. We are not particularly anxious to commit political suicide."50
Not only would the advantages of English education be lost, but pos-
sibly also the physical security to the life and property of the English-
educated elite. Anxiety about violence is difficult to document because to
have discussed it publicly would have played into British hands. As it was,
Englishmen enjoyed reminding Indians of the "anarchy" of the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. We may imagine the relish of Lord Welby,
chairman of the Royal Commission on Indian Finances, suggesting to
Dadabhai Naoroji in London that "the history of India is that the people
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have been continually slaughtering each other" and then proceeding to
quote Sir Madhaya Rao's alleged statement to Lord Roberts to the effect
that if the British were removed from India, "it would be like loosing the
bars of the cages of the Zoological Gardens and letting out the animals,
that very soon they would all be dead except the tiger-the tiger was, I
believe, the warlike people of Northern India."51 Few nationalists would
have agreed with this observation. However, there is enough evidence
about the experiences and attitudes of early Congress leaders to indicate
that some distrusted the volatility of the lower classes or at least had so
little contact with them that they really did not know what to expect. A
fear or apprehension of popular violence seems to have been common
among at least a minority of early Congress leaders, just as efforts to use it
were common among the extremists of the next generation.
The carnage of the 1857 Mutiny was part of the memory of the first-
generation Congress leaders. Pandit Ayodhyanath, Surendranath Baner-
jea, W. C. Bonnerjee, P. Ananda Charlu, Monomohan Ghase, Pheroze-
shah Mehta, and M. G. Ranade were born in the 1840s and were in
schools run by Englishmen during or soon after the Mutiny. Whether any
of them sympathized with the mutineers is not known. It is likely, though,
that they were thoroughly exposed to a British view of the mutineers as
cruel and rapacious barbarians. It is interesting how little empathy is
revealed in Dinshaw Wacha's account of the execution of two mutineers
in Bombay city. Wacha was a Parsi, a close associate of Pherozeshah
Mehta, and Congress general secretary after Hume's resignation. He
remembered coming out of his school in Bombay with his classmates and
finding that the two mutineers had been tied across the mouths of cannon
in the usual military fashion:
So far as my recollection goes, the European troops, Infantry and Artillery,
took up a position by way of a square. The Indian regiments were located
within the squares. There was a thrill of excitement all round and our pulse
throbbed faster and faster till at a given word of command the cannons
were fired and the pinioned criminals were blown. The burnt flesh sent an
unpleasant odour which we all could easily sniff. All was over.52
Similarly, Surendranath Banerjea wrote about "the lower classes of the
rural population" of Bengal as if they were not his own countrymen. He
described his investigation of the sale of country liquor in Hughli district
in 1887. He had heard reports that drunkenness was spreading among the
lower classes although he had apparently never before visited the liquor
shop "within a stone's throw of my house." He goes on to say:
I was not content with these reports. I visited a liquor shop at Haripal, and
the sight I witnessed there was one that I shall never forget. I saw half a
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dozen men and women lying dead drunk on the floor of the shop. Another
band of about a dozen men and women, all belonging to the lower classes,
in varying stages of drunkenness, began dancing around me in wild de-
lirious excitement. I apprehended violence and I slowly and cautiously
retraced my steps from the shop.
After this experience Surendranath campaigned to reform the drinking
habits of poor people. For the first time in twelve years of public life since
returning from England, he lectured in Bengali rather than in English.
Although his campaign was within his own Hughli district, he described
the rural areas as if they were alien. "It was indeed hard, rough work-
tramping along trackless areas, living in malarial countries, and eating
strange food."53 It may be that Surendranath's isolation from rural and
lower-class life in his own province was different only in degree from a
contemporary, wealthy Londoner's separation from the people of English
slums and farms. Yet the isolation was genuine and it was recognized as
a major hindrance to the making of a nation.
In communal, grain, and plague riots, well-to-do Indians found they
were often more vulnerable than Europeans to mass violence. During
disturbances, they depended on English officials to restore order with
police or sepoys. This was true of the communal riots in Bombay city in
1874 and 1893 and of the attacks on bhadra/ok by goonda and upcountry
men in Calcutta in 1907. It was also true of the Muslim attacks on Hindus
in East Bengal in 1907. Even when Europeans were the main targets of
rioting, as in the 1897 Muslim riots in Calcutta and in the 1898 Muslim
plague riots in Bombay, the effect on Congress leaders must have been to
reinforce the impression of lower-class volatility.
The argument here is not that Congress leaders were often themselves
the victims of violence. Rather it is that violence occasionally intruded into
the normally peaceful cities where Congress leaders lived and worked,
and reminded some of them of their common interest with the British in
the emerging social and political order and of their separation from sec-
tions of Indian society. There was sufficient violence that British and In-
dian enemies of the Congress were able to play on fears among Western-
educated Indians of sectional and lower-class violence. Lord Welby's
remark about letting the animals out of the zoo has been mentioned;
Sayyid Ahmad Khan taunted the Congress in a similar vein in his speech
of December 1887. He suggested that if the demands of Congress were
met, Bengalis would rule India:
Over all races, not only over Mahomedans but over Rajas of high position
and the brave Rajputs who have not forgotten the swords of their an-
cestors, would be placed as ruler a Bengali who at sight of a table knife
would crawl under a chair. (Uproarious cheers and laughter.) ... Do
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you think that the Rajput and the fiery Pathan, who are not afraid of being
hanged or of encountering the swords of the police or the bayonets of the
army, could remain in peace under the Bengalis? (Cheers.)54
The Pioneer of Allahabad publicized this speech, the Pioneer Press pub-
lished it in pamphlet form, and Sir John Strachey quoted from it approv-
ingly in 1888, adding that "the most essential of all things to be learnt
about India" was that without England to keep the peace between con-
flicting peoples, "anarchy and bloodshed would spread themselves over
the land."55
Sayyid Ahmad referred specifically to Bengalis but the term Bengali, if
it had not become a code word, had come to stand for a member of the
new professional elite in the eyes of Indians and Englishmen who disliked
the competitive society that was emerging. By encouraging talk about
communal and interregional violence, the British were making their pro-
phecies more likely to fulfill themselves. They were also contributing to
the estrangement felt by some Western-educated Indians from their own
society and to the desire of others to revive Hindu martial traditions.
A more significant cause of the Congress leaders' isolation from Indian
society was the conflict over social reform within their own families, castes,
and ancestral villages. Probably a majority of the nineteen most active
Bengali delegates had violated major Hindu dietary, marriage, and travel
restrictions. Anandamohan Bose, Aswinikumar Dutt, Nilratan Sarkar,
and Guru Prasad Sen were Brahmos, Kalicharan Bannerji was a Christian,
and W. C. Bonnerjee, Bhupendranath Basu, Romeshchandra Dutt,
Lalmohan Ghose, and others had exhibited disrespect for orthodox values.
One component of the reformed attitudes was the hostility of certain
Congress leaders toward the religious practices of orthodox Hindus.
Something of the reform spirit may be sensed from Romeshchandra Dutt's
family's concern with what Bipinchandra called "the bogey of pantheism."
As a child, Romeshchandra used to stand in the window with his brothers
and sisters on Bijaya day and count the images being carried to the
Hughli River for immersion. When the number of images decreased, they
rejoiced; when the number rose again, they lamented.56 Some reformed
Hindus feared the social pressures and absorptive powers of Hindu ortho-
doxy and sought to fortify themselves, mentally and institutionally, against
seduction by traditional forms of Hinduism. The Native Marriage Act of
1872 was an example of the effort to build defenses. It was passed in re-
sponse to a campaign by Keshabchandra Sen to legalize the Brahmo
marriage ritual, which expert legal opinion considered to violate Hindu
law then in force. The 1872 Marriage Act in effect required Brahmo part-
ners entering marriage under the new law to declare that they were not
Hindus. Norendranath Sen's Indian Mirror commented that with the
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required disclaimer of being Hindu, "the Brahmo Samaj has thereby been
saved, just in time, from falling into that vast and all-absorbing vortex
of Hinduism, which by its treacherous tolerance has swallowed up almost
all the reform movements in the country.... Such absorption is inevit-
able, unless our people guard their Church carefully against the dan-
ger."I5? But such openly hostile acts as declaring oneself a non-Hindu not
only increased the distance between Brahmos and the larger society; it also
added to the divisions between Brahmos. Many Brahmos wished not to
offend the majority community.
The greatest pressures came from outside of the reformed circles. It
was these external pressures which strained family unity, diverted leaders'
energies and emotions from politics, and conveyed negative messages
about the possibility of making common cause with other Hindu elite
groups. Bengalis who went to England, in particular, felt orthodox
society's strength. They faced possible excommunication or ostracism.
Belonging to the Brahmo Samaj or to reformed families provided some
insulation from social disapproval. There were also precautions a man
might make to relieve his community's apprehensions. Ramaswami
Mudaliar, for example, was said to have been received back in Madras
and his home town of Salem "without a murmur" after campaigning in
the 1885 general elections because he took a servant with him to cook his
vegetarian meals.58 But many men were less fortunate and, if not ostra-
cized, were suspected of having taken forbidden food and of having been
corrupted by the fleshpots of Europe. When Surendranath Banerjea,
Romeshchandra Dutt, and Behari Lal Gupta prepared to go to England to
study for the ICS, they had to keep their plans secret. The latter two
sneaked out of their houses at night to avoid being stopped.59 Enough
men returned from England with changed habits or views to give credence
to orthodox fears. For example, Motilal Nehru's elder brother, Bansi Lal
Kaul, had carefully observed the commensal rituals of Kashmiri Brah-
mans until he went to London for Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 1897. But
his trip to England "broke the shackles of a lifetime" and he returned
with anglicized eating and other habits.6o
A few men came back thoroughly alienated from Indian society. An
extreme case was W. C. Bonnerjee, who wrote home from England in
1865:
I have discarded all ideas of caste, I have come to hate all the demoralizing
practices of our countrymen and I write this letter an entirely altered man
-altered in appearance, altered in costume, altered in language, altered
in habits, altered in ways of thought-in short altered and altered for the
better too, in everything, I should say in all things, which have contributed
towards making our nation the [most] hateful of all others in the world.61
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In later years, Bonnerjee and his family spent much of their time in Lon-
don, where he maintained a house. Three of his children converted to
Christianity and some of his children spoke and thought in English rather
than Bengali. Bonnerjee was referred to disparagingly as "a Sahib and a
Christian" by other Bengalis.62 His anglicization was exceptional in its
completeness. Other leaders remained Indian in many aspects of their
lives and were respected for it. Nevertheless, Bonnerjee's membership in
the Congress high command was a measure of its character: he was the
first man to be elected twice as Congress president in spite of the fact that
his behavior closely resembled that of the rulers. His admiration for Eng-
land and his doubts about Indian culture were shared in varying degrees
by other Congress leaders. Surendranath Banerjea, Anandamohan Bose,
Romeshchandra Dutt, and many others were also open to charges of
"Sahibism."
Society's disapproval of those Indians who had crossed the kali paani.
married widows, or otherwise violated Hindu customs was registered in
domestic as well as public life. This attitude placed heavy burdens on
reformed Hindus because, however anglicized they were, members of the
new professional elite continued to value traditions of family loyalty and
unity. It is difficult to find examples of parental disapproval or family
division which did not cause distress. Sea voyages and new habits inter-
fered with basic filial responsibilities. Performance of the sradh is a case in
point. Conceivably the common desire to perform orthodox sradh for
their parents was an effort to atone for the grief caused by their challenge
to family traditions and to reestablish a measure of harmony with a society
they had affronted. In any case, carrying out family rituals was sometimes
difficult. Bipinchandra Pal found that when his father died, "as a Brahmo
and an outcaste I could not even touch his dead body nor perform the
last duties of a Hindu son to his father at the cremation ground. It was
my step-mother who had to light his funeral pyre while I had to stand
by."63 Wealthier men than Pal were able to overcome some Brahman
objections to participation in the sradh. Bonnerjee, for example, more of an
apostate than Pal, spent "thousands of rupees" on his mother's sradh
at Benaras. "Brahmans from various provinces were invited to come, and
lands were given away to them."64 However, few men had such means for
easing Brahman consciences.
The income and prestige of the new professionals won a certain toler-
ance from orthodox society for their reformed behavior. StilI more free-
dom was gained when reformers broke away from their family traditions
and formed new social groups within which marriages occurred, such as
the Brahmo, Prathana, and Arya Samajes, or new subcastes such as the
Kashmiri Brahman Moti and Bishan Sabhas of Allahabad.65 These
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groups were somewhat self-contained with their own priests and social
life. Even Ranade, who did not break with his caste, maintained two
Brahman priests in his home to officiate for his acquaintances whose
reformed lives had caused them to be boycotted.66 However, none of these
new social cells was able to give full protection from society's disap-
proval.
As a Brahmo, Bipinchandra Pal could not find servants to work for
him in his father's village.67 W. C. Bonnerjee could not live in his family's
ancestral house because he knew that "the servants would refuse to wash
any dishes that he used."68 Motilal Ghose's marriage arrangement was
endangered by rumors in his village that he and his brothers were meat-
eaters. His neighbors assumed this because Motilal was a Brahmo and
because witnesses claimed a large bull had entered the Ghose house and
had not come out.69
Chittaranjan Das' biographer says that he experienced "social obloquy
and opprobrium" and "the indignation of the whole country" because he .
arranged his widowed stepmother's remarriage. Das was a Brahmo but he
found himself in trouble with the Samaj on account of his "atheistic and
bohemian views." Because of these views, the leading Brahmo ministers
refused to officiate at his wedding in 1897. 70 Das was relatively well pro-
tected from society's pressures. The majority of reformed Hindus in the
Congress did not have even the limited security of Brahmo Samaj com-
munities.
INDIVIDUALISM AND FACTIONALISM
It might be anticipated that the pressures from orthodox society, the com-
mon interest in English education, and the special, ambivalent relation-
ship with the English rulers would have strengthened the bonds among at
least the reformed members of the educated classes. The political organi-
zations founded in the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the
Indian and British Indian Associations of Calcutta and the Congress it-
self, were products of those bonds. These organizations acted as watchdogs
for the economic and political interests of educated zamindars, lawyers,
journalists, and teachers in Bengal. But in fact, the first twenty-five years
of the Indian National Congress witnessed little lasting cooperation be-
tween public leaders. One reason for this situation may have been that
orthodox pressure had an unsettling effect upon university graduates,
leading some to doubt their own values and in certain cases to withdraw
from politics and other activities in which their convictions might be
challenged. Others responded sympathetically to the counterpull of
traditional allegiances and identities, seeing in them possibilities for a
national or at least Hindu unity and revitalization as well as for personal
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identity. The late nineteenth century in Bengal seemed to be a time of
political uncertainty, disarray, and regrouping.
There was also a factor seemingly independent of orthodox pressure
which contributed to the isolation of Bengali congressmen, a factor which
had no obvious relation to anglicization or orthodoxy but which made
reformed Hindus less able to resist orthodox pressure. This factor was a
pervasive factionalism that at times resembled anarchic individualism. It
may have been in part a function of the overcrowding and competition
within the colleges and professions. And it may have been a result of the
novelty of voluntary forms of organization which required subordinating
concern for traditional social boundaries and individual status to the
interests of a broader social organism. Individualism, and the acquisi-
tioners which often accompanied it, and factionalism bothered many
congressmen.
Bipinchandra Pal was an exemplar both of that individualism and of
the Hindu revival which sought to control individual behavior, and it is
doubtful whether he ever reconciled in either his thinking or his behavior
the conflict between individual autonomy and society's needs. In begin-
ning the second volume of his autobiography, he wrote, perhaps with pain-
ful personal experience in mind, that "the individual is not an isolated
unit but is part of a whole, composed of many other individuals." In-
dividualism, he believed, was particularly strong in Bengal. "The key-note
of the Bengal school of Hindu law, the Dayabhaga, is individualism,
while the key-note of the Mitakshara school, which governs the rest of
India, has been what may be called collectivism." Bipinchandra felt that
individualism was Bengal's "instinct of personal freedom" and the con-
comitant "social freedom," a spirit which had been dulled by orthodox
Hinduism. 71
By temperament and conviction an upholder of freedom, Bipinchandra
had difficulty fitting into organizations and accepting the authority of
leaders. He moved from one organization to another, battling and then
breaking with his superiors in each. For example, in 1890 he was chosen
from among 119 applicants for the post of librarian and secretary of the
Calcutta Public Library. The library's hours were 8 :00 A.M. to 9 :00 P.M.
Pal kept irregular hours, sometimes arriving at 8 :00 A.M. and sometimes
at noon but apparently working what he considered to be a full day. Some
members of the library's governing council who, according to Bipinchan-
dra, lacked "training in the principles of representative institutions"
began to object, and one "wrote caustic remarks" on the attendance re-
gister about Bipin's irregularity. Bipin, however, regarded the library's
president as the only man who might direct him and he let it be known that
if the council member continued to make impertinent remarks in the re-
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gister, Bipin would "be compelled to turn him out.. . This attitude of
mine inevitably offended some of my masters and I found it necessary to
give this post up." He then took a job with the Calcutta Municipal Cor-
poration but soon left this also. He next began working as a lecturer and
missionary for the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj. He started two journals,
Asha and Kaumudi. and used them to criticize the way in which the Brahmo
Samaj was conducted. He explained the problems thus: "The Democratic
constitution of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj had been threatening to create
an official Brahmo bureaucracy which seriously hindered the growth of
freedom of thought in the community and real spiritual life in its mem-
bers." 72 Soon after Bipinchandra had challenged the authorities of the
library and the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, he came under the influence
of Bijaykrishna Goswami. Whether this discipleship was related to the
death of his wife, as he thought, or an urge to bring his independent spirit
under control, he continued to chafe under what he regarded as the auto-
cracy of leaders in the associations to which he belonged. He was one of
the most outspoken critics of "the despotism" of Pherozeshah Mehta
within the Congress, and he joined Tilak, Aurobindo, and Lajpat Rai in
their demands that the Congress become democratic in its internal affairs.
No doubt Bipinchandra is an extreme example of that testy independ-
ence and restlessness which caused organizations to splinter and partner-
ships to come apart. But whether one examines politics, journalism, social
reform movements, or family life in later nineteenth-century Bengal, there
seems to have been a pronounced tendency toward factionalism. Many
factions formed without significant disagreements over principles. Other
factions, when they argued over principles, seemed actually to be engaged
in personal competition motivated by jealousy and concern for individual
prestige.
Certain congressmen seemed to relish conflict. MotHal Ghose of the
Amrita Bazar Patrika was such a person. His personality was colorful and
controversial but he seemed incapable of lasting cooperation with other
nationalists. An account of MotHai's effort to be elected to the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation in 1892 has been preserved; it suggests the intensi-
ty that intragroup rivalry could reach. The group in this case was the
Kayasthas of Ward No.1 in north Calcutta. Eight candidates had started
the campaign, but by election day the field had been reduced to three: a
wealthy zamindar (Pasupatinath Bose), a young, rising Congress lawyer
(Bhupendranath Basu), and a Congress editor (Motilal). The following
description of the campaign, written probably by Motilal himself, ap-
peared in the Amrita Bazar Patrika shortly before the election:
The three candidates who have presented themselves this year [from Ward
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No.1] for the honour of a seat on the Municipal Board are all Kayasthas.
Now these Kayasthas like others marry and give in marriage and thus form
relationships. In Ward No.1, therefore, the Kayasthas as a rule are related
to each other.
When therefore [would-be] Commissioner No. 1 appears in the field
his affectionate father-in-law as a matter of fact canvasses for him. The
spectacle fires the relations of other candidates with emulation and they
thus plunge themselves into the vortex of the whirlpool. The voters and
candidates being all Kayasthas are related to each other. The voter who is
the uncle-in-law of a candidate is the grand-father of another, and thus the
candidates find themselves in the midst of voters, who are generally their
relatives.
The usual rule for candidates in all countries is to base their appeals to
voters upon their own merits. In Ward No. I it is based, with very few hon-
ourable exceptions, upon relationship. One candidate pleads to a voter:
"Is not my brother your son-in law?" and thus secures the support of a
voter. This voter is immediately after besieged by another candidate, who
tries to convince him that the brother of a son-in-law can never have so
much claim as the brother of a maternal uncle, which relation he bears to
him. When such is the way the votes are canvassed for, it is no wonder that
the candidates and voters should all lose their proper senses.
It was very calm in the beginning. At that time the candidates met and
shook hands like friends. This was succeeded by squibs, lampoons and
satires. And now it is foul abuse-abuse which fouls even the mouth of a
fisherwoman.
It was very dull in the very beginning, when the candidates and their
friends bowed to each other whenever they met, formally and politely. It
was very exciting and exhilarating when lampoons and satires were hurled
upon rivals. Now that abuses have been resorted to the matter has becoqIe
more nauseating than putrid human flesh. 73
The campaigning and canvassing became increasingly tense and unfriendly.
The day before the election, Pasupatinath Bose had his English lawyer ap-
ply for a ruling from the High Court to remove Motilal's name from the
ballot on the grounds that Motilal's family, but not Motilal himself, was
the registered rate-payer. Justice Trevelyan rejected the application. On
election day, goonda appeared in order to intimidate voters. "Voters were
physically restrained from voting." Mounted police were finally called to
restore order. 74
Motilal often feuded with Surendranath Banerjea and his supporters
(Krishnakumar Mitra and Pandit Kaliprasanna Kavyakisharad). The bad
feeling between Motilal and Surendranath was so great in 1896 that some
doubted whether the Congress could be held in Calcutta that year. 75
In 1898-1899, the rivalry erupted in three defamation suits between Pandit
Kaliprasanna and Motilal. 76
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Surendranath Banerjea was year after year the heart of the Congress
movement in Bengal. He had a reputation for flexibility and lack of dog-
matism and upon occasion he acted as a conciliator between Congress
rivals. His newspaper, the Bengalee, rarely engaged in personal attacks.
Yet Surendranath had poor relations with many fellow congressmen be-
sides Motilal Ghose. It was well known that W. C. Bonnerjee's dislike for
Surendranath prevented them from cooperating in the early Congress.
Neither Anandamohan Bose nor Lalmohan Ghose gave Surendranath
much support in keeping the Congress alive in Bengal. Anandamohan is a
special puzzle. Although he had been a close associate of Surendranath in
City College and as secretary of the Indian Association, he stayed away
from him for nine years after 1887. 77 After the 1905 partition there were
also bad feelings between Aurobindo and Bipinchandra Pal on the one
side and Surendranath on the other.
This factionalism needs explanation. Here we can observe simply that
there seems to have been frequent fragmentation of organizations and
partnerships. It seems likely that many nationalists avoided strong com-
mitment to political organizations because of the divisiveness. Given a
choice between abstention and the messiness of factional politics, many
men preferred the former. As a result politics was atomized as well as
fractious. Congress leaders, unable to work together even within the Con-
gress, were rarely in a position to strike back or give mutual support when
attacked by orthodox society.
HINDU POPULISM
Two all-Indian controversies in the early 1890s revealed with striking clar-
ity the strength of orthodox groups when aroused. The first was that over
the Age of Consent Bill. In a sense the bill was an extension of the Brah-
mos' Native Marriage Act of 1872 because it raised the age limit for the
whole of Hindu society whereas the 1872 act applied only to Brahmos. The
Age ofConsent Bill also received some of its strongest support from Bengali
Brahmos. However, the opposition to the bill was probably more deter-
mined in Bengal than elsewhere. More marriages stood to be affected in
Bengal where, according to the census of 1881, 14 percent of Hindu girls
had been married before the age of ten, compared to 10 percent in Bombay
and 4.5 percent in Madras. 78 The militant Hindu newspaper Bangabasi led
the attack on the bill, which it said was part of England's attempt to de-
stroy the Hindu religion. The Bangabasi compared the English to Muslim
temple-destroyers such as Aurangzib and Kalapahar, and it regretted that
"we are unable to rebel although we are not of those who say it would be
improper to do so." In its attack on the bill and in its subsequent trial for
sedition, the Bangabasi was supported by many non-Brahmo congressmen
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whom it had recently been denouncing. The Bangabasi had criticized the
Congress and its supporters for their exclusiveness, for their ignorance and
avoidance of the Bengali language, and for their hypocrisy in preaching
nationalism while using English goods and adulterating Hindu culture
and morality with foreign borrowings. 79 Probably the attacks by the
Bangabasi, which had a circulation of twenty to thirty thousand, were a
factor in the decision of reformed congressmen such as W. C. Bonnerjee
and Motilal Ghose to oppose the bill. In the end, few late-nineteenth-
century issues stirred educated Bengali society as deeply as did the Age of
Consent Bill. And few emphasized as dramatically the vulnerability of
those Bengalis who welcomed government interference in Hindu religious
and social practices. One angry youth even tried to shoot Bipinchandra
Pal after the latter disrupted a meeting summoned to protest the bill. 8o
This incident, like the window-breaking and stone-throwing attack on the
police following Surendranath Banerjea's 1883 conviction in the Saligram
idol case,81 may have been less a defense of orthodoxy than a nationalist
protest against disrespect for and interference with Hindu usages in
general. But the anglicized character of the Congress leadership in Bengal
made this distinction a fine one at times.
The other sign of a resurgence of Hinduism was the spread of the cow-
protection movement in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The movement
peaked in 1893 with the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim riots in such widely
separated places as Rangoon, the North-West Frontier Province and Oudh,
Junagadh, and Bombay city. Most of the riots followed Hindu efforts to
rescue cattle intended for sacrifice during Bakr Id. More than one hundred
persons died in the riots, and in the district of Azamgarh alone, over eight
hundred persons were arrested.
The cow protection movement was weak or nonexistent in most Ben-
gali-speaking districts. Unlike in other provinces, no prominent Bengali
Congress leader seems to have been directly connected with the movement.
Nevertheless, Raja Sashi Sekharaswar Roy of Tahirpore, Bengal, had
embarrassed the leadership in 1887 by trying to move a resolution in the
Congress calling for a government ban on cow slaughter. 82 This attempt
was resisted by men who were intent upon making the Congress attractive
to Muslims. Two prominent patrons of the Congress movement in Bengal,
the maharajas of Darbhanga and Dumroan, openly supported the cow
protection movement. 83 And representatives from different parts of India,
including Bengal, attended a meeting of the Gauraksha Sabha in the
Congress pavilion following the Nagpur Congress session of 1891. 84
There is no doubt that the Congress leadership's failure to dissociate the
organization fully from the cow protection movement was a factor in the
decline in Muslim participation in the Congress. Whereas Muslims con-
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stituted 14.1 percent of Congress delegates (about 112 per year) before the
1893 riots, in the following thirteen years they made up only 7.1 percent
(about 58 per year). 85
Because the movement had gained little momentum within Bengali-
speaking parts of the Bengal province, it was a much less direct indication
to Bengali leaders of the latent power of the Hindu reaction than the Age
of Consent Bill controversy had been. But no Bengali congressman could
have been unaware of the riots and the spread of the cow protection move-
ment, especially in Bihar, the eastern North-West Frontier Province and
Oudh, and the Central Provinces, which preceded them. During the decade
following the riots, Bengali congressmen did not, it seems, revive their
early efforts to attract Muslims to the Congress. It is difficult to ascertain
what Bengali leaders thought about the Muslim abstention from the Con-
gress, since the issue was rarely discussed in public; presumably recruit-
ment of Bengali Muslims was regarded as having few prospects for suc-
cess. The Muslim abstention in turn may have left certain Bengali nation-
alists feeling freer to Hinduize their politics. However, Hinduization of
political rhetoric, symbolism, and organizational forms became wide-
spread among Bengali congressmen only after the partition.
CONCLUSION
This essay began with the observation that few Muslims made more
than a casual contribution to nationalist political organizations in Bengali-
speaking districts in the late nineteenth century. Although 23.4 million of
British India's 49.5 million Muslims lived in Bengal province, according to
the 1891 census, there is little evidence of Muslim participation in pro-
vincial conferences, the Indian Association, or the British Indian Associa-
tion in the 1880s and 1890s. Surendranath Banerjea had persuaded Amir
Ali and the Central Mahomedan Association to participate in the National
Conference in Calcutta in 1885. But after that, Congress' emphasis upon
representative government and competitive examinations and the lack of
concerted Hindu overtures to Muslims deterred most prominent Bengali
Muslims from joining. Abul Kasim, the pleader and zamindar from Burd-
wan, was the only continuously active Bengali Muslim in the Congress
prior to 1905.
The absence of Muslims is reflected in the biographies included in
Freedom Movement in Bengal, 1818-1904: Who's Who, published by the
Government of West Bengal in 1968. Although it was prepared under an
advisory committee consisting of N. K. Sinha, S. B. Chaudhuri, P. C.
Gupta, and Amales Tripathi, the only Muslim among the 148 individuals
is Nawab Abdul Latif. 86 Matiur Rahman has explained the separation of
Muslims from nationalist politics as a consequence of the Hindu character
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of such activities as the Hindoo Patriot, the Hindu Mela, and the Shivaji
festival. 8 ? However, he has not produced evidence that those activities
were motivated by anti-Muslim bias or, more importantly, that Bengali
Muslims perceived those activities as unfriendly or threatening. Perhaps
they did. A more pertinent reason for Bengali Muslim abstention from the
Congress may be that Congress activities in prepartition Bengal were con-
fined largely to Calcutta, that the most active and influential Muslim civic
leaders in Calcutta were non-Bengalis, that few Bengali Muslims in Cal-
cutta belonged to the same educational and economic strata as congress-
men, and that the source of separation was therefore as much regional as
communal. In any case, Bengali Congress leaders during the 1885-1905
period were, as a group, men who, while having few Bengali Muslim social
or professional associates, seemed to be free of communal prejudices and
seemed to feel more antipathy toward militant sections of Hindu society
than toward Muslims. University-educated Bengali Hindus, in and out-
side the Congress, were preoccupied with bhadra/ok deficiencies and divi-
sions. Relations with non-bliadra/ok Hindus and Muslims were a matter
of secondary concern prior to the partition. It was the Hindu patua of
Kalighat, for example, who turned out inexpensive drawings which
satirized the anglicized babus for the decay of family life, the sexual im-
morality, the drinking, and the reversal of sex role~ that were assumed to
have spread with the aping of European behavior. 88 The main thrust of
the social criticism of popular Hindu writers such as Indranath Ban-
dyopadhyaya, Rajanikanta Gupta, and Bankimchandra was directed
against their own society, rarely against Muslims. The sudden communali-
zation of politics that followed the 1905 partition would have been hard
to predict several years earlier. Bhadra/ok society was still sharply divided.
While nationalists were searching for means of integrating Hindu society
and overcoming perceived social deficiencies, such as elitism, factionalism,
and lack of courage, the means chosen were diverse. Which Indian past,
which tradition, which hero was appropriate? The answers were many.
The neo-Vaishnavism of Ramakrishna, Bijaykrishna Goswami, Aswini-
kumar Dutt, Motilal Ghose, and Bipinchandra Pal had little in common
with the /athi play and hero worship of Saraladevi Ghosal's biastami days
or the student samiti or Surendranath Banerjea's advocacy of an Akbar
festival.
The final point is that many leaders of neo-Hinduism at the turn of the
century had been raised in a manner which had isolated them from ortho-
dox society and had made them vulnerable to the scorn and sanctions of
traditional Hindus. Therefore, increasingly the reaction against angliciza-
tion came from fellow congressmen, ex-Brahmos, and English-returned
Bengalis. Bipinchandra Pal, Aurobindo, Rabindranath Tagore, Viveka-
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nanda, and Brahmabhandhav Upadhyaya had in varying degrees found
themselves outside traditions of Hindu bhadra/ok society. No doubt their
return through neo-Hinduism received stimuli from political motives.
But for many who made the transition there was a deeper aesthetic and
spiritual meaning derived from the basic act of self-discovery and con-
solidating a fragmented identity. Aurobindo described the release or re-
turn he seemed to be seeking from the constraints of his anglicization in
the 1890s when he discussed the mid-century Bengali renaissance:
The calm, docile, pious, dutiful Hindu ideal was pushed aside with im-
patient energy, and the Bengali, released from the iron restraint which
had lain like a frost on his warm blood and sensuous feeling, escaped joy-
ously into the open air of an almost Pagan freedom. The ancient Hindu
cherished a profound sense of the nothingness and vanity of life; the young
Bengali felt vividly its joy, warmth and sensuousness.89
Nationalists' preoccupation with the integration of high-caste society and
the redefinition of Hinduism inhibited the creation of a multicommunity
movement. But this preoccupation was overwhelmingly the result of ten-
sions within high-caste circles, and only to a minor degree the result of
conflict with Muslims or with nonelite Hindu castes.
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A Public Policy Profile on Rural
Development in Bengal
NICOLAAS LUYKX
East-West Center
INTRODUCTION
It was not until relatively recent times that there have been significant
public policies proposed or implemented specifically for the development
of the rural areas of Bengal. Many of these have been undertaken with
indifference, lack of commitment, or in the face of serious controversy.
The British East India Company came into prominence in Bengal dur-
ing the latter half of the eighteenth century and dominated its history for
a full hundred years. Following the disasters of the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry, the liberal conscience of Victorian England stimulated efforts to miti-
gate the harshness of natural calamity and exploitation by commercial
interest. These actions were motivated largely by a sense of compassion
and propriety. Despite the growth of rural infrastructure, social services,
and local administration, little genuine development took place in the next
hundred years. The turmoil of partition and independence, the density of
population, and the extent of poverty, disease, ignorance, and hardship
were hardly evidence of improvement in the lot of the average villager.
For the most part, rural people persisted in a subordinate role within a
pervasive patron-client system that, despite its fundamental humanitarian
bias, provided little scope for the client's advance to peerage.
It is a thesis of this essay that rural development is a matter of restruc-
turing life in rural areas. This includes the expansion of opportunity for
economic, political, social, and cultural fulfillment. It also includes the im-
provement of the capacity of individuals and groups to shape and utilize
these opportunities. Further, it includes the emergence of a set of norms
conducive to such changes.
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In drawing the picture of rural development policy in Bengal, I reach
back briefly to the arrival of the British East India Company and the
course of events up to 1947. Thereafter, I take up the principal postinde-
pendence programs implemented in West Bengal and East Bengal. Space
requirements force this presentation into the form of a sketch or profile,
but the concluding picture will be an outline of what I feel to be the crucial
issues facing rural development in Bengal.
But first a few words about the region are in order.
"Bengal" has been variously defined throughout history. The Bengal
Presidency over which the British East India Company acquired revenue
rights in 1765 included Assam, Bihar, and Orissa. The greatest extent of
the Bengal Presidency was in 1810, when it reached as far as Delhi and to
the Punjab. Assam was pared away in 1874, and East and West Bengal
were temporarily separated during the period 1905-1911. Bihar and Orissa
were not separated until 1912, but the ultimate diminution came with
partition in 1947. The State of West Bengal at that point was one-seventh
the size of the area known as Bengal a century earlier.l
By 1956 West Bengal had added territories bringing its size up to its
present dimension of 33,927 square miles. In 1961 the population of West
Bengal was estimated at 34.9 million, indicating an average population
density of 1029 per square mile at that time. In 1961 the population of
East Bengal (then, East Pakistan) was estimated at 55.3 million in an area
of 55,126 square miles, resulting in an average population density of 1002
per square mile. In the decade since that time populations have grown still
further, although recent disruptions due to war make the current situation
difficult to interpret.
Bengal is a delta laid down at the confluence of some of the world's
largest rivers. The Ganges and Brahmaputra meet at about the middle of
the region (see frontispiece) and are joined by the Meghna at a point south
of Dacca to the east. Other significant rivers, such as the Damodar, come
in from surrounding areas. The Damodar comes from Bihar and joins the
Hooghly south of Calcutta before emptying into the sea. Riverbeds have
shifted continuously throughout history, and the mouths of the Ganges
pour into the Bay of Bengal over a waterfront more than two hundred
miles in breadth. Although the rivers flood along their courses and deposit
silt which sustains much of Bengal's agriculture, the biggest influence
on agriculture is the alternation of wet and dry seasons characteristic of
the monsoon.
In Bengal the monsoon rains begin in May and end, for all practical
purposes, in early October. During March and April there are intermittent
nor'wester storms that strike suddenly, usually with brief heavy down-
pours. The period from November and extending into March is virtually
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without significant natural rainfall, and is a time of serious unemploy-
ment for most farmers. Temperatures in Bengal are conducive to farming
throughout the year.
In East Bengal rice and jute are the two principal crops. The major rice
season (Amon) is dependent on the monsoon rains, and it is during this
season that the vast majority (about eighty-three percent) of the country's
rice output is produced.2 Approximately the same proportion holds true
for West Bengal.3 Jute is a much more important crop in the east than it
is in the west. In East Bengal about a million tons are produced annually;
in West Bengal the figure is closer to forty thousand tons.4 Other crops of
importance throughout Bengal are wheat and barley, beans, potatoes,
sugarcane, pulses and oilseeds, and a number of spices.
With high population density the average farm is quite small. In East
Bengal the average farm is reported as 3.5 acres, with over half the farms
in holdings of 2.5 acres or less. Only 0.4 percent of the holdings are over
25 acres.5
Data for five villages in the Burdwan district in West Bengal indicate
that forty-one percent of the landholdings were less than three acres.
However, over half the families in these villages were without land and
participated in agriculture either as laborers or as sharecroppers.6
The Company and Permanent Settlement
When the British East India Company began its operations in Bengal in
the latter half on the seventeenth century; its position was tenuous and
costly. By a series of steps the Company sought to establish itself and to
obtain revenues with which to support its expanded operations. In 1698
it obtained the revenue collection rights to three towns adjacent to the
original settlement and, having inserted itself into the revenue system of
the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb as a zamindar, proceeded to expand its
control. 7 After a colorful series of intrigues, skirmishes, and battles among
European, Mogul, and indigenous Indian authorities, tensions resolved
themselves with the Company emerging as the diwan, or revenue collector,
for all of Bengal including Bihar and Orissa.
As immense as was the power to which the Company acceded, it was no
simple task to administer the revenue system. The British continued to
operate through intermediaries until suspicions of revenue leakages and a
genuine need to know the revenue capacity of the territory led them to
take a direct hand in fulfilling the role of diwan. It was some twenty years,
however, before a seemingly feasible method of revenue collection was
worked out. It proved unsatisfactory.
In 1793, the collection of revenue was turned over to zamindars who
were obliged to remit to the diwan(the East IndiaCompany)a permanently
POLICY PROFILE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT 181
settled cash fee. One-tenth of this amount was the zamindar's commission,
plus some minor additional revenues. This system promised the British a
dependable revenue base without the administrative headaches. It is also
argued that the system catered to the social tastes of the directors of the
Company and the governor general, Lord Cornwallis. 8 The zamindars,
who were previously only revenue collectors, now became a propertied
class not unlike the English landed gentry.
The Permanent Settlement also insulated the British from the know-
ledge of actual conditions in rural Bengal. The rights of the zamindars
were ensured so long as they transmitted the revenues on time. Village
records were nonexistent, and the insecurity of tenant cultivators of the
zamindari led to a gathering unrest. Cultivators were tenants at will and
could be turned out without recourse.
The first attempt at ensuring the rights of at least a segment of the tenant
cultivators came with the Rent Act of 1859. This act formally guaranteed
the security of tenure of tenants who had been on the land continuously
for at least twelve years. Although a commendable step, these guarantees
really applied to only a small proportion of all cultivators. And even those
with occupancy rights found themselves harassed and hounded by zamin-
dars at other points of vulnerability. 9 A subsequent Tenancy Act in Bengal
was passed in 1885 with the objective of controlling rent and preventing
indiscriminate ejection of cultivators. However, this field .of legal pro-
tection was simultaneously bounded by custom and traditional practice.
In evaluating changes it is hard to measure the cost of deteriorating patron-
age benefits in the face of enhanced formal security. This is especially
true when tenant cultivators are poorly informed as to their legal rights
and cannot pay for the fight to have these rights enforced.
Virtually from the outset of the Permanent Settlement there had been
doubts about its effectiveness in promoting rural stability and develop-
ment. For the sake of administrative convenience, the governing authority
had abdicated its responsibilities for rural development, blinded itself to
rural conditions, and systematically failed to realize the actual revenue
potential of the land.l 0 Subinfeudation meant that several intermediaries
(sometimes, dozens) stood between the actual cultivator and the zamindar.
In East Bengal it was not until May 1951 that the Permanent Settlement
was abolished. At that time it was replaced by the East Bengal State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act of the previous year.ll Under its terms the
cultivator was confirmed as proprietor and was to pay his taxes directly
to the government. Government soon discovered that its administrative
vigor on the revenue side had gone soft. The administration has since been
under considerable pressure to organize, staff, and rationalize a function
it had left in the hands of others for a century and a half.
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The Influence of Famine on Rural Policy
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From the earliest days, variations in agricultural output per person have
led to recurring periods of local scarcity and privation. Even under today's
conditions, a failure in the monsoon can lead to acute food shortages and
the associated rise in prices of choice food grains beyond the reach of the
ordinary consumer. Recent illustrations may be found in the succession
of bad crop years in India in the late 1960s.
Famine conditions are those ofextreme food shortage and severe human
suffering. Records differ when reported by different sources, but up to the
middle of the nineteenth century one source estimates an average of one
major famine every fifty years,12 These famines were usually confined to
local areas and were primarily the result of climatic variations.
With the development of a rail network in India during the latter half
of the nineteenth century and the growth in the grain trade (including
export), local prices could reach famine levels well beyond the extent
explainable solely by the degree of shortfall in local production, if any.
As always, famines have been a combination of food shortage and lack
of purchasing power among those who suffer most. A picture of profiteers,
hoarding stores of grain against a speculative rise in prices, is part of the
record of every scarcity over the past hundred years.
Government has shown relatively little ability to cope with this pheno-
menon because it attempted direct symptomatic melioration rather than
an attack on root causes. Famine relief was usually some combination of
food-for-work policies, direct food distribution, and control of prices and
the movement of goods. However commendable as an alternative to doing
nothing, such policies attacked only the evidence of problems but not their
causes. Hence, the problems have tended to recur.
It was at a very late juncture that government implemented effective
public policy for organizing, training, and guiding cultivators and other
small operators.
In the middle of the nineteenth century there was no department of
agriculture. Although a recommendation for its establishment was in-
cluded in the report of the Famine Commission of 1866,13 it was not
until after the famine of 1878 that the central administration in British
India combined the idea of a central department of agriculture with the
formation of similar departments in each province. Instructions were
then issued to that effect.
Therefore, in IS85, Bengal established a modest department of agri-
culture. It was only subsequent to the famine at the turn of the century that
the foundations of a regular agricultural service were laid. Nevertheless,
despite the efforts to build a research and extension organization, expendi-
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tures on the Agriculture Department of Bengal up to independence did
not compare favorably with those in other states of British India.14
The Agriculture Department's research program began in 1908 during
the temporary division of Bengal. In 1911, the first rice-improvement
program on the Indian subcontinent was established, with a headquarters
at Dacca. Despite all this, the government's work in agriculture never rose
to meet the province's needs. This failure led to a history of successive,
and to date only partially successful, attempts at meeting these needs by
alternative means.
The first agricultural schools in Bengal were established in 1922, in
West Bengal at Chinsura and in East Bengal at Dacca. However, these
attracted few students, largely because of the unfavorable employment
conditions at the lower levels of agricultural work.15 An institute for
higher education in agriculture, the first in Bengal, was founded in affil-
iation with Dacca University in 1941. In twenty-five years of operation
it provided some 350 graduates and 30 postgraduates.
WEST BENGAL AFTER INDEPENDENCE
Panchayats
In both East and West Bengal the rural areas had been under Union
Boards up through the period of partition and independence. In West
Bengal they continued up to the late 1950s when village panchayat elec-
tions were held. At that time an anchal (area) panchayat displaced the
Union Boards.16 In an area as politicized as West Bengal, the system of
Panchayati Raj (a national policy emphasizing local self-determination)
would have been a vehicle of convenience for the more volatile, attention-
getting politics of partisan and factional strife.
When Panchayati Raj was announced as a national policy in 1961,
West Bengal was specifically excluded because it was said to lack a pan-
chayat tradition. Between 1958 and 1961, panchayats had been established
in 96 of the 193 community development blocks, but a fear was expressed
that effective democratic institutions at the local level would not be allowed
to flourish.17
The issue is largely unresolved because evidence of continuing instability
and political extremism in West Bengal favors action by the forces of
centralization. Not only does the state grasp at powers it might otherwise
share with rural leaders, but also the central government, alarmed at
political violence, may impose central rule as it did in March 1970.18
Intensive Agricultural Districts Program (IADP)
Although the initial thrust in rural development following independence
had been in the realm of community development, it became clear during
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the course of the Second Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) that targets set for
food production during the period would not be met. Sensing an emer-
gency in the making, the government of India invited a team of special-
ists under Ford Foundation auspices to review the situation and make
recommendations for its improvement. The team's report19 inspired the
noted Package Program, which was introduced into single districts in
seven states. The "package" in question meant the simultaneous intro-
duction not only of good seeds but of fertilizer, pesticides, farm imple-
ments, and other production inputs as well.
Burdwan district in West Bengal was included under the program during
its second year (1962). Significant advances were made between 1962 and
1969 in increasing the irrigation potential during the principal growing
seasons and in raising the proportion of land under double-cropping from
seven to twenty percent. 20 However, because the new varieties, particularly
the noted IR-8, were less well adapted to the cloudy, sodden conditions
of the Amon season (the principal growing season fed by monsoon rain-
fall) than they were to the sunny, dry season (if irrigation were available),
other factors in the package held greater promise than did the seeds.
Increased fertilizer application, even on the better local varieties, seemed
to hold the greatest promise during the wet season.21 Other obstacles
stood in the way of a more widespread impact of IADP in Burdwan
district. Among these were the uneven topography which made the culti-
vation of dwarf varieties of rice hazardous at times of flooding. Also,
farms were highly fragmented and generally of uneconomic size. With a
condition of high rates of land rental, it is reported that few cultivators
had the means or felt incentives to invest in the Green Revolution.22
Cooperatives have provided little assistance in the district to the majority
of agricultural workers, those with three acres of land or less, because
their economic condition is so unstable that the only source of credit
generally open to them is through private moneylenders.23 The weight of
the evidence suggests that the Green Revolution is a rich man's plum:
only those with over three acres of irrigated land, owned and operated,
reported increases in rice yields and greater diversification of production.24
Even the political parties shunned the rural poor, at least up until the
mid-1960s. And even then the Marxist parties stood to gain more politi-
cal ground by promoting disaffection among the rural population than by
prosecuting its cause.
Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC)
The valley of the Damodar River in West Bengal has a history of frequent
flooding. The river was seriously implicated in the disastrous famine of
1943 when its waters breached the rail line that might have brought signi-
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ficant relief to the starving province. Because of the problems of flooding,
the need for irrigation to serve agriculture, and the need for hydroelectric
power to serve a growing industrial region, plans were laid in the years
before partition. The valley was to be developed along lines analogous
to those of the Tennessee Valley Authority ofthe United States. The upper
valley, in Bihar, is rich in mineral resources and stood to gain as an in-
dustrial region from the development of hydroelectric power plants. The
lower valley, in West Bengal, is an agricultural plain with considerable
potential if flooding could be brought under control and significant irriga-
tion facilities provided.
The disturbed political, administrative, and developmental situation at
the time of partition was such that a positive program like that of the
Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) was accepted with few reservations
by the legislatures at the center and in the states of Bihar and West Bengal.
Flood control, irrigation and water supply, and the production and dis-
tribution of electricity were to be the principal functions of DVC.25 An
integrated series of dams was constructed to meet the multiple objectives
of the project. During the rainy season the dams diverted excess water
into their catchment areas for release during the dry season. The irrigation
achievements in Bengal were only about two-thirds of the anticipated
command area, due largely to the failure of Bengal government to pro-
vide connecting channels between the main canals and the farmers' fields. 26
Eventually, the DVC did construct some of these field channels. However,
these operated in such a way that the water was largely unregulated and
varied perversely in direct proportion to the pace of natural rainfall.27
Nonetheless, Bengal benefited greatly from the DVC because it received
virtually all the advantages of flood control and most of those from irriga-
tion. The dams were built in Bihar, where the hardships of relocation
from the proposed catchment areas had to be borne by the population
of that state. An ingenious set of formulas involving heavy central con-
tributions was worked out in order to make the scheme attractive to the
legislatures of both Bihar and Bengal.28
The inherent autonomy of the DVC, however, went down hard in both
Bengal and Bihar. Most of this animosity was jealousy at seeing an in-
dependent power operating within state territory. Coupled with this was the
awkwardness in each state government's having to ask and give concessions
relating to the interests of a bordering state and the central government. 29
In a course of events strikingly similar to the diminution of the powers
ofTVA and the rise of those of the participating states in the United States,
Bengal and Bihar began to provide many of the services originally set up
as the responsibilities of the DVC, especially the generation and dis-
tribution of electric power. What had been an attractive proposal during
186 LUYKX
the turbulent times of independence turned into a source of annoyance
and embarrassment to state leaders as conditions stabilized and each
state acquired the effective powers to assert itself in relation to the center
and its neighbor. Much of this assertiveness can be laid at the door of the
West Bengal State Congress party.30
Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization (CMPO)
Despite its assertiveness in the case of the semiautonomous Damodar
Valley Corporation, the State of West Bengal has, in effect, declared it-
self incapable of coping with the city of Calcutta. It turned to outside
sources in the central government and international aid-giving agencies
for the technical skills and financial support of a major regional planning
effort.31
The allocations under the Third Five-Year Plan, the U.S. Food for
Peace program, the Ford Foundation, and other organizations were
substantial but the net results have been few. Certain critics feel, with some
justification, that the government of West Bengal and the Calcutta Me-
tropolitan Corporation are not taking the job of urban planning seriously
enough to implement their principal recommendations.32
In many respects Calcutta is a national phenomenon whose problems
extend well beyond those of West Bengal. The former prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, pointed out in 1961 that "Calcutta is the biggest city
in the country. Its problems are national problems-quite apart from
problems from West Bengal, and it is necessary that something special
should be done."33 The hinterland extends hundreds of miles to the west,
into an industrial region that has been characterized as the Ruhr of India.
Despite the far-reaching influence of the surrounding region on the city,
and vice versa, there is nothing in the Basic Development Plan for the
period 1966-1986 that recognizes the need for concommitant agricultural
and rural development in the region.
EAST BENGAL AFTER INDEPENDENCE
Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (V-AID)
In the unsettled conditions of postpartition East Pakistan, rural develop-
ment responsibilities were in the hands of the separately established de-
partments of government. These included agencies dealing with agricul-
ture, animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries, cooperation, marketing, health,
and so forth. 34 Each had a hierarchical organization, uncoordinated with
the hierarchies of any of the others. The problem was compounded by the
paucity of technically trained personnel, who had opted for Pakistan
following partition. Those personnel who were in the service of these
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agencies almost to a man lacked effective knowledge and experience of
meaningful rural development work.
Because of these difficulties, the government of Pakistan endeavored
to build a rural development extension service that, in a single agency,
would serve the needs of all the nation-building departments. As a model,
the government reached back to the same precedents on which India's
Community Development Program had been established. Building on
those precedents and on the contemporary experience of India's Com-
munity Development Programs and the United States extension programs,
Pakistan launched its own effort in June 1952-the Village Agricultural
and Industrial Development program (V-AID).
In 1938 a Rural Reconstruction Department had been established in
Bengal, following on pioneering rural development efforts elsewhere in
undivided India during the 1920s and 1930s.35 However, the inappropri-
ateness of having a development establishment separate from the nation-
building departments was recognized by the Bengal Administration
Enquiry Committee of 1944-1945. Upon the recommendations of this
committee, known also as the Rowlands Committee, rural development
responsibilities were to be assigned specifically to the technical and ad-
ministrative branches of the civil service and integrated into local govern-
ment activities.36 Despite the principles emphasized at the time of the
disbanding of the Rural Reconstruction Department just prior to parti-
tion, much the same kind of organization was reestablished in V-AID-
largely because of the combined inability and unwillingness of the existing
administrative machinery to meet the training and technical service needs
for village development during the early days of independence.
Multipurpose village workers were trained at one of three original
(later expanded) training institutes in East Pakistan. They were then
assigned to the bottom rung of the V-AID organization. At these levels
V-AID utilized specially constituted, locally elected councils of elders to
legitimize and institutionalize local development efforts.37 A hierarchy of
advisory councils with units at each administrative echelon brought re-
presentatives of the technical departments into contact with the V-AID
effort. The agency itself was organized into a separate hierarchy whose
chief administrator was located at the Central Ministry of Economic
Affairs. The chief administrator of V-AID in East Pakistan reported to
the Provincial Commissioner of the Division of Planning.
To train the middle and higher ranks of V-AID personnel, an academy
was established in East (as well as in West) Pakistan. This academy, loca-
ted at Comilla, began operations in 1959, at a time when V-AID was on
the threshold of dissolution.
Despite the application of a great deal of dedicated professional talent
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whose emotions and technical skills became wedded to the cause of rural
development based on community development principles such as "self-
help," "felt needs," and "local coordination," V-AID foundered on the
realities of the bureaucratic powers it sought to bypass. The technical
departments were subordinated in the programs. The chief officers of the
administrative districts of the civil government were involved only as
members of advisory committees, and the formal rural local government
bodies were not even in the picture. This de facto confrontation flared
into the open as the Agriculture Department became overtly competitive
and as other supporters of integrated rural development (including the
Comilla Academy) set off in more promising, if only slightly less turbulent,
directions. 38
In short order, V-AID was banned from working within the jurisdiction
of the Directorate of Agriculture. A year later it was abolished altogether.
The organization was gone but the problems remained:
When V-AID failed in its attempt at coordination the province was left
with serious problems: mutually exclusive departments trying to operate
separate and sometimes conflicting programs in the mofussil; a civil ad-
ministration unconnected with, and often unconcerned about, develop-
ment programs; and a system of local self-government badly weakened. 39
Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC)
Government decided on new endeavors to correct these problems. De-
spite its bureaucratic "victory" over V-AID, the Agriculture Department
was still regarded as incapable of meeting the considerable needs for in-
creasing agricultural production. The report of the Food and Agriculture
Commission, released in November 1960, specifically stated that the
department lacked the knowledge and facilities to do the job.4o Despite
the ill-fortune that the government of Pakistan seemed to be having with
attempts to bypass entrenched and ineffective units of government, it
did not give up. The success it experienced with the creation in 1959 of
the engineering-oriented Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA)41 led it to attempt the establishment of a semiautonomous
Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC). The primary responsi-
bility of ADC was to procure and distribute agricultural production
inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and credit) and to extend
knowledge through various information and training activities.
For many reasons the ADC was slow to organize. Not the least of the
problems was the unwillingness of the Agriculture Department to yield to
the recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Commission. Instead
the department continued to expand its programs in the rural areas.
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Basic Democracies and the Rural Works Program
After slightly more than a decade of independence in Pakistan, martial
law was proclaimed by Mohammed Ayub Khan in a bloodless coup in
October 1958. The effort was principally to restore order and direction
to a nation whose political scene was approaching chaos and whose
economic scene was stagnating. A year later Ayub Khan promulgated the
broadly innovative "Basic Democracies Order," which reorganized local
government. Not only was a new form of electoral college42 organized
under this order, but the system potentially became an instrument for
greater local involvement in national affairs and for bringing public
services closer to the rural areas and the towns.
Within the districts of East Bengal three tiers of local government were
established. At the lowest level were the Union Councils. At the next
higher jurisdiction, covering an administrative area of approximately one
hundred square miles and a population of 150,000 to 200,000, were the
Thana Councils. At each of the then seventeen districts were the District
Councils. The Union Council bore a close resemblance to the Union
Board set up under the Bengal Village Self-Government Act of 1919.43
The members were elected within electoral wards from population clus-
ters of about 10,000 persons (later raised to 12,500). The members of the
Union Council elected their own chairman. Although the Union Council
had a long list of optional functions and an income based on land revenue,
it did not in fact progress much beyond the precedents of the Union
Board in the decades prior to independence and fell short of meeting con-
temporary local government needs.44
Much the same could be said of the District Council, whose member-
ship was composed of officials and representatives elected from the' body
of Union Council chairmen in the district. The council's revenue base was
largely a share of the land revenue, although additional taxes could be
levied. With an extended list of optional functions the District Council was
provided with a fairly full scope. However, in 1963 it was reported that the
new District Councils were suffering under the same weaknesses-lack
of planning, inefficient administration, and a shortage of funds-which
had plagued the old District Boards.45
The same could not be said of the Thana Council, especially after it
became the object of intensive experimentation and development as a
pilot project in the rural administration experiment of the Academy for
Rural Development at Comilla. The Thana Council was an innovation
without precedent at that hierarchical level. Originally established as the
locus of a police station providing access to most rural areas within a walk
of a few hours, the thana level of jurisdiction provided an opportunity to
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deliver other public services at a point closer to the rural people and to do
so in a coordinated manner.46 The district level had been the previous
concentrated location of public services closest to the rural people. As
increasing numbers of officers of the various nation-building departments
were assigned to the thana level, they were organized into a thana office
building constructed with funds under the Rural Works Program. At this
location they could be more easily contacted by farmers and cooroinated
by thana-level supervisory administrators. The basic functions of the
Thana Council were envisioned as planning and coordination.47
Unlike the Union and District Councils, there were no separate revenue
sources available to the Thana Council other than grants from higher
levels. This was fitting because the council, per se, had no executive func-
tions beyond those which its members could exercise in their regular roles
as government officers or as chairmen of the Union Councils within the
thana.
The chairman of the Thana Council was the subdivisional officer (SDO),
a young man near the beginning of his career in the higher civil service, the
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). The SDO was at the same time chairman
of all the Thana Councils within his subdivision and was thus available
only intermittently. The day-to-day affairs of the Thana Council were in
the hands of the circle officer, an appointed official in the provincial
civil service, the East Pakistan Civil Service (EPCS). The appointed
members of the Thana Council were thana-level government officers
representing the administrative and technical cadres of the various govern-
ment departments. The elected members were the chairmen of the Union
Councils within the thana.
Several levels of administrative status and jurisdiction were represented
at a fully attended Thana Council meeting, as were several levels of social
station and background. This fact, coupled with the proximity to both
rural people and government services, made it a natural object for ex-
perimentation. One challenge was to devise ways in which to make the
Thana Council a cohesive functioning unit. Another was to fit the apti-
tudes of the council to development needs.
Government officers were not accustomed to coordinating with each
other, much less with elected rural leaders. The early meetings of the
pilot Thana Council in Comilla were marked by erratic attendance and
confusion over roles and status.48 A need for training and for a functional
raison d'etre had to be filled. Intrinsically the members of the council were
not rural development planners, and their entire experience was contrary
to the norm of coordinated and cooperative rural involvement.
One role that did seem to come more easily to the local council than any
other was the management of rural public works projects at low cost. This
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discovery came at a time when the U.S. Food for Peace program had
provided surplus food grain to Pakistan. The leader of the Harvard De-
velopment Advisory Service Team in Pakistan suggested that a rural
works program be attempted in East Pakistan on a pilot basis in Comilla
Thana.49 The pilot project adapted a rural planning device from Malaysia
-the Red Book, which was a series of map worksheets and detailed
instructions. The elected and appointed members of the Thana Council
worked under the guidance of the circle officer, who had been through a
special training course at the Academy for Rural Development. They
prepared base maps of the existing drainage canal and road network and
a series of annual plan maps that were designed to meet the priority needs
for drainage canals, culverts, ridges, and village roads over a period of
five or more years. Because similar plans were being concurrently laid for
rural works adapted to the jurisdiction of the Union Council and the
District Council, extended coordination of plans was undertaken between
hierarchical levels. Technical engineering opinions were provided under a
mandate to the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA).
The methods for identifying projects, for assigning them priorities, for
collating Thana Council and Union Council projects, for securing techni-
cal opinions from such agencies as WAPDA, for training local project
committees (chaired by Union Council members) to supervise local labor
hired during the dry season, for using Food for Peace wheat in partial
payment of wages (a practice displaced in later years by wage payments
using proceeds from government sales of the wheat), for measuring physi-
cal accomplishments, for keeping records and accounts, and for establish-
ing working relationships between government officers and council mem-
bers-all were incorporated into a manual of procedures. This manual
became the basis for the training program and operational guidance of
the Rural Works Program as it was expanded from its pilot phase to all of
East Pakistan and subsequently to the whole country. Not only did the
Rural Works Program provide a rural infrastructure;50 it also gave local
officials and elected leaders experience and confidence in managing public
affairs in coordination with other units of local government and with the
available technical public services.51
The Comilla Pilot Project in Rural Cooperatives
An alternative approach to rural cooperatives was experimented with on a
significant scale in Comilla Thana by the Academy for Rural Develop-
ment beginning in 1960.52 Although variously stated in various sources,
the objectives of the project eventually worked out to be:
1. The organization of economically dispersed small holders, share-
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croppers, and laborers who were vulnerable in their dealings with com-
mercial traders, moneylenders, landlords, and employers.
2. The training of rural people in technical vocational skills, problem-
solving, management procedure, hygiene, literacy, and related develop-
mentally relevant knowledge, attitudes, and skills which were unavailable
from traditional sources in village society.
3. The provision of supportive services especially for the promotion of
productivity and income. These included organizational and production
planning assistance, access to credit and other production inputs, to
technical information, and to stable markets.
4. The constructive guidance through discipline, both in the form of
positive inducements such as access to the services mentioned above, and
to a certain extent in the form of negative sanctions. These controls con-
serve scarce resources and provide mutual protection against individual
vagaries.53
The project's intent was to give rural people the capacity to participate
in shaping their own futures and to enter into collaborative relations with
government and other institutions in effecting developments that were
beyond the capacity of government alone.
The Comilla pilot project in rural cooperatives comprised a system of
village-level cooperative societies integrated under a central cooperative
association which acted as a servicing headquarters for all the cooperatives
within the hundred or so square miles of the thana. The basic unit was the
village-based cooperative, which was integrated into the cooperative sys-
tem. Although each cooperative was formed voluntarily by a group of
local farmers, they obligated themselves to follow a program of activities
that took full advantage of the services provided through the central
cooperative association.
A primary society had about forty members who selected their own
leaders. The membership was expected to meet weekly under the coordina-
tion of the manager to discuss financial management, technical training
in agriculture, and other matters. Each member was also expected to
purchase at least one ten-rupee share in the central association each year
and to make a small savings account deposit every week (the minimum
amount was decided by each local society-usually a quarter of a rupee or
more). Each week the manager of the cooperative society visited the
central association's headquarters to deposit these funds and have them
recorded. While there he attended training classes on seasonally im-
portant agricultural topics. Another member of the village cooperative,
selected to be the "model farmer," attended regular training sessions held
at conveniently located centers in the rural areas. These two officers of the
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primary society acted as de facto agents in their home villages, leading
training sessions at each weekly meeting and using their own landholdings
as demonstrations.
Credit, power pump irrigation, tractor cultivation, the supply of im-
proved varieties of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, and the processing and
marketing of farm products were among the services provided by the
central association. The members of the local cooperatives were expected
to make the fullest possible use of these services. The amount which could
be borrowed by members of a local cooperative depended on the total
savings of the group together with the amount they held as shares in the
central association, and qualified by an appraisal of the functional viabil-
ity and vigor of the cooperative. The loans were allocated within the
society by the managing committee according to a general production
plan in which the purpose of each member's loan was stated. The financial
arrangement for savings and loans constituted a rural banking system.
In time, nonagricultural cooperatives were organized in Comilla Thana
among local craftsmen, cycle rickshaw operators, and others (many of
whom were landless laborers). As the membership of these. groups in-
creased it became necessary for two intervening "federations" to be
organized between the primary cooperatives and the central association:
one for agricultural cooperatives and one for nonagricultural (special)
cooperatives. Each federation maintained accountants and inspectors who
acted as tutors and overseers of the progress of the societies, the accuracy
of their records, and the progress of individual members. These inspectors
kept a lookout for weaknesses and breakdowns in the system. Difficulties
which the inspectors could not resolve on the spot during their field visits
were referred to the appropriate federation for corrective action: The
federations could, if necessary, exert pressure for compliance by with-
holding essential services or, as a last resort, they could sell collateral
assets to recover defaulted loans-although this was rarely necessary.
The development of the cooperative project was tied in with the acade-
my's pilot project in rural administration. The rural cooperative system
was envisioned as an integral element in the Thana Training and Develop-
ment Center. The support was mutual, since the cooperatives bolstered
the government's rural development activities and the local officials
served as trainers at the weekly classes for managers and others.
The expansion of the pilot project beyond the initial experimental
area of Comilla Thana took place in several stages. In mid-1963, three
thana projects were set up, one in each of three other divisions of the
Province of East Pakistan. These were located adjacent to training in-
stitutes operated by the Department of Basic Democracies and Local
Government. Key staff members underwent a six months' course of train-
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ing at Comilla. These principal staff members, once they were posted, con-
tinued to coordinate through a specially designated supervisory officer
located at Comilla and through attendance at monthly coordination con-
ferences. 54 Following a pattern similar to the three earlier expansion than-
as, the Comilla model was readapted in 1965 in seven other thanas of
Comilla district.55 Because the Comilla project was a pilot operation,
the expansion projects were administered by the Directorate of Agri-
culture and later by the Agricultural Development Corporation. Col-
laborative arrangements existed between these agencies and the Comilla
Academy, especially with respect to training and coordination.
Although numerous difficulties were encountered in attempting to
implement these expansions of the original model, there was considerable
progress. As of June 1968, there were 339 primary cooperative societies
in Comilla Thana, of which 78 were nonagricultural. 56 As of June 1967,
less than two percent of the loans made between 1961 and 1967 were
overdue.57 In mid-1968 there were 673 primary agricultural societies in
the three expansion thanas launched in mid-1963, with a loan repayment
rate of ninety-two percent,58 In the seven thanas elsewhere in Comilla
district into which the Comilla-type cooperative model had been expanded
in 1966, a total of 948 primary societies had been established and a loan
repayment rate ofeighty-two percent was reported.59
Thana Irrigation Plan (TIP)
At this time expanison was methodically continuing into the remaining
thirteen thanas of Comilla district, as well as into other areas on a modi-
fied basis. However, questions were also being raised regarding the pace
of rural transformation. The Comilla-type cooperative system was a
relatively sophisticated complex requiring considerable time to establish
and institutionalize a viable network of agricultural and nonagricultural
societies linked to a central servicing headquarters and to the agencies of
the civil administration.
As an alternative to pursuing the strategy of first building up fairly
sophisticated system of cooperative societies to spread agricultural moder-
nization and technological change, a reverse procedure was suggested. It
was proposed to utilize the method ofplanning through the Thana Councils
that had been successfully worked out under the Rural Works Program
as a device for planning the installation for power pump facilities and
irrigation channels on a broad scale. Irrigation was seen as the chief
technological requirement for rapid agricultural change under monsoon
conditions which included a long dry season. Pump and motor sets were
to be integrated with special local farmer organizations that could be
set up as irrigation groups. Their relatively simple structure made the
irrigation groups more amenable to rapid expansion. This program was
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accepted by government and formalized as the Expanded Works Program
-Thana Irrigation Plan (TIP), with a target of installing forty thousand
pumps in the province over a five-year period.
In addition to the complex of supporting institutions provided locally
through the planning and coordination of the Thana Council, administra-
tive support at the highest level was secured through a provincial coordi-
nating committee that included the chief administrators of the Depart-
ment of Local Government, the Agricultural Directorate, the Water and
Power Development Authority, and the Agricultural Development Cor-
poration. Agricultural credit was introduced into the irrigation program
with the support of the Agricultural Development Bank, the Provincial
Cooperative Bank, and the medium of Tacavi loans under the revenue
administration. The sequence of activities was leading ultimately to the
integration of other services into the program.
The growing perception of the comprehensive nature of rural develop-
ment needs, and the existence of encouraging demonstrations of other
integrated programs, led in 1969 to the placement of a formal proposal
before the Pakistan Planning Commission to establish multifaceted rural
development cooperative projects in all the thanas of East Bengal along
lines adapted from the Comilla experiment.
It was at approximately this time that natural calamity and civil unrest
swept the province. However, it did not fail the notice of the administra-
tors of martial law that the areas where the projects were established had
gone through the period with greater stability, on the whole, than had
most other areas. Progress was suspended because of the worsening politi-
cal situation. War broke out in March 1971, making constructive action
impossible.
REFLECTIONS ON RURAL PUBLIC POLICY
Rural development policy in Bengal must cope with some concerns that
are unique to the region and with others that are broadly shared with
other densely populated agrarian areas. The density of population, the low
levels of education, the incidence of disease, the vulnerability to a dramatic
climate, and the shallow governmental capacity in the nation-building
public services are problems experienced in many other parts of the world.
But the specific ways in which these problems appear in Bengal are, of
course, unique. Also unique is the mystique of being a "Bengali," a
member of a large linguistic, cultural, and historical entity that is perceived
internally and externally as distinct from other areas. Despite these com-
plicating factors, and many others, public policy for rural development will
have to deal with at least six basic issues.
First, the rural scene is a "system" of broad relationships that, at least
in concept, need to be perceived as integrated. Such a perspective indicates
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the need to gather information, select goals, mobilize resources and inter-
ests around these goals, and plan a foundation of nationhood that can
be shared. This approach highlights a need for integrated local and central
planning. The administrative services of government must also be in-
tegrated with private, commercial, and social interests. Dynamic stability
and leadership at the highest levels are essential.
Second, investments in flood control, irrigation, transportation, electric
power, public buildings, and other facilities will need to be made with
foresight and determination well beyond the demand for short-term
economic benefits.
Third, investments in agricultural research and extension (including
crop and animal husbandry, rural credit and banking, special education,
and the like) will have to be made so as to take advantage of international
developments and to involve the relevant elements in the rural areas.
Fourth, rural governing instutitions will have to be developed according
to the goals that have been selected. Rural planning and public facilities
bodies will be necessary to manage local irrigation, marketing, banking,
credit, education, and public works in collaboration with institutions at
higher levels.
Fifth, revenue and other fiscal institutions-including competent as-
sessment and collection agencies as well as policy- and law-making in-
stitutions-will have to be developed to build a system of resource mobi-
lization and allocation. Poverty and low productivity mask the rich re-
source base of Bengal, which could be developed.
Sixth, a flexible approach needs to be fostered in the reformation or
design of rural policies and institutions. The pilot projects at Comilla and
elsewhere offer hard evidence to government that standing practice can
be modified.
The tasks faced by any government are immense, and the governments
in Bengal have been deeply involved in these tasks with the help of, and in
spite of, their domestic and international well-wishers and critics. Al-
though inevitably flavored with utopian sentiment, the cases I have dis-
cussed offer lessons that should not go unnoticed.
NOTES
1. Marcus F. Franda, "West Bengal," in State Politics in India, ed. Myron Wei-
ner(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), n. I, p. 247.
2. Haroun er Rashid, East Pakistan. A Systematic Regional Geography and its
Development Planning Aspects, 2nd ed.(Lahore,Pakistan: Sh.Ghulam & Sons,
1967), pp. 151-153.
3. West Bengal State Statistical Bureau, Report on Sample Survey for Estimation
ofAcreage and Yield Rates, 1959-60 (Alipore, West Bengal: West Bengal
POLICY PROFILE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT 197
Government press, 1965), part 1, table 10, p. 27; part 2, table 10, p. 21.
4. Rashid, op. cit., p. 207; West Bengal State Statistical Bureau, op. cit., part I,
table 10.1, p. 28.
5. United States Agency for International Development/Mission to Pakistan,
Statistical Fact Book: Selected Economic and Social Data on Pakistan (Is-
lamabad, Pakistan: USAID Mission, 1968), table 6.14.
6. Francine R. Frankel, India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political
Costs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), tables 9 and 10, pp. 165,
166.
7. Hugh Tinker, South Asia: A Short History (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp.
107-110.
8. Elliot Tepper, Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural East Pakistan
(East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, August
1966), p. 5.
9. B. M. Bhatia, Famines in India (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963), pp.
130-131.
10. Tepper, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
II. Ibid., p. 10.
12. Bhatia, op. cit., p. 7.
13. Tepper, op. cit., p. 13.
14. Ibid., p: 17.
15. Kalimuddin Ahmed, Agriculture in East Pakistan (Dacca, East Pakistan:
Ahmed Brothers Publications, 1965), pp. 332-333.
16. Ralph W. Nicholas and Tarashis Mukhopadhyay, "Politics and Law in Two
West Bengal Villages," Bulletin of the Anthropological Survey of India, vol.
XI, no. I, p. 34.
17. Ibid., p. 36.
18. Frankel, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
19. Ford Foundation, Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It (New
Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry
of Community Development and Cooperation, 1959).
20. Frankel, op. cit., p. 160.
21. Ibid., p. 163.
22. Ibid., pp. 163-169.
23. Ibid., pp. 170-172.
24. Ibid., pp. 173-175.
25. K. S. S. Raju, "The Damodar Valley Corporation" (unpublished manuscript,
March 1970), p. 9.
26. Ibid., p. 20.
27. Frankel, op. cit., p. 158.
28. Marcus F. Franda, West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 72-74.
29. Ibid., pp. 89-95.
30. Ibid., p. 127.
31. Franda, "West Bengal," pp. 315-316.
32. Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization. Basic Development Plan:
Calcutta Metropolitan District 1966-68 (Calcutta: Government of West Ben-
gal, Development and Planning Department, CMPO, 1966), preface; see also
Franda, "West Bengal," fn. 110, p. 316.
33. As quoted in Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, op, cit., preface.
198 LUYKX
34. Government of Pakistan, A Report on Agricultural Extension Work in the
U.S.A. and Reorganization ofExtension Service in Pakistan (Karachi: Govern-
ment of Pakistan Press, 1952), p. 26.
35. The noted work of F. L. Brayne in Gurgaon district (Punjab) while he was
deputy commissioner, of Spencer Hatch in South Travancore, of Rabindro-
nath Tagore at Shriniketan, and of Malcom Darling, although imp<;rmanent,
was influential on much of the work taken up by governments at a later date.
36. Tepper, op. cit., p. 104.
37. Jack D. Mezirow, Dynamics of Community Development (New York: The
Scarecrow Press, 1963), pp. 56-63.
38. See Mezirow, op. cit., pp. 133-135; Tepper, op. cit., pp. 19-20; and Akhter
Hameed Khan, "The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla"
(text of a presentation delivered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
July 1964, and printed in Rural Development in East Pakistan: Speeches of
Akhter Hameed Khan (East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, Michigan State
University, 1964), pp. 21-51.
39. Tepper, op. cit., p. 105.
40. As cited in Tepper, op, cit., p. 21.
41. Nicolaas Luykx, "Organizing for More Effective Labor Utilization in Rural
East Pakistan," in Some Issues Emerging from Recent Breakthroughs in Food
Production, ed. Kenneth L. Turk (Ithaca: New York State College of Agri-
culture, 1971), pp. 154-155.
42. Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965), pp. 197, 272-273, passim.
43. Tepper, op. cit., p. 106.
44. A. T. R. Rahman, Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots: A Study of Three
Union Councils in Kotwali (Comilla) Thana (Comilla, East Pakistan: Pakistan
Academy for Rural Development, 1962), p. 15; and Tepper, op. cit., p. 108.
45. Richard O. Niehoff and George M. Platt, "Local Government in East Paki-
stan" (unpublished manuscript), cited in Tepper, op. cit., p. 1l0.
46. A. K. M. Mohsen, The Comilla Rural Administration Experiement: History
and Annual Report 1962-63 (Comilla, East Pakistan: Pakistan Academy for
Rural Development, October 1963), pp. 51-64.
47. Akhter Hameed Khan, "Note Prepared for Mr. Azfar, Chief Secretary, Gov-
ernment of East Pakistan, May 1959," as reproduced in Moshen, op. cit.,
appendix C-l, pp. 88-89.
48. Mohsen, op. cit., pp. 18-24.
49. Khan, "The Pakistan Academy," pp. 49-51.
50. John W. Thomas, "Rural Public Works in East Pakistan's Development"
(Cambridge, Mass.: Development Advisory Service, Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University, Economic Development Report No. 112, 1968).
51. Tepper, op. cit., p. 119.
52. The progress of this experiment has been widely reported on. Primary sources
are in the annual reports of the cooperative project published by the Academy
for Rural Development beginning in 1961; additional data are collected in
Arthur F. Raper and others, Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive
Experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
POLICY PROFILE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT 199
53. Nicolaas Luykx, "Rural Governing Institutions," in Institutions in Agricul-
tural Development, ed. Melvin G. Blase (Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1971), pp. 195-203.
54. Raper, op. cit., pp. 235-236.
55. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
56. Ibid., table D, p. 308.
57. Ibid., p. 74.
58. Ibid., p. 236.
59. Ibid., p. 241.
A Bibliographic Essay on Bengal
Studies in The United States
DAVID KOPF
University of Minnesota
In May 1972, at the Eighth Annual Bengal Studies Conference in Toronto,
some fifty scholars participated in seven panels dealing with a variety of
topics ranging from Brahmo contact with Unitarianism in the nineteenth
century to current priorities in Bangladesh. As with every other conference
since the earliest one at Michigan State in 1965, ideas were hotly discussed,
and even mediocre papers with vaguely formed issues evoked sharp con-
troversy, while clarity and academic detachment remained the two schol-
arly virtues conspicuously absent during the proceedings. And, as always,
each American participant succumbed to that indefinable, indefensible,
and indefatigable spirit or mystique of Bengal which in the face of chronic
disaster-from the partition of 1905 to the bloody birth of Bangladesh-
has produced a rapturous ambivalence between love and hate, optimism
and pessimism, loyalty and alienation.
To understand the progress of Bengal studies in the United States during
the last decade, one must somehow account for that zealous and irrational
appreciation of Bengal by American academics who are generally con-
servative in bestowing affection, rational by profession, and relatively dull
in choice of lifestyle. The Bengal known to American scholars who have
lived and researched there over the last decade is without doubt the most
politically unstable and the most violent state in South Asia, the most
troubled socially, and the least progressive economically. The great Bengali
urban metropolis of Calcutta (where most of the Americans under con-
sideration have lived for a year or more) has the distinction among Indian
cities of having been treated by the world press in a consistently deroga-
tory manner as the "city of dreadful night."l Calcutta's image and pros-
pects were perhaps best summed up by a sympathetic New York Times
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correspondent a few years ago in an article entitled "Can India Survive
Calcutta1"2
Nevertheless, with few exceptions, most of the graduate students who
were trained as Bengal specialists between 1958 and 1964 have persisted in
their chosen field. Edward Dimock, who inspired the majority of them in a
seminar on the cultural and literary history of Bengal at Chicago, has
attributed the enthusiasm for Bengali culture to the attraction of the
language, to Bengal's "long and lush ... literary tradition," to Bengal's
"tremendous fund of source material," and to Bengal's rich and diversified
history.3 Moreover, Dimock contended that American scholars with area
studies background and with competence in a modern South Asian lan-
guage had become impatient with "simplistic thinking" about the "macro-
cosm" of India and were instead probing deeply into the "microcosm" of
regional cultures.4 In Dimock's words, "we must begin to examine in
necessarily minute detail the single strands which make up the complex
fabric of India."5 Each region of the subcontinent has unique aspects
which are in "themselves fascinating and highly individual, and as such
worthy of study and understanding."6 Parochialism, however, is not the
objective of the American student of Bengal: "it is through the unit that
we are attempting to approach the totality."?
Part of the emotional commitment to Bengal, therefore, is to be ex-
plained as a consequence of an area studies training and an emphasis on
regional languages and cultures. Bengal happened to be selected as the
first experiment to justify the hypothesis and one can only imagine the
excitment of the pioneers whose articles and monographs opened a virtual
new world. In an editorial preface to the second volume of the Bengal
studies proceedings, I noted that:
In May, 1966, the University of Missouri played host to the second annual
conference on Bengal Studies which had convened to discuss "Bengal Re-
gionalism: Origins and Conceptual Problems." There was much confusion
and uncertainty about the validity of intensive regional studies in those
days and we were often criticized by well-meaning scholars who were doing
precisely the same thing for Punjab, Maharashtra, and the Dravidian
South. Though most of us were quick to defend the regional approach, we
were conceptually unsure of ourselves. Evidently we were not alone that
year in trying to avoid a crisis of scholarly identity between India and Ben-
gal, Maharashtra, or the Punjab. A month earlier, Robert I. Crane had as-
sembled South Asian notables of every region and discipline at Duke Uni-
versity to inquire into "Regions and Regionalism in South Asian Studies "8
ACADEMIC PROFILE OF THE BENGAL SPECIALIST
This essay deals with a selection of the published work of fourteen schol-
ars-thirteen Americans and one acculturated New Zealander-who in
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the estimation of their peers have made solid contributions to Bengal
studies. Who are these persons? Where were they educated and what was
their intellectual orientation to South Asia? What are their disciplines and
their general characteristics as scholars of Bengal studies? Interestingly,
the two senior scholars who published earliest on Bengal, Edward Dimock
and Stephen Hay, were Harvard Ph.D.'s. Dimock worked in the Depart-
ment of Sanskrit and Indic Studies, whereas Hay was a product of the
Department of History with a specialized interest in East Asia.
In the late 1950s both these men joined the University of Chicago during
the period of formative growth of the university's South Asia Center. At
the initiative of Myron Weiner, a political scientist specializing on India,
the Bengali language was first offered at the university. The early interest
in Bengal by Dimock, Hay, and Weiner explains why Chicago produced so
many graduate students committed to that region of South Asia. And of
those students, the majority were in history, a discipline which tradi-
tionally favored intensive area concentration. Thus among Hay's students
up to 1964 were included Philip Calkins, Leonard Gordon (on leave from
Harvard), Warren Gunderson, Ronald Inden, Barrie Morrision, and
myself. Weiner's student of Bengal was Marcus Franda while Ralph
Nicholas from anthropology was the first graduate from that department
with the same regional specialization.
At the University of Pennsylvania under Norman Brown's direction,
South Asia Regional Studies was established as a department offering
degrees to doctoral candidates with a concentration in one of several dis-
ciplines. Rachel Van M. Baumer received her doctoral degree from this
program after having studied Bengali literature with the late T. W. Clark.
Blair Kling developed his interest in modern Bengali history there while
studying with Holden Furber, dean of South Asian historians in America.
John McLane and John Broomfield, the former an American and the latter
a New Zealander, are both historians who were area-trained abroad.
McLane is a graduate of British universities whereas Broomfield studied
at Australian National University.
Among the pioneers of Bengal studies over the last decade, historians
predominate. Of the fourteen, ten are trained historians while two others
are strongly influenced by history in their work. This stress has made most
of the Bengal scholars conscious of the temporal dimension, of processes
and stages of growth and decline, of the need to view Bengali society and
culture dynamically rather than statically. Most conferences and seminars
on Bengal have been organized chronologically around major historical
periods, and one of the leading questions that invariably emerges at such
gatherings deals with the problem of change and continuity in Bengali
culture.
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On the other hand, a great emphasis on the little tradition of Bengal as
against the great tradition of India, the relativistic bias of some anthro-
pologists at Chicago, and the inevitable consequences of regional identity
have modified the characteristic historicity of the group by stressing the
inner structure of the culture more than the irruptiye external forces and
movements impinging on it. Those Bengal scholars who have sought a key
to the unique culture of the region have tended to treat historical changes
as irrelevant happenings which hardly touch the hard core of the closed
system.
Nonetheless, the Bengal specialist has not gone to ideological extremes
in his work. Other influences and considerations have operated in the
field. If, for example, historians predominate among Bengal specialists, it
is the modernists who predominate among historians. This tendency may
be explained as a result of a happy coalescence of interests between ad-
vocates of regidnalism in South Asia and representatives of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare anxious to extend fellowships to
students achieving linguistic competence in the crucial languages of Asia.
The National Defense Education Act center idea favored Bengali or
Marathi or Hindi because they were the living languages of the Indian
people. It is probably safe to generalize that agencies willing and able to
send Americans to India or Pakistan favored proposals on problems that
were of contemporary interest or at least modern in the sense of tracing
the origins of present-day concerns. Therefore, it should come as no
surprise that though only Nicholas and Franda among the fourteen are
social scientists per se, the majority of historians are greatly influenced by
social science methods and techniques.
Thus it can be said that the Bengal specialist is subject to a numbe"r of
influences: historical perspective, cultural relativism, social science, and
present-day concerns. Nor is it possible to establish for him any neat
category between the social sciences and humanities. As area specialist
exposed to both approaches and as historians who by the nature of their
craft must belong to both camps, Bengal scholars have thus far proved a
mixed bag indeed.
AN ANALYSIS OF BENGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN AMERICA
Probably the first work of consequence by an American scholar of Bengal
appeared in 1963 with the publication of Edward Dimock's translation
of Bengali tales from court and village in a volume entitled The Thief of
Love. Dimock had three purposes in bringing out the volume: to justify
the regional approach to South Asia by showing "that there is a good
deal of enjoyment as well as enlightment to be had from study of the
regional literatures of South Asia"9; to illuminate the medieval period of
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India, "that period from the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries"10;
and to meet a need clearly felt at the University of Chicago: "there are
precious few translations from the literature of the medieval period of
any South Asian language."l1
Dimock's volume, as he described it, was a pioneer effort to open up a
new world or perhaps rediscover it. "When we considered India at all,"
he wrote, "most people of my generation, growing up in the thirties and
forties, thought of it in terms of the British Empire."12 It was not the real
India that people conjured up in their minds but a series of images gen-
erated by popular literature and the cinema. Said Dimock, "India was a
British land, and her culture, represented to us in movie versions of
Kipling stories, was that of Britain, re-enacted in a tropical and foreign
land."13 The second set of images Dimock sought to counter was that of
the nineteenth-century Orientalist scholar who conceived India largely
in terms of the Sanskritic-oriented culture or great tradition of the Indian
macrocosm. It was Dimock's conviction that by moving away from the
British and Orientalist perceptions of India and by moving into the pop-
ular cultures and popular languages of the regions, a new and richer
dimension of understanding about India could be achieved.
Dimock's partiality for medieval Bengali language and literature and
his emphasis on the interaction of the classical great tradition (Aryan)
with the regional traditions (Dravidian) had important implications which
later Bengal scholars did not always accept. Dimock argued in his intro-
duction that Bengali stood to Sanskrit rather much as Italian did to Latin.
Surely if the objective of the scholar were to explore Italian history and
culture, he would prefer to work with Italian sources rather than Latin.
But then Dimock's analogy took a certain twist when he referred to a
Bengali literary tradition that has been "unbroken from the ninth or tenth
century Buddhist esoteric texts called caryii-padas, to the present."14 The
first difficulty was Dimock's overly close identification between the region-
allanguage of Bengal spoken today and its linguistic and literary phase of
development during the middle ages. The second difficulty was that he did
not carry the analogy between Bengali and European languages far enough
in the historical perspective of change and continuity. Is the language of
the Italian people today the language of the pre-Renaissance period? Do
the English people today speak in the idiom of Chaucer? As for Bengal, is
the literature of the Bengali people today really the same as the literature
of the pre-Muslim period? Is the Bengali of Cal).9idasa the same Bengali
of Rabindranath Tagore? Dimock's stress on origins and the unbroken
continuity of a tradition thus turned the quest inward in the direction of a
closed inner core of the Bengali culture which, it was believed, remained
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pure and immune from revolution, invasion, and conquest-and from the
processes of modernization which had been transforming Western literary
traditions for centuries since the Renaissance.
Not surprising, therefore, is the fact that Dimock chose as his last trans-
lation chronologically in The ThiefofLove Bharatchandra's Vidyii-Sunda-
ra, composed sometime before 1760. The British began to dominate Bengal
about then: the victory at Plassey was in 1756; the selection of Calcutta as
capital was in 1772; the development of a new Bengali prose style was
dated from 1800 with the establishment of the College of Fort William;
and the reform work of Rammohun Roy, "father of modern India," has
generally been set at about 1815. From then on, a radically new Bengali
language and literature emerged through textbook translations, journal-
ism, novels, short stories, poetry, and drama. The writers were among the
newly risen Western-educated intelligentsia whose creative outburst and
ideological pursuits on behalf of modernism and a new cultural identity
have come to be known as the Bengal renaissance.
In 1965, sandwiched between articles in Changing Japanese Attitudes
Toward Modernization, there appeared a lone piece on Indian moderniza-
tion by Stephen Hay: "Western and Indigenous Elements in Modern
Indian Thought: The Case of Rammohun Roy." With Hay, among Amer-
icans interested in Bengal, Dimock's quest backward in time to understand
continuity was shifted to the future to understand change. And instead of
Dimock's preoccupation with the sources of the inner culture, Hay ad-
dressed himself to the study of Bengal in interaction with the Western
world. "All through the non-Western world in recent centuries," wrote
Hay, "the pace of change has been vastly accelerated by contact and con-
flict with the expanding society and culture of the modern West."15 Hay
too conceived of himself as a pioneer, not merely of discovering new facts
about Bengal but of contributing new ideas to the evolving conceptual
scheme on the problem of Asian modernity in the context of cultural en-
counter and accommodation with the West. He said: "Our problem, then,
is to create and refine a conceptual framework for the study of change in
non-Western civilizations, within which indigenous and Western, tradi-
tional and modern elements can be analyzed and meaningfully related to
each other."16
Hay's choice of Bengal as his region of inquiry apparently did not stem
from any strong commitment to the language and culture. "Nowhere in
India were Western influences stronger, and Indian responses more vigor-
ous, than in the region where the British planted their capital: Bengal."17
This was Hay's justification for selection of venue. It was Hay, while de-
picting the new class of upper-caste "Hindu gentry" responding favorably
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to the "cultural traditions of their new rulers," who first coined the term
bhadralok18 as a conceptual device for comprehending the Bengali elite
under British colonialism and imperialism.
Rammohun Roy, born in 1772, twelve years after Bharatchandra's
death, was chosen by Hay because he was the "first Indian intellectual
seriously to study the civilization of the West."19 Moreover, Rammohun
expressed in his writings "the fundamental ideas on the nature and rela-
tionship of Indian and Western society and culture whose implications
have been worked out by a succession of later thinkers and reformers, and
are still being worked out today."20 Therefore, by studying Rammohun
one could learn something significant not merely about Bengal but also
about "the nature and relationship of indigenous and Western, tradition-
al and modern elements in nineteenth and twentieth century Indian
thought."21
The importance of this article by Hay and of his general approach to the
history of Bengal is that it cleared away many of the Eurocentric attitudes
about modernity in South Asia and opened new vistas for dealing with the
general problem in a more objective, scientific, and sophisticated manner.
In point of fact, Hay never offered anything new about Rammohun or
about the Bengal of Rammohun's time. In the article, available informa-
tion on Rammohun was used to advance an idea and to promote interest
in a valuable line of questions. Through Rammohun, for example, Hay
finally worked out a definition of modernization: "a continuing process of
improvement directed toward the achievement of this-worldly enlighten-
ment and well-being through the sustained and systematic application of
reason."22 Hay's conclusion that Rammohun was a modernizer of his own
tradition rather than a westernizer was no less important in implication
than his conclusion that the impact of British intrusion in Bengal did in
fact constitute a watershed between tradition and modernity in South
Asia:
Westerners ... brought to South Asia traditions of modernization which
have transformed the views of Hindu and Muslim intellectuals toward
their own traditions, making it impossible for them to return to their pre-
modern, or traditionalist, orthodoxies. It is only a question of time until
creative individuals come forward to continue the work pioneered by Ram-
mohun Roy of selecting, reinterpreting, and integrating traditions from
many civilizations, within the framework neither of traditionalism, nor of
revivalism, but of continuing cultural modernization.29
In 1966 two rather different books on Bengal were published: Edward
Dimock's The Place of the Hidden Moon, and The Blue Mutiny by Blair
Kling. Both had been doctoral dissertations, Dimock's dealing with erotic
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mysticism in the Vai~I)ava-Sahajiyacult of Bengal and Kling's dealing
with the Indigo Disturbances in Bengal between 1859 and 1862. In terms
of the problem of continuity and change in Bengal, Dimock was clearly
reinforcing his earlier work by steeping himself in the literary and religious
tradition of Vai~I)avism as expressed in the sixteenth century during the
era of Caitanya and his disciples. Kling, on the other hand, dealt directly
and effectively with changing agrarian patterns as a result of British intru-
sion and responses to it by Bengali cultivators, zemindars, and the urban-
ized intelligentsia of Calcutta.
Dimock's sources for The Place ofthe Hidden Moon were mostly Bengali
and Sanskrit texts which he employed laboriously and expertly as build-
ing blocks in constructing as it were the architecture of Bengali culture. To
be sure, Dimock established a comparative bridge between leading themes
of Bengali Vai~I)avism and similar themes in the European medieval tradi-
tion-as, for example, the existence among Christian and Hindu poets of
an apparent parodox between the spiritual "sacred" and the carnal "pro-
fane."24 The attempt to reconcile love of spirit and love of flesh as two
warring intellectual or religious principles was, in Dimock's opinion, not
a cultural peculiarity but "a human peculiarity" (neither East nor West).25
This applied to the "two essential phases or characteristics of love, union
and separation," which were human and not cultura1.26 Wrote Dimock:
In Bernard's image, the soul "desires" to be united with the Christ, and
this statement emphasizes that the two are separate. It is this aspect of the
image which is most usual to Christian, and I might add to orthodox Vai-
~l).ava, poets, although the pain of separation always suggests the joy of
union. For love in separation is pure love, spiritual love. 27
These comparative assessments, especially the subsequent subtleties
about love and marriage in the two great traditions of religious poetry, are
extremely sensitive and useful both in comparative mysticism and in com-
parative medieval religious systems. But Dimock's purpose in all this, it
seems to me, was not to break down discrete systems as a universalist but
to win recognition and equality for a Bengali tradition by showing its
functional equivalent in the hallowed heritage of the Western tradition.
Thus Dimock argued effectively that the Vai~I)ava-Sahajiyacombination
of sacred and profane love is neither uniquely the manifestation of a non-
Christian heathen faith nor to be "passed off as the product of a primitive
mentality."28
Dimock's monograph represented one of the most sensitive and inspired
attempts to resurrect a medieval tradition of ~ndia done in the twentieth
century. It was also a masterful attempt to rectify a false image of both
Sahajiyas and Vai~I)avas allegedly using religion as a pretext for orgies of
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self-gratification. Dimock, for instance, made an early and careful distinc-
tion between kama and prema (carnal and spiritual love, respectively) as
applied to the Radha-Kr~l)a theme in Bengali poetry:
True love is prema, the love that Radha and the Gopis had for KnI}a, the
love that the true worshipper emulates, which, when he has realized himself
as Kr~I}a and his partner as Radha, he could not help emulating. In his
attitude and in his worship there can be no trace of kama, of carnal desire,
of desire for the satisfaction of the self; kama, unless it is transformed into
true love, prema, leads not to joy, but to misery and hell.29
The world Blair Kling created in absorbing narrative style in The Blue
Mutiny was totally different from Dimock's medieval age centering about
the great reformer Caitanya. Reading Kling's book dispels doubts that
British intrusion materially changed Bengali life and society. Kling's was
the first monograph by an American that dealt in large part with the rural
history of Bengal under the British. In it he traced the rise of the indigo
plantation system from 1802 through its golden age as a profit-making
business (1834-1847) to its decline and collapse in the 1850s and 1860s.
One segment of the book contains the story of nonofficial European plant-
ers, a story that is often ignored in the history of the colonial experience.
The fact that by 1860 these planters had bought two-thirds of the land in
Nadia district suggests how powerful they had become. The Blue Mutiny
also tells the story of the zemindars, or aative landowners, who competed
with the Europeans. Above all it tells the story of the cultivators of indigo,
their trials and tribulations, their leaders during the rebellion. Finally it
tells the story of sympathetic Europeans and the Calcutta intelligentsia
who joined forces against violence, coercion, and exploitation in the plan-
tations.
Kling argued that the Indigo Rebellion was an important event in Ben-
gali history for at least three reasons: first, the Government of India Act
XI (1859) led to a full investigation of plantation abuses and provided
legal options for the oppressed peasant and enabled the cultivator to
"grasp the concept of lawful rights" with the result that they became
"enthusiastic supporters of the legal process"30; second, it provided the
Calcutta intelligentsia with the experience of "applied techniques of polit-
ical agitation" which they would later use in the nationalist struggle; and
third, it helped give "rise among the intelligentsia to an idealization of the
rustics."31 Besides opening a field in Bengal studies on resistance move-
ments, Kling's important contribution was in his objective treatment of
the facts-which made some Indian zemindars look as evil as did Europe-
ans when portrayed by nationalists, and made European officials and
magistrates appear much less imperious and unconcerned than when de-
picted by their own countrymen during the Victorian era. Kling's strict
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adherence to facts raises the question: Would Indians have done any dif-
ferently in the position of the planters?
In 1967, the Asian Studies Center of Michigan State University pub-
lished the first set of papers of the Bengal Studies Group which had met
two years earlier in East Lansing. The subject of the conference was "Ben-
gal: Literature and History." Following the direction Bengal studies were
taking in America, the papers were divided by Dimock, the editor, into
the medieval period and the period of the nineteenth century and after.
The writers had been asked to use literary sources for the study of Bengal's
cultural history.
The medieval papers included Dimock's study "The Ideal Man in
Society in Vai~I)ava and Vai~I)ava-SahajiyaLiterature," a translation of
"Two Autobiographical Accounts from Middle Bengali Literature" by
Wayne Kilpatrick, and a study of ''The Hindu Chiefdom in Middle
Bengali Literature" by Ronald lnden. lnden's piece is of special interest
because this was his earliest product as a student of social history and as
a follower of Dimock seeking the true Bengal in the middle ages. From
Bengali sources entirely, lnden masterfully reconstructed the "inner"
political history of Bengal in the seventeenth century. The term inner
is used advisedly here because lnden went beyond the usual level of Mogul
imperial or regional Muslim dynastic history to the level of actual control
by a number of independent and semi-independent rajas or zemindars.
According to lnden, though the Moguls conquered Bengal, problems
of communication and transport compelled them to delegate actual power
to the local chiefs. But to lnden, concerned less with such "passive ex-
ternal factors" and more with the culture pattern and Bengali value sys-
tem, the real question was this: What were the "more 'active' internal
factors relating to political organization and activity within the chiefdom
itself that from the point of view of the inhabitants living inside the
chiefdom made it a permanent political institution?"32 lnden answered
his question by setting the organization and functions of the chief's
political system (riijya) against a close study of the structural components
which made up the chiefdom. Thus there was the political system itself,
the territory or dda, and the hierarchy of social groups or samiija. All
these components were pulled together in a complex economic network
based largely on agriculture-paddy cultivation-as the main source of
wealth. The social system comprised the caste groups who according to
lnden were dominated by the same three upper-caste groups of contem-
porary Bengal: "the Brahman-priests, pandits, and preservers of Hindu
tradition; the Baidyas-physicians; and the Kayasthas-officials and land-
holders."33 lnden, then, from a medieval text, listed the lower specialist
castes.
lnden's leading conclusion, perhaps, was that the whole system was held
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the age of progress was the middle-class intellectuals whom Gunderson
defined as "an umbrella under which the urban-dwelling, educated
Bengali, regardless of income, status, or aspirations, could find shelter."45
Gunderson's main conclusions about modernization among the Bengali
middle class followed Hay's own and represented a growing realization
among Americans that modernization was not necessarily synonymous
with westernization. This notion is apparent in Gunderson's statement
that "Bengali intellectuals showed an ability to borrow selectively and to
incorporate new forms and ideas, without ceasing to be Bengalis."46 Thus,
along with Hay and others, Gunderson was prepared to argue that an
attachment to cultural forms by Bengalis wishing to maintain their own
identity did not necessarily label them as exponents of "orthodoxy or
traditionalism."
The third paper on modern Bengal was by T. W. Clark's student,
Rachel Van M. Baumer, who had written her dissertation on the many
facets of Bankimcandra Chatterji's thought and had chosen for her topic
in this volume "Communal Attitudes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries." Instead of the focus on acculturation as a result of British-
Bengali interaction, she directed her attention to Hindu-Muslim relations
as reflected in the writings of Bengali Hindus. This paper had particular
merit because of the excellence of the translations and the lucid, well-
structured narrative style.
Baumer's method was to trace Hindu attitudes to Muslims in three
separate works by three separate authors writing at three different times
during the modern period. In my opinion, this method enabled her to
write the most effective paper of any in terms of carrying out the objectives
of the volume: to fuse literature and history by using literature historically.
She looked at Ram Ram Basu's Raja Pratapadityacaritra, written for the
College of Fort William in 1801; she examined Sitaram, a later novel by
Bankimcandra published in 1887; and she analyzed Saratcandra Chat-
terji's Mahd, which appeared in 1921. Baumer discovered that in the
early 1800s Basu, when writing this history of a Bengali raja in sixteenth-
century Jessore district, was completely oblivious to "Hindu-Muslim
tension."47 In fact, "the word Muslim rarely occurs in the text."48 But in
Bankimcandra, Hindu nationalism had evolved a hostile attitude not yet
so much against the British overlord as against Muslims. According to
Baumer, cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims were to Bankim
"fundamental and irreconcilable."49 In Saratcandra there seems to have
been a reaction against Bankim's kind of communal attitude and an
appeal "to [Saratcandra's] own community for a return to reason for
peace and harmony in everyday life with men of the other community."50
Baumer's article was extremely revealing and pertinent in the light of
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recent events which brought about the bloody birth of Bangladesh. But in
the context of Bengal studies in America, her article represented the first
effort to work with modern Bengali literature in contrast to Dimock's
work with the medieval. The result was to open up a new world of Bengali
fiction which could be studied aesthetically or as sources for social and
cultural history.
The year 1868 proved to be a harvest year for Bengal studies-at least
among the modernists who were beginning to show the fruits of their
labor in history, anthropology, and political science. This was the year
John Broomfield published his prize-winning Elite Conflict in a Plural
Society; Leonard Gordon brought out his "Portrait of a Bengal Revolu-
tionary" on M. N. Roy in the Journal of Asian Studies; Ralph Nicholas
summed up years of research on the Bengal village in "Structures of Poli-
tics in the Villages of Southern Asia" in the Singer-Cohn volume Structure
and Change in Indian Society,. and Marcus Franda published his West
Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India. The regional approach to
South Asia which the Bengal specialists had pioneered was producing
results.
Broomfield, trained in area studies in Australia, demonstrated in his
work that parallel interests had developed between Australia and America
with regard to approaches to the history of Bengal. Hay, lnden, and
others at Chicago had already recognized a certain unity of self-interest
among the long-prevailing upper castes of Bengal who obviously had
adapted themselves rather well under the British and constituted a re-
gional elite during the era of colonialism and imperialism. It was precisely
here that Broomfield found his primary area of interest, which he eventu-
ally developed into the concept of the Bengali bhadralok:
At the beginning of the twentieth century Bengali rural and urban society
differed in many fundamental respects, yet they shared a common do-
minant elite. In city, town, and village there was one group of Bengalis who
claimed and were accorded recognition as superior in social status to the
mass of their fellows. These were the bhadra/ok, literally the "respectable
people," the "gentlemen." They were distinguished by many aspects of
their behavior-their deportment, their speech, their dress, their style of
housing, their eating habits, their occupations, and their associations-
and quite as fundamentally by their cultural values and their sense of social
propriety.51
As a student of Bengali sociopolitical history in the British period,
Broomfield framed his monograph on the bhadralok in the context of
British-Bengali interaction and focused on the institution of the Bengal
Legislative Council. Broomfield assessed leading political events in
Bengal from 1912 to 1927, addressing himself for the most part to com-
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munal relations between Hindus and Muslims from the end of the first
Bengal partition of 1905 to the rise in power of a Muslim bhadralok in
Bengal legislative politics. No book by a Bengal specialist so skillfully
combined the traditional historian's exciting narrative with the problem-
centered approach of the social scientist.
What Broomfield has contributed, therefore, is a kind of sociology of
Bengal politics in historical perspective. The drama that unfolded under
British rule and administration was that of groupings in a pluralist society
maneuvering to promote their self-interest in competition with one an-
other. Like Kling's book, Broomfield's constituted a major breakthrough
in the older .British Empire historiography of India, which was essentially
concerned with British diffusion rather than with British-Indian interac-
tion. It was not the British who really interested Broomfield but Bengali
elites who had no other choice but to confront the British while at the
same time playing another more crucial role within their own culture and
in competition with one another. This kind of sociological analysis, re-
stricted to one region, also enabled Broomfield to shatter the older gener-
alizations about the liberal moderate nationalists. He humanized them by
demonstrating how their ideological commitment was culturally and
socially determined.
Politics was also G6rdon's primary concern in his article on M. N.
Roy as young Bengali revolutionary. But, contrary to Broomfield, it was
not sociology so much as cultural anthropology which shaped Gordon's
view of "modern" Bengal. The influence of Dimock, Inden, and Chicago
anthropologists was clearly discernable in this valuable article on the
unique features of the Bengal revolutionary. Gordon is perhaps the first
Bengal specialist of the modernist school to have been captivated by the
notion that there are eternal Bengali traits and relationships, or an un-
broken continuity of culture, offering the key, as it were, to understand-
ing Bengali participation in all historical forces and movements.
Although M. N. Roy was a revolutionary nationalist advocating in-
dependence against the British, Gordon felt it unnecessary to refer to any
Englishman at all in Bengal except perhaps those whose names turned up
in CID files. Instead, Gordon's young man Narendranath (Roy's real
name) began his revolutionary career in the peculiarly Bengali way: he
was really part of a faction (dal) rather than part of a larger movement;
moreover, the leader of the faction was not an idealistic revolutionary
with charisma but a cross between an elder brother (dada) and a spiritual
preceptor (guru), and the group of revolutionaries (most of them very
young) were really the leader's student-disciples (chela), who considered
one another as coreligionists (gurubhai). Gordon has presented some
statistics on these factions, and gleaned from the Sedition Committee
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Reports (compiled between 1907 and 1917), which seem to indicate that
most members of the revolutionary factions were between sixteen and
twenty-five years of age and that ninety percent of them were of the three
upper castes (Broomfield's bhadra/ok). Also significantly, Bengali, to Gor-
don, was the warm attachment which developed between disciples and
leader within the faction, an attachment far more important than ideology
and which meant in effect that with the death of the dada the da/ itself
disintegrated.
Ralph Nicholas, who had studied two West Bengal villages in 1960-
1961 and has published a number of articles on them since, was the first
Bengal specialist in anthropology. In 1968, when his important article in
the Singer-Cohn volume appeared, he had turned to the new subdivision
of social anthropology called "political anthropology."52 The fact that
Nicholas found himself the only American anthropologist of Bengal, that
he had entered a hybrid field where a great many conceptual problems
remained unsolved, meant that he had to create (or at least generalize
upon) a model of a village political structure while still digesting a wealth
of ethnographic data. He met the challenge more than adequately.
Nicholas defined political activity in terms of power and conflict rather
than in terms of administrative authority and action. As he himself put it,
"I am talking about the conflict over power, not about administration,
government, or the direction of public policy in South Asian villages. "53
The question he turned to was social cleavage as it typified political con-
flict in villages. His ethnographic accounts of the two villages suggest two
different types of cleavage: the vertical, which divides structurally equiva-
lent political groups "characteristic of the ideal unstratified societY,"54
and the horizontal, which divides "super- and subordinate groups from
one another" and is "caracteristic of the ideal stratified society."55
Vertical cleavages seem to be manifested mostly as factions, "and within
certain castes, in the form of divisions between segments of patrilineal
descent groupS."56 Horizontal cleavages, on the other hand, were found in
South Asia between castes and "between ruling autocrats and their sub-
jects."57
Nicholas did not freeze his data into a model nor did he suggest any-
where that existing patterns of one or the other variety were not alterable
in contemporary India by modernizing processes. He found the village
situation remarkably fluid, suggesting perhaps that internal, culturally
determined factors were not sufficient in themselves to explain the social
and political dynamics of village life. Nicholas, as a historic-minded
anthropologist, was quite aware that the historical forces were not merely
passive external factors in village society but were processes which could
radically alter existing norms and styles. In his final conclusion he states:
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Of the changes which have been brought about in rural India by social
and economic reform the effects or potential effects of two seem most
important. Universal adult franchise generally has a great impact upon
the political system of villages in which the dominant caste is a minority of
the population. Land reforms, when they become effective, will bring major
changes in the political systems of villages in which control over land has
been concentrated in a small number of hands.58
As Nicholas was the first Bengal anthropologist, Marcus Franda was
the first political scientist. Franda, an area-trained specialist, wrote his
first book on the political integration of a culture region in which he had
ample opportunity to fuse his scientific understanding of the federalizing
process with his acquired sympathy for the state culture of Bengal. What
emerged was a study of political culture in which a conflict of issues
between the center and state on such concerns as irrigation, land reform,
and party government represented the clash between national policy
decisions and the realities of local conditions.
By selecting Bengal, Franda had chosen the one region of India which
has felt least comfortable in its constitutional role simply as one of many
states, continually asserting its autonomy both politically and culturally.
He explained this problem initially with a historical account of Bengal,
which until 1874 included East and West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, and
Assam and was the most populous region in all South Asia. Then, at
independence in 1947, Bengal was reduced to one-seventh the size of
Greater Bengal a century ago.59 The fact that Calcutta was capital of
British India until 1911, and that Bengalis held most of the privileged
positions under imperialism, goes far to explain historically the reason
for the twentieth-century Bengali image of crisis, agitation, and rebellion.
Among Franda's discoveries was that on the highest level of center-
state interaction (as evidenced, for example, by the appointment of the
States Reorganization Committee by Nehru in 1953) the national policy
has been a "middle ground between the alternative paths of coercion and
complete surrender to provincial sentiments."6o As for explaining the
Bengali attitude to the center, Franda's data seem to indicate a high degree
of responsiveness by regional politicians to local interests which often
clash with national policies and programs. As an illustration he cited an
aspect of the Domodar Valley Corporation controversy between local
cultivators and the federal government. The Bengalis argued that local
improvement was more crucial than completing the second stage of the
DVe project. Thus argued Franda: "The West Bengal Congress Party has
a reputation for being susceptible to pressure from people who are con-
sidered 'key men', and for being capable of resisting ideological orienta-
tions, and it is on this basis that it has effectively organized the state."61
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This is Franda's most significant conclusion about the effectiveness of
Bengali regional demands against the center: "the cohesion and strength
of state party units (at least where the dominant party is in power in the
state) and the degree to which the populace can be mobilized for political
action-playa large part in determining the nature of center-state prob-
lems in India."62 Besides Franda's obvious contribution of placing the
problem of regions and regionalism in a political context, he has also been
the first among Bengal modernists to examine the problem of interaction
in the post-British period. The older British subject-British overlord re-
lationship has now been replaced by that of the Bengali politician-Indian
national perspective.
The year 1969 witnessed the publication of a monograph on the Bengal
renaissance by myself, two more volumes of papers from earlier confer-
ences on identity and urbanism, and Rachel Van M. Baumer's article on
literary tradition and modernity in Sankar's novels. My book on the
Bengal renaissance followed Broomfield's as the second Bengal mono-
graph in America to be awarded the Watumull Prize.
The Bengal renaissance, a vital component of the Bengali self-image for
a century or more and a perennial theme in South Asian historiography,
was a sensitive area of scholarship by virtue of having been appropriated
as cultural baggage in the ideology of Indian nationalism. This renaissance
has been variously interpreted as the search for identity in the modern
world, nation-building, linguistic modernization, the flowering of the
Bengali literary genius, the socioreligious purification of Hinduism, and
the finest hour of creative achievement by the bhadra/ok. More often than
not the origins of that renaissance have been traced back to the arrival in
Calcutta in 1815 of Rammohun Roy, a charismatic hero of the Bengali
people. From his attitudes and the subsequently evolving institutions
associated with his name have been derived all that is modern and pro-
gressive about twentieth-century India; from his courageous assault
against the citadel of contemporary corrupt Hindu society while at the
same time maintaining his cultural integrity against Western critics, he
established the prototype of the present-day dynamic Indian who feels no
conflict between his heritage and his quest for modernity.
These and other such hypotheses formed the basis of my research on
how the renaissance actually got started. As an area-trained specialist
with social science exposure, I felt uncomfortable with the Rammohun
Roy interpretation partly because of the inadequacy of the Great Man
theory as a explanation and partly because of the obvious nationalist bias
in minimizing the role of the English, whom I surmised served equally
well as a catalyst. I was equally dissatisfied with the British view of the
birth of the Bengal renaissance, which placed too much emphasis on
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Macaulay's Minute of 1835 as a catalyst. Westernizers argued that Ma-
caulay's minute committed the government to a policy of favoring English
education as against the Orientalist policy of obstructing the flow of
progress by having sponsored education in the languages of the Indian
people. .
What I discovered chiefly was that the Bengal renaissance originated
through interaction between a group of linguistically competent and cul-
turally sympathetic Britishers known as Orientalists and a group of par-
tially westernized, professional Bengali intermediaries called the intelli-
gentsia. Rammohun was surely a leading figure but he was essentially
just one of a new grouping of intelligentsia whose contribution to the
renaissance had to be evaluated collectively. As for the Orientalists, my
conclusion was that they were neither averse to change, since they did
encourage the English language as a means for "native" improvement,
nor was their support of the indigenous "oriental" languages so much
intended as an obstacle to modern ideas as it was a calculated effort to
convey new learning into the spoken, vernacular languages of the people.
By intensively studying the College of Fort William, a pivotal Orien-
talist training institution for English civil servants established in Calcutta
in 1800, I was able to describe fully how Europeans underwent deep
changes as a result of becoming intellectually and psychologically accul-
turated to India. This kind of acculturation produced the progressive
Orientalist with a syncretistic modernizing program centered around the
assumption that the new wine of nineteenth-century civilization could be
poured into the old bottles of Indian institutions and practices with dyna-
mic results. The Orientalist cultural policy for India was therefore not an
antithesis to Macaulay's westernizing policy but an alternative. This is
why I concluded the book by affirming that the Orientalists played a
major role in the birth ofIndian renaissance and modernity:
As portrayed in this book, the Orientalists bear little resemblance to the
dismal image that has been theirs since the Victorian era. The Orientalists
served as avenues linking the regional elite with the dynamic civilization
of contemporary Europe. They contributed to the formation of a new In-
dian middle class and assisted in the professionalization of the Bengali
intelligentsia. They started schools, systematized languages, brought print-
ing and publishing to India, and encouraged the proliferation of books,
journals, newspapers, and other media of communication. Their impact
was urban and secular. They built the first modern scientific laboratories
in India, and taught European medicine. They were neither static classi-
cists nor averse to the idea of progress; and they both historicized the
Indian past and stimulated a consciousness of history in the Indian intel-
lectual. It was they who transmitted a new sense of identity to Bengalis
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that enlarged what Robert Bellah has called "the capacity for rational goal
setting," an instrumental process in the development of a modern out-
100k.63
I also edited in that year, 1969, the second volume of the Bengal Studies
Conference papers entitled Bengal Regional Identity. One of the exciting
new fields of Bengali history reported on at the conference was that of the
delta region of Bengal from classical times to the rise of Muslim domi-
nance. Barrie Morrison, who had developed an interest in Bengali history
and archaeology in the ancient and early middle periods, wrote on "Re-
gion and Sub-region in Pre-Muslim BengaL" Through an analysis of
seventy-one inscribed copper plates found in various parts of East and
West Bengal and covering the period between A.D. 433 and 1285, Morri-
son addressed himself to the question of whether or not there was a
Bengal.
What Morrison did find of great significance (and which he would
elaborate upon in his published monograph a year later) were the four
principal political divisions within the area now designated as the delta
of Bengal. These political subdivisions of the Bengal region were Varendra,
"lying north of the floodplain of the modern Ganges, west of the Jamuna
and east of the Mahananda Rivers"64; the Bhagirathi-Hugli area on both
banks of the river, encompassing the modern districts of 24 Parganas and
Midnapore; the Samatata area comprising the Sylhet-Comilla-Chittagong
area east of the Surma and Meghna Rivers; and "the modern Dacca and
Faridpur districts which lie at the present confluence of the Padma and
Meghna Rivers."65 A detailed study of the four major administrative
areas demonstrated "varying political relations with each other and with
great variation in the kinds of religious donations made."66 Thus' con-
cluded Morrison: "These variations are sufficient to demonstrate that the
inscriptions do not provide any evidence of the existence of a Bengal
regional identity before the coming of the Muslims."67
Perhaps the most important and challenging implication of Morrison's
research appears in the epilogue to the article where he discussed Bengal
cultural identity in the middle period. For years, Dimock and others had
cherished a conviction that a Bengal culture pattern had existed in the
delta from the ninth century-perhaps earlier-with its distinctive lan-
guage, literature, religion, social system, and political order. But Morrison
argued that "it seems probable that the institutions which would make
possible the emergence of a 'regional identity' did not come into existence
before the thirteenth century or even the nineteenth century."68 The early
inhabitants of the delta were a "linguistically and culturally diverse
population. "69 Among these "heterogeneous people" there was "little
evidence of the existence of major political institutions which would bring
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them together and provide a focus for any sense of regional identity."7o
After discussing a few hypotheses, Morrison convincingly concluded that:
When the opportunities for the expression of their perception were found
under conditions of patronage and peace, such as obtained under the
Mughals and the British, the Bengalis produced a rich and varied array of
cultural achievements-in literature, sculpture, scholarship, and fine handi-
crafts. It was through the act of expressing themselves that the population
of the Delta began to distinguish themselves as Bengalis and acquire it sense
of identity. The expression of this culture left such a brilliant and lasting
impression upon Bengalis and the rest of the world that we occupy our-
selves trying to understand the origin and content of this culture. 71
Dimock's contribution to the volume, "Muslim Vaisnava Poets ofIBe~gal," represented his first to deal with the~ali M~siim in relation
to the Bengali Hindu in the middle period, aiming most probably to find
the culture pattern and identity in a syncretism between the two. After
all, as Dimock noted, "Hindus and Muslims live and have lived for cen-
turies side by side, sharing pastoral and other festivals; and . . . many
similarities of the devotional Sufi doctrines to those of the Hindu bhakti
make it but a short step from one religion to the other." 72 In fact, Dimock
was now seriously considering "syncretistic cults" in Bengal:
We might look briefly at the area of poetry, and within that area, the poetry
J within the Vai~l)ava tradition-a tradition usually considered strictly Hin-
du. It cannot be said that the Muslim Vai~l)ava poets of Bengal represent a
major syncretistic movement, or even that they represent more than a mi-
nor example of interaction between the two major traditions. On the other
hand, instances of Muslims writing poetry on Radha-Kr~l)a, Caitanya, or
other Vai~l)ava themes are not isolated and unique ones.73
Thus the poetry of the Vai~I)ava tradition-Jinks the two_communities
into a larger-Bengallregl0nitfcuit~re. A story like Jayadeva's love- ~f
RlidhafOrKr~I)a iidlie Gltagovlndahelped break down orthodox Islam
and Hinduism in the delta by creating a prototype for the distinctively
Bengali love story. Dimock's selection was superb, as were his compara-
tive references between Sufi and Vai~I)ava poets treating similar themes.
And perhaps most moving of all were his final remarks in which the theme
of universalism counterbalances the "parochial" quest for a Bengali
regional identity. From the Ain-i-akbari by Abu'l Fazl, Dimock referred
to Akbar's policy of trying to eliminate hostility between Hindus and
Muslims with the hope "that the thorn of strife and hatred be caused to
bloom into a garden of peace." 74 Concluded Dimock:
Our poets, judging from the language of their poetry, were not educated
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men; they were, perhaps, wise and religious men. We know nothing about
them except their poems, and that they, like many Hindus, felt that truth
need not be named, that it is not the possession of any single tradition or
sect. Among some at least, the thorn of strife and hatred may have bloomed
into a garden of poetry and peace.75
Ralph Nicholas developed the same syncretistic idea as Dimock in
"Vai~t)avism and Islam in Rural Bengal," but as an anthropologist ob-
serving present conditions in the Bengali village. Thus it was quite natural
indeed for Nicholas to hypothesize that the distinctiveness of Bengali
Vai~t)avism and Bengali Islam "is a product of some unique features of
Bengali rural society, and that religious distinctiveness has, in its turn,
contributed to Bengal's regional identity."76 To Nicholas one of the
fundamental reasons why Bengal is so distinctive as a culture is because
it is highly distinctive physically. His description of Bengal as the greatest
delta on earth (fifty thousand square miles), of the continuously changing
course of Bengal's major rivers, and of the frontier-type settlement in
rural Bengal (which has followed the best agricultural land eastward and
southward where the rivers were most active) constituted one of the most
succinct geographical introductions to Bengal that exists anywhere. When
one adds Nicholas' observation that Bengal's ethnic homogeneity, so
conspicuously non-Aryan, is probably due to the fact that throughout
classical times it was "beyond the pale of Aryan civilization" and thus
was never "profoundly affected by Hindu conceptions of 'proper' social
organization,"77 then the sources of Bengali heterodoxy or uniqueness
are easily grasped.
One effective way that Nicholas as a social anthropologist demonstrated
the "significant similarities" between Vai~t)avas and Muslims as Bengalis
was to present "parallel sets of religious roles."78 Thus in the countryside
there is a similarity between the mendicant Hindu and Muslim (called
bairagi and fakir, respectively). There is also the role of the gurumurshid
pair defined in relation to the disciple (cela-murid). Both the Hindu guru
and the Muslim murshid function to "initiate the cela or murid into the
mystical knowledge of profound religious experience or religious ec-
stasy."79 If they are saintly enough in life, these religious teachers may
in death be treated as saints, and their tombs become sacred areas for
devotees. As Nicholas reported, "there is probably no village in Bengal
that does not have the tomb of a pir (darga), the tomb of a gosvai (samad-
hi), or both."80
Of major importance in the article was the theoretical portion in the
conclusion wherein Nicholas reviewed leading concepts of "culture area"
(cultural uniqueness) in anthropology with the end of accepting one or the
other to fit the Bengal case. For example, as he himself did to some extent
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in the paper, one might show the "unique properties of [Bengal's] language
and literature, its culture and social structure, its history, and even such
elemental characteristics as its physical geography and the biological
peculiarities of its inhabitants."81 But Nicholas was apparently beginning
to favor an idea which Dimock had pursued for years-to direct one's
questions to the "symbolic systems that lie at the center of belief and
practice in these religions."82 Nicholas was moving toward Levi-Strauss,
one of many anthropologists who argue that "cultures and societies are
systems, the components of which function together for the maintenance
of the whole." 83 But Levi-Strauss had gone even farther: "Each system has
a key that reveals the ideal form of all sets of relations within it."84
Though Nicholas accepted the idea of rural Bengal as a system, he was not
prepared then to name a "key to all its parts."85 In fact, he ended his
article with a series of questions rather than with generalizations, conced-
ing implicitly that Bengal studies were after all in their infancy.
Among the modernists dealing exclusively with urban elites, Rachel
Van M. Baumer, Blair Kling, and Leonard Gordon offered exceedingly
fresh papers, demonstrating the strides being taken by Bengal specialists in
America. Baumer's article in particular, "Bankimcandra's View of the
Role of Bengal in Indian Civilization," generated a kind of intimate rap-
port between scholar and subject which could only be possible through a
deep understanding of the language and an even deeper understanding of
the society and culture. Baumer's article demonstrated the wide world of
difference experienced when one crossed over the line between Dimock's
medieval and Nicholas' village Bengal to the milieu of the Bengal bhad-
ra/ok and intelligentsia.
As Baumer's excellent translations indicated, Bankimcandra was a fairly
well educated man with a sophisticated sense of humor and satire, as much
at home with sustained intellectual prose in the pages of the BaizgadarSan
as he was with creative fiction in the form of short stories and serialized
novels. His was a familiar type in the nineteenth-century world: the ner-
vous, ambivalent intellectual holding onto tradition while sinking deeper
and deeper into the quicksand of impending modernization. But somewhat
more precisely, he was a pioneer of the third-world intelligentsia who
stood not merely between tradition and modernity but between Afro-
Asia and the West groping through their culture's past to discover an
identity.
In Baumer's article this process was illuminated exactly. Bankimcan-
dra's progressive or modernist outlook was evidenced, according to
Baumer, in the didactic motivation for writing these articles "designed to
instruct Bengalis in the ways necessary for the future restoration of great-
ness."86 Though Bankimcandra was Western-educated and held down a
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European position in the civil service, his blueprint for Bengali or Indian
revitalization did not include a repudiation of one's national heritage while
undergoing radical westernization. On the contrary, he urged reviewing
one's own past, where a discovery of the real India would reawaken pride
in one's culture and a new sense of identity:
The past held inspiration and lessons for the future; the problems of the
present needed recognition and solution in preparation for the future; the
future could be as great as Bengalis, working together, wished to make it.
Thus history became a tool in the promotion of nationalism, introspection
the mental exercise for the restoration of moral fibre, and awakened pride
the emotion from which would derive the inspiration to action. 87
But as Baumer has shown all too well, Bankimcandra's own reading of
the Bengali past within the larger framework of Indian civilization was not
all that consistent nor was his own quest for an identity ever fully resolved
intellectually. In the first place, though Bankimcandra prided himself as a
Bengali he was also a proud Brahman with a Brahman's exaggerated
esteem for the golden age of Aryan civilization-a civilization to which
Bengal was peripheral. Thus we find Bankimcandra performing subtle
mental gymnastics to prove the Aryan purity of Bengali Brahmans and the
non-Aryan impurity of the Bengali Sudras who converted en masse to
Islam. All the while, as Baumer demonstrated, Bankimcandra attempted
to proclaim "that Bengalis were one with other Aryan-descended Indians
who shared the glory of that "ancient Aryan race, who were the greatest
of all races on earth and our forefathers. "88
This search for an identity was, as Baumer developed it, a three-stage
process composed of the discovery of a golden age, the discovery of a, dark
age, and the ideology of future recovery contingent largely on a correct
historical assessment of one's golden and dark ages. Why did India
decline? Because "in his view, Brahmans became greedy and tyrannical,
Ksatriyas, weak and luxury-seeking, and Sudras, passive and unprotest-
ing."89 He asked, what have we become? And he answered, "Bengalis
lack physical strength, Hindus lack virility, while India lacks social cohe-
sion and unity of purpose."90 The way to future recovery was, according
to Bankim:
The nation whose historical recollections of former greatness remain tries
to keep that greatness, or if lost, to restore it again. Blenheim and Waterloo
are results of the memories of Crecy and Agincourt. Even though Italy fell,
she has risen again. Today the Bengalis want to become great-alas! where
is the historical memory of Bengalis ?91
In Blair Kling's article "Entrepreneurship and Regional Identity in
Bengal," though he treated the same bhadra/ok class to which Bankim-
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candra belonged, the problem of identity is seen from a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective. Turning more and more to a study of the modern
economic history of Bengal, Kling found himself faced with the question
of why Bengalis preferred "to earn meager salaries as teachers, civil
servants, accountants and clerks," while leaving "the major industries and
most of the banking, commerce and real estate in the hands of non-
Bengalis."92 In short, as the atypical entrepreneurial Prafulla Chandra
Ray once said while admonishing his fellow bhadra/ok, "the Bengali has
got many noble qualities . . . in one essential aspect, however, he has
proved a dismal failure, namely in the art ofearning his livelihood." 93
P. C. Ray's indictment of his fellow Bengalis as lacking the spirit of
enterprise has become part of the stereotype of the contemporary Bengali
whom non-Bengalis of South Asia tend to ridicule. Fortunately, Kling as a
historian has handled the problem in a historical context rather than in
one anthropological. Thus he seemed less concerned with the alleged
deficiency of entrepreneurship as reflective of an enduring value system
but more concerned with favorable and unfavorable economic conditions
over a long span of time and dealing principally with Bengali-British
interaction. To be sure Kling was well aware that "on the one hand, the
vast majority of middle class Bengalis are the descendants of Brahmans
and Kayasthas who have traditionally held both business occupations and
the indigenous business castes of Bengal in contempt."94 But one could
not ignore the fact that, on the other hand, "under British influence
Bengalis have aspired to a value system that associated trade with elitist
status." 95
Kling found that between 1750 and 1850 the intellectual and adminis-
trative castes of Bengal did associate with the British in merchant activities
"without losing self-respect."96 But starting in the period of 1828-1848
during unusually severe economic turbulence, Bengalis began to turn away
from business. In addition to economic depression, which broke out again
and again, there was another factor which helps explain Bengali abdica-
tion from enterprise: "During the first half of the nineteenth century,
business ethics were still unformed, and firms with long established re-
putations were defrauded by their British partners, leaving their Indian
partners liable for debts. As a result, in the 1850s many Bengali capi-
talists retreated from commerce."97
Kling has ably demonstrated how throughout the nineteenth century
some Bengalis, aware of the importance of a spirit of enterprise, con-
tinually prodded their countrymen to change their values by imbibing a
new puritan ethic. But in 1918, despite the entrepreneurial aspect of the
Swadeshi movement, an Industrial Commission report "attributed the
failure of Swadeshi industries in Bengal to the lack of enterprise and busi-
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ness sense among Bengalis."98 The response by Bengalis was that "the
government itself thwarted entrepreneurship in Bengal."99 Kling's own
feeling at this stage in his research is summed up in the following:
Thus, in an important way the regional identity of the Bengali is a function
of his economic situation. But the interrelationship between economics
and regional identity is a complex one. The Bengali attitudes toward busi-
ness that set him apart from the non-Bengalis differ widely among Bengali
castes. These attitudes derive from traditional values, from new values ac-
quired through association with the British, and from recent historical
experience in the course of which Bengali entrepreneurship was subjected
to one frustration after another.I°o
If the papers in that volume on identity displayed anything in common
about Bengalis, it was surely their tendency throughout history to be
different from their South Asian neighbors. If Dimock and Nicholas were
accurate in their depiction and analysis from medieval to present-day
rural society, it was more important for Hindus and Muslims to be
Bengali than to be Hindus or Muslims. Baumer's Bankimcandra went
through amazing intellectual contortions to reconcile his Bengali identity
with his Brahman-Aryan identity, while Kling's effort to make sense out
of the Bengali aversion to a spirit of enterprise only accentuates the
difference of style and attitude between the complex Bengali and his fellow
Indians.
Leonard Gordon's article, "Bengal's Gandhi: A Study in Modern
Indian Regionalism, Politics, and Though," adds stilI another case study
of Bengali heterodoxy in stilI another dimension of twentieth-century
nationalist politics. Although Gandhi emerged throughout north India as
the charismatic hero of the liberation struggle, in Bengal some of the most
prominent nationalist leaders treated him with contempt. In fact, one of
Gordon's chief aims was "to try to explain why the very name 'Gandhi' is
anathema to many Bengalis."lOl
Gordon used the image of Gandhi in Bengal as a central focus for
writing the intellectual history of Bengali politics. Thus one of the best
features of the study is Gordon's analysis of the ideology of such men
as Subhas Chandra Bose, Rabindranath Tagore, and M. N. Roy. This
is not to say that Gordon has not stressed crucial events in the struggle
for power; but he has probed deeper into the issues underlying these
events and even deeper behind the issues to the strong ideological com-
mitments. Bose, for example, in his book The Indian Struggle (1934),
"saw himself on the side of reason, science, and modern values against the
most deplorable traits of enfeebled India which Gandhi was exploit-
ing."102 Tagore, another who "admired Gandhi's gift for awakening the
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rural masses to self-help and political consciousness," turned against
Gandhi because he objected to the "blind obedience he felt the movement
entailed," to "panaceas like spinning, and to the xenophobia he detected
in Gandhi's message."103 Gordon summarized Tagore's ideological
position in the following way: "Tagore wanted to retain the gains of
Western education, science, medicine, technology and lay the ground for
the meeting of all cultures on a basis of mutual exchange. He feared that
Gandhism, particularly in practice, would end in India in turning in upon
herself and bringing about her own destruction rather than gaining her
long-sought freedom."104
But as in Gordon's other article on M. N. Roy as a youthful revolution-
ary, there was an attempt to link ideology and politics to Bengali culture
per se or at least to some of the conspicuous values of the culture. Here
was perhaps Gordon's most significant contribution to date: the attempt
to relate the Bengali's negative response to Gandhi to the Sakta tradition
of the upper-caste Hindu bhadra/ok. Up to this point in Bengal studies,
and probably as a result of Dimock's influence, Vai~l)avism was the re-
ligious tradition among Bengalis almost universally emphasized. But
Gordon, fully aware of the Bengali terrorist use of the mother goddess
image in politics, now extended the Sakta religious tradition as a general,
culturally determined hypothesis to explain bhadra/ok revulsion to Gand-
hi and to Gandhism. As Sakta followers of Durga or Kali, the bhadra/ok
associated themselves "with traditions of violence, . . . carried out
animal sacrifices," and had a "tradition of private murder for revenge."1 05
Referring in particular to Subhas Bose, Aurobindo Ghosh, and M. N.
Roy, Gordon wrote:
These three men would have agreed that in order to regain the lost strength,
power and autonomy, all means were permissible. This would fit with their
Slikta background (no matter how secular they became later in life) and
with Bengali traditions of violence mentioned earlier. They would have
agreed with Nirad Chaudhuri that Gandhi's way was "the morality of the
servus." Gandhi's politics did not appeal to them except so far as it was
effective in launching a militant nationalist movement,lOG
The second volume of Bengal studies to appear that year was Urban
Benga/, edited by Richard Park. According to the editor the conference
was "less concerned with the administrative and technological conse-
quences of urbanization in Bengal and more with the social and political
repercussions that flowed from urban centers."107 Park seemed most
intrigued about the papers dealing with premodern Bengal (seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries), and he noted that attempts to depict the "tradi-
tional" Bengali city and then hypothesize about it were much appreciated
by the conference as a whole.
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One of the medieval papers was a joint effort by lnden and Dimock
entitled "The City in Pre-British Bengal" and based on a poetic school of
folk literature known as the mmigala-kavya. Though originally prompted
to use this literature as history, they eventually chose to view the descrip-
tions of cities in it as idealized representations rather than as convention-
ally accurate pictures. A source such as Mukundarama's Ca1J4i-Mangala.
for example, was used by lnden and Dimock not so much to reconstruct
a Bengali city of the early middle ages as to extract from its accurate
particulars and "fanciful descriptions" reflections of Bengali cultural
values.l°8
It is therefore clear, although not altogether surprising, that we are
moving here in the direction of anthropology using history for anthropo-
logical reasons rather than of history using literature for historical ends.
The quotation from Vansina's Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical
Methodology justifying oral tradition as "more likely to be accurate than
those which are conscious (written)"109 is puzzling because Dimock and
lnden were apparently not concerned with accuracy but with the "realis-
tic ideal" of the Bengali town,llo Mukundarama's description of Gu-
jarata was to them "the projection of material reality on a divine canvas.
It is both physical and metaphysical."lll This kind of analysis is more
valuable to the field of anthropological philosophy, which thrives on the
study of myth, than to the discipline of history, which however liberally
interpreted still pursues its basic goal of demythologizing man's past and
historicizing it. In the following conclusion by Dimock and lnden, the
anthropological import of their study becomes apparent as they use the
Bengali city as a key to unlock the unique Bengali society and culture:
All of this leads us to an interesting conclusion about the Bengali Hindu's
conception of the ideal society. The ideal unit in Bengali society according
to Mukundarama is not the Bengal region as a whole; nor is it Bengal as
represented in a simple village or in its regional capital. The ideal unit of
Bengali society is considered to be the local chiefdom with its capital; and
the highest social ideal that a man can attain is to become raja and master
of his local chiefdom and to live at the pinnacle of the complex urban life
which goes on in the chiefdom's capital town.... The entire social
structure of Bengal is encapsulated in the ideal local chiefdom and its
capital.I12
The article by Philip Calkins, "The Role of Murshidabad as a Regional
and Subregional Center in Bengal," is a more conventional piece of urban
history in the sense that Murshidabad represents only itself and its func-
tion during a given period. Calkin's concern was with Mogul Bengal and
with a Mogul city, Murshidabad, capital of the province from 1704 to
1772. Although he accepts 1800 as the year when "Murshidabad had lost
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much of its importance as a commercial and administrative center,"113
Calkins was reluctant to accept 1700 as the point of origin for its impor-
tance: the city was already important as a commercial center before it
was selected as provincial capital.
Calkins' article is extremely valuable because he has carried on where
Barrie Morrison left off in matching political units with cultural subre-
gions during the Delhi Sultanate period (1200-1576) and Mogul period
(1576-1757). Calkins not only established a correlation between Mor-
rison's earlier subregions and the locations of political centers for the
Muslim period but broadened the correlation to include economic centers
as well. Calkins has one important reservation about his hypothesis-the
large-scale sea trade that began to expand in the seventeenth century
altered the configuration of the other subregions, placing greater economic
emphasis on the Bhagirathi-Hugli subregion. "In one sense," said Cal-
kins, "the significance of the location of Murshidabad is bound up with
this expansion of European trade."114 Witness the fact that "Murshida-
bad was chosen [as provincial capital] because it already was an important
place (commercially) in 1700."115
One of the most original segments of the article was Calkins' account of
the city of Maksusabad, which he contends was the name for the first
town of Murshidabad. By the 1660s it was evidently headquarters for the
district or pargana, and "the officers stationed there had jurisdiction over
the growing center of European factories at Kassimbazar."116 This kind
of valuable historical reconstruction establishes Calkins as a gifted Bengal
scholar genuinely interested in history. Using such sources as Bengal
Gazetteers, European traveler reports, and diaries, Calkins amassed im-
pressive evidence that "from the middle of the seventeenth century, then,
Makhsusabad was situated at the crossroads of the major commercial
route from southeast Bengal into North India, and on the route down the
Bhagirathi-Hugli, and on to Europe or the Far East."117 Not only was
Murshidabad thus center of an economic as well as a political network.
According to Calkins, "although the political and administrative role of
the city has been emphasized in historical accounts, I suspect that the
commercial city was of greater importance to the surrounding area."118
The papers on modern urban Bengal may not have been as original as
those dealing with the medieval period, but they were equally good as
scholarship and perhaps a little more daring conceptually. In "The Ur-
banized Intelligentsia of Calcutta and their Asian Counterparts in the
Nineteenth Century," I made both a summary of my findings on the origin
of a modernizing intelligentsia in Bengal and an attempt to test my genera-
lizations about Bengal against other cases of Asian intelligentsia respond-
ing to varying kinds and degrees of Western intrusion. This article
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constituted the first venture among the Bengal group to compare any
aspect of Bengal's culture and history with the outside world. If in the
same volume Dimock and Inden were moving into Bengal ostensibly in
search of a key to the discrete culture, I proceeded outward among the
remainder of the human race, placing my new information on the Bengali-
English encounter in the larger perspective of Asia's encounter with the
West.
One of my conclusions in British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance
was that the so-called nationalist wing of the Western-educated intel-
ligentsia in Calcutta, which was relatively tradition-oriented and most
concerned about maintaining an Indian identity, was as dynamic and
progressive an elite as the westernized wing, which was inclined to
disavow its heritage and tradition and to take on anglicized ways. In the
same way that Orientalists offered a modernizing alternative to the wester-
nization program of the Anglicists, so I argued, the protonationalist
intelligentsia of the renaissance period offered a modernizing alternative
to the xenophilia proposed by the westernized intelligentsia. The specific
questions I raised were these: "Was it necessary to adopt the English
language, religion, social system and political structure in order to mod-
ernize? Or was modernity less the forms and trappings ofa given European
cultural configuration and more a complex of universal processes that
could be made to function in the same way when integrated into any
existing tradition?"119
I defended the Bengali intellectuals who identified with "the tradition,"
arguing that in the first place "the tradition as a systematic arrangement of
culture traits was the invention of sympathetic 'acculturated' Englishmen
in interaction with Bengalis" and that this "so-called tradition was' most
frequently used dynamically as a means to promote change rather than
apologetically as an end in itself."120 In fact, I went on to say that "tradi-
tional reformers were as much antithetical to status quo Hinduism as
were the extreme westernizers."121 The question I now raised in the
article was "how unique was the experience of the Calcutta intelligentsia
in nineteenth-century Asia?"122 My objective was "to compare and con-
trast the tradition-oriented modernizing intelligentsia in Calcutta with
apparently comparable movements in Istanbul, Peking, and Hong
Kong."123 My method was to analyze their similarities and differences in
four categories: patterns of Western intrusion, the social organization of a
modernizing intellectual class, the modernizing activities of this new elite,
and the development of their modernizing ideologies.
I found that, despite differences in patterns of Western intrusion (such
as being directly ruled by Europeans as in Calcutta and Hong Kong or
indirectly affected by European penetration as in Istanbul and Peking),
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a modernizing intelligentsia did develop in all cases and that it was divided
along tradition-identifying and Western-identifying lines. This kind of
comparative analysis showed a remarkable parallel-especially on the
ideological plane-between Rammohun Roy in Bengal seeking to update
Hinduism, Namuk Kemal among the Young Ottomans seeking to update
Islam, and K'ang Yu-wei among the mandarin reformers seeking to
reinterpret Confucianism along modern lines. A main conclusion was
that:
Faced with the tremendous power of the West on the one hand, and his
own culture's impotence on the other, the modern professional intellectual
of Asia invented cross-cultural blueprints designed to revitalize his own
traditions. These blueprints, though they reveal much about the value sys-
tems of unique cultures in transformation, tell us just as much about the
universality of this ideological function vis-a-vis Western intrusion. In
other words, if on the one level, the intelligentsia employed the symbols of
their own culture's value system, on another level the process of intellectual
response seems to have been remarkably the same all over the non-West-
ern world. 134
John McLane's article, "Calcutta and the Mofussilization of Bengali
Politics," was also about the Calcutta elite but not so much on their
function as intelligentsia as on their function as politicians moving into the
Bengali countryside after 1905 to mobilize rural support for the nationalist
cause. McLane's acceptance and usage of the concept bhadralok was
much like Broomfield's, and indeed the article was framed around the
kinds of questions raised by Broomfield in his Elite Conflict in a Plural
Society. Specifically, McLane took a single district-Bakarganj-to
"illustrate the process of politicization in its most successful and excep-
tional form under the leadership of Aswini Kumar Dutt, Bengal's proto-
Gandhi."125 This attempt to mobilize the mofussil had many other mani-
festations besides recruiting peasantry. The Gandhian aspect led to a
"glorification of the simple rural life, village uplift work, and revival of
village industries."126
Underlying these events between 1905 and 1907, McLane argued, was
a "critical dualism . . . within Bengali society itself, between the bhadra-
lok and the non-bhadralok."127 Besides being of the upper castes, the
bhadralok were distinguished by their "preference for the literate profes-
sions and office jobs" precluding "any occupation involving manual
labor."128 Lack of social and political contact with the cultivators na-
turally placed the bhadralok at a great disadvantage in their campaign to
mobilize rural support. To make matters worse, in East Bengal, where
"Muslim communal consciousness was aroused by partition, Hindu
bhadralok, in the absence of cross-cutting agrarian ties, were easily
isolated from the Muslim peasantry."129
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McLane in this article became the first to see the Swadeshi period, or at
least its origins, not so much from the vantage point of Calcutta politics as
from that of the mofussil. His dismal portrait of the Calcutta bhadra/ok
turning in desperation to rural Bengal reminds us not only of Broomfield's
work but of Blair Kling's as well. Lack of Bengali entrepreneurship and
quite the reverse phenomenon among non-Bengalis had led by 1905 to
"Bengali loss of control" and their own realization that they were "al-
ready irrelevant for much of Calcutta's life."13o Said McLane: "Bengalis
were in Calcutta but they were not where the power and money were."131
McLane argued that Bengalis felt themselves emasculated by the
British and seized upon the partition of Bengal in 1905 to crystallize their
anger and frustration against the foreign overlord. Undergoing a renewed
crisis of identity, the bhadra/ok began to rediscover "symbols and institu-
tions associated with rurallife."132 In the remainder of the article, McLane
gave a detailed history of the bhadra/ok failure to "establish enduring
links with the peasants."133 Muslim hostility, goonda activity, and police
brutality were among the chief obstacles to fulfilling that end. In a larger
sense, "the 1905-1907 period was a phase in the prolonged, painful,
and unresolved dilemma which rural India presents for the educated
classes."134 And, as McLane also concluded, the collapse of the movement
was part of the overall collapse of the Swadeshi movement, "leaving the
Hindu bhadra/ok more bitter, frustrated, divided, and threatened than
they had been before 1905."135
In the same year of 1969 Rachel Van M. Baumer, in a special edition of
Books Abroad devoted to Indian literature, wrote an article entitled
"Sankar: Twentieth-Century Kathak." The importance of the article for
Bengal studies was that it attempted to bridge the widening gap between
medieval and modern Bengali literature as interpreted by traditionalists
and modernists, respectively. She reprimanded medievalists for treating
the Bengali literary tradition before 1800 as "something completely
frozen in a particular pattern."136 As for the modernists, she wrote: "By
contrast, the modern literature (after 1800) is often thought of as being
completely innovative and devoted to experimentation, having very little
in common with the earlier body of literature."137
By analyzing the earlier novels of Moni Shankar Mukherji, otherwise
known as Sankar (born 1933), Baumer was able to demonstrate that
literary conventions of the medieval period persist in modern writers who
are most adept in their "mastery of accommodation of new and old in a
simple, yet captivating style."138 This ability to integrate new and alien
forms into indigenous literary traditions was not simply restricted to
Sankar and to nineteenth- and twentieth-century Bengali writers; accord-
ing to Baumer, "innovation and change are, in fact, important elements in
Bengali literature in all ages."139
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To the superficial observer, therefore, Sankar's novels might seem
highly Western, but on closer analysis they represent a twentieth-century
version of the medieval kathak or storytelling tradition of Bengal. The
significance of this approach and method cannot be minimized. For one
thing, Baumer restored historical perspective to Bengali literature by
demonstrating change as well as continuity of a given tradition. On the
one hand, she has moved away from the one-dimensional view of the
anglophiles who judged all modern Bengali literature from the vantage
point of British influence; on the other hand, she has moved away from the
one-dimensional view of the medievalists who have tended to judge Bengali
literature as cultural purists denying the relevance of growth by synthesis.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in Sankar's work the prob-
lem of identity should be paramount. When the intelligentsia seek to
modernize their culture's traditions, literary or otherwise, some sort of
identity crisis seems inevitable.
In 1969-1970, Stephen Hay's monograph on Tagore was published as
Asian Ideas of East and West. Hay's interests had changed considerably
over the years: from Bengal to Gujarat, from Rammohun and Rabin-
dranath to Gandhi, and from social thought to an examination of the
individual psyche. Though the book did constitute a comparative study
or cross-cultural history of Tagore and his critics in Japan, China, and
India, Hay carefully refrained from any elaborate methodological schemes
taken from history or the social sciences. Hay's basic framework still
remained Asian intellectual response to Western influences, although he
had tried to probe deeper into the relevant Asian cultures per se. This set
of perspectives on the Asian intelligentsia established Hay as a historian
of ideas. As he put it, "I have tried to reconstruct what I have variously
called their intellectual landscape, their thought-world, or the structure,
spectrum, movement, currents, or universe of their ideas."140
But aside from intellectual history, Hay found another perspective
even more important: "to see each individual thinker as a study in him-
self, as an independent agent with a unique life history and world view."141
To achieve this, he had tried "to plumb the depths of each man's psyche-
correlating the historical and contemporary development of his family,
region, and country in the political and the cultural realms, on the one
hand, and his own psychological development and impact on his society
and culture on the other."142 Hay made it clear that he had turned away
sharply from "simplistic theorizing about historical 'forces,' or 'move-
ments' such as 'nationalism.' "143 There was a danger in the overuse of
such concepts:
They can conceal the incalculable diversity of human experience behind a
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facade of plausible half-truths, and by conveying a brilliant illusion of
certainty can discourage that tentative but persistent groping for more re-
liable generalizations about the real world which is the heart and soul of
scientific work. . . . To this end I ask that my readers approach with
caution the concept of "revitalization" of cultural traditions on which I
have placed some emphasis. The phenomenon to which it refers is not
the operation of some abstract and impersonal "historical force" but the
free activity of unique human beings living in specific environments and
personal circumstances.144
In considering that Hay chose to write on more than eighty Chinese,
Japanese, and Indian intellectuals, depicting each as an individual, it is
understandable why he has underscored his justification for what may be
called the psycho-history of ideas. Moreover this was no mere intellectual
history of Tagore, or of Bengal, or of India, but of East Asia as well. The
method for writing this kind of comparative intellectual history was to
replace the usual focal point of Western impact with Tagore's own ideol-
ogy, to which Asian intellectuals responded. By so doing, Asian intel-
lectuals expressed their attitudes, values, and ideas on their own traditions,
on Asian unity, and on the positive and negative features of Western
intrusion.
It was perhaps unfortunate that in the only monograph done by an
American on Tagore to date, so little emphasis was placed on Rabin-
dranath's immediate Bengali environment, either as shaping the young
man as a prophet or as interacting with the poet as a mature man. Though
Hay became the third American writing on a Bengal theme to win the
Watumull Prize, his works have not so much illumined aspects of Bengali
society as they have dealt with individual personalities and their work.
In his first chapter, "The Making of a Modern Prophet," Hay simply
reviewed those features of the Bengal renaissance which seem to have
shaped Tagore's ideas of East and West. It undoubtedly served as a good
survey of background material on Tagore for understanding what fol-
lowed in the 1920s-at least from Hay's point of view of what was most
relevant about Tagore's ideology in that decade. But it ignored the ambi-
valence between nationalism and universalism in the quest for identity,
a vital part of the Brahmo ideological legacy which Tagore imbibed
through his family. It is curious that in a book on psycho-history Hay
should have ignored Rabindranath's identity crisis: he said little or noth-
ing about the Swadeshi phase in the poet's life when he sought to resolve
his nationalist-universalist ambivalence with the writing of his best novel,
Gora.
Instead, Hay chose to explore in great detail and from every perspective
what he believed to have been Tagore's core concept in his thought on
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East and West. The West represented materialism while India or the East
(they were apparently synonymous in Tagore's mind, according to Hay)
"was distinguished by spiritual profundity."145 Hay found this notion to
have been important among the Bengal intelligentsia, and retraced its
development from Rammohun through Keshub to Vivekananda, Auro-
bindo, and Rabindranath. Indeed, of all the ideas selected, reinterpreted,
and synthesized from both Indian and Western sources throughout the
renaissance period, Hay argued that this one was most significant. Never-
theless, even when articulated by Tagore, it was rejected in Bengal:
But the synthesis he proposed between Indian or Eastern spirituality and
Western material civilization was criticized increasingly in the twentieth
century by younger men, at first because their nationalist bias demanded
political equality with the British, and later because their secular world
view denied validity to the realm of the spirituaI.146
In 1970, Barrie Morrison's work on ancient Bengali history was pub-
lished as Political Centers and Culture Regions in Early Bengal. Morrison's
was a highly specialized and technical work, the achievement of a pioneer
archaeologist who is exuberant about listing and organizing all available
data but who is modest about hypotheses and generalizations. His main
discovery, as already pointed out in discussing his article for Bengal
Regional Identity, was in determining the four subregions of ancient
Bengal. In the book he not only filled in the details but lucidly described
how he went about dating and locating the inscriptions and their appear-
ance and organization. As a historian-archaeologist, Morrison confirmed
the general chronological scheme for pre-Muslim Bengali history from an
analysis of seventy-one engraved copper plates and one engraved stone
slab. Thus there was Bengal under the Guptas (A.D. 400-600), when the
territory was tightly organized under a larger empire and transfer pro-
cedures were similar in Bengal to those elsewhere in the empire. Between
the sixth and eighth centuries Bengal "was fragmented into local rulers
and dynasties."147 In the ninth century Pala influences were distinct,
whereas in the twelfth century the Senas displaced the Palas. By the thir-
teenth century the Muslims predominated and the "older Hindu and
Buddhist dynasties were destroyed or disappeared."148
A third significant scholarly effort to appear in 1970 was an article in the
Journal ofAsian Studies by Philip Calkins: "The Formation of a Regional-
ly Oriented Ruling Group in Bengal, 1700-1740." Calkins was dealing
with an important though relatively ignored period when the all-India
Mogul empire was beginning to disintegrate into regional kingdoms. The
article was a well-constructed history of the Bengali elite between Au-
rangzebe's death and the rise of an independent Bengal under Alivardi
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Khan. Calkins asked whether the decay of Mogul India meant also-as
often implied-a decay in the provinces. His own research indicated that
although "some sort of decay is evident in the political life of the provin-
cial governments ... in Bengal high standards of administrative efficiency
were maintained."149
For Bengal specialists the article's worth lies in Calkins' discussion of
the changing elite structure during the period under consideration. In the
seventeenth century the Mogul system was still highly centralized and
viable, with the result that however much power the indigenous landlords
may have had locally in their' position as zemindars, the government
officials or mansabdar controlled the zemindars. But in the eighteenth
century the mansabdari position weakened, primarily because they had
much less support from the center. Calkins demonstrated how the need for
more revenue for the center led to detailed surveys of existing holdings and
a squeeze on zemindars "to bring payments up to the required level or lose
the zemindari to the government or to money lenders."150
By 1727 the fifteen largest zemindars were responsible for almost half
the revenue of the province. Gradually banking houses such as the Jagat
Seths came into power who not only supported the governor but earned
considerable interest on loans to zemindars who could not pay their re-
venue. In the 1730s the power of the governor declined while that of the
large zemindars and bankers increased. It was their combined power
which brought Alivardi Khan to the governorship in 1739. A year later
Bengal was virtually independent from the center. One of Calkins' im-
portant conclusions was that this coalition of interests "continued to
govern Bengal until the military intervention of the British began to
destroy the system."151
In 1971, Marcus Franda published his second monograph, Radical
Politics in West Bengal, which constituted the first effort by an American
specialist of the delta region to go beyond the era of nationalist politics
under Congress leadership to the rise of communism. Because the com-
munist movement in Bengal had achieved great power and influence, the
subject was naturally vital and meaningful for understanding contempo-
rary events. A topic like this one could be treated in some wider context
(such as international diplomacy). Or the subject could be treated by a
Bengal specialist as a means for understanding modern Bengal rather than
using Bengal to understand modern communism.
Franda's work, though it could be used for the latter purpose, was clear-
ly designed to accomplish the former. For one thing, as with his first book,
Franda was dealing with regionalism; it was Bengali communism that he
concerned himself with almost exclusively and it was about Bengali com-
munism that his conclusions were framed. In fact one of his important
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questions was this: Why have Bengalis been so active in the communist
movement while other Indians have for the most part sought alternative
outlets for political expression and participation?"152 Moreover, Franda
brought to the book his eleven years of accumulated knowledge of Bengal
and the scholarly work of other Bengal specialists which combined to give
the monograph cultural authenticity and scholarly stature similar in its
contribution to Bengal studies to the MIT Studies on Communism, Revi-
sionism, and Revolution.
From the very start, under "Party Leadership: Sources of Elite Re-
cruitment," Franda placed the radical left in Bengal in the social context
of the bhadralok and in the cultural context of the Bengal renaissance. The
elite from which "the Bengali Communist and Marxist Left parties have
drawn their leadership (and much of their following) is the Bengali bhadra-
10k, an elite that is unique to the Bengali-speaking area."153 In the
nineteenth century this elite "experienced a cultural renaissance . . . that
placed Bengal firmly in the forefront of almost all Indian associational
life."154 In the manner of Broomfield, Franda has characterized this
grouping as a "privileged minority most often drawn from the three high-
est castes . . . very well educated, very proud of their language, their
literacy, and their history."155
Franda seemed too much a specialist of Bengal to hypothesize that the
Bengali communist movement was simply an adjunct of the Moscow and
Peking variety, but he was too much a political scientist to view the move-
ment as simply a manifestation of a unique and closed cultural system
with no essential relationship to foreign sources. Thus Franda continued
the Bengal studies modernist technique of framing problems around the
theme of culture contact and acculturation. His communist leaders, lead-
ers in contact with Russian and Chinese communists, seem to be an exten-
sion of the bhadralok function of a century ago of using Englishmen as
"windows to the West."
For example, there was a direct relationship between the origins of the
communist movement in Bengal in 1921 and the Soviet Comintern. The
generation of nationalists who joined the communist movement from the
1930s were encouraged to do so "by older members who had been in
contact with international communism since 1921."156 External consider-
ations that centered about Russia's struggle for survival against Nazi
Germany prompted Communist Party of India members of join "with the
British government in support of the Allied war effort."157
In more recent times, the major factional split within the Communist
Party of India, which brought into being the Communist Party Marxist in
April 1964, was in large part occasioned by Bengali response to the grow-
ing Sino-Soviet ideological rift and to the Chinese invasion of India in
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1962. The creation of a third communist party in Bengal, the Communist
Party Marxist-Leninist in April 1969, though occasioned by an internal
event known as the Naxalbari movement, was nevertheless based also on
an ideological response to Mao's indictment of the Communist Party
Marxist for abandoning guerrilla-style revolutionary struggle in favor of
participation in the electoral process.
Franda maintained a good balance in his analysis of the interaction be-
tween the "internal" pressures of Bengali society, culture, and history and
the "external" pressures of foreign ideological, political, and military
considerations and events. For Franda, as evidenced in his final chapter,
"Communism in a Bengali Environment," the indigenous environment
was not merely caste, kin, and the pool of religious symbols but also the
historical situation of twentieth-century Bengal itself. Like Kling, Broom-
field, McLane, and others, Franda saw contemporary Bengal as an es-
sentially tragic place broken by a long series of catastrophes. Thus Franda
saw partitions, refugees, famines, communal riots, and general political
and economic decline as very real cultural or environmental factors. In
fact they constituted the most pressing "internal" source of Bengali com-
munism:
The sources of Bengali communism are primarily regional, being intimately
related to the decline of Bengal in this century and to the Bengali search for
a new regional identity and regional political power. The ability of the
Bengali revolutionaries to adapt communism and Marxism to their own
regional traditions and perceived political needs explains their high level
of involvement with communist and Marxist ideas, despite the absence of
such involvement in most parts of India. i58
EPILOGUE
After less than a decade of scholarship, it is too early to draw conclu-
sions about Bengal studies in the United States. If one judges from the
richness and variety of fields pursued by the Bengal specialists, the clarity
in defining the issues between them, and the quality of their scholarship,
then support for promoting area studies in South Asia has served a posi-
tive purpose. It is evident in this review that neither regional parochialism
nor academic gamesmanship resulted from the area studies emphasis in
the United States during the 1960s.
And there is every indication that the 1970s will see even greater devel-
opment in Bengal studies-either along lines set by Dimock, Hay, and
Weiner or along new lines of investigation. Of great importance to this
development are the younger scholars who are attacking old problems
with a new vigor and reinterpreting them according to fresh perspectives.
Recent dissertations and papers at seminars and conferences suggest
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both a continuity of themes and a change in which entirely different lines
of inquiry are being followed. Religious modernism in the context of Ben-
gali renaissance and nationalism, for example, is currently being re-
searched by Alexander Lipski (neo-Vai~l).ava movement), David Kopf
(Brahmo Samaj), and Barbara Southard (Ramakrishna Mission). Also
related to this "subculture" within Bengal studies is the dissertatiun by
Geraldine Forbes on the positivist movement in Bengal. Rachel Van M.
Baumer's close analysis of Vidyasagar's innovations in Bengali language
and literature should prove significant from the vantage point of literary
modernization. The Bengal uniquists are presently at work applying the
concepts of Levi-Strauss to the region, and one looks for imaginative
results in the 1970s-particularly from such anthropologists as Ralph
Nicholas, Ronald Inden, and Akosh Oster. One new area which has been
relatively neglected is that of the Bengali Muslim. The creation of Bangla-
desh has radically changed that situation, and one can now look forward
to studies dealing more with East than West Bengal and more with Bengali
Islam than with Bengali Hinduism.
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